The Convergence of Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling in West Africa: Migration Pressure Factors and Criminal Actors

Abstract

In West Africa, there is a very close link between the phenomenon of trafficking and migrant smuggling. This article will analyze the pressure elements and the causes that drive sub-Saharan people to migrate, placing themselves in the hands of criminal networks that end up exploiting them—women and minors sexually, and men through forced labor. The main corridors departing from West Africa and the characteristics of the criminal groups exercising criminal governance will also be addressed. This research has used both primary and secondary sources, as well as empirical fieldwork consisting of interviews with security force officials, international humanitarian aid organizations, and academic experts on migration issues related to trafficking and smuggling. Our research reveals that the origin of migration is multifactorial. The violence experienced in West Africa, but also the misgovernance, the lack of opportunities for a very young population with limited prospects, and the human insecurity affecting the entire region, are the main reasons that compel people to migrate. In these migration processes, the safety of migrants is compromised as they are forced to start their journey through clandestine means, which exposes them to trafficking networks and thus to violence and exploitation. It is along the migration routes where trafficking and migrant smuggling converge.

1. Introduction

The illicit trafficking of persons and human trafficking are two phenomena linked to organized crime that involve a violation of basic human rights and endanger the lives of the most vulnerable individuals. Their criminal nature prevents an accurate understanding of the scale of these manifestations, but one certainty exists: these phenomena are linked to population movements and the difficulty of crossing certain borders that have been tightened in destination countries, even though they do not serve as a deterrent to migrants (González Del Miño and Anguita-Olmedo 2023; Beauchemin et al. 2020). This gives rise to both a need and an illicit business, controlled by violent groups, based on the economic principles of supply and demand (Dewey 2017). Without a doubt, this situation disrupts the development and stability of many countries that are affected not only by unregulated financial markets (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2021), but also by being countries of origin, transit, or destination for migrants who become clandestine. The West African region1 is a vast, complex, and highly volatile area (see Figure 1). The 16 countries that make it up, of which 5 are considered very fragile states2 (Skaperdas 2001; Emerson and Solomon 2018), face major challenges (Anguita-Olmedo 2023): high levels of human insecurity, violent conflicts, the low legitimacy of rulers, terrorism, climate change, resource degradation, or precarious working conditions, especially for the youngest.

The lack of opportunities becomes a driving factor for intra- and extra-regional migratory flows, making this a structural phenomenon along with insecurity. In this regard, we must not overlook that West Africa, along with Central Africa3, is one of the most populated and fastest-growing regions. Both regions have some of the youngest populations in the world, where three-quarters of the population are under 35 years old, 12% are under 15, and around 64% are under 244, Therefore, it is expected that, over the coming years, 12 million young people (World Bank Group 2024) will reach working age (Choi et al. 2020) and if they do not find this job market in their countries of origin—where the supply of labor exceeds the demand—they will seek it where they believe opportunities exist.

The Convergence of Human Trafficking and Smuggling in the Migration Process

In this context, in which border crossings are inevitable, it is not difficult for criminal networks in the region to take advantage of migrants’ vulnerabilities by offering transportation services through longer, more dangerous, and more expensive routes, due to the difficulties in reaching the external borders of the European Union legally. For this reason, migrant smuggling converges with another illegal business that yields high profits: trafficking. Along the journey, many of them go into debt, and to pay the high costs of hiring a criminal network, they end up being exploited, men through labor, and women and minors sexually (IOM 2023).

Trafficking and the smuggling of migrants are growing phenomena in this region (UNODC 2022), protected by impunity—both judicial and police—political corruption, and insecurity in all its forms. While it can be said that African countries have great development potential (Fundación Alternativas 2025), the challenges they face are preventing the identification of viable alternatives to displacement, which is why the likelihood of emigrating does not decrease. The routes of various types of trafficking—such as drugs (cannabis, opiates, or cocaine) (Sampó 2019), weapons (UN 2023a), gold, or gas (UN 2023b)—converge in this region, where some of the most dangerous routes originate and end, and whose consequences end up having a global impact. Undoubtedly, all this creates hotspots of instability and insecurity that require in-depth analysis to find possible solutions, or at least improvements.

Several questions must be asked: What are the push factors and causes driving sub-Saharan Africans to migrate? What are the main migration corridors from West Africa? What are the characteristics of the criminal groups that use migratory routes to traffic and smuggle migrants?

To answer these questions, it is necessary to establish the following objectives. First, determine the pressure factors affecting this region that become the root causes of migration. Second, we must analyze the criminal actors, mainly organized crime groups that lead illicit markets, but not only them—also those involved in the business of migrant smuggling and trafficking. In this region, small local groups also operate, taking advantage of their knowledge of the routes and the needs of migrants. Third, to establish the reasons why the most dangerous routes are most frequently used, which exposes migrants to exploitation, and to identify the types and characteristics of that exploitation.

Once the objectives are defined, the starting premise establishes that the main reasons for emigrating are multifactorial, and as long as the structural causes behind them persist, so too will the need to migrate. These structural factors are rooted in the political trajectory of the countries in the region since their decolonization, which has led to a persistent state of misgovernance, lack of institutional structures, violence, and poverty. Although in addition to these structural factors there are others considered micro, such as the individual’s own decision to migrate (Aliaga-Sáez et al. 2025; Fontana 2024; Abu et al. 2024; Acién González 2024), or at the meso level (Wolde et al. 2023; Setrana et al. 2025; Vega-Muñoz et al. 2025), such as relations with the diasporas, in this conflictive and violent zone the macro factors prevail, since in addition to violence there are other characteristics of the region that make it difficult to achieve a better life in their own countries. On the other hand, the vulnerabilities of migrants at the point of origin also condition their situation during the journey. In most cases, migrants who begin the journey expose themselves to serious consequences, since trafficking and smuggling converge along the routes. Analyzing these two phenomena is crucial because these routes represent some of the most dangerous and complex corridors in the world, with a significant lack of protection for migrants. These routes that cross Sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel, and North Africa are mainly controlled by transnational criminal groups (UNODC 2022), which carry out their illegal activities by taking advantage of legal and institutional vacuums due to the lack of governance, the conflicts inherent to many of these countries, and economic and social problems. Likewise, Africa’s proximity to the southern border of the European Union makes the region one of significant geopolitical and strategic interest, due to its implications for migration, asylum, and international cooperation policies (EUROPOL 2024). Ignoring the complexity of the phenomenon would imply an inability to address the root of the problem and, therefore, a strategic failure in managing present and future migration which involves the development not only of this region but of all of Africa.

2. About the Method

The research carried out is qualitative and exploratory in nature (Stebbins 2001), a fundamental methodological approach given the limited knowledge about the phenomenon of migrant smuggling and trafficking in the African context. Its main objective is not so much to verify hypotheses as to understand the dynamics underlying migratory routes and how migrants are exposed to exploitation and violence. These types of investigations are characterized by their flexibility to adapt to the changing object of study, which is especially useful in topics such as migrant smuggling and trafficking, where some variables are not well defined. As Zerpa de Kirby (2016) points out, qualitative methodology makes it possible to address sociocultural and political dynamics to deeply understand socially rooted phenomena. Exploratory research (Gericke et al. 2016) is based on in-depth interviews and content analysis (López Noguero 2002; Gheyle and Jacobs 2017; Krippendorf 2019) which help construct a contextualized narrative. However, the analysis of official statistics (Mohajan 2020) will also allow us to measure the phenomenon, or at least to define the scope of the study object, to complement the results by providing a much more holistic view and establishing relationships between variables with a deductive approach (Rana et al. 2021).

Several sources have provided information for the development of this research. First, information was gathered from various databases and reports from international organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UNICEF, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNHCR, CEAR, and Europol, among others. Second, research and think tanks such as the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE), and the International Center for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), in addition to specialized materials published by experts and academics. From all of them, systematized references were obtained regarding the number of migrants and the circumstances under which they reach or approach the external borders of the European Union via African routes. Also included were trafficking patterns, points of origin and destination, the profiles of traffickers, the profits they earn, and their modus operandi. In this data collection, the most current, rigorous, and comprehensive sources were used, although this was not always easy, as the clandestine nature of smuggling and trafficking introduces a bias into the information. In this regard, content analysis (Bardin 1986; Berelson 1952; Krippendorf 1968) provides a valid tool to reveal the issues faced by the region. It should be noted that in many cases, official statistics and reports do not disaggregate data for West and Central Africa, so when this has occurred, both regions are specified. Furthermore, another added difficulty arises from the significant lack of data linking trafficking to migrant smuggling. Although it is known that migrants are exploited along the routes, the clandestine nature of those traveling through these routes and of the criminal groups prevents access to a significant number of patterns.

Thirdly, the interviews conducted with experts on the subject (Roulston et al. 2003) have also been fundamental, constituting the empirical component of this work. The interviews are an essential tool (Knott et al. 2022) for complementing the data extracted from official reports and other statistical sources, as they provide access to direct personal experiences. In this regard, the interview with a member of the Spanish National Police Corps (Police Commissioner, FG) stationed in Niger for a period of three years is particularly relevant. His main role was to collaborate in the fight against trafficking and migrant smuggling with the Nigerien authorities. His direct, on-the-ground experience in combating trafficking and smuggling in a country considered a convergence point for routes coming from the east, west, and south constitutes a highly valuable contribution to this research. The remaining eight interviews were conducted with members of a Humanitarian Organization, in contact with migrants arriving in the European Union, and to academics or analysts expert in migration, organized crime and Africa: LM belongs to an international humanitarian aid organization; CS is an academic expert in organized crime and illicit trafficking; MB is an academic expert in international security and organized crime; CJ is a criminologist and academic; SA is a security and illicit trafficking analyst, PG is an academic and expert in irregular migration to Europe; VB is an researcher on migration to the European Union and, finally, MAA is an expert in Africa and security. All of them were selected for the knowledge and experience they could bring to the situation in Africa, organized crime and the exploitation of migrants. The key informants have been selected by purposive sampling. Regarding ethical issues, they were informed of the nature of the research and informed consent was requested. To ensure confidentiality and anonymity, only the initials of the interviewees were used. In all cases, their contributions have helped to grasp the complexity of the phenomenon by offering multiple perspectives.

The information provided through semi-structured and anonymized interviews, each lasting approximately one hour (in some cases, videoconferencing or written questionnaires were used), has been very useful to determine the modus operandi of criminal groups, both local and transnational, but also to identify the motivations of migrants, the social and economic contexts that favor displacement, the most used migration routes, the networks involved in migrant trafficking and their links with trafficking, as well as the methods of recruitment, coercion, and labor exploitation or sexual violence. Therefore, collecting these testimonies has contributed to enriching the qualitative and exploratory research carried out. For a subsequent investigation, interviews will be conducted with migrants who have arrived on the Spanish coasts, especially in the Canary Islands and Ceuta and Melilla, in order to learn firsthand about the experiences lived during the journey.

3. Results

3.1. Concomitant Factors in the Region: Context Analysis

To understand the criminal dynamics in migration routes, it is necessary to establish the main reasons that favor the movement of people, both internal and external, and, therefore, the illicit activities surrounding these displacements. Although the countries of West Africa share the same geographical space and a colonial history, the same cannot be said of other realities that seem dissimilar, especially in political, economic, social, and cultural aspects, which are shaped by the vast territory this region occupies, its ethnic, political, and religious diversity, and the multiple structural problems that feed into each other.

3.1.1. (Mis)governance and Coups d’état

The political development of the sixteen States of West Africa cannot be analyzed as a uniform whole, since each has followed its own path since gaining independence, with unequal progress in democratic consolidation, fluctuating between authoritarian regimes and fragile democracies. The region’s insecurity is a constant concern, motivated by the inability to address the continuous undermining of life, illicit trafficking, insurgencies, and ethno-religious conflicts. Mali, Guinea, Niger, and Burkina Faso have experienced significant deterioration of the political system and their institutions. In August 2020 and May 2021, Mali suffered two coups d’état that placed the military in power. As if by a domino effect, Guinea followed in September 2021; Burkina Faso experienced two coups d’état in just eight months, in January and October 2022; and Niger in July 2023, being described by the United Nations Secretary-General as an “epidemic” of coups d’état (United Nations Secretary-General 2021). Other countries in the region such as Sierra Leone or Guinea-Bissau have also suffered failed military uprisings (Security Council Report 2022). Côte d’Ivoire experienced a civil war between 2002 and 2011 (Lazare Flan 2021), with a prior coup d’état in 1999, now being a relatively stable country (CESCE 2024); Togo suffered a military coup in 1967, since then the military have supported the rulers in a kind of nepotism and corruption that still endures (Asinde 2018; Agbeve and Maroto Blanco 2024); Liberia also experienced a military coup in 1980 that led to two civil conflicts between 1989 and 2003. After years of instability, in 2017 the first peaceful alternation took place, and today it is above the regional average in terms of Good Governance (CESCE 2020). The case of Nigeria is not very different, with leadership changes and alternation between civilian and military regimes. Nigeria is one of the most populous countries in Africa, with 250 different ethnic groups and three religious realities that have resulted in ethno-religious confrontations (González 2016), added to which are clashes between rebels and authorities and terrorist groups operating in part of its territory, placing Nigeria sixth in the Global Terrorism Index in 2025 (Institute for Economics & Peace 2025), behind Burkina Faso in first place, Mali in fourth, and Niger in fifth.

All this undoubtedly greatly hinders the stability of these countries and the entire region, reversing the clear advances of previous years in terms of development. On another note, if the data are analyzed, some West African countries rank among those with the highest perception of corruption (see

Table 1. Corruption Perceptions Index 2024: Global scores (Transparency International 2024).

Country/Territory	ISO3	Region	CPI 2024 Score	Rank
Cape Verde	CPV	SSA	62	35
Benin	BEN	SSA	45	69
Côte d’Ivoire	CIV	SSA	45	69
Senegal	SEN	SSA	45	69
Ghana	GHA	SSA	42	80
Burkina Faso	BFA	SSA	41	82
Gambia	GMB	SSA	38	96
Niger	NER	SSA	34	107
Sierra Leone	SLE	SSA	33	114
Togo	TGO	SSA	32	121
Mauritania	MRT	SSA	30	130
Guinea	GIN	SSA	28	133
Liberia	LBR	SSA	27	135
Mali	MLI	SSA	27	135
Nigeria	NGA	SSA	26	140
Guinea-Bissau	GNB	SSA	21	158

). Out of 180 countries in the ranking, the best positioned is Cape Verde at 35th place, with a perception index of 62/1005. On the contrary, the worst-ranked are Mali, in 135th place, Nigeria in 140th, and Guinea-Bissau in 158th, with perception indexes of 27, 26, and 21, respectively (Transparency International 2024). These data justify the population’s disenchantment and undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the rulers.

Along these lines, and taking into account the data on corruption and the political situation of some of the States in the region, we can identify the main causes that have led the Armed Forces to take power as a combination of factors, among which stand out the inability to confront insurgent and terrorist groups, as in the case of Mali or Burkina Faso; the intention of some political leaders to perpetuate themselves in power even against what their constitutions establish (Robert 2023), as in Côte d’Ivoire or Guinea; corruption or lack of economic progress. In the opinion of the interviewed MAA, “all of this combined with foreign intervention that has done little to help stability, by prioritizing effective military presence and balances instead of carrying out transformative initiatives”. These actions confirm Mearsheimer’s (2001) theories that the objective of a State is hegemony wherever it can obtain it, a situation that can be observed in the actions of powers in West Africa. On the other hand, although the population has applauded the military coups with the thought that their living reality could change, it is also true that many coup officers took advantage of this frustration of the population to access power, some convinced that they could help improve insecurity and others motivated by power and privileges (Yabi 2024).

The military coup in Niger, especially, although also those in other countries, “has caused significant international concern and has represented a turning point for West Africa” (Interviewed PG). This situation has caused an alteration of the geopolitical and economic dynamics of the region. The consequences of these coups have triggered a set of reactions that have affected West Africa, fragmenting the region, reconfiguring alliances, and redefining security strategies (López Martínez 2024; Durez 2020).

Niger was a strategic ally in the fight against jihadism by hosting French military troops on its territory, whose cooperation agreements were broken with the arrival of the military to power (Lazare Flan 2021) who instrumentalized Western neocolonialism to support the change in direction and gain popular support. The reaction of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), condemning the coup and threatening military intervention, positioned countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso alongside the Nigerien coup leaders, forming the Sahel States Alliance (AES) (Jaime González 2024) and leaving ECOWAS in a difficult position, unable to prevent or reverse the coups d’état, demonstrating its incapacity as a regional international organization.

These coups d’état have also reconfigured the region’s alliances, as many of these countries have distanced themselves from their traditional European allies. This shift has allowed other external actors to enter the geostrategic game (Interviewed MB). The departure of France, following the political change experienced after the military coups, left a vacuum that has been gradually occupied mainly by Russia and China. In the opinion of the interviewed MAA, “they are not the only ones, as the United States and also Turkey are trying to play their own roles”. Russia began its penetration into the area in 2017 through the Wagner Group, now Africa Corps6, with a commitment to help combat jihadism and contribute to the region’s security. Despite this, Garrido Guijarro (2024) considers that only in Mali is there a consolidated Russian military presence, and in Burkina Faso there is only a small contingent to support the military government. Although the fight against jihadism is an excuse, the underlying reason behind this intervention is the control of the area’s natural resources. This is also the case with China, which has become an important investment and commercial partner for some countries with sanctioned regimes in exchange for resource exploitation, a relationship based on mutual gain or win–win and a development aid policy (Interviewed MAA). China’s policy reach in Africa, in recent years, has transcended the economic dimension, expanding into the political sphere and security field (Alaminos Hervás 2022).

3.1.2. Economic Contradictions

Economically, although the countries in the region have significant potential for improvement due to their natural resources, political and security circumstances do not help their recovery, this having been heavily affected since the COVID-19 pandemic. The legacy of colonialism can partly explain the current situation of the entire continent. According to Alaminos Hervás (2021), the arbitrary borders drawn by the metropolises resulted, on one hand, in small states with little territory and resources, making them economically unviable, while on the other hand, they created a large number of landlocked countries compared to other continents, which has hindered trade with disastrous consequences.

The region experiences a lack of economic growth that has been dragging on since decolonization and is reflected in macroeconomic indicators. The Human Development Index (see

Table 2. Human Development Index (HDI) 2023–2024 (UNDP 2025).

Country	Rank	HDI Value	Var.
Cape Verde	131	0.661	−1
Ghana	145	0.602	1
Nigeria	161	0.548	−1
Togo	163	0.547	3
Mauritania	164	0.54	0
Côte d’Ivoire	166	0.534	0
Senegal	169	0.517	−1
Benin	173	0.504	0
Gambia	174	0.495	0
Liberia	177	0.487	0
Guinea-Bissau	179	0.483	0
Guinea	181	0.471	−1
Sierra Leone	184	0.458	0
Burkina Faso	185	0.438	0
Mali	188	0.41	0
Niger	189	0.394	−1
Nigeria	161	0.548	−1

) reveals the position of each West African country. Only two, Cape Verde and Ghana, are situated in the lower-middle part of the table, while the rest are among the poorest in the world with low human development, particularly highlighting Sierra Leone, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger with very low indexes, in the last positions of the ranking.

The countries in the region share similar characteristics and contradictions. Despite having numerous natural resources (Nievas Bullejos and Mesa García 2020), the economy is very poorly diversified and relies mainly on the primary sector—agriculture and transhumant livestock farming—both sectors are highly vulnerable to climate change, where shepherds and farmers compete for water and fertile land (Sánchez Herráez 2025). Furthermore, widespread insecurity7 has forced the population to migrate, either to urban centers or to other countries, which has caused a disruption of agricultural and livestock activities. For the interviewee PG, “the lack of manufacturing industry and infrastructure has prevented local development, making them dependent on a primary sector with major problems”. This situation is worsened by constant population growth, which results in increased demand that production cannot meet, despite the expansion of cultivated land areas, yields have not increased (Aguirre Unceta 2021). To try to alleviate this situation, the African Union has promoted a transformation of the economies through diversification, industrialization, and manufacturing production, which has been included in Agenda 2063 (African Union 2013) with the aim of promoting development cooperation and positioning the continent as a space of prosperity.

However, in the years since its signing, the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa, although it has experienced some growth in its gross domestic product—3.4% in 2024 and expected to be between 3.8% and 4.3% in 2025—is not sufficient to overcome the extreme poverty in which many countries are immersed (Swissinfo.ch 2024). While some countries, such as Nigeria, have moved to being middle/low-income countries, it is the third country in the world with the highest number of absolutely poor people, with incomes below 2.15 dollars per day. Sub-Saharan Africa has gone from having 291 million poor people in 1990 to 505 million in 2024, experiencing a constant increase and concentrating the largest proportion of people in extreme poverty worldwide (Asenjo 2024).

In addition to agriculture and livestock, these countries are also rich in mineral resources. Gold exports, such as those from Burkina Faso, account for 80% of income; Ghana exports 37% of its mining products, with gold representing 90% of those exports, which in 2024 amounted to 57% of its income (World Bank Group 2025a; InAfrica 2024). Of the 13 African countries that export gold worldwide, 7 are located in West Africa (Tecnología Minera 2021). However, while the limited development of infrastructure hinders access to markets, in the case of Mali, with lithium mines, or Niger with uranium and oil, the legal economy coexists with the illegal one, where criminal groups end up imposing their own rules in the illicit market (Anguita-Olmedo 2023).

Related to this economic data is demographic growth which, although it could be considered a positive aspect in developed countries, “in the region of West Africa is a weakness and also of a structural nature” (Interviewed MB). This region has the highest demographic growth, increasing at a rate close to 3%, with a fertility rate ranging from 3.4—the lowest—in Ghana, to 6.1—the highest—in Niger. Moreover, 60% of the population is under 25 years old (World Bank Group 2025b), based on 2023 data. These figures show that even if there is economic growth, it would not be enough to transform it into development. As Gómez-Jordana rightly states, “as long as the percentage of demographic growth is equal to or higher than that of economic growth, the longed-for African development will be unattainable” (Gómez-Jordana Moya 2019, p. 2). To reverse this situation, it is not only economic policies that are necessary, but also educational, family planning, urban, and labor policies (Eizenga and Gnanguènon 2024).

3.1.3. Social Fragility

All these political and economic factors have led to high levels of poverty and inequality in most West African countries. In this regard, for the interviewed MB, “in addition to widespread insecurity, there is low productivity, informal economies, and dependence on foreign trade, which are preventing access to decent jobs, but also to an equitable redistribution of wealth among a mostly young population that is growing faster than in any other region”. The conceptual framework in which we can situate what is happening in West Africa is human security—or rather the lack of it. This hybrid concept, in which the notions of peace, security, and human development are interrelated, was introduced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 report, and it is essential to understand what is happening in this region, affected by armed conflicts, violence, inequality, and poverty. From the point of view of food security, the West African region is at its highest level of risk in the past 10 years, with Mali and Burkina Faso being the most affected (FAO 2023), but whose spillover into the coastal countries poses a major concern for the entire international community. The stagnation of production, but also other causes such as currency devaluation, rising inflation, and trade barriers, have worsened the food crisis in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali.

In West and Central Africa, 16.7 million children under five suffer from acute malnutrition, 8 out of 10 children between 6 and 23 months lack essential foods for their development; 55 million people suffer from food shortages and nutritional deficiencies, especially during the dry months and as a consequence of an increase in cereal prices of more than 100% in the past five years (Naciones Unidas 2024). This has caused per capita cereal availability to drop by 2%. In some areas of northern Nigeria, 31% of women aged 15 to 49 also suffer from malnutrition. Countries such as Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, or Mali are already experiencing famine. In this region, between 2015 and 2022, the number of people in need of aid has quadrupled, from 7 million to 27 million. The increase in food prices represents an unsustainable situation for the poor populations of the region.

Without a doubt, the social transformation that Africa needs in general, and the region of our study in particular, involves the development of electrical infrastructure, tripling the pace of electrification (Grupo del Banco Mundial 2024) or of sanitation (WaterAid 2021a). In this regard, half of the population of West Africa lacks these two basic services (see

Table 3. Population in relation to access to electricity and drinking water.

Countries	Population (millions)	Access to Electricity (%)	Basic Access to Hand Washing Facilities (%)	Basic Access to Drinking Water (%)	Open Defecation Practice (%)
Benin	13.35	57%	11%	66%	54%
Burkina Faso	22.67	19%	12%	48%	47%
Cape Verde	0.59	97%	Not available	87%	20%
Côte d’Ivoire	22.70	69%	19%	73%	26%
Gambia	2.71	65%	8%	78%	1%
Ghana	33.48	85%	41%	81%	18%
Guinea	13.86	48%	17%	62%	14%
Guinea-Bissau	2.11	37%	Not available	67%	17%
Liberia	5.3	32%	1%	73%	40%
Mali	22.59	53%	52%	78%	7%
Mauritania	4.74	49%	43%	71%	32%
Niger	26.21	20%	Not available	50%	68%
Nigeria	218.54	61%	42%	71%	20%
Senegal	17.32	68%	24%	81%	14%
Sierra Leone	8.61	29%	18%	61%	18%
Togo	8.85	57%	10%	65%	48%

).

As can be seen in the Table 3, the data reflecting these countries in terms of access to electricity and sanitation is concerning and in great need of improvement in most of them. A large part of the population does not have electricity. The cases of Burkina Faso, where only 19% of the population has access to electricity, or Niger, Liberia, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau, whose figures do not reach 50% in any case, are particularly alarming (IEA et al. 2024). These figures also reflect two paradoxes. According to Segura Clavell (2024), the first is related to the lack of energy capacity in one of the continents with the most natural resources in the world. The second is that international decarbonization commitments to mitigate climate change and support for clean energy are harming Africa, precisely a continent with large reserves of oil and gas, even if their exploitation involves pollution (Aybar 2021).

Regarding sanitation, it is estimated that 64% of the population of West Africa does not have access to adequate sanitation facilities. Access to this type of infrastructure is closely related to quality of life and hygiene, which is the foundation of good health. There are major gaps, as only 35% of the population in this region has access to basic handwashing facilities, 70% to drinking water, and 33% to sanitation (WaterAid 2021a).

This data reflects the challenges not only in electricity but also in drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), all of which are closely related to the development capacity of West African states. Inadequate WASH services are responsible for up to 10% of the global disease burden, which means that women and girls lose more opportunities to earn income or attend school (WaterAid 2021b).

These structural problems are also related to the very persistent educational gaps in the region (Interviewed LM). In addition to the lack of schooling, there is also poor-quality education, both due to the lack of infrastructure and the results, which are not only low but also decreasing. In this regard, 80% of 10-year-old children in the West and Central Africa region are learning poorly, unable to read or understand a text (Mosuro et al. 2021). On the other hand, in June 2019, 9272 schools had been closed in eight countries of the region, affecting 1.91 million children and approximately 44,000 teachers. In 2024, the number of closed schools rose to 14,000. In Burkina Faso alone, in the spring of 2023, 6100 schools remained closed, nearly half of all closed schools in West and Central Africa (Consejo Noruego para Refugiados 2023). Efforts made by the government in this country have led to the reopening of 1300 schools in 2024, although many others remain inactive. Added to this situation is the fact that 40.6 million children of primary and lower secondary school age in the region are not enrolled. These figures have an even greater impact on girls, who are 2.5 times more likely than boys to be out of school in primary school and 90% more likely in secondary education (Mosuro et al. 2021). There are several reasons for this educational crisis. First, the increase in violence in West and Central Africa. Second, the disruptive forces of climate change, which cause massive floods that damage or destroy fragile educational infrastructure, preventing school attendance.

This has undoubtedly been the recent case in countries such as Niger, Mali, or Nigeria, where rains forced a delay in the start of the school year (Save the Children 2024). And third, the low investment in education, with low-income countries spending an average of 54 dollars per student per year—far from the 8500 dollars invested by a high-income country (Tooze 2024).

3.1.4. Violence and Insecurity

Some of the elements that could serve as a unifier for the entire subregion—ethnic diversity, religion, and cultural wealth—has, however, become a factor of division that has been instrumentalized by jihadist groups to heighten rivalries and local conflicts, causing a security crisis, in opinion of CS. The growing threat of jihadist groups, especially in the Sahel region (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) and in Nigeria, has exposed the inability of governments to protect their citizens. These contexts of weak or disputed governance are a decisive factor for the expansion of criminal networks and jihadist groups (Anguita-Olmedo 2023) as well as forced movements.

In the Sahel countries, deaths from terrorism exceed 6000 in the past three years, accounting for half of the world’s fatalities (Naciones Unidas 2025). In 2024 alone, there were 3885 deaths due to terrorism in the Sahel, with the number of deaths increasing tenfold since 2019. Unlike other countries where terrorism is carried out by individuals or lone wolves, in West Africa most attacks were perpetrated by jihadist groups, primarily the Islamic State affiliate in the Sahel and Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen8 (JNIM, Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims), an al-Qaeda branch (Institute for Economics & Peace 2025). These two groups have been in conflict since 2020 due to strategic and objective-related differences, taking advantage of the region’s ethnicity and the fight against state forces to gain followers (Mesa García 2022). The Police Commissioner (FG) considers that in some cases, “they use extortion to control the population through fear; in others, they offer protection from other terrorist groups and the state, providing services in exchange for loyalty”. Moreover, the situation of young people, explained by the factors previously analyzed, facilitates this adherence, as it is seen as a guarantee of survival.

In Burkina Faso, deaths due to terrorism have increased by 68%, placing it at the top of the region’s countries. In Niger, terrorist attacks rose by 94% in 2024. In Mali, jihadist groups operate in 75% of the territory, with JNIM being the most active, directing its attacks in western Mali toward the Senegalese region of Kayes. In this area, the number of attacks has doubled annually since 2022. This group carried out 21 attacks in 2023 and 25 in 2024, after executing only 10 in 2022 (Fuente Cobo 2025). “The great capacity of these terrorist groups allows them to fight one another for territory, confront other sub-state rebel and criminal groups, but also the State itself in an attempt to co-opt its authority” (Interviewed CS). In this context, interviewed experts (CS, MB, and SA) agree that the population is caught between the different jihadist groups, the state forces trying to suppress them, and external mercenaries acting independently, leaving them with few options: stay and suffer the violence, join the terrorist groups, or migrate.

Although the epicenter of terrorist actions is located in the Sahel within West Africa, the geographic spillover is extending toward the Gulf of Guinea along with the intensity of actions. Amina Mohammed, Deputy Secretary-General of the UN, warns that there are increasing risks of infiltration and radicalization in southern countries and that “a new group known as ‘Lakurawa’ is carrying out cross-border attacks in northwestern Nigeria, Niger, and Chad” (Naciones Unidas 2025). These groups have become actors shaping the future of the region. The spread of terrorist actions to countries along the Atlantic arc, such as Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, or Ghana, stems mainly from JNIM, although it appears that the true objective is to reach Burkina Faso through its southern borders to destabilize the military government. The state response and the use of foreign agents have led to an intensification of violence, generating greater instability and further eroding state legitimacy.

Moreover, two of the interviewed (CS, CJ) agreed that “the jihadist groups in the region are also involved in illicit businesses as a means of financing, especially in drug trafficking, where they are linked to organized crime groups”. Control of territory is crucial in both cases to consolidate their power, imposing control and order through violence. The result is criminal governance facilitated by state incapacity (Anguita-Olmedo 2023).

In this context, both the Police Commissioner (FG) and the academic experts (CS, SA, and PG) agreed that situations of violence, insecurity, lack of opportunities, or poverty push the population of this region to migrate, initiating intra- and extra-regional displacements. On the run, for the interviewed LM “migrants end up exposed to greater violence and exploitation on dangerous routes dominated by criminal groups”.

3.2. Migration in West Africa and Migratory Corridors

We have just analyzed the main factors that explain why populations in the region are forced to move, a point on which the interviewed experts agree. While global migrants make up 3.8% (304 million) of the world’s population (UN DESA 2025), only 6.9% (21 million) of Africans live in another African country different from their country of birth.

This figure represents an increase compared to 2015 data, when it was approximately 18 million (IOM 2024). The number of those living outside Africa has also risen, from around 17 million in 2015 to 19.5 million (6.4%) in 2020 (11 million in Europe, 5 million in Asia—mainly in Gulf countries—and 3 million in North America). These figures show that most of the migration is intra-African and that only a small portion of African migrants reach Europe. While it is true that most analyses pay more attention to South–North migration, there is also South–South, intracontinental, or horizontal migration (Blanco 2024). The decision to migrate is not only due to the structural factors (macro level) already discussed, but also to other reasons linked to individual decisions (micro level), or to links with the existing diaspora in other countries, mainly in the closest countries, or to financial costs (meso level). One of the main reasons that can explain why they stay on the African continent is related to the difficulty of crossing borders and the cost of travel. This is due to the tightening of EU migration policies, especially in the control of external borders through their securitization. Or rather, the absence of common migration policies that show a failure in the management of flows. This has led to a tightening of border control and a lack of sensitivity in the treatment of irregular migrants and in the reception of those seeking refuge. Despite this, migratory flows have not been reduced, only transformed.

The interviewed VB and SA agree when they state that to reach the borders of the countries closest to the European continent, migrants not only have to pay a significant amount of money, but are also exposed to numerous migratory controls, many of them violent, which causes a rethinking of the migratory process, avoiding long and dangerous routes to seek an improvement in the quality of life in the nearest countries.

It is important to note that current migration flows are mixed, including both those who need refuge and have been forcibly displaced, and irregular or vulnerable migrants. Both groups, by using the same routes, are exposed to similar fragilities and risks (UNHCR-ACNUR 2024).

If we consider the data from West Africa, of the current 8.4 million international migrants in the region, less than 10% head to Europe. About 70%, or approximately 5.8 million (UN DESA 2025), move within ECOWAS member countries, mostly for labor reasons, migrating to nearby countries with stronger economies. The remaining 20% move to other countries within the African continent. Of these, it is estimated that 16.3% (based on 2020 data) were between the ages of 15 and 24 (United Nations 2024).

Sub-Saharan Africa is home to 31.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). The countries with the highest number of forced displacements in the West African region are Nigeria, mainly due to natural disasters (854,000) and conflicts (around 3.6 million) (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2023), Burkina Faso, almost exclusively due to conflict and violence; Niger, mainly due to climate-related causes; and Mali, due to conflicts and, to a lesser extent, disasters (IOM 2024). These data indicate that although West Africa remains a hotspot of conflict and insecurity, the Sahel countries are the most unstable in the region and where the largest migratory flows occur. In 2022, there were more than 2.9 million refugees and internally displaced persons in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Niger, for example, hosts nearly half a million displaced people from neighboring countries affected by violence, even while generating its own displaced population (Fundación Alternativas 2024). The countries in the region that receive the most immigrants are Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria, which acts both as a sending and receiving country for migration. The most important intraregional migration corridor is from Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire, with 1.3 million people (Castel 2024).

Therefore, movements are more local than global. These intraregional movements have been facilitated by the removal of borders between ECOWAS countries—all in the region except Mauritania—which allows citizens to enter, exit, reside, and conduct business in any member country (Hirsch 2024). This process has been ongoing since 1979; however, conflicts and the adoption of more restrictive national policies have in recent years hindered its implementation, as national security concerns have taken precedence over the economic benefits of free movement.

From West Africa, tens of thousands of people embark on migratory journeys, creating corridors that have become more established over the years, and which are directly linked to the misgovernance of the region’s countries. These “migration corridors”9 reveal where migrants and refugees are coming from and where they are heading, often using increasingly long and dangerous routes (see Figure 2). The main routes crossing Africa and the Mediterranean are where the highest number of deaths and disappearances have been recorded. In addition to the 16,954 deaths along African routes, there have been 31,945 recorded deaths in the Mediterranean crossing since 2016. So far in 2025, migrant deaths recorded in Africa amount to 317 (IOM 2025), still far from the death toll of those who tried to reach Spain via the Atlantic or Mediterranean in 2024, which stands at 10,457.

The first corridor where many African migration routes converge starts in Niger—a key country for migration heading toward Libya and the European Union—with the city of Agadez serving as the epicenter of these migration routes. From Agadez, migrants from countries such as Nigeria, Guinea, Gambia, Liberia, or Cameroon head toward Sebha and other cities in southern Libya, where journeys across the Central Mediterranean are organized. Some of these journeys cost between €2000 and €7000—or even more—depending on the distance, and additional fees are charged for a spot on boats or for crossing borders. This route is the most used and also the most dangerous (see Figure 3), as migrants are exploited by smuggling networks along the way.

Before the coup d’état, in 2016, Niger strengthened its migration laws, criminalizing anyone involved in facilitating the transit of people in any form (Mesa 2024). This shift was driven by aid from the European Union, which, in an effort to outsource migration control to countries of origin and transit, financed the securitization of Niger’s borders. This pressure forced smugglers to change traditional routes, and the methods used. As a result, new routes between Niger and Libya have emerged, and Algeria has also become a hub for migrant smuggling (UNODC 2022). However, the situation has changed following the military coup in Niger, as the restrictions imposed by the previous government have been lifted (Hirsch 2024).

The second corridor is the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands, which originates in Mauritania, Gambia, and Senegal. The increase in controls along the Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes, along with restrictions imposed by Italy, has led to this route gaining prominence in recent years (González Del Miño and Anguita-Olmedo 2023). The journey from Gambia can exceed 1500 km. In attempts to reach the Spanish coast, the number of migrant deaths increased by 58% in 2024, with this route accounting for 9757 deaths between 2021 and 2024 (see Figure 4). Among the victims, there has also been a rise in the number of women and minors (421 women and 1538 minors), due to the precarious nature of the journeys (Caminando Fronteras 2024). Most of the minors come from Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal. Girls often flee forced marriages, female genital mutilation, and structural violence against women, while boys are escaping forced recruitment by armed groups (Alboan y Entreculturas 2023).

The third corridor is the Sahel route towards North Africa. Countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger serve as transit points to Algeria and Morocco. From there, migrants attempt to reach the coasts of the European Union, either via the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla or through the Western Mediterranean. This corridor is used by migrants from North Africa, as well as those arriving from other countries such as Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, and even Syria. The meeting point for all of them is the Moroccan city of Oujda, near Melilla. This border city has become the epicenter of both legal and illegal trade and a waiting place for migrants, many of whom have been expelled from Algeria in their pursuit of the European dream. Morocco thus becomes a “buffer” state capable of controlling migration flows and using them as a tool for political leverage.

As Hernando (2024, p. 3) states, “along these routes, nearly 32% of the migrants who arrived in Spain by land and sea between January 2022 and December 2023, and who were surveyed by UNHCR, confirmed having suffered some form of violence along the way” (see Figure 5). However, exposure to these violations does not deter migrants from attempting to reach European territory. Obstacles imposed on migrants force smugglers to change routes, even if this means higher costs for migrants and greater exposure to new dangers.

3.3. The Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Connection: Criminal Actors on Migration Routes

The expansion of violence and conflict in West Africa, along with all the factors previously analyzed, generates among the population a need to emigrate due to the constant fear of forced recruitment, kidnapping for forced labor, or exposure to death. This situation has motivated many families to prioritize the migration of young people as a protection strategy (Caminando Fronteras 2024). The idea of survival outside their country, despite exposure to other forms of violence along the routes, is much more attractive than the limited opportunities they face if they remain in their communities of origin. In this socioeconomically disadvantaged region, where the only way out is to emigrate, it is easy for migrant smuggling to turn into trafficking if it is not accompanied by guarantees of protection and support networks. Not only those who decide to emigrate are subjected to these situations, but also those displaced for the reasons already mentioned suffer this type of exploitation in camps, especially women, who trade sex for food and resources (UNODC 2024b). Although there are no exact figures on how many migrants are trafficked, the interviewees MB, VB and CJ agree that it causes serious consequences for the victims and their communities because they not only lose human resources but also leave psychological and physical scars for life. According to the IOM,

Human trafficking has negative economic and social effects, long-term repercussions on physical and mental health, and implications related to human rights. It is also highly gendered; women and girls are more vulnerable to trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced marriage, and domestic servitude, while men and boys are more exposed to trafficking for labor exploitation in sectors such as fishing and mining”

(Bauloz et al. 2022, p. 2).

In this regard, interviewees LM, SA, and CS confirm testimonies from women who, with the intention of migrating, contacted “a friend” who, promising them work in Europe, recruited them at origin and before reaching their destination, they were sold and forced into prostitution. Worldwide data has recorded a total of 436 trafficking flows across borders with victims from 162 different countries who were trafficked to 128 countries (see Figure 6). Of all these, 112 (26%) involved victims from Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, Africa is not only where the highest percentage of cross-border trafficking originates, but victims have also been detected in 60 countries, with destinations increasing towards the Middle East.

In the migration corridors of West Africa, abuses against migrants are common throughout the journeys due to the presence of criminal networks that take advantage of the illegal business opportunity. These networks operate with the complicity of local actors who also profit from the business. But not only that, as organized crime in West Africa also has connections with terrorist groups operating in the region. As we have already explained, control of territory is a strategic issue for jihadists, which is why JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel are in conflict. In this territory, considered polycriminal due to the activities carried out there (see Figure 7), some of the most important cross-border routes converge, through which drugs and migrants circulate, as well as cigarettes, diamonds, precious woods, weapons, and medicines (UNODC 2024a), making collaboration between criminal groups with overlapping interests inevitable.

Although there are no real figures on the profits generated by trafficking, the ILO considers that forced labor alone generates around 236 billion dollars per year (International Labour Organization (ILO) 2024), having grown by 37% since 2014. It must be considered that the illegal profits from forced labor in the private economy, whether labor or sexual, are only a part of trafficking. It is estimated that criminals generate 10,000 dollars per victim. In Africa, the profits from forced labor generate US$20 billion per year. Forced sexual exploitation represents 73% of the total illegal profits, although it only accounts for 27% of the total number of forced labor victims. This means that for each person who is sexually exploited, the profits amount to 27,252 dollars, compared to 3687 dollars from other types of exploitation. Without any doubt, this explains why migrant traffickers earn more from sexual exploitation and forced labor compared to the profits they obtain only from transportation (International Labour Organization (ILO) 2024).

Although it is difficult to obtain data, especially in Africa, trafficking has increased worldwide, particularly trafficking of girls and boys, who represent 38% of identified victims, and of that percentage, 60% are girls. Around 45% of detected children are victims of trafficking for forced labor purposes, and 47% are exploited for other purposes, such as forced criminality and begging. Women and girls account for 61% of total victims (with data from 2022) and are mainly exposed to sexual exploitation (UNODC 2024b).

In West Africa, child trafficking is more frequent than adult trafficking, and children are victims of forced labor, including domestic work and begging (see Figure 8). At the end of 2022, an operation in the region against organized crime networks allowed the rescue of 56 minors who were victims of sexual exploitation and forced labor in gold mines, open-air markets, and domestic settings in countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo (Interpol 2022). In the case of girls, exploitation is sexual or for forced marriages. West Africa records high levels of child labor compared to other regions (see Figure 9), which is associated with the socio-economic situation already discussed. Although United Nations reports indicate that child marriage is not necessarily associated with trafficking but rather responds to other causes such as cultural ones, traffickers find more business opportunities in places where these practices are common.

Compared to the main profile of trafficking victims within the African continent, most African victims detected in Europe are adults exploited in forced labor (see Figure 10). On the other hand, although trafficking sometimes occurs abroad in the context of labor migration, it usually begins from the very moment they decide to migrate, falling into the hands of criminal organizations during the journey or even upon arrival at the destination.

The interviewees, CS and MB agree that “the sale of people along the migration routes northward is common. There is the practice of selling migrants who have been captured by third parties for forced labor”. These same patterns have been documented, according to UNODC (UNODC 2024b), in the Sahel but by extremist armed groups controlling the territories through which the routes pass.

The criminal groups responsible for migrant trafficking and human trafficking form an intricate network that is difficult to dismantle. In the words of Interpol’s Secretary General, Jürgen Stock, “human trafficking and migrant smuggling are often part of a broader and more complex criminal chain” (Shemag and Mefo Takambou 2023). An example is the human trafficking and exploitation network recently dismantled that operated in Ghana, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire. The criminals promised jobs in Canada in exchange for $9000. However, the destination was none other than Ghana, where more than 200 people were forced to work under physical coercion (Pressenza IPA 2025). This demonstrates that from recruitment to transportation and subsequent exploitation, an organization and planning with a certain degree of complexity are required, although as noted by Cengiz and Oguzhan Omer (2022) the extent of the organization, or the nature of the criminal organization, is a contentious question.

On West African routes, the number of incidents and the dynamics of departures indicate the existence of well-structured trafficking and smuggling networks, with a high degree of organization, capable of adapting and evolving quickly in response to measures taken by authorities for their prosecution (FRONTEX 2024). In the opinion of PG, “this adaptability is crucial in irregular migration processes, as these networks evade controls by reinforcing alternative routes”.

However, and in this CS, VB, and the Police Commissioner (FG) agree, not all actors involved in migrant smuggling in this region are professionals or form compact groups, although their interests converge with those of organized crime groups. To the Police Commissioner (FG) “on long routes like those described earlier, the journey is divided into stages, each under the authority of individuals with different levels of professionalism and capacity to control”. Although for the UNODC (2024a) there is no conclusive evidence of the participation of violent extremist armed groups in trafficking and smuggling, there is evidence that they indirectly benefit from these businesses. In this regard, traffickers either have relationships with them but with weak affiliation or simply pay a tax to cross territories under their control. Nonetheless, the UNODC report notes that in 2023, between 80 and 90 armed groups recruited children to participate in conflicts as porters, which is undoubtedly a form of trafficking. Among these groups are JNIM and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). In the case of women and girls, they are used as sex slaves to reward combatants. These practices have been detected in Nigeria and Mali, where some groups use sexual violence and trafficking as a strategy to terrorize communities (UNODC 2024b).

Furthermore, as occurs in other regions outside of Africa, for example, in Latin America (Anguita-Olmedo and Sampó 2021), there are many activities along the journey provided by people hired by the networks, but who do not necessarily form part of them. We are talking about local guides who know the terrain and offer their services as specialists and also provide, for example, suitable vehicles to cross the desert, boat captains for maritime journeys, logistical networks supplying fuel to the boats, or madams who mainly take care of the women forced into prostitution to cover the costs of the trip (Acién González 2024). In this same sense, the UNODC (2024b, p. 72) report states that “Africa has a unique landscape of traffickers, with large-scale and systematic criminal activities carried out by organized crime groups operating internationally, armed groups and small-scale and less organized traffickers, including individual and community-based activities”.

Likewise, as the interviewees VB and MAA state, this violence is not only used by organized crime groups or those involved in the business, but it can also come from public officials, such as security agents who use their authority to take advantage of migrants, and in the case of women, for sexual favors; fellow travelers or other actors who exploit the vulnerabilities migrants suffer during the journey (see Figure 11).

For UNODC (2024b, p. 72),

In the context of trafficking occurring along migration routes, the same actors involved in the smuggling industry may opportunistically collaborate with, or operate as, trafficking networks aiming at exploiting migrants. Research on the routes to North Africa or to the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council has shown how, in some cases, smuggler-traffickers seem to be part of a broader system that starts with an initial contact with migrants in their community of origin and concludes with exploitation in transit or at the destination. Also seen in this context are traffickers who, as opportunistic criminals or individuals, are able to exploit these vulnerable migrants en route.

In Africa, crimes against children forced into labor are mainly perpetrated by small-scale groups, which provide services through an unstructured connection with the exploiters. The services they offer are recruitment and transport, and, on some occasions, they go directly to the family offering the child a job. The deception consists of agreeing that the expenses generated by the child will be charged when they arrive at the workplace, so there is no need for the family to go into debt in advance. However, when the child arrives at the destination, for example, the mines, the exploiters buy the highly inflated debt from the transporters, thus creating a debt bondage from which it is difficult to escape. In Africa, 10 million people work in small-scale mines, of which between 20% and 40% are children aged 5 to 14. In Senegal, in mining camps, between 13% and 30% of women engaged in sex work are victims of trafficking, having been recruited by small intermediaries, either in places of origin or along migration routes. Despite international efforts to combat trafficking and migrant smuggling, with initiatives such as the West Africa Coalition Against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (WACTIPSOM), created in 2024, it is necessary to address the structural causes that drive forced displacement and irregular migration.

4. Discussion and Conclusions

Migration flows are not only the result of individual decisions but are deeply conditioned by multifactorial structural situations and power structures ranging from criminal networks to state strategies. Therefore, it is essential to eradicate poverty and inequality, but also the violence and conflicts experienced by a large part of West Africa, as this would help reduce irregular migration and forced displacement, and consequently the violations and breaches of human rights. Another important point is the security policy of destination countries. The closing of borders and the difficulty of obtaining legal entry permits are favoring the emergence of migrant smuggling networks that take advantage of the need to migrate, demanding a high price for transportation, which places migrants at the mercy of these criminals who end up exploiting them to pay off the debt. If these migration policies in destination countries were relaxed, they would allow for regular, safe, and orderly migration and would not expose migrants to smugglers’ networks or to the violence they suffer along the routes.

There are many business opportunities in the region that could contribute to its development. As already seen, foreign investments in mining have led to significant growth, resulting in increased extraction, higher profits, and a reduction in unemployment rates in some areas. Geostrategic minerals (coltan, cobalt, lithium, and gold, along with rare earth elements) are essential to global industry, and these are found in Africa. Therefore, the development of infrastructure to enable the exploitation of these minerals can help reverse the situation of low human development in which many African countries are immersed. However, alongside this legal trade, illegal ones also emerge in parallel, relying on the use of vulnerable people, both adults and children, in forced labor, which continues to perpetuate poverty and slavery.

Investment must also be made in electrification and sanitation for communities as a key driver of development. Access to water is closely linked to quality of life, a fundamental pillar of health. The fact that 64% of the population of West Africa does not have access to adequate sanitation facilities (WaterAid 2021a) is a clear indication of the needs of the population.

Among the situations involving human rights violations are migrant smuggling and trafficking, both of which require comprehensive approaches for their eradication. It is true that among experts there is an ongoing debate as to whether all severe circumstances of exploitation can be considered trafficking. Although the definitions of trafficking and migrant smuggling are set out in the Protocols of the Palermo Convention, it is not always easy to determine whether a given exploitation situation constitutes trafficking. In practice, distinguishing between a migrant who has accepted a job under exploitative conditions and someone who has been trafficked for the purpose of forced labor, especially if the exploitation has not yet begun, is not always straightforward. This distinction affects detection, investigation, prosecution, and sentencing in such cases (Bauloz et al. 2022).

On the African routes, migrants are subjected to humiliation. What begins as migrant smuggling, a commercial relationship established by offering a service in exchange for payment, turns into trafficking. In the case of women, they are almost always subjected to prostitution or forced marriages. Many are unable to pay the rising costs of the journey as they cross different geographical areas and are exposed to other local networks that subject them to prostitution both in the African countries themselves and in other countries in the Middle East or Europe. And it is not always at the hands of organized networks, but also during the journey they are asked for sexual favors in exchange for security by their own travel companions or members of the security forces of the countries through which they pass. In the case of the men, they are almost always employed in the fields or in mines, although they are exploited, their aim being to earn a little more money to continue their journey.

Regarding the distinction between criminal group and criminal organization as actors involved in trafficking or migrant smuggling, we concur with Finckenauer (2007) that a differentiation must be made between “organized crime” and “crime that is organized.” Organized crime groups are characterized by a high degree of structure, sustained operations over time, and the capacity to exert coercion both internally and externally. In contrast, organized delinquency is more opportunistic and based on the specialization of its members, without a clear structure or a high level of sophistication.

As has been demonstrated, in the case of West Africa, both highly complex organized groups and less professional, loosely connected groups—or even individuals—are active. These actors, in various ways, intersect with migratory flows and take advantage of the needs of those on the move to exploit or sell them.

In mixed migration routes, where both irregular migrants and refugees fleeing violence and other causes travel, various actors highlight the lack of protection for migrants. The stages from places of origin to destinations increase the cost of the journey, generating a debt that is difficult to repay except through forced labor or, in the case of women, through sex. This is the point at which trafficking and migrant smuggling converge.

It has become evident that, despite the efforts of ECOWAS to foster cohesion among the member states of the alliance, it has not succeeded in consolidating a solid mechanism to control the various illicit traffics—of arms, drugs, or people—that cross West Africa. Regarding irregular migration, the approach implemented does not focus on prohibition but rather on raising awareness about the risks involved in such migration and on attempting to improve future opportunities, especially for the youth (IOM 2024). Although the results have not been very encouraging, all efforts aimed at addressing trafficking and exploitation must be welcomed with interest.

Moreover, West Africa shares complex situations of (mis)governance, instability, and violence, not only perpetrated by criminal and terrorist groups but also by the states themselves, which, in their struggle to reclaim territories, apply indiscriminate violence. Corruption is also part of an ineffective political system (Page and Wando 2022), generating distrust among a population that feels insecure and unprotected.

This entire web of conflict, violence, insecurity, and criminal actors fosters trafficking and migrant smuggling, exposing people to migratory corridors where human rights violations are an inherent reality for those who embark on the journey.