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Article

Collaborative Currents: The Promise of Conflict Resolution in Public Acceptance of Utility-Scale Renewable Energy Projects

by
Muhammad Mohsin Hussain
1,
Suleyman O. Altiparmak
2 and
Emre Hatipoglu
3,*
1
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen AB24 3QR, UK
2
James Madison College, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA
3
KAPSARC School of Public Policy, KAPSARC, Riyadh 13415, Saudi Arabia
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Land 2025, 14(5), 1056; https://doi.org/10.3390/land14051056
Submission received: 8 April 2025 / Revised: 26 April 2025 / Accepted: 28 April 2025 / Published: 13 May 2025
(This article belongs to the Section Land Socio-Economic and Political Issues)

Abstract

:
In the face of escalating climate challenges, the energy sector is increasingly investing in renewable projects. However, the implementation of utility-scale renewable energy initiatives is often hindered by public opposition. While previous research has offered detailed insights into the determinants of public acceptance generally, there remains scope for examining the impact of strategies that developers can employ to coalesce support for success at the local level. This study contributes with a comparative case study of two U.S. utility-scale projects: the Empire Wind offshore wind farm, which achieved success through proactive conflict resolution, and the Northern Pass hydroelectric transmission project, which was halted due to sustained local resistance. Our findings suggest the critical importance of community-centered conflict resolution strategies in garnering public support and facilitating the successful deployment of large-scale renewable energy projects.

1. Introduction

Electricity generation is currently the largest source of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Nonetheless, it plays a key role in the transition toward net-zero emissions by rapidly adopting renewable energy sources [1]. Renewable energy generation has exhibited remarkable growth worldwide: solar, wind, and hydropower are expected to surpass coal by 2025. By 2027, coal’s share in the energy mix is forecasted to decline below 33%, while renewables are expected to increase to 47% [1]. This transformation is driven by investments in energy transition.
Fluctuating fossil fuel costs, increased policy support, the convergence of climate and energy security objectives, and a strategic focus on industrial development have made investments in renewables more attractive. Comparing their estimates for 2023 with data from 2021, the IEA [2] (p. 12) found that annual investments in clean energy had increased at a significantly faster rate than investments in fossil fuels, with a growth of 24% compared to 15%. Increased investment reduces costs and enhances profit opportunities. Specifically, the levelized costs of energy generation for solar PV and wind power have decreased over time [3].
Despite their investment potential and role in achieving net-zero goals, renewable projects often face public opposition and regulatory hurdles when proposed for local deployment [4]. Renewable energy investments often present a political redistribution challenge, where the benefits of a project are widely distributed, while the costs may be locally concentrated. In other words, these investments do not automatically translate into political gains for local governments and their constituents. Meanwhile, the concentrated nature of costs can mobilize opposition from groups that perceive themselves as disadvantaged. Given this, it is not surprising that the successful deployment of renewables hinges on securing public support [5].
A growing body of literature examines public acceptance of renewable projects. Several factors influence public support for renewables. Wind energy, for instance, while environmentally preferable, raises concerns over noise, visual pollution, and ecological disruptions [6]. Besides environmental concerns, public perceptions regarding the cost of the energy projects, health and safety concerns, visual impact on land, and inadequate access to participation also shape acceptance towards renewables. Transmission infrastructure, such as high-voltage lines required for energy distribution, also affects public support [7]. Environmental concerns and land use conflicts associated with transmission lines often generate opposition, particularly when they traverse private lands or ecologically sensitive areas [8,9,10] (p. 58).
Recent scholarship has underscored that the energy transition, particularly in the case of large-scale projects (also known as utility-scale plants), is often characterized by conflict and public resistance [11] (p. 283). This resistance arises from their potential to significantly alter surrounding landscapes and cause noise pollution, fueling conflicts between developers and key stakeholders. Unlike smaller projects, such as rooftop solar panel installations, utility-scale plants require substantial land—typically ranging from 1 to 100 acres [12]. In the United States, the perceived negative impact of renewable energy projects on the landscape has led over 15% of counties to block utility-scale wind and solar projects [13]. Additionally, a survey funded by the U.S. Department of Energy [14] reports that 30% of such projects perceived to negatively alter the landscape face delays or cancellations due to local resistance. This phenomenon is not unique to the U.S. [15]; empirical research elsewhere has found similar concerns shaping public attitudes at the local level in Germany [16,17], South Korea [18], and the United Kingdom [19] (p. 10). Consequently, such opposition can impede the transition to cleaner energy sources in communities [20,21].
Given their potential to generate large amounts of electricity to meet community energy needs, investigating strategies to mitigate public opposition to these projects is critical. To that end, some studies on renewable energy deployment have emphasized the role of advocacy by elected officials and community leaders in promoting clean energy for sustainable development [19,22]. Elsewhere, scholars have found suggestive evidence that informal engagement with citizens can be effective in resolving controversies surrounding renewable projects [23]. Nevertheless, a key shortcoming of this literature is its predominant focus on government-led strategies [24] (p. 8) rather than those employed by developers. Additionally, these studies often fail to distinguish between the engagement strategies of governments, activists, and developers, instead grouping them under the broad category of “Renewable Energy Technology (RET) actors” [25]. This, we argue, is a critical oversight, as these groups have distinct incentives and employ different strategies for mediating public conflict.
Our paper addresses this gap by integrating insights from the renewable energy acceptance literature and conflict resolution studies to investigate the impact of developer-led strategies in securing the successful deployment of utility-scale renewable projects. We argue that addressing public opposition requires community-centered conflict resolution, wherein local concerns are actively addressed through inclusive dialogue, participation, and collaborative decision-making rather than traditional institutional bargaining. The latter approach, including litigation and lobbying efforts directed at investors and government officials, often bypasses meaningful community engagement. While some research has examined informal approaches to conflict resolution in renewable energy [26], and one comprehensive study has analyzed the impact of public engagement strategies, such as litigation or protest across 150 countries [27]—to our knowledge—this is the first study to compare approaches to conflict resolution employed by developers and assess their effects on renewable deployment.
We provide qualitative evidence for our argument by comparing two renewable projects in the United States: The Empire Offshore Wind project, which succeeded due to effective stakeholder engagement, and the Northern Pass hydroelectric transmission project, which was terminated due to persistent local resistance. These projects are comparable in that both were utility-scale developments requiring substantial land and receiving public scrutiny due to their environmental and economic implications. However, they diverged in one crucial aspect: the strategy employed by developers to mitigate public opposition.
Beyond contributing to the discourse on renewable energy acceptance, this paper also offers a political science perspective by examining the structural challenges within multi-level governance systems like that of the United States. Specifically, it explores the “legal mismatch” that arises when local governments wield increasing authority and veto power over large-scale renewable projects. This influence stems from historical land use regulations and zoning policies, which grant local governments substantial decision-making power [28,29]. Local stakeholders opposed to such renewable projects may find it more effective to leverage local government authority rather than engage with pro-investment actors at the national level, thereby shaping renewable energy policy outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we review the literature on local energy politics, with a particular focus on the U.S., to identify key factors driving conflicts over renewable energy projects. This review provides a foundation for understanding how local political dynamics influence project outcomes. Building on this, the section then discusses in detail the conflict resolution strategies used by developers of renewable projects, motivating our hypothesis that informal approaches—such as community engagement—are more effective than institutional mechanisms like litigation for successful renewable deployment. The third section tests this hypothesis through a comparative analysis of the Northern Pass Project and the Empire Wind Project, with a focus on their initial permitting processes, where most stakeholder interactions occur. Finally, we conclude by discussing our comparative case study in light of our hypothesis and outlining avenues for future research and policy.

1.1. Local Energy Politics and Conflict Dynamics

Renewable energy projects inherently involve multiple stakeholders and often extend across different jurisdictions. In democratic societies, particularly those that delegate significant authority to local governments, local politics has become a key factor in understanding the governance of renewable energy. Increasingly, scholarship has emphasized the importance of people-centered energy transitions, stressing that successful decarbonization requires active local participation and community-centered approaches [30,31,32,33,34]. Although there have not been many opportunities for locals to participate in energy transition across diverse contexts; there is some evidence from Scotland in the United Kingdom [30], Alaska in the United States [33], and Denmark and United States more generally to suggest that local participation could be instrumental for successful deployment of renewable projects [35].
This is because the role of local actors in renewable deployment has become increasingly apparent across various political contexts. For example, after the Fukushima disaster, local figures such as the mayors of Mihama and Takahama, along with power companies like Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) and Yonden, significantly impacted the national discourse on the potential restart of Japan’s nuclear plants [36]. In India, “the promotion of renewable energy … at state level” is predominantly led by a variety of local actors rather than federal-level institutions [37] (p. 658). Similarly, the successful transition to wind energy and the resultant reduction in pollution have emerged as a career booster for local leaders in the Communist Party of China [38].
The United States offers a particularly revealing case study in understanding how local politics and renewable energy investments interact. In the absence of a coherent federal policy, local and state-level governments have taken the lead in promoting decarbonization strategies [39], even though local politics can sometimes lack formal power [40]. States and counties exhibit a wide range of institutional setups, resulting in varying levels of ambition and success in setting goals for decarbonizing their economies [41]. In contexts requiring serious investments but also bearing significant localized costs, this decentralization paves the way for intra- and inter-level competition and conflict.
One of the primary causes of these conflicts is the substantial land requirements of renewable energy projects. Unlike fossil fuel plants, renewable energy generation is geo-specific; wind corridors, solar radiation patterns, and hydrological potentials often dictate facility locations [26,42]. Moreover, renewable projects are spatially more intensive than coal and gas plants per unit of energy produced [43,44]. These spatial and environmental demands can disrupt local livelihoods in multiple ways. For example, Susskind et al. [15] identify seven main reasons for local opposition to renewable projects in the U.S.: environmental, land value, tribal rights, public participation deficits, intergovernmental conflict, health risks, and financial concerns.
The energy justice literature highlights that the distribution of benefits and burdens during energy transitions is often inequitable, disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations. These include rural farmers, wage laborers (and their unions), people reliant on fishing for their livelihoods, and the urban poor [45,46]. Distributive injustices are further exemplified by additional costs imposed on local communities, such as deforestation along transmission corridors, disruption of ecosystems, and the reduction of tourism potential. Moreover, the employment benefits associated with renewable energy investments are often less localized than those of fossil-fuel generation plants, exacerbating local grievances [47].

1.2. Approaches to Resolving Renewable Energy Conflicts

To address conflicts arising from a renewable project’s spatial intensity, environmental impact, and associated costs for local communities, developers typically pursue two broad strategies to manage and resolve conflicts. Understanding how developers deploy these strategies and which approach is more likely to succeed is critical for advancing more equitable and sustainable energy transitions.
The first strategy relies on litigation and formal legal channels. Following the “litigation explosion” [48], “law explosion” [49], or “hyperlexis” [50] of the 1960s and 1970s, developers increasingly turned to courts to resolve disputes over land use, siting, and permitting. Litigation offers a structured, rule-bound pathway for resolving conflicts, often culminating in enforceable decisions [51,52,53]. However, resorting to legal action can exacerbate adversarial dynamics, impose significant financial and reputational costs, and prolong project timelines. Even projects that eventually secure approval, such as the Vineyard Wind offshore wind farm in Massachusetts, have experienced significant delays and heightened opposition as a result of sustained legal battles [54]. Litigation may also reframe localized grievances into broader political conflicts, further entrenching opposition rather than resolving it [55,56,57,58,59,60]. An illustrative example of this dynamic is the Cape Wind offshore wind project also proposed in Massachusetts, where initial local concerns about environmental and aesthetic impacts were amplified through litigation into a national controversy over federal authority, coastal rights, and renewable energy policy, ultimately hardening opposition and contributing to the project’s failure [61].
Recognizing the limitations of adversarial approaches, scholarly insights increasingly emphasize the adoption of community-centered strategies grounded in negotiation, mediation, and collaborative governance [57,62]. These informal methods prioritize early engagement, trust-building, and joint problem-solving over confrontation. In this framework, developers and local stakeholders are not merely participants in consultation but active partners in project design. Co-design approaches integrate affected communities directly into planning and decision-making processes, allowing local knowledge, values, and concerns to meaningfully shape project outcomes [63,64]. By moving beyond traditional, top-down consultation models, co-design frameworks promote genuinely shared authority, where critical decisions about project siting, design, benefit distribution, and mitigation measures are co-produced. For instance, the Tucson Electric Power Solar Project in Arizona is working closely with indigenous tribes to integrate their concerns about land use and cultural heritage, ensuring that the solar installation aligns with local values [65].
Based on this discussion, we argue that community-centered approaches, grounded in co-design principles, increasingly represent a more effective and sustainable strategy than litigation. Particularly as renewable energy projects grow in scale and complexity, developers’ ability to navigate local politics through proactive engagement is likely to become a critical determinant of project success [66,67,68,69,70].
Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis. 
Proactive community engagement and other modes of informal conflict resolution processes are more effective than litigation or otherwise pitting conflicting interests on a renewable investment in an institutionalized setting.

2. Materials and Methods

We employ a comparative case study design to test our hypothesis that the successful deployment of utility-scale renewable projects depends on the conflict resolution strategies adopted by developers. Specifically, we compare the Empire Offshore Wind Farm project by Equinor in Long Island, New York, which successfully completed its initiation phase in early 2024, with the Northern Pass hydroelectricity transmission project by Eversource in New England, the initiation of which was canceled due to local opposition on 2 February 2018 [71,72,73] 1.
In our methodological approach, we focus on the initiation stages of each project. We define the initiation stage as the period during which developers first interacted with local stakeholders, introduced the project to the public, and undertook actions to address or manage stakeholder concerns. This period is critical because it sets the strategic tone for subsequent project development and typically determines the project’s social license to operate. Our case selection follows a most-similar systems design: both projects were large-scale renewable energy developments located in the northeastern United States, faced comparable types of local opposition, and carried similar environmental and socioeconomic risks.
To systematically evaluate the projects, we apply the following concrete criteria derived from Table 1: project location, announced project capacity, transmission requirements, the range of concerned stakeholder groups, risks perceived by local communities, and the mode of conflict resolution employed by developers. Project outcomes are evaluated based on the success or failure of the initiation phase, operationalized as either the successful progression to project deployment in the case of Empire Wind or cancellation due to unresolved opposition in the case of Northern Pass.
Figure 1 juxtaposes the proposed locations of the two projects. The Empire Wind project had an announced capacity of 2.1 gigawatts, while Northern Pass was planned at 1.2 gigawatts. In terms of transmission requirements, Northern Pass necessitated a continuous land strip of approximately 192 miles, compared to Empire Wind’s estimated 20 to 50 miles. Both projects encountered opposition from a broad range of groups, including residents, local and state politicians, the tourism industry, real estate owners, environmental organizations, municipalities, and other grassroots organizations. Specific to Northern Pass were concerns raised by farmers, whereas in the case of Empire Wind, fishermen and labor unions were important actors. Both projects were associated with similar risks, notably negative impacts on the landscape and biodiversity at the proposal stage.
However, the projects differed notably in their modes of conflict resolution. On one hand, the developers of Northern Pass primarily relied on litigation and formal engagement through regulatory processes to address opposition. In contrast, the developers of Empire Wind prioritized community engagement, adapting project plans to accommodate concerns and actively involving stakeholders throughout the process. As our comparative case study suggests, it is this strategy centered on community engagement that increased public acceptance of Empire Wind, whereas the litigative approach employed for Northern Pass failed because it alienated local stakeholders rather than giving them a meaningful voice in the process.
Our analysis draws on secondary sources, including newspaper articles [72,74], academic papers [75,76], documentaries [77,78], and news-origin videos [79,80], complemented by primary project documents [81,82,83,84,85] and appeal filings [86].
Although not identical in every respect, the two cases are comparable across the key parameters outlined above. Empire Wind represents a hard case for testing our hypothesis, as it involved a significantly larger announced project capacity of 2.1 gigawatts compared to the 1.2 gigawatts planned for Northern Pass. Larger projects, particularly offshore and onshore wind farms, often attract greater scrutiny and resistance due to their perceived scale of impact [87,88], yet Empire Wind achieved successful initiation. This comparison supports the argument that differences in conflict resolution strategies critically shaped public acceptance and ultimately determined project outcomes.
Figure 1. (a) Location of the proposed Northern Pass Project [81]; (b) location of the proposed Empire Wind Project Phases 1 and 2 [82].
Figure 1. (a) Location of the proposed Northern Pass Project [81]; (b) location of the proposed Empire Wind Project Phases 1 and 2 [82].
Land 14 01056 g001

3. Results

3.1. Overview of Cases

We begin with an overview of the two projects, then discuss in detail the reactions by stakeholders following their proposal, i.e., how they responded to the perceived risks of these projects posed to local communities. The Northern Pass project was one of the several projects that aimed to relay/connect Quebecois power to the New England electricity grid. The project had a 1200 MW capacity Eversource Energy, which later on was reduced to 1090 to take advantage of a new technology, known as HVDC lite. At a more general level, the project was a part of decarbonizing New England power while maintaining the supply of electricity. Its hydroelectric power would also reduce the need for fossil-fuel-generated electricity. The project was provisioned to receive Hydro-Quebec electricity at the Canada–US border at Pittsburg, NH, and carry it through high-voltage infrastructure 192 miles south to the interconnector at Deerfield, NH. This would traverse a 32-mile corridor in the region of northern Coos County, referred to as the Great North Woods. Subsequently, it would pass through the White Mountain National Forest and infringe upon the Appalachian Trail. The proposal entailed installing over 1500 new steel lattice towers, towering two to three times higher than the surrounding trees, 90- to 135-foot-tall towers. In areas where it intersected with existing transmission corridors, Northern Pass intended to expand the corridor, raise tower heights, or install new towers.
The regulatory process for the Empire Wind project was initiated in 2011, when the New York Power Authority, Long Island Power Authority, and Con Edison—collectively known as the Offshore Wind Collaborative—formally submitted a petition to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) to secure a commercial lease on the outer continental shelf. This request marked the beginning of a comprehensive federal evaluation to assess the project’s feasibility and compliance with environmental and energy regulations. The aim of this project was to distribute energy to the Atlantic coast, forming a key part of the U.S. utility-scale renewable energy investment strategy [89,90]. With a planned capacity of 2.1 GW, the project consisted of up to 147 wind turbines spanning 80,000 acres, approximately 25 to 50 km southeast of Long Island. Once operational, Empire Wind was expected to power over one million homes. Given their size, both Northern Pass and Empire Wind were expected to create many opportunities for local employment.

3.2. Initial Stakeholder Reactions

Both Northern Pass and Empire Wind were initially met with a negative public response. Northern Pass, while initially backed by Governor John Lynch and the New Hampshire Building and Construction Trades Council in 2010, turned into a contentious issue. Specifically, concerns over the construction of over 1500 steel lattice towers, and their effects on the White Mountain National Forest and the Appalachian Trail, raised local concerns.
Many environmental organizations, local municipalities, and grassroots groups opposed the Northern Pass project. Environmental groups against the project comprised the Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests (SPNHF), the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), and the NH Chapter of the Nature Conservancy. Kimball [76] notes that a grassroots movement led by citizen activists mobilized these environmental groups alongside political figures from the Democratic and Republican parties to take action against the deployment of this project. Their efforts were successful, as by 2012, state legislation blocked the use of eminent domain for acquiring land, further complicating Eversource’s plans. Governor Maggie Hassan publicly opposed the project, stating that Northern Pass had engaged in a “publicity stunt disguised as an effort to stand up for New Hampshire” [75].
Like the Northern Pass project, concerns were raised by multiple groups about Empire Wind’s negative impact on the environment and the visual aspects of the landscape. While the project fell under federal jurisdiction, it initially garnered local opposition from a wide range of stakeholders. The group leading the opposition was the local fishing industry, as a significant portion of the area leased for Empire Wind overlapped with established fishing grounds. Fishermen feared that construction and turbine operations would disrupt marine ecosystems and limit access to key fishing areas. Other environmental groups also raised alarms about the potential effects of the turbines on marine wildlife. Marine biologists noted that wind turbine noise could disorient migratory species such as sea turtles, while the project area itself was home to or within the migration path of more than 40 species of seabirds [91] (p. 21). Some environmental organizations worried that the project could contribute to an increase in whale deaths, a concern echoed by Rep. Chris Smith (R-N.J.), who stated, “Like the canary in the coal mine, the recent spate of tragic whale deaths shed new light and increased scrutiny to the fast-tracking of thousands of wind turbines off our coast” [74].
Regarding the visual impact of the wind turbines, concerns were raised by Long Island residents. With turbine heights reaching approximately 290 m, and three rotating blades of 130 m each [92], many feared that the structures would obstruct ocean views, potentially decreasing property values and tourism revenue. Acting City Manager Ron Walsh of Long Beach emphasized local frustrations, stating, “We are taking steps to take control of this process… If we don’t do this, the state can give [Equinor] permission to take the land. This is about giving the city a say in the process” [90].
Interestingly, labor unions initially welcomed both projects in their respective communities, as Equinor and Eversource promised to offer work opportunities for locals. [93,94]. However, as we demonstrate in the subsequent section, what maintained support for Equinor was its engagement with all local stakeholders and transparency in its operations during this initial phase of project development.

3.3. Litigation vs. Community-Centered Conflict Resolution

3.3.1. An Arm’s Length Approach by Eversource in New Hampshire

A deeper look at the Northern Pass project reveals that Eversource, the developer, failed to overcome local resistance by prioritizing legislative efforts and financial incentives over direct engagement with local stakeholders. For example, the company hired real estate agents to make cold calls to property owners, and when asked about negotiating land easements, a Public Service of New Hampshire representative stated, “We are hopeful that we will be able to negotiate with landowners and come to a neutrally acceptable position that we can get that” [77].
Instead of involving local communities in the impact assessment process, Eversource outsourced this task to a consultancy based in Toronto and Boston [95]. This decision led to a failure to account for community preferences, especially concerning the fiscal burden on locals. Their initial analysis overlooked the financial impacts on residents, including property tax revenues, and assumed that any new revenues would be used to pay off project debt, significantly reducing potential benefits to the local community [95] (p. 3), [96] (p. 2).
Further decisions were made by Eversource without consulting local communities or demonstrating transparency in their dealings: they offered a USD 200 million “Forward New Hampshire Fund” as a financial incentive. However, critics, including the Appalachian Mountain Club (AMC), dismissed this as a “slush fund” designed to sway public opinion rather than addressing legitimate concerns [76]. To add, despite Eversource framing their project Northern Pass as beneficial for the broader New England region, critics argued that local economic benefits were minimal. Dan Dolan, President of The New England Power Generators Association (NEPGA), stated, “While the creation of any jobs in the current economy is helpful, it now appears that the Northern Pass jobs benefits will be much smaller than has been advertised” [97].
Eversource also proposed alternative routes, including the partial burial of 60 miles of transmission lines in 2015, but opposition persisted. The company ultimately failed to fulfill this promise due to financial constraints. David Long, head of Northern Pass in New Hampshire, remarked that “the private firms backing the project could not afford full burial of the transmission lines, and a 50 percent cost increase would make the project financially unviable” [75].
A 2013–2014 poll revealed that opposition remained steady at 34 percent, while those unsure about the project dropped from 39 percent to 26 percent [75]. Between 2016 and 2018, public hearings held by the New Hampshire Site Evaluation Committee (SEC) generated significant input from grassroots organizations, local groups, and state legislators, many of whom actively worked to block the project. Despite these efforts, Eversource maintained a defensive stance, arguing that the SEC’s decision jeopardized USD 3 billion in potential benefits for the state. In 2019, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the decision, effectively canceling the project. Despite this setback, Eversource expressed frustration, maintaining that the process had ignored substantial evidence and could deter future energy projects [98].
Following this ruling, instead of deepening engagement with the community to address the project’s concerns, Eversource expressed frustration with the SEC’s decision, stating that “the process failed to comply with New Hampshire law and ignored substantial evidence.” The company further claimed that the ruling jeopardized “USD 3 billion in jobs, taxes, and benefits for the state” and warned that “the SEC process is broken and could deter future energy projects” [98]. This reaction also underscored Eversource’s continued focus on state/region-level benefits, as the utility company continued to overlook the local sources of the conflict. State Senator Jeanie Forrester remarked, “It really is a testament to the people of New Hampshire, to their strength and fortitude, and to their commitment to preserve our landscapes. It was a battle of David versus Goliath, and we won” [86] (p. 13).

3.3.2. Proactive Community Engagement by Equinor in New York

In contrast, the Empire Wind project showcases how large-scale renewable energy projects can achieve success when developers prioritize transparency, community participation, and proactive conflict resolution. Unlike the Northern Pass failure, where litigation was unable to quell public opposition, Empire Wind illustrates how structured engagement with local stakeholders can foster project success. Equinor’s approach involved extensive environmental assessments, public hearings, and stakeholder consultations, gathering public input from 2018 to 2023 to identify and address key concerns.
To mitigate opposition from environmental groups, Equinor implemented several measures, including an extended whale monitoring initiative in partnership with the Wildlife Conservation Society. Launched in 2019, the initiative aims to track and mitigate risks to marine life until 2028 [99]. Additionally, Equinor introduced a Fisheries Compensation Plan and a Regional Compensation Plan to assess and mitigate economic impacts on local industries, such as fishing. These plans allowed impacted communities direct communication channels with the project team.
Equinor’s commitment to stakeholder engagement is thoroughly outlined in their Fisheries Communication Plan, published on their website to promote transparency regarding project activities [100]. This document explicitly states their objective to maintain a comprehensive database of fisheries stakeholders and contacts associated with operations in the proposed deployment area of the Empire Wind project.
Leveraging this database, Equinor pledges in this plan to facilitate ongoing dialogue with local fisheries stakeholders throughout all phases of project development (p. 17). To support this engagement, the company has appointed marine biology and fisheries industry experts with strong connections to the local fishing community, which has developed over a period of twenty years. Notably, they have participated in commercial lobster fishing in the area (p. 21) and currently serve on the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC)—an advisory body that collaborates closely with fisheries in the Northeastern United States, including the area targeted for Empire Wind [101].
To independently verify Equinor’s representation, we reviewed these experts’ publicly available profiles on LinkedIn, which is a professional networking platform. This review demonstrated their advanced academic background in marine biology and related fields, combined with practical experience in the field, such as working as a deckhand on commercial fishing vessels.
Equinor also engaged labor unions to ensure a balance between specialized and local workforce participation. Empire Wind 1 alone is expected to generate over 4000 job-years, including 1800 directly related to the project and another 2200 indirect and induced jobs [102].
After securing a lease in March 2017, Equinor won New York’s first large-scale offshore wind development bid in 2018. The U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) approved the Construction and Operations Plan for Empire Wind in February 2024. The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) confirmed that Empire Wind 1 is expected to be operational by 2027, although this timeline may be impacted by recent political developments [103]. As of 17 April 2025, the Trump administration has decided to halt the construction of Equinor’s Empire Wind project. [73]. This unexpected development could significantly delay the project’s timeline and introduce new challenges to the realization of the Empire Wind 1 project.

4. Discussion and Conclusions

This article examined how developer-led conflict resolution strategies shape the outcomes of large-scale renewable energy projects during their early stages. Empirically, we compared two cases: the Empire Wind and Northern Pass projects to assess how different approaches to conflict resolution influenced project success. We hypothesized that large-scale renewable projects are more likely to succeed when developers prioritize informal, community-centered strategies such as co-design and negotiation, rather than relying on adversarial legal channels.
Our findings support this hypothesis: Equinor’s collaborative approach enabled it to build social legitimacy with residents, local fisheries and labour unions by collaborating with them to mitigate the perceived risks of their Empire Wind project, while Eversource’s reliance on litigation and lack of communication with the local stakeholders contributed to protracted conflict, widened opposition, and ultimately project failure. These dynamics are consistent with prior research showing that adversarial strategies often escalate disputes, polarize stakeholders, and shift localized concerns into broader political conflicts that undermine trust and delay implementation [55,56,57,58,59,60]. Together, the cases affirm key claims from the energy justice literature that participation, equity, and shared authority are not only normative goals but practical requirements for effective and equitable energy transitions [15,45,46,47].
At the same time, the April 2025 decision by the Trump administration to halt Empire Wind on claims that its environmental assessment had shortcomings highlights the limits of even the best-designed local engagement strategies. While strong community ties can reduce local friction, they cannot fully shield projects from political turnover or shifting federal priorities. This case underscores the importance of multi-level resilience: developers must not only secure local legitimacy but also meet the highest standards of environmental review and forge alliances capable of withstanding partisan shifts at higher levels of government. Future studies might inquire how generalizable this risk of shifting national priorities affecting land use is amongst other countries facing similar multi-level governance issues.
Finally, structural siting challenges for land-intensive renewable technologies remain unresolved [104,105]. Projects often face opposition rooted not only in environmental impact but also in land use conflicts and perceived inequities. As nations push for accelerated energy transitions, future research should examine how developer strategies can better address these persistent equity concerns, particularly within national policy frameworks that aim to scale up clean energy deployment [106,107,108].

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, E.H. and S.O.A.; methodology, E.H. and S.O.A.; investigation, M.M.H. and E.H.; resources, M.M.H. and S.O.A.; writing—original draft preparation, M.M.H., S.O.A. and E.H.; writing—review and editing, M.M.H. and E.H.; visualization, M.M.H.; supervision, E.H.; project administration, E.H. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

The original contributions are contained within the article. Further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
AMCAppalachian Mountain Club
BOEMBureau of Ocean Energy Management
CLFConservation Law Foundation
KEPCOKansai Electric Power Company
NEPGANew England Power Generators Association
NYSERDANew York State Energy Research and Development Authority
RETRenewable Energy Technology
SPNHFSociety for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests
SECSite Evaluation Committee

Note

1
Although outside the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the rejection of the Northern Pass Project on 19 July 2019, despite an appeal from its developer, Eversource [71]. As a result, the future of the project is uncertain. In contrast, the Empire Wind Project was currently expected to commence operations in 2027 [72]; however, it has been subsequently put on hold following an executive order by the Trump administration on 17 April 2025 [73]. Note that this unexpected political intervention by the US federal government in New York does not alter our findings, which aim to explain the success of developer-led strategies for securing public support in local contexts.

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Table 1. Comparison of cases.
Table 1. Comparison of cases.
CharacteristicsNorthern Pass
(Failed Initiation)
Empire Wind
(Successful Initiation)
LocationU.S. NortheastU.S. Northeast
Announced Project Capacity1.2 GW2.1 GW
Transmission Requirements192 miles of land stripApprox 20–50 miles of land strip
Concerned GroupsResidents, local politicians, state-level politicians, tourism industry, real estate owners, environmental groups, municipalities, other grassroots organizations, farmersResidents, local politicians, state-level politicians, tourism industry, real estate owners, environmental groups, municipalities, other grassroots organizations, fishermen,
labor unions
RisksNegative impact on landscape, biodiversityNegative impact on landscape, biodiversity
Mode of conflict resolutionLitigation/Formal engagementCommunity engagement
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Hussain, M.M.; Altiparmak, S.O.; Hatipoglu, E. Collaborative Currents: The Promise of Conflict Resolution in Public Acceptance of Utility-Scale Renewable Energy Projects. Land 2025, 14, 1056. https://doi.org/10.3390/land14051056

AMA Style

Hussain MM, Altiparmak SO, Hatipoglu E. Collaborative Currents: The Promise of Conflict Resolution in Public Acceptance of Utility-Scale Renewable Energy Projects. Land. 2025; 14(5):1056. https://doi.org/10.3390/land14051056

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Hussain, Muhammad Mohsin, Suleyman O. Altiparmak, and Emre Hatipoglu. 2025. "Collaborative Currents: The Promise of Conflict Resolution in Public Acceptance of Utility-Scale Renewable Energy Projects" Land 14, no. 5: 1056. https://doi.org/10.3390/land14051056

APA Style

Hussain, M. M., Altiparmak, S. O., & Hatipoglu, E. (2025). Collaborative Currents: The Promise of Conflict Resolution in Public Acceptance of Utility-Scale Renewable Energy Projects. Land, 14(5), 1056. https://doi.org/10.3390/land14051056

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