Perspectives on Trust: Toward a Historical Mapping of the Concept and Its Dimensions

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

-

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Comments on the Quality of English Language

See attached file.

Author Response

 

1. General concept comments

Comment A.1: Collectivist narrative is blurry and hard to follow.

Response A.1: Thank you for pointing this out. I tend to agree with the observation and suspect that the fuzziness may be due to the shortening and condensing of the text from various earlier versions. Therefore, I have revised, rewritten, or included a number of clarifying sentences to the introductory passages on collectivist perspectives to enhance the text´s clarity and coherence, making it easier to follow, as in these subsequent parts:

Example A.1.1: On page 3, paragraph 1, 81-…), Addition of the explanatory sentences to the introductory distinction between the individual perspective and the collectivist perspective:

 

3. Tracking the conceptual development of trust

3.1 Individual vs. Collectivist Perspectives on Trust

There are a number of ways to distinguish the main approaches in which authors conceptualize trust. In my view, one of the most analytically comprehensive and useful frameworks for organizing perspectives on trust is proposed by Delhey and Newton (2003, 94-101), who differentiate between (1) individual and (2) collectivist perspectives. Whereas individual approaches view trust as a phenomenon related to individuals, their core personality, rationality, identity, interests, individual dispositions, or social orientations, collective approaches tend to view trust as a property of societies, communities, social systems, and their inherent institutions. Both conceptualizations assume that the study of trust is predominantly either a bottom-up or a top-down research enterprise. Alternatively, as shown in some recent studies (Larsen 2013; Frederiksen 2019; et al.) and discussed in the last section 4, there are advantages and challenges in combining these levels, their perspectives and underlying dimensions. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to use the general epistemological orientations of these two schools of thought as an initial starting point for mapping the conceptual development of trust. This classification will therefore generally serve as the basis for identifying, mapping, and discussing trust perspectives in the following sections.

Example A.1.2: On page 4, paragraph 2, 100-…: minor text revisions in the introductory passage on individual perspectives:

3.1.1 Individual Perspectives

The first category, referred to as individual perspectives, conceptualizes trust primarily as a matter of personality or rationality. The first approach, often categorized in the literature as personality theory (Delhey and Newton 2003, 95), is here termed:

1. Personality perspective: The central premise of this perspective is that trust, as a core personality trait, is predominantly developed during early childhood socialization, with subsequent life experiences, including traumatic events, potentially altering an individual's trust orientation towards the social environment (Erikson 1950; Uslaner 2002; Delhey and Newton 2003;).
2. Rational-choice perspective: In contrast, the second strand within individual perspectives conceptualizes trust not as a personality trait shaped through socialization but as a series of individual events and cognitive evaluations of trustworthiness. This approach, often referred to as the "rational choice perspective" (Dunn 1993, 641; Möllering 2001, 412-413; Misztal 2020, 342-347), views trust as a more or less rational pursuit of interests.

Example A.1.3: Introducing common denominators and internal distinctions of the collectivist perspectives:  

3.1.2 Collectivist Perspectives

Authors who adhere to collectivist perspectives do not necessarily perceive trust as an inherent attribute, trait, or disposition of individuals. Instead, they regard it as a property of collectives or social systems. For these scholars, trust is fundamentally a matter of norms, rules, and ethical habits that shape society (Fukuyama 1995, 7). Furthermore, it is about social reciprocity (Putnam 2000, 21), different types of role expectations (Barber 1983), social relations and the obligations inherent to them (Misztal 1996, 21), or, to acknowledge a larger picture, trust permeates social cohesion (Larsen, 2013). The underlying epistemological and methodological logic of collectivist perspectives can be seen as inversely mirroring that of individualist approaches to trust. Individualist approaches generally prioritize the analysis of personality and rationality in trust, with varying degrees of consideration for collective norms and social structures. Collectivist perspectives similarly do not disregard the role of individual trust in their research frameworks. However, they tend to view trust as a social and not merely an individual reality, and as a matter of societal, community, or institutional structures. More specifically, the societal view focuses on social institutions, collectives, or whole societies. The emphasis on communal structures focuses on community or civic culture. Scholars who focus on institutional structures see trust as largely linked to political institutions of the state. Collectivist threads on trust will thus here be divided into three conceptual subcategories: societal, civic, and institutional subperspectives:

1. Societal perspective: The basic assumptions of this perspective can be subsumed under the view that trust represents a social reality, encompassing emotional, cognitive, and behavioral dimensions of human experience (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; 2012). In this vein, trust is primarily related to social circumstances in which individuals act, social institutions in which they participate, and societies with their social orders, divisions, and inequalities in which they live. The theoretical foundations of this perspective can be traced back to the concepts of collective consciousness, division of labor and organic solidarity within modern societies as articulated by Émile Durkheim and, more explicitly, to Georg Simmel's inter-subjective sociological analysis of trust.
2. Civic perspective: This perspective differs from the aforementioned societal views in that it places greater emphasis on the role of associative life within communities and their citizens in fostering trust, rather than focusing on the perceived efficacy of modern social and state institutions. The attitudes of "civicness" (Putnam 1993) and "sociability" (Fukuyama 1995), norms of reciprocity, and the trustworthiness of citizens working together on equal footing, which result in the bridging republican culture of trust, are among the principal foci for these authors. Their contemporary work is largely rooted in the conceptual framework established by Alexis de Tocqueville, exploring the formation of trusting bonds among citizens as the interplay between their participation, civil society and democratic institutions.
3. Institutional perspective: A recent development among the three aforementioned collective perspectives is the institution-oriented view on trust between citizens. This view explores and largely associates trust with the political institutions of the state and their role in creating or sustaining social trust. Some authors of this perspective conceptualize trust itself as an informal institution (Rothstein 2013, 1011). The central trust-related concepts and measures within this thread include the quality of government, corruption, and the perceived impartiality of political institutions (Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Rothstein 2013).

 

Comment A.2: Overall, the passages are mostly quotes that do not express the author's opinion. It feels clunky and does not provide a strong logical foundation for the whole piece. More signposting or better structure is needed. For example, a clear diagram of perspectives, sub-perspectives and their dimensions.

Response A.2: The initial aim of the paper is to provide a conceptual framework, in part by showing how modern concepts of trust have evolved historically. In this sense, I believe that including some influential concepts in the form of quotations is necessary. However, in grateful acknowledgement of the constructive comment, I have tried not to overburden the arguments with quotations, to make my position clearer and to facilitate a clearer structure of the arguments - so I have introduced more signposting, my interpretations and a diagram of perspectives/sub-perspectives/dimensions.

2.2.1 Examples of signposting introduced:

Page 4:

Collectivist perspectives similarly do not disregard the role of individual trust in their research frameworks. However, they tend to view trust as a social and not an individual reality, and as a matter of societal, community, or institutional structures. More specifically, the societal view focuses on social institutions, collectives, or whole societies.

Page 8:

Alternatively, another approach to trust from the rational choice perspective is presented by Hardin.

Page 9:

Correspondingly, more recent integrations of these concepts can be found in the contributions of Paul Bauer and Markus Freitag.   

Page 14:

In addition, Barbara Misztal presents an additional conceptualisation within the societal perspective on trust. For Misztal, an essential question of trust is that of order (Misztal 1996, p. 25). "In essence, the problem of establishing trust in society is the issue of the conditions necessary for social order and human action to continue." The fundamental premise of her argument can be summarized as follows (Misztal 1996, p. 95-101): The nature of trust can be examined through the lens of three distinct forms of social order or their constituent elements: (1) stability, (2) cohesion, and (3) cooperation. On the whole, each of these encompasses a range of trust-related practices, including routines for stability, friendships for cohesion, and forms of solidarity for political cooperation.

 

2.2.2 Examples of the author's interpretations and opinions:

Page 12:

Trust is not something that I as an individual simply carry around with me and give or withhold, but rather a fundamental social mechanism that exists collectively and that we can mutually use – as in the benevolent leap of faith towards strangers, the bonding and bridging of the intangibility of social relations, social institutions and society itself. This is the basic assumption of authors analysing trust from the societal perspective. Some of its core ideas can be traced back to the work of Durkheim and Simmel.

 

2.2.3 A better structure: a diagram of perspectives, sub-perspectives and their inherent dimensions is added (Figure 2.1, page 5, see below):

 

 

Figure 2.1: A mapping of the major perspectives, sub-perspectives, and some of the underlying dimensions of trust. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Specific comments

 

Comment B.1: Can the author elaborate on the influence of Simmel and Durkheim to provide a more elaborate summary?

 

Response B.1: A brief elaboration of the influence and a more articulate summary is added (3.2.3, Page 12):

 

3.2.3 Collectivist societal perspective Simmel-Luhmann-Giddens-Misztal: Cohesion and reflexivity

 

 

Trust is not something that I as an individual simply carry around with me and give or withhold, but rather a fundamental social mechanism that exists collectively and that we can mutually use - as in the benevolent leap of faith towards strangers, the bonding and bridging of the intangibility of social relations, social institutions and society itself. This seems to be the basic assumption of authors analysing trust from the societal perspective. Most of its core ideas can be traced back to the work of Durkheim and Simmel.

Interestingly, Durkheim does not write explicitly about trust. But he does argue for an important moral element in modern societies. For him, these are based on an 'organic solidarity' between individuals, rooted in our interdependence of roles and social division of labour. Durkheim's position is that every society is in fact a moral society, and this is where, although not explicitly mentioned, trust is to be found as a moral social mechanism of social order in our modern terms (Durkheim 1977, pp. 266-269; Misztal 1996, pp. ).The influence of his conceptualization can be seen in the association of trust with the boundaries of a 'moral community' in contemporary writings on trust. The unconvincing part of this is that a plurality of moral systems coexist in modern societies.

Simmel (1956), on the other hand, explicitly analyses trust in several passages. In his view, as we can see from his highly perceptive but sometimes contradictory writings, societies are rather bricolages of moral systems, and intersubjective pluralism is the name of the game. The phenomenon of trust operates at the macro level of societies or nations, but also at the mezzo and organisational levels within social classes, ethnic groups or interest-based associations. His work is the first more explicit examination of trust as a concept within the social sciences and provides important support for the arguments of the societal perspective (Misztal 1996, pp. 49-50). Simmel identifies three core dimensions of trust, which I summarise as follows:

 

• Trust is a socially cohesive phenomenon. Simmel (1950, p. 318) states: "Confidence, evidently, is one of the most important synthetic forces within society." This theme of the cohesive effect of trust is reiterated in subsequent societal oriented literature on trust and beyond (Luhmann 1979, pp. 18-23; Misztal 1996, pp. 50-51; Uslaner 2002, pp. 1-3).

 

Comment B.2: Table 3.1 – instead of using incomplete / out of context quotes from historical research, the author should concisely summarize, in contemporary language, the definitions they wish to present.

 

Response B.2: A table is revised and more concise summaries of definitions and authors´ conceptualizations in contemporary language are added (Table 3.1, page 9):

 

 

Table 3.1: Brief historical overview of trust conceptualizations representing different perspectives and sub-perspectives with their inherent dimensions.

Author	Basic conceptualisation	Perspective / sub-perspective	Dimensions
Simmel (1950 [1908], p. 318)	Trust is one of the important cohesive forces within societies and an intermediary between knowing and not knowing.	Collectivist / societal	Cohesion, Reflexivity
Erikson (1950, p. 220)	Trust is a general state of confidence which implies that one learns about the reliability of other people, that one trusts oneself and that one is trustworthy for others.	Individual/ personality	Stability, security (ontological, emotional)
Deutsch (1958, p. 266)	To trust is to expect that a certain event or behaviour will occur, and if that expectation is not fulfilled, there will be great negative consequences for the trusting individual.	Individual / Rational choice	Cognition
Almond and Verba (1963, p. 228)	Trust is the belief that people are generally cooperative, trustworthy and helpful. We can call this belief general social trust, and it can have consequences for political trust in institutions. This is the case in the United States and the United Kingdom.	Collectivist / civic	Cohesion,
Rotter (1967, p. 651)	Trust is an interpersonal phenomenon in the sense of an individual or group's expectation that a promise made by another can be relied upon.	Individual / personality	Stability, moral
Luhmann (1979 [1968], p. 69)	Trust is more like induction in terms of extrapolation beyond the evidence provided. Reflexivity is an important dimension of trust between people, but even more so in trust in systems. Here, the fact that others also trust becomes a matter of mutual and conscious trusting.	Collectivist / societal	Reflexivity, cohesion
Barber (1983, p. 19)	The general function of trust is social ordering for actors and systems through their continuous interaction in organisations and institutions. In this sense, it provides moral and cognitive expectational maps that are "socially learned and socially confirmed".	Collectivist / societal	Moral, cognitive
Lewis und Weigert (1985, p. 969)	The fundamental function of trust is sociological rather than psychological, since it always presupposes social relationships. Its main dimensions are cognitive, emotional and behavioural, and are bound up in a unified, cohesive social experience.	Collectivist / societal	Cohesion, cognition, emotion
Gambetta (1988, p. 217)	Trust or distrust represents a particular expectation we have about the likely behaviour of others. It is embedded in a perceived level of subjective probability and reflexivity that another individual agent or group will perform a particular action. It is not possible to predict or monitor this action in a continuous way in advance, hence the need for trust.	Individiual / Rational Choice	Cognition, reflexivity
Yamagishi und Yamagishi (1994, p. 132, 139)	Trust is an expectation of the benevolent intentions of others with whom we interact, based on our inference of their personal traits. Trust can be divided into knowledge-based trust and general trust. In the former, we focus our expectations on particular people or organisations; in the latter, we believe in the goodness of human nature in general.	Individual / Rational choice - personality	Moral, cognitive, reflexivity
Giddens (1994, 26, 33)	Trust is confidence in the reliability of a person or a system. In trust between people, it can be seen as a form of belief in the honesty, benevolence or love of another. As trust in abstract systems, it is faith in the competence of others or correctness of their basic principles. All human-based systems in modern societies, such as the monetary system or expert systems, depend on trust.	Collectivist / societal	Cohesion, reflexivity
Misztal (1996, 21)	Trust is generated by social relationships and the obligations they contain. Conceptually, it is based on our uncertainty about other people's motivations. Socially, trust is motivationally based on strong and positive personal bonds, our affection for the targets of trust, or our belief that we have good reasons to trust.	Collectivist / societal	Cohesion, moral, emotional
Sztompka (1999, p. 25-26)	When we trust, we are essentially betting on the future unforeseeable actions of others. In this sense, trust consists of two main components: our beliefs and our commitments. It begins with particular expectations, but this "anticipatory belief" is not enough. We must also actively commit ourselves to actions that may have uncertain, uncontrollable and possibly negative consequences for us.	Individualist / Rational choice – personality	Cognition, moral
Hardin (2002, p. 40)	Trust is a tripartite relationship in which a) the trustor generally b) trusts the trustee to do c) based on the trustor's judgement of the trustee's intentions with respect to a particular action. Generally, the trusted person's intentions are based on self-interest, which also recognises or includes the trustor's interest, moral obligation or individual character.	Individual / rational choice	Cognition, reciprocity, moral
Uslaner (2002, p. 2)	Trust is an individual belief rooted in a fundamental ethical assumption - that other people share your core values. This presupposes the existence of common bonds that enable cooperation, which are essentially based on assumptions about human nature. That is, that the world is a beneficial place and we have certain obligations to one another.	Individual / personality	Moral, cohesion
Delhey und Newton (2004, p. 4)	Trust is not so much as an individual property that we carry around with us, but an assessment of the society in which we live. In this sense, trust is a collective good and an essentially social phenomenon. Individually, it is based on the feeling that other people will not intentionally harm us or will even recognise our interests.	Collective / societal	Moral, cognition, cohesion
Rothstein (2011, 161-162)	Trust between people or social trust is an informal institution that has individual intrinsic values such as optimism about the future, political values by supporting democratic institutions and an economic value for co-operation. Dysfunctional governments and corrupt institutions that fostering inequalities and discrimination could be the worst social ill leading to pervasive social distrust.	Collective / institutional	Stability, moral

 

 

 

Comment B.3: Same applies to section 3.2.1, it is predominantly quotations and not the authors own words. Making the dimensions of trust that they are presenting feel chaotic and hard to follow.

 

Response B.3: Acknowledging the comment, I have revised this section on the societal perspective, adding more personal interpretations to ease the flow of argument (see examples below):

 

Example B.3.1 (Page 12):

 

Trust is not something that I as an individual simply carry around with me and give or withhold, but rather a fundamental social mechanism that exists collectively and that we can mutually use – as in the benevolent leap of faith towards strangers, the bonding and bridging of the intangibility of social relations, social institutions and society itself. This is the basic assumption of authors analysing trust from the societal perspective. Some of its core ideas can be traced back to the work of Durkheim and Simmel.

Interestingly, Durkheim does not write explicitly about trust. But he does argue for an important moral element in modern societies. For him, these are based on an 'organic solidarity' between individuals, rooted in our interdependence of roles and social division of labour. Durkheim's position is that every society is in fact a moral society, and this is where, although not explicitly mentioned, trust is to be found as a moral collective mechanism of social order in our modern terms (Durkheim 1977, pp. 266-269; Misztal 1996, pp. ).The influence of his conceptualization can be seen in the association of trust with the boundaries of a 'moral community' in contemporary writings on trust. The unconvincing part of this conceptualisation is that it does not akcnowledging that in modern societies a plurality of moral systems actually coexist.

Simmel (1956), on the other hand, explicitly analyses trust in several passages. In his view, as we can see from his highly perceptive but sometimes contradictory writings, societies are rather bricolages of moral systems, and intersubjective pluralism is the name of the game. (…)

 

 

1. General questions to help guiding the revision of the article

 

Comment C.1: Author highlights historical papers up until 2019, so all papers are 5 years+. Would be of value to discuss emerging trends within the last 5 years, how do we develop digital trust – e.g. in AI, social media etc.

 

Response C.1: The aim of the paper is a brief, condensed historical mapping of conceptual developments of trust. Thankfully acknowledging the comment, a short section on recent developments regarding the trust perspectives has been added (see below and the revised version of the article, pages 20-21):

4.1 Recent developments

 

Different perspectives on trust and their implicitly divergent conceptualisations are still receiving varying degrees of attention from social scientists. Some of their attempts focus on disentangling the pervasive conceptual juggernauts responsible for stalemates, extending research interest to new phenomena such as social disruption or digital environments, or attempting to reconcile constructed conceptual divisions with reframing proposals. As far as the structure of themes and foci is concerned, there are at least four threads of developments in trust research that can be discerned in recent years, with varying degrees of visible association with specific theoretical perspectives or their combinations.  (1) The first recent (re)emerging theme is the question of typology of trust, denoting the revisions and explorations of its different forms and types. (2) The second theme is the issue of methodology, measurement and ways to better empirically capture and understand trust. (3) The third distinct stream of trust research and conceptualisations is addressing the issues of trust in new digital social environments. And the final thread of recent work on trust can be defined as (4) those contributions that extend, reframe and possibly reconcile perspectives on trust.

 

(1)     The focus of recent (and not so recent) typology-oriented efforts is the search for theoretical plausibility and empirical viability of trust concepts. Some of the authors re-examine trust conceptually. Others empirically test the presumed conceptual differences and construct what they believe to be a convincing trust typology. An example of the former is the implementation of Sartori's (1984) ladder of abstraction, which aims at a universal, interdisciplinary definition of trust (Utthental 2024). Here, trust is differentiated along two axes: one is the distance of the object/subject of trust, the other is the level of its abstractness/concreteness. The truster's trusting orientation towards distant, more abstract objects is attributed to the individual's psychological propensity to trust in general, as in the personality perspective, while the second, more concrete trust is assumed to stem from a predominantly evaluative basis of the truster's capacities, as in trust game experiments from the rational choice perspective.

Beyond such efforts associated with a particular perspective on trust, or attempting to bridge them across disciplines, there nevertheless seems to be an emerging general consensus around the formerly divisive perspective-based compartmentalisation of what trust is or is not. Most authors seem to generally agree on the conceptual distinction between social trust targeting specific persons, groups or people in general and political trust in varying institutions (Zmerli 2024; Newton et. Al. 2018). 

(2)     Methodological discussions arising from or related to different perspectives on trust generally revolve around the question of how to measure and empirically capture trust in a plausible and comprehensive way for such a multidimensional social phenomenon. An exemplary proposal for measurement development methodology is offered by the authors, who build their arguments largely on the premises of the rationality-bound perspective - generally understanding trust as a form of context-dependent subjective probability assessment of the trustworthiness of individuals. Their revisionist measures aim at capturing more specific contextual trust attitudes through additional probing survey questions, such as asking about "parents" instead of "family" in general. This approach is generally based on the rationality-bound universal trust proposition Truster A trusts Trustee B to do X in context Y (Bauer and Freitag 2018), as opposed to the normative trust assumption Truster A trusts as in standard survey questions, which assumes the existence of an unspecified context-independent general trust attitude among individuals (Uslaner 2015, 2018). The latter, classically measured with the "most people can be trusted" question or a modification of Rosenberg's Faith in People Index (Rosenberg 1956), has recently also seen revisionary attempts, such as scaling extensions to 7- or 9-point bipolar scales (Robbins 2024) or the Stranger Face Trust (SFT) questionnaire, which is based on trust responses to specific visual representations of strangers. Once again, these methodological assumptions lean toward more evaluative (rationality-oriented) rather than personality or societal norm-oriented perspectives on trust (Robbins 2019). (...)

 

Comment 3.2: Table 3.1 – instead of using incomplete / out of context quotes from the historical research, the author should concisely summarize, in contemporary language, the definitions they wish to present.

A clear schema of perspectives, sub-perspectives and their dimensions are required and then that structured followed to discuss in more detail each of the perspectives and deimensions.

 

Response 3.2: See above.

 

 

I look forward to constructive criticism and comments.

 

Best regards,

 

The Author.

 

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Important caveat at the start of this (short) report: I am just a simple behavioural/experimental economist and my experience with thinking about and doing research on the concept of trust is pretty much limited to studies involving Berg et al. (1995)'s trust game and studies using the "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" question from the World Value Survey as a dependent or independent variable. I am not really used to the kind of 'historical analysis of a concept' approach exhibited in this paper.

That doesn't mean I thought it was an uninteresting paper. It starts out with a taxonomy of different ways we could think about trust - individualist and collectivist with different sub-categories. The main part of the paper is a description of the historical development of the 5 main categories in the literature. This subsequently leads to some general points about the current and future state of thinking and doing research about trust. It's just that I am not well read enough within this field of literature to be able to say if this is complete or whether everything that's covered is covered correctly. Or how novel this analysis is. The handful of studies mentioned that I am familiar with (Putnam, Fukuyama, Knack and Keefer, Ostrom) are alle covered appropriately as far as I can tell.

My main issue is one of a bit more clarification. It is largely clear to me what the difference is between the individualist and collectivist interpretations of trust are but I am a bit confused about the precise distinction between the three collectivist sub-categories (societal, civic, institutional). This is probably my fault because I am not really embedded within the literature but if you are interested in having a wider audience engage with your ideas it might be worth making this distinction a bit clearer. The first paragraph of 3.2.3 is really good in this respect. I kind of miss a paragraph like this in the other sections in this bit of the paper. They all start immediately with the literature and don't really explain the concept first. 

My only other question is why the study only covers the literature up to 2019 (p2, row 67)? It could simply be that not much of interest has happened in the field since then but it seems to be a bit of a random cut off point. A bit of clarification here would be much appreciated.  

Other than that I found it a very interesting paper to read. Well structured. Well written. It reads like a very nice and thorough overview of the topic with some interesting ideas at the end. 

 

Author Response

Comment 1

My main issue is one of more clarification. It is largely clear to me what the difference is between the individualist and collectivist interpretations of trust, but I am a bit confused about the precise distinction between the three collectivist subcategories. (…)

Response 1: Thank you for pointing this out. Rereading the paper, I tend to agree with the observation. Therefore, I have elaborated on the distinctions between the collectivist perspectives in two places to provide more clarity (see below):

 

3. Tracking the conceptual development of trust

3.1 Individual vs. Collectivist Perspectives on Trust

There are a number of ways to distinguish the main approaches in which authors conceptualize trust. In my view, one of the most analytically comprehensive and useful frameworks for organizing perspectives on trust is proposed by Delhey and Newton (2003, 94-101), who differentiate between (1) individual and (2) collectivist perspectives. Whereas individual approaches view trust as a phenomenon related to individuals, their core personality, rationality, identity, interests, individual dispositions, or social orientations, collective approaches tend to view trust as a property of societies, communities, social systems, and their inherent institutions. Both conceptualizations assume that the study of trust is predominantly either a bottom-up or a top-down research enterprise. Alternatively, as shown in some recent studies (Larsen 2013; Frederiksen 2019; et al.) and discussed in the last section 4, there are advantages and challenges in combining these levels, their perspectives and underlying dimensions. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to use the general epistemological orientations of these two schools of thought as an initial starting point for mapping the conceptual development of trust. This classification will therefore generally serve as the basis for identifying, mapping, and discussing trust perspectives in the following sections.

                                                (…)

 

3.1.2 Collectivist Perspectives

Opposed to the basic assumptions above, do authors who adhere to collectivist perspectives not necessarily perceive trust as an inherent attribute, trait, or disposition of individuals. Instead, they regard it as a property of collectives or social systems. For these scholars, trust is fundamentally a matter of norms, rules, and ethical habits that shape society (Fukuyama 1995, 7). Furthermore, it is about social reciprocity (Putnam 2000, 21), different types of role expectations (Barber 1983), social relations and the obligations inherent to them (Misztal 1996, 21), or, to acknowledge a larger picture, trust permeates social cohesion (Larsen, 2013). The underlying epistemological and methodological logic of collectivist perspectives can be seen as inversely mirroring that of individualist approaches to trust. Individualist approaches generally prioritize the analysis of personality and rationality in trust, with varying degrees of consideration for collective norms and social structures. Collectivist perspectives similarly do not disregard the role of individual trust in their research frameworks. However, they tend to view trust as a social and not an individual reality, and as a matter of societal, community, or institutional structures. More specifically, the societal view focuses on social institutions, collectives, or whole societies. The emphasis on communal structures focuses on community or civic culture. Scholars who focus on institutional structures see trust as largely linked to political institutions of the state. Collectivist threads on trust will thus here be divided into three conceptual subcategories: societal, civic, and institutional sub-perspectives:

1. Societal sub-perspective: The basic assumptions of this perspective can be subsumed under the view that trust represents a social reality, encompassing emotional, cognitive, and behavioral dimensions of human experience (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; 2012). In this vein, trust is primarily related to social circumstances in which individuals act, social institutions in which they participate, and societies with their social orders, divisions, and inequalities in which they live. The theoretical foundations of this perspective can be traced back to the concepts of collective consciousness, division of labor and organic solidarity within modern societies as articulated by Émile Durkheim and, more explicitly, to Georg Simmel's inter-subjective sociological analysis of trust. At the beginning of section 3.2.3, I briefly discuss their influence and trust-related conceptualizations for the societal thread on trust.
2. Civic sub-perspective: This perspective differs from the aforementioned societal views in that it places greater emphasis on the role of associative life within communities and their citizens in fostering trust, rather than focusing on the perceived efficacy of modern social institutions or whole societies. The attitudes of "civicness" (Putnam 1993) and "sociability" (Fukuyama 1995), norms of reciprocity, and the trustworthiness of citizens working together on equal footing, which result in the bridging republican culture of trust, are among the principal concerns for these authors. Their contemporary work is largely rooted in the conceptual framework established by Alexis de Tocqueville, exploring the formation of trusting bonds among citizens as the interplay between their participation, civil society and democratic institutions.
3. Institutional sub-perspective: A recent development among the three collective perspectives is the institution-oriented view on trust between citizens. This view explores and largely associates trust with the political institutions of the state and their role in creating or sustaining social trust. Some authors of this perspective conceptualize trust itself as an informal institution (Rothstein 2013, 1011). The central trust-related concepts and measures within this thread include the quality of government, corruption, and the perceived impartiality of political institutions (Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Rothstein 2013).

 

Comment 2

My only other question is why the study covers the literature up to 2019. (…) A bit of clarification here would be much appreciated.

Response 2: Although the focus of the paper is primarily a condensed historical overview of trust as a concept, I understand the point. Therefore, I have added a short section on recent developments in perspectives on trust (see below and pages 20-22 of the revised version):

 

 4.1 Recent developments

 

Different perspectives on trust and their implicitly divergent conceptualisations are still receiving varying degrees of attention from social scientists. Some of their attempts focus on disentangling the pervasive conceptual juggernauts responsible for stalemates, extending research interest to new phenomena such as social disruption or digital environments, or attempting to reconcile constructed conceptual divisions with reframing proposals. As far as the structure of themes and foci is concerned, there are at least four threads of developments in trust research that can be discerned in recent years, with varying degrees of visible association with specific theoretical perspectives or their combinations.  (1) The first recent (re)emerging theme is the question of typology of trust, denoting the revisions and explorations of its different forms and types. (2) The second theme is the issue of methodology, measurement and ways to better empirically capture and understand trust. (3) The third distinct stream of trust research and conceptualisations is addressing the issues of trust in new digital social environments. And the final thread of recent work on trust can be defined as (4) those contributions that extend, reframe and possibly reconcile perspectives on trust.

 

(1)     The focus of recent (and not so recent) typology-oriented efforts is the search for theoretical plausibility and empirical viability of trust concepts. Some of the authors re-examine trust conceptually. Others empirically test the presumed conceptual differences and construct what they believe to be a convincing trust typology. An example of the former is the implementation of Sartori's (1984) ladder of abstraction, which aims at a universal, interdisciplinary definition of trust (Utthental 2024). Here, trust is differentiated along two axes: one is the distance of the object/subject of trust, the other is the level of its abstractness/concreteness. The truster's trusting orientation towards distant, more abstract objects is attributed to the individual's psychological propensity to trust in general, as in the personality perspective, while the second, more concrete trust is assumed to stem from a predominantly evaluative basis of the truster's capacities, as in trust game experiments from the rational choice perspective.

Beyond such efforts associated with a particular perspective on trust, or attempting to bridge them across disciplines, there nevertheless seems to be an emerging general consensus around the formerly divisive perspective-based compartmentalisation of what trust is or is not. Most authors seem to generally agree on the conceptual distinction between social trust targeting specific persons, groups or people in general and political trust in varying institutions (Zmerli 2024; Newton et. Al. 2018). 

(2)     Methodological discussions arising from or related to different perspectives on trust generally revolve around the question of how to measure and empirically capture trust in a plausible and comprehensive way for such a multidimensional social phenomenon. An exemplary proposal for measurement development methodology is offered by the authors, who build their arguments largely on the premises of the rationality-bound perspective - generally understanding trust as a form of context-dependent subjective probability assessment of the trustworthiness of individuals. Their revisionist measures aim at capturing more specific contextual trust attitudes through additional probing survey questions, such as asking about "parents" instead of "family" in general. This approach is generally based on the rationality-bound universal trust proposition Truster A trusts Trustee B to do X in context Y (Bauer and Freitag 2018), as opposed to the normative trust assumption Truster A trusts as in standard survey questions, which assumes the existence of an unspecified context-independent general trust attitude among individuals (Uslaner 2015, 2018). The latter, classically measured with the "most people can be trusted" question or a modification of Rosenberg's Faith in People Index (Rosenberg 1956), has recently also seen revisionary attempts, such as scaling extensions to 7- or 9-point bipolar scales (Robbins 2024) or the Stranger Face Trust (SFT) questionnaire, which is based on trust responses to specific visual representations of strangers. Once again, these methodological assumptions lean toward more evaluative (rationality-oriented) rather than personality or societal norm-oriented perspectives on trust (Robbins 2019).  (...)

 

 

Thank you for taking your time. I look forward to further constructive criticism and comments.

 

Best regards,

 

                                                The Author.

 

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I am happy with the current version. I would only signal that Figure 3.2 or (3.1?) displays very poor quality?resolution in the pdf file.

Best wishes,