A Novel Tool to Assess the Risk for African Swine Fever in Hunting Environments: The Balkan Experience
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Study Area
2.2. Questionnaire
2.3. Question Selection and Risk Factor Identification
2.4. Expert Knowledge Elicitation Implementation
2.5. Expert Knowledge Elicitation Statistical Analysis
2.6. Risk Categorization and Mapping
2.7. Feasibility Assessment
3. Results
3.1. Questionnaire
3.2. Selected Questions for the Expert Knowledge Elicitation
3.3. Snowball Sampling Method
3.4. Snowball Sampling Method
3.5. Intra-Class Correlation (ICC)
3.6. Expert Knowledge Elicitation
3.7. Risk Scores and Maps
3.8. Feasibility Scores and Maps
4. Discussion
4.1. Results
4.2. Uses of the Tool
- identify the weakest hunting grounds (i.e., those at higher risk).
- categorize the hunting grounds based on their Overall ASF Risk score.
- pinpoint where the ASF surveillance in wild boar is weakest, i.e., where the uncertainty of freedom of disease is the highest.
- identify the easiest or cheapest (i.e., most feasible) mitigation measures to decrease the ASF risk, whether at individual hunting grounds or the whole country.
- compare the level of hunting biosecurity between countries or regions.
- monitor the change of risk over time, by repeating the surveys and analyses.
- guide decision making at hunting grounds during outbreaks, by prioritizing actions not just because of proximity, but also at those hunting grounds with high-risk scores.
4.3. Limitation and Biases
4.4. Future Work
Supplementary Materials
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Country/ Territory | Human Population | Country/ Territory Extension | Suitable Area for WB | Number of HG | Hunting Season | ASF Status | WB Population | WB Density |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Kosovo 1 | 1.8 mln | 10,908 km2 | 82.5% [9] | 32 | 1 July–31 January | Free | <2000 [18] 3000–3500 [19] | 1.34 per km2 [18] |
Montenegro | 0.6 mln | 12,812 km2 | 82.0% [9] | 35 | 1 October–31 January | Free | 5616 [20] | 0.20–0.33 per km2 [9] |
Serbia | 7.0 mln | 88,407 km2 | 75.3% [9] | 321 | 1 April–31 March | Infected | 25,606 [21] | 0.47–0.75 per km2 [9] |
Risk Factor | Risk of ASF Introduction | Risk of ASF Spread | ASF Detection Capability | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Mean | Mdn | SD | Mean | Mdn | SD | Mean | Mdn | SD | |
Supplementary feeding of WB with products of animal origin from uncontrolled sources (swill or kitchen waste) | 4.75 | 5 | 0.53 | ||||||
Movements of live WB between HGs. This refers only to WB moved or transported by humans | 4.38 | 5 | 0.92 | 4.38 | 5 | 0.97 | |||
Access to landfills or scavenging places for WB | 4.25 | 4 | 0.79 | ||||||
High number of pigs in low biosecurity farms (e.g.,: free range or backyard) present in HG | 4.21 | 4.5 | 1.18 | 3.33 | 3 | 1.01 | 3.04 | 3 | 1.27 |
Lack of compliance by the HG user, i.e., the user has not applied measures ordered by the authorities in the past 2 years | 4.08 | 4 | 0.78 | 4.08 | 4 | 0.78 | 2.71 | 3 | 1.63 |
Bringing meat products into the HPA is allowed | 4.08 | 4 | 0.97 | ||||||
High WB density in the HPA | 3.92 | 4 | 1.02 | 4.50 | 5 | 0.78 | 3.92 | 4 | 1.18 |
Shared personnel vehicles, equipment and facilities (e.g., dressing and storage areas) with other hunting ground/s | 3.92 | 4 | 1.02 | 3.92 | 4 | 1.02 | |||
Hunters who own pigs or work on pig farms | 3.88 | 4 | 1.12 | ||||||
People who visited other hunting grounds or pig farmsin the last 72 h are allowed to hunt | 3.71 | 4 | 1.12 | ||||||
Absence of cleaning and disinfection of hands, footwear, clothing and personal equipment after offal and manipulation of dead animals | 3.54 | 4 | 1.47 | 4 | 4 | 0.88 | |||
Driven hunt is practiced | 3.54 | 4 | 1.1 | 4.04 | 4 | 0.86 | 3.04 | 3 | 1.12 |
Absence of posters/flyers/briefings to inform the public and hunters upon entering the HPA about the importance of ASF and measures to prevent it | 3.5 | 4 | 1.02 | 3.54 | 3 | 0.88 | 3.58 | 4 | 1.32 |
High number of visitors into the HG | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.10 | ||||||
HPA is in contact with cities and settlements | 3.46 | 3 | 0.88 | 2.92 | 3 | 0.97 | 3.42 | 3 | 1.14 |
Absence of disinfectants and cleaning and disinfectionprocedures for equipment, facilities, meat storage, evisceration sites | 3.38 | 4 | 1.35 | 4.04 | 4 | 0.91 | |||
Supplementary feeding of WB | 3.33 | 3.5 | 1.27 | ||||||
HPA is in contact (i.e., crossed or bordered) with roadsand/or navigable watercourses | 3.25 | 3 | 0.79 | 3.21 | 3 | 0.83 | 2.88 | 3 | 1.30 |
Absence of disinfection point for every visitor | 3.13 | 3 | 1.08 | ||||||
Low proportion of fenced area within the HPA | 3.08 | 3 | 1.21 | 3.29 | 3 | 1.08 | |||
Vehicles used for hunting that leave the HG withoutbeing cleaned and disinfected first | 3 | 3 | 1.44 | 3.83 | 4 | 1.13 | |||
Large size of the HPA | 2.96 | 3 | 1.3 | ||||||
Absence of disinfection barriers | 2.92 | 3 | 0.97 | 3.17 | 3 | 0.96 | |||
Absence of transport and/or storage space used only for WB meat in order to avoid cross contamination of meat from other species | 2.54 | 2 | 1.59 | 2.58 | 3 | 1.5 | |||
WB being transient (occasional or seasonal game) | 2.50 | 2 | 1.18 | 2.83 | 3 | 1.31 | |||
HG not collecting information on the last hunting activity of hunters | 2.17 | 2 | 1.55 | ||||||
Training of the HG manager in game pathology and handling of game and game meat | 2.88 | 3 | 1.23 | 3.50 | 3.5 | 1.02 | |||
Absence of fixed (designated) dressing areas | 3.50 | 4 | 1.14 | 2.08 | 2 | 1.56 | |||
Absence of a disposal plan in case of an ASF outbreak | 4.54 | 5 | 0.83 | ||||||
Limited disposal of found dead WB | 4.33 | 5 | 0.87 | ||||||
Absence of cargo transport or leak-proof bags or tanks to move dead WB | 4.21 | 4 | 0.88 | ||||||
Meat or trophies leaving the hunting ground without an ASF PCR negative test | 4.04 | 4 | 0.86 | ||||||
No systematic destruction of offal (from hunted animals) | 4.04 | 4 | 0.91 | ||||||
Active search for dead WB carcasses | 4.71 | 5 | 0.55 | ||||||
Sampling of hunted WB for ASF testing | 3.63 | 4 | 1.28 | ||||||
Low effort or incentive in finding dead WB carcasses in the HG | 2.83 | 3 | 1.49 | ||||||
Absence of culling | 2.67 | 2.5 | 1.05 |
Kosovo | Montenegro | Serbia | |
---|---|---|---|
Risk of ASF Introduction | 44.28 (42.25–46.31) | 40.37 (38.41–42.33) | 33.62 (32.28–24.95) |
Risk of ASF Spread | 40.90 (39.05–42.74) | 45.47 (43.51–47.42) | 41.85 (40.85–42.84) |
ASF Detection Capability | 29.11 (27.45–30.76) | 44.54 (40.88–48.20) | 36.47 (35.12–37.81) |
Overall ASF Risk | 56.07 (53.60–58.53) | 41.29 (36.72–45.86) | 39.00 (37.25–40.75) |
Feasibility Variable | Kosovo | Montenegro | Serbia |
---|---|---|---|
How feasible is it to dispose of all or most found dead WB? | 3 | 1 | 5 |
How feasible is it to forbid visitors and hunters from bringing meat products into the HG’s HPA? | 2 | 1 | 4 |
How feasible is it to forbid from hunting those hunters who own pigs or work on pig farms? | 4 | 1 | 3 |
How feasible is it to forbid driven hunts? | 4 | 1 | 4 |
How feasible is it to forbid hunters who have visited pig farms in the last 72 h from hunting? | 4 | 1 | 4 |
How feasible is it that the HG management does NOT use kitchen or restaurant waste or other sources of animal protein (swill) to feed WB? | 3 | 2 | 4 |
How feasible is it to create a plan for how and where to dispose of dead WB in case of an ASF outbreak? | 4 | 2 | 4 |
How feasible is it to decrease the density of WB by increasing hunting, eliminating supplementary feeding or other means? | 4 | 2 | 4 |
How feasible is it to prevent WB accessing landfills or scavenging places? | 2 | 2 | 4 |
How feasible is it NOT to share any personnel, vehicles, equipment or facilities (such as dressing or storage area) with other hunting grounds? | 6 | 2 | 4 |
How feasible is it NOT to transport live WB into or outside of your HG? | 6 | 3 | 4 |
How feasible is it to have leak-proof bags or tanks available on stock to transport dead WB carcasses out from the HG? | 2 | 3 | 4 |
How feasible is it to inform the public and hunters (through posters, flyers or face-to-face briefings) about the importance of reporting dead WB and about the main ASF prevention measures? | 4 | 3 | 4 |
How feasible is it to destroy all offal from hunted WB? | 4 | 3 | 4 |
How feasible is it to establish fixed areas to dress carcasses? | 4 | 3 | 4 |
How feasible is it to always clean and disinfect the hands, footwear, clothing and equipment after dressing and/or handling dead animals? | 3 | 4 | 4 |
How feasible is it to always clean and disinfect vehicles before they leave the HG? | 3 | 4 | 4 |
How feasible is it to always clean and disinfect hunting equipment, facilities, meat storage or dressing areas after they are used? | 3 | 4 | 3 |
Average of the medians | 3.61 | 2.33 | 3.94 |
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Orrico, M.; Hovari, M.; Beltrán-Alcrudo, D. A Novel Tool to Assess the Risk for African Swine Fever in Hunting Environments: The Balkan Experience. Pathogens 2022, 11, 1466. https://doi.org/10.3390/pathogens11121466
Orrico M, Hovari M, Beltrán-Alcrudo D. A Novel Tool to Assess the Risk for African Swine Fever in Hunting Environments: The Balkan Experience. Pathogens. 2022; 11(12):1466. https://doi.org/10.3390/pathogens11121466
Chicago/Turabian StyleOrrico, Mario, Mark Hovari, and Daniel Beltrán-Alcrudo. 2022. "A Novel Tool to Assess the Risk for African Swine Fever in Hunting Environments: The Balkan Experience" Pathogens 11, no. 12: 1466. https://doi.org/10.3390/pathogens11121466