Echoes of Violence: Intergenerational Trauma, Fear, and Political Apathy Among Zimbabwean Youth Post-2008 Electoral Violence

Abstract

Zimbabwe’s 2008 electoral violence created lasting societal impacts, yet the psychological consequences for youth, particularly through intergenerational effects, remain under-explored. This study examines how memories of this violence are transmitted to contemporary youth, including those born after 2008, and influence their political attitudes and participation. The study employed a qualitative approach in Harare’s Mbare suburb, utilising 20 in-depth interviews and four (4) focus groups, which were analysed through a trauma-informed lens. Findings indicate that youth inherit ‘traumascapes’ from elders, which cultivate fear, silence, and political apathy. Parental warnings and experiences link activism directly to vulnerability, prompting youth to adopt disengagement or performative allegiance as survival strategies amidst structural impunity and socio-economic precarity. Unresolved, intergenerationally transmitted trauma perpetuates cycles of civic disempowerment. The study concludes that post-conflict recovery in Zimbabwe requires moving beyond institutional reforms to prioritise psychosocial healing and demands that transitional justice frameworks explicitly address these inherited psychological wounds.

1. Introduction

Zimbabwe’s 2008 presidential runoff election marked a critical juncture in the nation’s political and psychosocial history, unleashing widespread violence that created a ‘traumascape’ reverberating across generations. This was a pivotal moment. After the opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC), won the first round (47.9% vs. Robert Mugabe’s (ZANU-PF) 43.2%) on 29 March, the subsequent 27 June run-off was engulfed in unprecedented state-sponsored violence (Badza 2008; Ploch 2010). This systematic campaign, which included widespread intimidation, torture, abductions, and killings of perceived MDC supporters, targeted both rural and urban areas (Gwanzura 2024; Human Rights Watch 2008). Estimates indicate that at least 200 people were killed, over 5000 maimed or tortured, and over 36,000 were displaced, leading to Tsvangirai’s withdrawal and Mugabe’s declaration as winner, before a fragile Government of National Unity was formed (Reeler 2013a; Human Rights Watch 2008).

The 2008 violence had a distinctive, national-level impact permeating communities across the country, unlike other, more geographically concentrated, historical atrocities in post-independence Zimbabwe. It permeated deep rural areas and urban cities alike, making its psychosocial imprint uniquely widespread and salient for examining intergenerational trauma. While immediate victims bore visible scars, the insidious effects persist in the psychological and affective aftershocks impacting youth who were children during the violence or born subsequently. This study examines how intergenerational trauma related to this period manifests among contemporary youth, with a specific focus on experiences captured through formal fieldwork in the urban township of Mbare, Harare. Mbare suburb serves as a vital microcosm for this widespread impact. As a densely populated area with high residential mobility and a history of political volatility, Mbare offers a concentrated environment to examine how the profound effects of 2008 electoral violence, both directly and through transmitted memory, shaped contemporary urban Zimbabwean youth attitudes and political engagement, providing insights transferable to similar high-density contexts (Mutongwizo 2018; Zvaita and Kaye 2023).

Importantly, this study situates the 2008 violence not as an isolated event but as part of a historical continuum marked by colonial conquest, state repression, and episodic brutality. Following independence in 1980, Zimbabwe experienced significant episodes of state-led violence, including the Gukurahundi massacres, the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme, and Operation Murambatsvina. The Gukurahundi massacres (1982–1987) saw the killing of approximately 20,000 civilians in Matabeleland and Midlands by the state’s Fifth Brigade. These atrocities, lacking formal truth and reconciliation mechanisms, left deep scars and institutionalised impunity (Ngwenya and Harris 2015; Mamombe and Kurebwa 2021). Operation Murambatsvina in 2005 and the 2008 election violence reaffirmed state coercion as an instrument of political survival, reinforcing what Tumarkin (2005) calls “traumascapes”. The concept of ‘traumascapes’ was largely advanced by the works of Tumarkin (2005, 2015, 2019), referring to public spaces, cultural practices, and collective memories that become deeply imprinted with the enduring affective and psychological aftershocks of violence. Thus, ‘traumascapes’ are not merely physical locations but encompass the social and psychological environments where unaddressed historical wounds continue to shape contemporary social interactions, civic norms, and even the very fabric of identity (Kosatica 2022; Caruth 2016, 1995). Hence, in the context of this study, they should be understood not merely as an event but as an ongoing, transmitted condition influencing how a society perceives safety, participation, and dissent (Caruth 2021). This entrenched culture of political violence has become a method of governance, embedding fear and obedience as civic norms (Phimister and Raftopoulos 2004; Zvaita and Kaye 2023). Additionally, Mwonzora and Helliker (2020) document how violence became ritualised and strategically enacted through political youth formations, further contributing to a national political climate steeped in fear and performance.

Against this backdrop of cyclical violence and entrenched fear, the article addresses a critical question: How does potential intergenerational trauma from Zimbabwe’s historical and electoral violence, particularly the 2008 crisis, manifest in contemporary youth behaviour and perceptions of politics? Through a trauma-informed lens, the study explores how inherited memories, structural impunity, and psychosocial defence mechanisms might contribute to political apathy, performative allegiance, and civic disengagement. It contributes to humanitarian and peacebuilding discourse by foregrounding the mental health dimensions of post-conflict recovery, arguing for the inclusion of community-based healing and youth-centred psychosocial support within transitional justice frameworks. This paper makes an important contribution to existing literature by reframing youth political disengagement in Zimbabwe not as passive disinterest but as a contextually conditioned survival strategy informed by structural violence and transgenerational trauma. The study integrates phenomenological research with political socialisation and trauma theory, seeking to centre the lived narratives of youth and their affective geographies of fear, resilience, and constrained agency.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Cycles of Violence in Zimbabwe

The roots of Zimbabwe’s political violence lie in its colonial and postcolonial transitions, shaped by conquest, armed struggle, and authoritarian consolidation. As Phimister (2008) and Chitukutuku (2017) observe, both colonial and liberation legacies embedded a political culture in which violence became an acceptable tool of governance. Colonial administration under the British South Africa Company institutionalised racial hierarchies, dispossession, and forced labour, establishing structural foundations of inequality that would shape future political orders. The nationalist liberation struggle (Second Chimurenga) did not dismantle these violent structures but transformed them into revolutionary instruments, normalising militarisation as a form of civic expression and state power (Ngwenya and Harris 2015).

A wide range of studies have unpacked how the 2008 presidential runoff marked a violent crescendo in Zimbabwe’s long history of state-sponsored coercion (Mwonzora and Helliker 2020; Reeler 2013b; Mutanda 2019). This period was characterised by the orchestration of violence by party-aligned actors—ZANU-PF youth militias, war veterans, and security forces—who engaged in ideological indoctrination, torture, and mass displacement (Munoriyarwa 2021; Moyo 2020; Mwonzora and Helliker 2020). The brutality was neither spontaneous nor unprecedented, as it echoed tactics long employed by liberation-era forces and later refined in post-independence Zimbabwe through state apparatuses and semi-autonomous militias (Mutanda 2019; Chitofiri and Nkomo 2023). Rather, it was embedded within an established trajectory of militarised mobilisation, political retribution, and repression that traces its roots to both colonial and post-independence statecraft. As Phimister and Raftopoulos (2004), Chitando and Togarasei (2010), and Moyo (2020) assert, coercion and violence were long-standing tools employed by both colonial and postcolonial regimes to maintain hegemonic control. These events created what Mutanda (2019) and Chitiyo and Kibble (2014) describe as a civic landscape governed by fear and symbolic violence, where communities learnt survival through silence, obedience, and calculated disengagement. In this context, the legacy of 2008 represents more than electoral suppression—it signals a broader psychosocial inheritance that shapes how individuals interpret security, participation, and resistance in the public sphere. These experiences—witnessed, endured, or narrated—formed a reservoir of trauma that has since shaped how a generation interprets safety, civic action, and dissent.

2.2. Trauma, Memory, and Intergenerational Transmission

Scholarship on trauma increasingly emphasises its intergenerational transmission across psychological, affective, and social dimensions, underscoring how psychological and emotional wounds are passed down through generations. Trauma is not solely lodged in the bodies of direct victims but is also embedded in narratives, storytelling, significant silences, familial warnings, cultural rituals, communal reflection, and socialisation patterns (Chou and Buchanan 2021; Isobel et al. 2019; Ndlovu and Tshuma 2021). This transmission is particularly heightened in post-conflict societies where justice is deferred, denied, or formal reconciliation mechanisms are absent.

Research demonstrates that such inherited trauma shapes youth identity, often resulting in avoidance behaviours, political apathy, mistrust of institutions, and psychosocial disorders, as seen in contexts like Rwanda, Cambodia, and among refugees in the United States (Burchert et al. 2017; Ingabire et al. 2023; Sangalang and Vang 2017). In Zimbabwe, these dynamics are particularly pronounced due to the lack of a credible transitional justice process, with the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) remaining largely ineffective, underfunded, and distrusted (Mamombe and Kurebwa 2021). Furthermore, the absence of adequate mental health infrastructure reinforces these conditions, contributing to the widespread prevalence of post-traumatic stress symptoms within communities (Parsons et al. 2011; Abas et al. 2023).

Zimbabwean youth construct ‘postmemories’ of events like the Gukurahundi through media and familial narratives, often marked by silences, fear, and selective retellings (Ndlovu and Tshuma 2021). Even those who did not directly experience events like the 2008 violence are shaped by the affective atmosphere created (Mumbire and Chakabwata 2024). This aligns with findings in post-genocide Rwanda, where symbolic retellings and everyday references to past trauma influence youth perceptions of politics, security, and reconciliation (Kagoyire et al. 2023; Benoit 2025). While informal coping strategies like prayer, storytelling, and humour remain vital in Zimbabwe, they are often insufficient to address the deeper psychological wounds that persist (Abas et al. 2023; Parsons et al. 2011).

2.3. Structural Violence and Youth Disengagement

Compounding these traumatic legacies is the pervasive impact of structural violence. Defined by Galtung (1990) and elaborated upon by scholars like Farmer (2004), and Jackson and Sadler (2022), structural violence refers to systemic inequalities embedded within political, economic, social, and legal institutions that harm individuals by impeding their access to basic needs and opportunities. This form of violence can produce profound and intergenerational social suffering, particularly impacting marginalised communities. In Zimbabwe, structural violence manifests through limited access to employment, education, and healthcare, often reinforced by entrenched political patronage systems (Chiweshe 2016). The enduring mental health consequences are significant, with studies identifying elevated PTSD symptoms among Zimbabwean youth even outside periods of active conflict, underscoring the trauma inflicted by these systemic failures (Abas et al. 2023).

The confluence of inherited trauma and ongoing structural violence profoundly shapes youth political socialisation and engagement. This occurs within a political culture that often delegitimises dissent and equates activism with threat. The state’s failure to address past traumas, such as the inadequate reintegration of war veterans, further erodes social trust and fuels cynicism towards democratic processes (Mutambara et al. 2023). Consequently, youth political socialisation is conditioned by normalised fear, repression, familial attitudes towards the state, collective memory, and civic alienation (Esau et al. 2019; Johnson and Alabi 2019). In this environment, observable behaviours like political neutrality or strategic allegiance to dominant parties often function as trauma-informed survival mechanisms, rather than genuine expressions of civic identity or political loyalty. Critiques suggest that top-down post-conflict interventions are often ineffective, highlighting the need for grassroots-centred approaches focused on healing and coexistence (Chiweshe 2016).

Despite extensive documentation of Zimbabwe’s violent history and the structural challenges confronting its youth, few studies have integrated psychological, structural, and intergenerational lenses to examine youth disengagement from a trauma-informed perspective. Most existing work focuses on immediate post-conflict interventions or formal transitional justice frameworks (Mamombe and Kurebwa 2021; Brounéus 2010). A significant gap remains in understanding how the long tail of electoral and political violence influences the inner worlds, identities, and social behaviour of youth born into or shortly after conflict.

This study addresses the gap by adopting a trauma-informed psychosocial lens that foregrounds how inherited memory, structural inequality, and political repression interact to shape youth disengagement. It complements the macro-level analyses of peacebuilding and institutional reform with the micro-level lived experiences of youth, thereby offering a more holistic understanding of post-conflict recovery in Zimbabwe. By combining intergenerational trauma frameworks with insights from structural violence and political socialisation theory, the study seeks to reposition youth not merely as victims of history but as key actors in shaping more inclusive and psychologically aware democratic futures.

3. Theoretical Framework

To ground the analysis of inherited trauma and its behavioural implications among Zimbabwean youth, this article draws on three interconnected theoretical frameworks: intergenerational trauma theory, structural violence theory, and political socialisation theory. Together, these lenses illuminate how traumatic memory, institutionalised inequality, and fear-based civic learning converge to shape the political subjectivities of youth in post-2008 Zimbabwe. This approach facilitates a multidimensional understanding of how violence functions not only as a past event, but as a pedagogical, psychological, and structural force that reproduces civic silence across generations.

3.1. Intergenerational Trauma Theory

Intergenerational trauma theory, emerging prominently within Indigenous and post-conflict psychology literature, offers a compelling lens to understand the transmission of distress across generations in contexts of unresolved violence. Initially conceptualised through studies on Holocaust survivors and later expanded through work on Indigenous communities and conflict-affected societies, the theory asserts that trauma is not confined to the individual who directly experiences violence but can be psychologically and behaviourally transferred to subsequent generations (Menzies 2010; Chou and Buchanan 2021). This transmission occurs through mechanisms such as emotional regulation patterns, avoidance behaviour, communication silences, and relational dynamics that encode past harms into everyday life. The work of Isobel et al. (2019) deepens this argument by showing how families implicitly teach fear and survival strategies as adaptive responses to traumatic environments, often normalising emotional suppression and political disengagement. Drawing from this theoretical tradition, the present study interprets political apathy, silence, and fear among Zimbabwean youth as part of a broader psychosocial inheritance stemming from previous generations’ exposure to political brutality, thus treating trauma not as an event but as an enduring condition that shapes civic identity.

3.2. Structural Violence Theory

Structural violence theory, first developed by Johan Galtung (1964, 1990) and expanded by scholars such as Farmer (2004) and Jackson and Sadler (2022), situates harm within institutional and systemic arrangements that prevent individuals from achieving their full potential. Unlike direct violence, structural violence is insidious and often invisible, manifesting in the denial of rights, social exclusion, economic inequality, and political repression. It embeds itself in the operations of states, markets, and cultural practices, reproducing social suffering over time. In post-colonial African contexts, this theory has been especially powerful in explaining how colonial legacies and authoritarian governance systems sustain patterns of marginalisation. In Zimbabwe, the concept illuminates the ways in which economic precarity, politicised service delivery, and the erosion of public trust operate as mechanisms of harm. Research has noted that structural violence is not only historical but continuously reproduced through governance practices that conflate political loyalty with survival (Kotzé 1978; Dilts et al. 2012; Ho 2007). This theoretical perspective enables a deeper understanding of how civic disengagement, psychosocial distress, and survivalist behaviours are conditioned not only by historical violence but by the ongoing institutional configurations of exclusion and impunity.

3.3. Political Socialisation Theory

Political socialisation theory, originating from the behavioural revolution in political science in the mid-20th century, investigates how individuals acquire political attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours through interaction with family, peers, media, and institutions (Ray 1968; Edwards 2012). Traditionally employed to explain voter behaviour and ideological formation in democratic settings, the theory has since evolved to incorporate authoritarian, post-conflict, and transitional societies where fear and coercion become formative political experiences. Scholars demonstrate that in contexts of repression, the family often becomes the primary conduit for political education—not through active engagement but through silence, caution, and fear-based messaging (Haegel 2020; Jaime-Castillo and Martínez-Cousinou 2021; Esau et al. 2019). The insights of this theory are particularly relevant to settings like Zimbabwe, where political behaviour is shaped less by ideological allegiance and more by survivalist instincts, inherited caution, and systemic mistrust. In framing political disengagement not as apathy but as an outcome of prolonged exposure to coercive political environments, the theory provides an analytical anchor for understanding how civic orientations are cultivated under the shadow of violence and how youth internalise these orientations through both explicit teachings and unspoken cues within their socio-political environment.

3.4. Integrated Theoretical Lens

The strength of this theoretical framework lies in its integrated approach, which acknowledges that trauma, inequality, and political learning are not isolated phenomena but dynamically interlinked forces shaping youth political subjectivities in Zimbabwe. Intergenerational trauma theory provides the foundational understanding of how the historical legacies of violence, particularly from events like the 2008 elections, are transmitted across generations, imbuing the contemporary environment with fear and caution. Structural violence theory then illuminates how systemic inequalities such as unemployment, economic precarity, and politicised resource distribution create the very conditions of vulnerability and desperation that exacerbate the impact of this inherited trauma, often compelling youth into coercive political engagements for survival. Finally, political socialisation theory acts as the bridge, explaining how these inherited traumatic memories and ongoing structural constraints are internalised, leading youth to adopt specific civic orientations like apathy, silence, or performative allegiance as adaptive survival mechanisms. Together, these theories offer a holistic lens, moving beyond a simplistic view of political behaviour to reveal how violence operates as a pedagogical, psychological, and structural force, perpetually reproducing civic disengagement across generations in Zimbabwe.

4. Methods and Materials

This study employed a qualitative, phenomenological research approach (Moustakas 1994) to investigate the lived experiences surrounding political violence, trauma, and silence among diverse stakeholders, including youth aged 18–35, civil society representatives, informal traders, religious leaders, and political activists in Mbare, Harare. Phenomenology was selected to facilitate an exploration of the meanings participants ascribe to their experiences navigating socio-political dynamics shaped by historical and contemporary violence.

Data collection occurred exclusively in Mbare between 2018 and 2022, conducted by the first author. Twenty (20) semi-structured in-depth interviews were used to capture personal narratives and subjective reflections. Additionally, four focus group discussions (FGDs), each with an average of 6–10 participants (total 34), were facilitated to explore communal memory and shared norms. The selection of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions aligns with qualitative methodologies that prioritise obtaining rich, detailed accounts and understanding the meanings participants attribute to their lived experiences (Creswell and Poth 2024). Participants for both methods were purposively selected to represent a spectrum of roles within the community, ensuring diverse perspectives.

Ethical procedures included obtaining written informed consent from all participants after fully informing them of the study’s objectives and their right to withdraw at any time. Confidentiality and anonymity were ensured throughout the research process by using pseudonyms and omitting potentially identifying details from all data and reports.

The transcribed interviews and FGDs data were analysed using reflexive thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2019). This iterative and interpretive method was chosen for its adaptability in identifying patterns of meaning pertinent to participants’ lived experiences of trauma, fear, and coping. To enhance analytical rigour and acknowledge potential biases, both authors maintained reflexive engagement throughout the data analysis process, continually examining assumptions and ensuring interpretations remained grounded in the participant narratives (Braun and Clarke 2019).

5. Results

The findings from this study illustrate the depth to which political trauma appears embedded in everyday life, especially among youth who were children during or born after the 2008 electoral violence. Key themes emerging from interviews and focus group discussions include the impact of harsh socio-economic conditions, the pervasive nature of fear and its varied responses, a sense of impunity, and the burden of structural violence.

5.1. Constructing the Traumascape: Fear, Silence, and Internalised Repression

A consistent theme across interviews and FGDs was the pervasive culture of silence transmitted from parents and elders to youth. Several participants shared how family members explicitly discouraged political engagement. As one participant put it, “We were told, ‘Never talk about politics. Politics brings death’… You know what happened in 2008, vanhu vakakuvadzwa [people were harmed], we don’t want to be followed here, tinofira mahara [we will die for nothing]” (Male youth, FGD2). Such messages were deeply internalised, creating what participants described as a “mental border” that blocked political conversation within homes. The silence was not passive—it was described as a protective mechanism rooted in survival narratives passed down from relatives who experienced past violence.

The interviews revealed that fear was not episodic but ambient. As election periods approached, entire communities would shift behaviour. People just vanish, noted a 19-year-old female respondent. You don’t talk loud. You don’t move around in party colours. This ambient fear shapes behavioural adjustments, aligning with common fear responses (Marschall 2021). The depth of this ingrained caution is underscored by historical narratives, such as the experiences shared by older community members; for instance, a businessman recounted his ordeal during the 2008 re-run election period, stating,

… I can give you an example about myself, I was victimised because I bought a red BMW [Red was considered to be a political symbol for opposition party]. I was taken and beaten. I only survived because I ran to the police. The youth who beat me, we are working together here in Magaba. Of course, we have a history but we have learnt to work together. Some of them have gone mad because they killed a lot of people in 2008 and others have converted to church which means they have changed their ways

(Mhofu, Male).

This demonstrates how direct experiences of political brutality, even if from a previous generation, contribute to the ‘traumascape’ and implicitly inform the pervasive climate of fear that influences younger generations’ daily lives and decision-making. Youth described patterns of fear reflecting flight, freeze and fawn corresponding to the following:

Avoidance of political discussions, rallies, or places associated with potential conflict(flight). This included fleeing areas during crackdowns, as Peter (male, political leader and activist) explained regarding police brutality after protests, some of us had to run away and spend a week without coming to work here … He added that around elections or rumoured protests, others will not even come to work because we have a history of what happens … This ‘history’ is deeply informed by pervasive experiences of state violence, notably the systematic repression witnessed during the 2008 elections, establishing precedents for how communities and individuals react to political tension.

Maintaining public neutrality or silence (freeze), especially on sensitive topics or when interacting with unknown individuals. This was linked to social anxiety and fear of repercussions for perceived affiliation. Jamie (male, political leader and activist), highlighted the constant alertness required by opposition members,

While we have witnessed the brutality of the regime for long, the 2008 scenario made it quite obvious for most of us to know that violence can happen at any time. You have to be alerted all the time … you are not safe even from the state security itself … So obvious we live in fear.

Kuda (male, community youth member) expressed a related fear rooted in instability, There is always that fear of the unknown … the environment seems very unstable. The researcher also noted manifestations of this fear during data collection itself, with some participants declining involvement or expressing discomfort with audio recording due to fear of state security repercussions.

Strategically performing allegiance or compliance to appease those perceived to hold power (fawn), often for protection or access to resources. Gile (female, community youth member) described this explicitly,

Most young people are ZANU-PF card-carrying members not by choice but because they are trying to protect themselves from the potential violence that might come. The 27 June [the day 2008 re-run elections were held] history has taught us well, and we always warn and prepare these young ones on how to conduct themselves in this politically charged environment

(Female, community youth member).

This was reinforced by Yala (male, FGD2),

The only way you can protect yourself … is to be a card-carrying member. That gives you at least peace …

(male, FGD2).

These psychological adaptations appeared deeply entrenched, driven by both historical narratives and present-day anxieties about safety and survival. However, perspectives on the omnipresence of fear varied; for instance, some youth, particularly those aligned with the ruling party, indicated a more episodic view, noting,

I don’t think there is need for fear and I don’t see that people are afraid. Violence is not an everyday issue. It has episodes and seasons

(Taku, Male, ZANU-PF youth activist).

This suggests that while fear permeates the general atmosphere, its intensity can be perceived as cyclical rather than constant, or that political affiliation might offer a perceived buffer against persistent anxiety.

5.2. Political Apathy as a Survival Strategy

Youth disengagement from politics emerged less as passive indifference and more as a deliberate, informed survival tactic rooted in observations of violence and perceived risks. One 26-year-old participant articulated the calculation,

Being seen as opposition is dangerous. But being neutral keeps you safe. You can move. You can do business

(male, informal trader).

Political neutrality functions as a strategy for maintaining mobility and economic participation within a constrained environment.

Economic survival was frequently described as tightly bound to political networks, compelling performative loyalty. Youth spoke of needing perceived affiliation for access to vending spaces or informal jobs. One female participant noted,

To get a stall, you must show you are loyal. That means joining meetings, wearing the T-shirt. Otherwise, you’re pushed out

(Lisa, female, informal trader)

This performative aspect makes genuine belief hard to distinguish from pragmatic necessity. Expanding on this, she explicitly linked precarious livelihoods to overt political coercion and historical events, stating,

You do what they say and if you are identified as a member of opposition or you disagree with them, you are beaten, or your business space is taken from you. This trend was high common since the 2008 re-run elections, and the formation of Chipangano.

Mhofu (male) critically observed this dynamic regarding youth exploited by political elites,

They are deceived and manipulated for a few cents for drugs, beer and [a] few regalia and that’s it, they are muscles for life.

5.3. Impunity and Generational Entrapment

The culture of impunity was frequently cited as reinforcing trauma and cynicism. Respondents highlighted those known perpetrators of past violence often remained visible and unprosecuted, sometimes holding positions of influence. This perception undermined trust in formal justice or reconciliation processes. A female trader shared an example,

There’s a guy we call ‘Hondo’. He used to beat people in 2008. Everyone knows. He has more power now. Who can report him?

(female, informal trader).

The observation that those responsible for past harms seemed to face no consequences contributed to a sense of generational entrapment and futility regarding political change, captured by a male youth’s question,

If the people who beat my uncle now drive big cars, what peace are we talking about?

(youth, community member).

This psychological entrapment, whereby trauma and injustice are daily realities, contributes to a sense of inherited futility. Youth begin to perceive the political system not just as violent but as immune to reform.

5.4. Internalised Structural Violence

Participants strongly linked their mental health struggles and challenging behaviours to broader socio-economic conditions, reflecting the impact of structural violence (Galtung 1990). High unemployment and poverty were central concerns. Jigzah described the desperation,

Most young people in the ghetto are in poverty. They are involved in a lot of drug abuse and prostitution because they have nothing to do and they are desperate. This is what makes many young people vulnerable to being used, as what happened in 2008. Youth end up doing anything, including violence, if they are getting paid to do it

(Male, Youth leader).

Cloud added regarding survival means,

Some of them are trying to put in some decent work but the majority of them are now thieves

(Male, Informal business owner).

Themes of hopelessness, anxiety, and depression were prevalent. A young woman stated, Sometimes I just sleep the whole day. I don’t see a future. I feel heavy. Another participant reflected, Most of us are not crazy, but we are broken. We walk around broken. Young women faced particular vulnerabilities, as Musi observed:

For girls its worse and sad, some were abused and raped for being part of the opposition and some are involved in prostitution and co-habiting just to survive (Female, Political and community leader).

These expressions were often linked to unemployment, lack of education, or the pressure to align with political actors for survival. Substance abuse was widely mentioned as a common coping mechanism for escaping these pressures, though participants also noted it could fuel further community problems. As one FGD participant explained,

Drugs help them forget. But the same drugs make them violent. It’s a cycle. During the re-run elections, all the youths got was beer and meat, and they were willing to make everyone suffer. That cycle continues even today

(Female, youth).

The intersection of psychological distress and structural hardship underscores the complex challenges facing youth. For Zimbabwe’s post-conflict youth participating in this study, this intersection manifested as both emotional distress and behavioural withdrawal.

5.5. Perceptions of Peace Efforts, Reconciliation, and Healing Initiatives

Alongside descriptions of hardship and fear, participants voiced significant concerns and scepticism regarding formal efforts towards peace, reconciliation, and addressing past violence within their community. The findings reveal that perceived lack of genuine commitment and effectiveness from state authorities is often attributed to politicisation and corruption. Cloud (male, informal business owner) expressed this distrust,

The authorities are always trying … because it’s their job, but the truth of the matter is they fail because most matters of violence are political and because the system is highly corrupted. Most perpetrators are not arrested for long, and justice never takes place because they are protected by some senior political party member or they pay the police.

While one participant, Musi (female, political and community leader), noted a specialized police branch potentially helping, overall sentiment towards police effectiveness in handling political violence was low, with youth labelling them “useless”, “toothless”, and “corrupt”. Many felt a general lack of state determination to implement meaningful peacebuilding or rehabilitation programmes. Taku (male, young business owner) stated,

Reconciliation and peace are possible when the government is determined, and the people are willing. But it seems our government has no interest in that.

Consequently, participants indicated a greater reliance on non-profit institutions like churches, NGOs, and civil society organisations for peace-related work and addressing social challenges. Jigzah (male, youth leader) mentioned specific programmes,

There are some support services from NGOs … There is “Youth In Action” which is being run by the Roman Catholic Church. It focuses on addressing community challenges affecting young people, they have been involved in cleaning the community and addressing a lot of youth challenges such as drug abuse and violent behaviours.

Civil society organisations like the Counselling Services Unit (CSU) were mentioned for rehabilitating violence victims, and others like Rea (male, civil society expert) noted efforts focused on human rights training and conscientisation. However, despite these initiatives, most youth participants reported never having been involved personally in any formal rehabilitation or reconciliation programmes. Regarding national-level strategies, participants were aware of mechanisms like the post-GNU Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) or the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) but expressed disappointment that these efforts had not translated into tangible action within their community. Musi reflected,

After the 2008 election violence, the GNU government formed COPAC to promote the message of peace. They told us that there will be healing workshops, but they never happened here … It’s important to have reconciliation and peace: Zvinoita kuti vanhu vawadzane [It promotes good fellowship amongst people].

Lisa (female, informal business owner) shared this scepticism,

There has never been any form of reconciliation or forgiveness in this community. All the national stories of healing and reconciliation never reached the real victims … I think it was all for show.

This sentiment was also echoed in focus groups,

We last heard about peace and healing during the GNU. And we know there is a commission … but we have never seen them doing anything here, yet violent activities are always taking place …

(Male, civil society, FGD 2).

Another youth added,

… there has never been a form of intervention or healing program to help people heal from this history of violence. It quite traumatic you know

(Male, community youth, FGD1).

This absence of effective reconciliation efforts for past traumas was seen as a critical gap, leaving wounds unaddressed and potentially contributing to cycles of violence. Prev (male, church leader) knew young perpetrators who regretted their actions but had no access to reconciliation programmes. Participants also highlighted the value peace programmes, whether formal or informal, could have,

Peace programmes especially, those on healing and reconciliation help to shape new relationships that can be the platform for addressing old wounds and close gaps for any future violence…

The lack thereof leaves youth feeling trapped by the past. Participants also expressed notable frustration with ad hoc, short-term interventions by some NGOs or researchers, which were perceived as extractive or lacking long-term commitment. Participants expressed a desire for sustainable programmes addressing core issues like unemployment, rather than temporary projects or donations,

How I wish we had proper long-term programmes … most NGOs though they help, they just come for a short period of time.

(Female, community youth, FGD3)

Another youth felt their key issues weren’t genuinely heard in some short-term engagements (male, community youth, FGD4). This scepticism towards external interventions highlights the need for genuine partnership and sustainable initiatives in any peacebuilding efforts.

5.6. Exclusion, Exploitation, and Negative Perceptions

Beyond economic hardship and fear, participants also described experiences of being excluded from meaningful participation, exploited by those in power, and burdened by negative societal stereotypes. Youth felt marginalised from decision-making spaces, as Paddy (male, political party youth member, FGD1) noted,

Youths are often considered to be voiceless … most of our leaders believe that young people have no ideas…

This exclusion pushes them towards informal sectors where they remain vulnerable to exploitation, both political, as described by Mhofu, and potentially sexual, as highlighted by Lynn (female, civil society leader and peacebuilder) regarding transactional relationships (“sugar mama and sugar daddy syndrome”) arising from economic desperation. Compounding this, youth felt unfairly “demonised”, as Lynn termed it, based on negative perceptions. This negative stereotyping is mostly ascribed to how many young people were the main perpetrators of the 2008 violence, linking their generation to past brutalities. Another participant lamented,

As young people, we are often looked down upon … The narratives about youths are always negatives. This is mostly ascribed to how most young people were the main perpetrators of the 2008 violence.

This complex web of exclusion, exploitation, and negative stereotyping further shapes their experiences and constrains their opportunities.

6. Discussion

The study’s findings reveal deeply rooted patterns of trauma transmission, fear-based socialisation, and the perpetuation of political apathy among Zimbabwean youth, particularly in the high-density urban context of Mbare. However, it is important to note that similar dynamics may manifest differently in rural settings. These findings are congruent with broader scholarship highlighting the long-term effects of trauma in post-conflict settings (Charlson et al. 2019; Betancourt et al. 2015). While previous research has often focused on direct victims and perpetrators of violence (Zvaita and Kaye 2023), this study reinforces the assertion that trauma can be indirectly inherited across generations, influencing youth who were not direct witnesses to the 2008 electoral violence but whose identities and political attitudes have been shaped by it (Ndlovu and Tshuma 2021; Sangalang and Vang 2017).

The intergenerational effects described by participants—particularly stories of parental fear, enforced silence, and disengagement from politics—support the concept of “traumascapes” (Tumarkin 2005), where landscapes of violence persist in social memory and influence daily life and civic behaviour. While many youths did not directly witness the 2008 violence, the recurring and recent threats of violence they have encountered serve to confirm and reinforce the vivid accounts they were exposed to during childhood. Similar patterns have been observed in Rwanda and Cambodia, where historical trauma has shaped post-genocide youth attitudes toward politics and reconciliation (Ingabire et al. 2023; Burchert et al. 2017). In Zimbabwe, familial narratives involving beatings, disappearances, and economic reprisals have become entrenched psychosocial boundaries that discourage political engagement and promote strategic neutrality. These intergenerational transmissions of trauma condition youth behaviour in ways that mirror broader patterns of politically induced silence and survivalist adaptation (Parsons et al. 2011; James 2010).

Fear, as both a historical residue and present condition, was evident in youth expressions of anxiety and silence. This resonates with the PTSD prevalence and mental health challenges reported in Zimbabwean primary healthcare settings (Abas et al. 2023). Structural impunity—marked by the absence of public acknowledgement, justice, or community-based healing processes—has compounded these psychological injuries (Ngwenya and Harris 2015; Brounéus 2010). This absence of justice mechanisms has, in turn, intensified avoidance behaviours, with youth preferring to remain politically invisible to avoid reprisal. This links to what Atwoli et al. (2015) describe as trauma-induced disengagement in fragile post-conflict states.

Another critical dimension revealed in this study is the dual nature of silence as both protective and suppressive. Youth often perceived political neutrality as a form of survival—a necessity in a context where economic opportunities are linked to political patronage. This survivalist strategy, particularly the “fawn” responses observed, where youth adopt behaviours to please political actors or align themselves with dominant parties without genuine support, aligns with the theorisation of trauma-adaptive behaviours in coercive environments (Miller and Rasmussen 2010; Yehuda et al. 2015). Such findings affirm that trauma does not only manifest through visible mental distress but also through strategic social choices, constrained civic imagination, and adaptive apathy. Crucially, the data suggest that youth political apathy in Zimbabwe is not born of indifference but is a by-product of inherited fear and socio-economic precariousness. This contradicts common narratives that depict youth as disinterested in politics. Instead, the study underscores that disengagement is rooted in structural violence, intergenerational storytelling, and perceived risks of political involvement (Mutambara et al. 2023; Chiweshe 2016). These insights broaden trauma discourse to include not just wartime survivors but youth in electoral autocracies where violence is systemic and cyclical.

7. Implications of Findings

The study’s findings carry significant implications for understanding the enduring impact of political violence and the complexities of post-conflict recovery in contexts like Zimbabwe. Firstly, the palpable presence of ‘traumascapes’ and the explicit intergenerational transmission of fear, as evidenced by parental warnings and elders’ historical accounts, underscore that violence is not merely an episodic event but an ongoing, inherited condition. This challenges approaches to peacebuilding that focus solely on institutional reforms or transitional justice mechanisms that do not explicitly address these deeply embedded psychological wounds. It suggests that civic disengagement, often dismissed as apathy, is in fact a rational, contextually conditioned survival strategy deeply ingrained by historical precedent and continuous exposure to political coercion. The observed ‘flight’, ‘freeze’, and ‘fawn’ responses are not passive disinterest but active adaptations by youth to navigate a volatile political environment where overt participation carries tangible risks to their safety and economic survival.

Secondly, the pervasive culture of impunity, where perpetrators of past violence remain unprosecuted and often hold positions of power, has profound implications for social trust and the potential for future civic agency. This perpetuates a cycle of generational entrapment, where the absence of justice mechanisms continuously reinforces cynicism and the perception that the political system is immune to reform. For youth, this means inheriting not just memories of violence but also a learnt futility regarding formal avenues for change, making them vulnerable to exploitation by political elites who weaponise their precarity.

Finally, the strong linkage between internalised structural violence (unemployment, poverty, lack of opportunities) and youth vulnerability deepens our understanding of the multi-faceted nature of conflict’s aftermath. The study highlights that economic desperation is not merely a background factor but a direct driver of certain political behaviours, including performative allegiance and involvement in exploitative political networks. This implies that true post-conflict recovery and youth empowerment cannot be achieved without addressing fundamental socio-economic inequalities. A failure to prioritise psychosocial healing alongside structural reforms will likely perpetuate cycles of civic disempowerment, as youth continue to adopt self-protective measures that limit their potential for meaningful political participation and societal transformation. These insights are crucial for reframing youth political disengagement not as a deficit of will but as a direct outcome of a traumatised political landscape.

8. Conclusions

Zimbabwe’s path to post-conflict recovery cannot be envisioned purely through political or legal reform. As this study demonstrates, trauma transcends temporal and physical boundaries, embedding itself in the collective psyche of communities and reproducing through generational storytelling and everyday socialisation. The 2008 electoral violence has left an enduring legacy—not only in the memories of those who were directly brutalised but also in the behavioural repertoires and civic attitudes of a new generation. Their strategic silence, avoidance of political identity, and perceived vulnerability to reprisal highlight the insidious nature of intergenerational trauma. A trauma-informed approach to peacebuilding is therefore indispensable. Policies and reconciliation frameworks must account for the silent, inherited psychological wounds that shape youth participation in Zimbabwean politics. Community-based mental health services, trauma-sensitive civic education, and platforms for truth-telling and memorialisation are essential in cultivating a politically resilient generation. Without such interventions, the cycle of fear, coercion, and disenfranchisement will remain entrenched, impeding efforts to democratise, heal, and build inclusive post-conflict societies.

9. Policy and Practice Recommendations

The findings of this study suggest several recommendations for both policy and practice. First, the state must acknowledge and address the legacy of electoral violence as a long-term psychosocial challenge. Healing cannot be achieved through legal reform alone; targeted trauma-informed interventions are essential. There is a need to incorporate trauma counselling and mental health services into community development and youth empowerment programmes, particularly in high-density urban areas like Mbare and potentially other affected rural communities. Second, educational and civic engagement programmes must be trauma sensitive. Schools, youth centres, and civil society organisations should provide safe spaces for young people to discuss their experiences and understand the historical and political contexts of the violence that shaped them. This includes creating platforms for storytelling, memory work, and artistic expression that validate youth experiences while building critical civic agency. Third, the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) must decentralise its processes to reach traumatised communities and include intergenerational trauma in its reconciliation frameworks. Community-led truth-telling, memory preservation, and reparative initiatives could serve as grassroots vehicles for healing and participatory democracy. Finally, economic and social policies should be mindful of the structural violence that sustains youth vulnerability. Addressing youth unemployment, precarious livelihoods, and political patronage systems must be seen as central to any meaningful post-conflict recovery. Without economic alternatives, trauma-informed political disengagement will continue to shape the future of Zimbabwean civic life.