How Does Social Security Affect Farmers’ Contracted Land Withdrawal: Evidence from the Suburbs of Shanghai and Wuhan
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypotheses
2.1. Social Security and the Withdrawal of Rural Households from Contracted Farmland
2.2. Mechanism of Action of Pension Income
3. Data Sources and Variable Selection
3.1. Study Area
3.2. Data Sources
3.3. Variables
3.4. Methodology
4. Results and Analysis
4.1. Analysis of the Descriptive Results
4.2. Analysis of the Impact of Social Security on the Withdrawal from Contracted Farmland
4.3. Analysis of the Mechanism of Pension Income on the Withdrawal from Contracted Farmland
4.4. Robustness Test
5. Discussion
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Degree of Land Withdrawal | Land Withdrawal Period | Land Withdrawal Right | Property Rights Change | Land Withdrawal Model |
---|---|---|---|---|
Short-term withdrawal of land | <10 years | Withdrawal of land management rights | Changes in farmers’ property rights | Incomplete withdrawal |
Long-term withdrawal of land | 10–30 years | Withdrawal of land management rights | Changes in farmers’ property rights | Pending complete withdrawal |
Permanent withdrawal of land | Indefinitely | Withdrawal of land contract rights | Loss of farmers’ property rights | Complete withdrawal |
Variables | Variable Descriptions | Mean | SD |
---|---|---|---|
Dependent variables | |||
Degree of withdrawal from contracted land | No withdrawal = 0; Short-term withdrawal = 1; Long-term withdrawal = 2; Permanent withdrawal = 3 | 1.777 | 1.055 |
Independent variables | |||
Urban social security participation rate | The proportion of family members participating in urban social security to total family members (%) | 0.572 | 0.313 |
Mediating variables | |||
Pension income | Total pension income of the family (10,000 yuan) | 3.105 | 3.484 |
Controlled variables | |||
Head’s gender | Men = 1; Women = 0 | 0.863 | 0.344 |
Head’s age | Age of household head (year) | 66.104 | 10.450 |
Head’s education | Illiterate = 1; primary school = 2; junior high school = 3; high school/technical secondary school = 4; college and above = 5 | 2.581 | 0.902 |
Family size | Population of the household (person) | 4.634 | 1.511 |
Dependent count | Number of dependents in the household (person) | 1.769 | 1.061 |
Annual income | Total household income last year (10,000 yuan) | 24.343 | 22.079 |
Agricultural income | The proportion of agricultural income in the total household income (%) | 0.093 | 0.191 |
Urban housing | Number of urban dwellings owned by households (unit) | 0.876 | 0.822 |
Family debt | Whether family members have debt: yes = 1; no = 0 | 0.399 | 0.490 |
Family savings | Whether family members have savings: yes = 1; no = 0 | 0.813 | 0.390 |
Land expropriation | Has the contracted land been expropriated: yes = 1; no = 0 | 0.255 | 0.436 |
Land quantity | Area of contracted farmland of household (mu) | 5.502 | 7.069 |
Land ownership | The ownership of the family’s contracted land belongs to: private = 1; others = 0 | 0.135 | 0.341 |
Village collective dividend | Village collective production and operation dividends and other welfare income (10,000 yuan) | 0.028 | 0.072 |
Village medical condition | Satisfaction with the medical condition of villages: 1–5 indicates very dissatisfied to very satisfied | 3.852 | 1.154 |
Village ecological environment | Satisfaction with the ecological environment of villages: 1–5 indicates very dissatisfied to very satisfied | 4.398 | 0.767 |
Geographical location | Shanghai = 1, Wuhan = 0 | 0.486 | 0.500 |
Variables | Y | Y | M | Y |
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Urban social security participation rate | 1.606 *** (0.097) | 1.126 *** (0.117) | 6.778 *** (0.219) | |
Pension income | 0.085 *** (0.014) | |||
Head’s gender | −0.203 ** (0.089) | 0.209 (0.207) | −0.222 ** (0.090) | |
Head’s age | 0.000 (0.004) | 0.057 *** (0.009) | −0.003 (0.004) | |
Head’s education | −0.055 (0.039) | 0.260 *** (0.089) | −0.064 (0.040) | |
Family size | −0.031 (0.030) | 0.001 (0.060) | −0.033 (0.029) | |
Dependent count | 0.081 * (0.042) | 0.647 *** (0.087) | 0.001 (0.040) | |
Annual income | 0.000 (0.001) | 0.001 (0.004) | 0.001 (0.001) | |
Agricultural income | −0.404 ** (0.171) | −0.240 (0.374) | −0.408 ** (0.170) | |
Urban housing | 0.095 * (0.052) | 0.283 *** (0.104) | 0.119 ** (0.051) | |
Family debt | −0.177 *** (0.067) | −0.493 *** (0.149) | −0.149 ** (0.067) | |
Family savings | −0.212 *** (0.081) | 0.180 (0.179) | −0.205 ** (0.081) | |
Land expropriation | 0.367 *** (0.081) | 0.490 *** (0.156) | 0.373 *** (0.083) | |
Land quantity | −0.036 *** (0.007) | 0.022 * (0.012) | −0.035 *** (0.007) | |
Land ownership | −0.089 (0.081) | −0.114 (0.181) | −0.162 ** (0.079) | |
Village collective dividend | 2.068 *** (0.554) | 1.015 (0.965) | 2.062 *** (0.576) | |
Village medical condition | −0.064 ** (0.032) | −0.110 * (0.063) | −0.059 * (0.032) | |
Village ecological environment | 0.095 ** (0.045) | −0.048 (0.088) | 0.082 * (0.044) | |
Geographical location | 1.470 *** (0.095) | 0.010 (0.175) | 1.535 *** (0.093) | |
_cons | −6.354 (0.859) | |||
/cut1 | −0.148 (0.060) | −0.536 (0.376) | −1.240 (0.372) | |
/cut2 | 0.505 (0.056) | 0.339 (0.378) | −0.375 (0.372) | |
/cut3 | 1.493 (0.059) | 1.790 (0.379) | 1.061 (0.372) | |
N | 1478 | 1478 | 1478 | 1478 |
Prob > chi2 (F) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Log pseudo-likelihood | −1838.670 | −1489.173 | −1502.188 |
Variables | No | Short-Term | Long-Term | Permanent |
---|---|---|---|---|
Urban social security participation rate | −0.198 *** (0.020) | −0.069 *** (0.009) | 0.017 *** (0.005) | 0.250 *** (0.026) |
Control | YES | YES | YES | YES |
N | 1478 | 1478 | 1478 | 1478 |
Variables | Y | M | Y | Y | M | Y |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
Urban social security | 0.488 *** (0.102) | 2.564 *** (0.179) | ||||
Urban social security participation rate | 1.923 *** (0.211) | 6.778 *** (0.219) | ||||
Pension income | 0.085 *** (0.014) | 0.158 *** (0.021) | ||||
Control | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
_cons | −4.963 (0.976) | −6.354 (0.859) | ||||
/cut1 | −0.716 (0.371) | −1.240 (0.372) | −0.955 (0.656) | −2.128 (0.657) | ||
/cut2 | 0.156 (0.372) | −0.375 (0.372) | 0.552 (0.658) | −0.644 (0.657) | ||
/cut3 | 1.547 (0.373) | 1.061 (0.372) | 3.101 (0.662) | 1.903 (0.663) | ||
N | 1478 | 1478 | 1478 | 1478 | 1478 | 1478 |
Prob > chi2 (F) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Log pseudo-likelihood | −1528.272 | −1502.188 | −1488.871 | −1496.786 |
Variables | Shanghai | Wuhan | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Y | M | Y | Y | M | Y | |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
Urban social security participation rate | 2.228 *** (0.296) | 8.271 *** (0.502) | 0.707 *** (0.137) | 6.043 *** (0.261) | ||
Pension income | 0.094 *** (0.031) | 0.066 *** (0.014) | ||||
Control | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
_cons | −10.517 (1.354) | −3.157 (1.190) | ||||
/cut1 | −2.536 (0.704) | −4.196 (0.766) | −0.916 (0.497) | −1.263 (0.481) | ||
/cut2 | −2.030 (0.718) | −3.694 (0.762) | 0.106 (0.497) | −0.245 (0.480) | ||
/cut3 | 0.363 (0.701) | −1.412 (0.715) | 1.097 (0.497) | 0.747 (0.483) | ||
N | 718 | 718 | 718 | 760 | 760 | 760 |
Prob > chi2 (F) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Log pseudo-likelihood | −438.552 | −458.459 | −895.792 | −897.519 |
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Sun, Y.; Cai, Y.; Tian, X.; Zhong, W. How Does Social Security Affect Farmers’ Contracted Land Withdrawal: Evidence from the Suburbs of Shanghai and Wuhan. Land 2025, 14, 1965. https://doi.org/10.3390/land14101965
Sun Y, Cai Y, Tian X, Zhong W. How Does Social Security Affect Farmers’ Contracted Land Withdrawal: Evidence from the Suburbs of Shanghai and Wuhan. Land. 2025; 14(10):1965. https://doi.org/10.3390/land14101965
Chicago/Turabian StyleSun, Yiping, Yinying Cai, Xia Tian, and Wenyu Zhong. 2025. "How Does Social Security Affect Farmers’ Contracted Land Withdrawal: Evidence from the Suburbs of Shanghai and Wuhan" Land 14, no. 10: 1965. https://doi.org/10.3390/land14101965
APA StyleSun, Y., Cai, Y., Tian, X., & Zhong, W. (2025). How Does Social Security Affect Farmers’ Contracted Land Withdrawal: Evidence from the Suburbs of Shanghai and Wuhan. Land, 14(10), 1965. https://doi.org/10.3390/land14101965