Research on the Peer Behavior of Local Government Green Governance Based on SECI Expansion Model
2. Theoretical Analysis
2.1. Formation Logic of Peer Behavior of Green Governance
2.2. The Necessity of Knowledge Management in Green Governance
3. The Differentiation Logic of Green Governance Peer Behavior Based on Knowledge Management
3.1. Local Governments and Their Green Governance Responsibilities
3.2. Mechanism of Knowledge Management on Green Governance of Local Government
3.2.1. Knowledge Management Promotes Green Governance Peer Behavior
3.2.2. Knowledge Management Content of Green Governance
3.2.3. Differentiation Process of Green Governance Conglomeration Behavior under Knowledge Management
- In the negative-peer state, both parties choose the self-governance strategy. Due to the development ladder, the interaction between the two sides is not strong, while independent governance can retain local characteristics. In this state, both sides’ knowledge is only transformed by the internal knowledge chain, and the green development gap is further expanded due to the difference in the knowledge base.
- In the reverse-peer state, the focus government chooses the active leadership strategy, while the non-focus government keeps the independent governance strategy. Due to the high willingness of the focus government, they hope to promote the flow of green governance knowledge and promote green governance of non-focus government. However, due to the lack of initiative and low level of willingness, non-focus governments generally maintain the state of autonomous governance. In this state, the focus government ‘follows’ the non-focus government’s green governance, and the decision-making is in the opposite direction.
- In the positive-peer state, the focus government chooses the active leadership strategy, and the non-focus government chooses the active participation strategy. Because of both sides’ complementary ability and willingness, through cooperative governance they can use the knowledge learning effect, knowledge spillover effect, knowledge synergy effect, and knowledge reciprocity effect to improve their abilities or wishes. In this state, the gap of green development is gradually narrowing.
- In the consistent-direction peer status, the focus government chooses the strategy of self-governance, and the non-focus government chooses the strategy of active participation. Because of the low willingness level of some focus governments, they choose independent governance to keep the competitive advantage of the jurisdiction and avoid the risk of cooperation. The non-focus government is willing to seek cooperative governance to realize the internal and external transformation of knowledge. In this state, the non-focus government ‘catches up’ the focus government’s green governance, and the decision-making is in a positive direction. It is worth noting that due to the existence of a basic gap, non-focus government will continue to ‘fall behind,’ and regional green development differentiation may exist.
4. Evolutionary Game Model of Green Governance Peer Behavior of Local Government
4.1. Basic Assumptions
- The focus government adopts two strategies: ‘actively leading’ or ‘autonomous governance’. The probability of choosing ‘active leadership’ is , and the probability of ‘independent governance’ is . There are two green governance strategies of non-focus government: ‘active participation’ and ‘autonomous governance’, the probability of ‘active participation’ is , and the probability of ‘autonomous governance’ is .
- Both ‘social internalization’ and ‘combinatorial internalization’ are the internalization process of external knowledge, and also the process of knowledge appreciation and coordination . The abstract reflection is the influence of the knowledge learning effect and knowledge spillover effect on the behavior of the subject.
- ‘Social externalization’ and ‘combinatorial externalization’ are both internal knowledge externalization processes. In the process of knowledge external transfer, each subject has to bear the corresponding expenditure costs, mainly including emotional willingness expenditure, the loss of private value of knowledge, and the use cost of knowledge platform. In the process of social externalized tacit knowledge transfer, there are activity expenses such as collaborative docking and negotiation, assuming that the tacit knowledge expenditure coefficients of focus government and non-focus government are and , respectively. Therefore, the cost of each knowledge learning effect is and . In the explicit knowledge transfer of combinatorial externalization, the private value of knowledge of all governments is impaired, and the management experience, policy guidance, and other activities need to rely on effective channels or places. The higher the occupation rate of knowledge transformation platform, the higher the cost of human and material resources. Assuming that the value coefficient of explicit knowledge of the focus government and non-focus government is and , respectively, and the occupancy rate of knowledge transformation platform is and , respectively, the cost of the knowledge spillover effect is and , respectively. In the knowledge synergy effect, in order to build a knowledge collaborative network, the focus government and non-focus government bear the cooperation costs of and , respectively, and and are the respective cooperation cost coefficients.
- In self-governance, knowledge is only transformed internally. At this time, the focus government and non-focus government rely on their own explicit and tacit knowledge to form internal knowledge income and , where and are fixed income coefficients. There are differences in the development basis between focus government and non-focus government, and their own governance will further expand the green development gap: . At the same time, the focus government and the non-focus government rely on the ability of self-learning and knowledge transformation, tap the potential knowledge benefits, and can obtain the knowledge value-added benefits of self-governance: , , where , are the knowledge increments obtained by both sides through focused learning. Because of the idle spillover knowledge resources and knowledge closure, the focus government and non-focus government will lose the opportunity of spillover knowledge: , . . is the opportunity loss coefficient of the focus government and non-focus government, respectively. The focus government and the non-focus government are punished for the loss of knowledge protection: and . and are the penalty coefficients of knowledge protection for the focus government and non-focus government, respectively.
- There are external constraints in knowledge management. When the focus government actively leads and the non-focus government actively participates in green governance, the central government will give corresponding incentive support and . The central government tries its best to promote the integration of regional green development. When the non-focus government has the will to actively participate and the focus government governs independently, it will give the focus government punishment. The focus government will eliminate the backward industries to the non-focus government, so the focus government will get the industry elimination income , and the non-focus government will get the industry transfer income . Considering the lack of the initial development ability of the non-focus government, when the focus government actively leads and the non-focus government governs independently, the central government will not punish the non-focus government temporarily. Any party who refuses to cooperate in governance will suffer credit loss .
4.2. Payment Matrix and Dynamic Equation of Replication
4.3. Equilibrium Stability Strategy Analysis
4.4. Influence of Knowledge Management on the Evolution Trend of Peer Behavior
4.4.1. The Evolution Trend of Peer Behavior in the Internalization Stage of External Knowledge
- The effect of knowledge learning promotes the focus government and non-focus government to actively participate in knowledge transformation activities to achieve a positive-peer state. Willingness stimulus coefficient , and learning effect perception coefficient are the decreasing functions of and . With the higher stimulation degree of the two kinds of government to the knowledge learning effect, the stronger the relationship between perception and trust. Saddle point e gradually transfers to equilibrium point A, and the system is stable in the positive-peer state of active leadership and active participation.
- The knowledge synergy effect plays a positive role in promoting the focus government and non-focus government to achieve positive-peer status. With the increase of elasticity coefficient, , of complementary knowledge stock and distribution ratio , of knowledge synergy income, BECD area increases significantly. This shows that the higher the elasticity of complementary knowledge stock of focus government and non-focus government, the higher the income of the knowledge synergy effect transformation, which is greater than the income of their own governance and promotes both sides of the game to stay in a positive-peer state. At the same time, the higher the distribution coefficient of synergy benefits, the stronger their willingness to participate, but it is possible for both sides to fall into a bad situation of competing for interests. Because the elasticity coefficient of complementary knowledge stock has a relationship of and the focus government knowledge stock is significantly higher than that of non-focus government, the complementary knowledge stock elasticity coefficient of the focus government has a stronger effect on the overall knowledge synergy effect income.
- The reciprocal effect of knowledge promotes the evolutionary system to a positive-peer state. The cooperative value-added coefficient is decreasing with and , which indicates that under the knowledge collaborative network, the focus government and non-focus government gain value-added benefits, and the system will converge to a stable state of active leadership and active participation.
4.4.2. Evolution Trend of Peer Behavior in Internal Knowledge Externalization Stage
- The input cost of the knowledge learning effect suppresses the participation enthusiasm of the focus government and non-focus government. Tacit knowledge expenditure coefficients and are increasing functions of and . With the increase of parameter value, saddle point e gradually approaches equilibrium point D, and the ABEC region expands continuously. The system converges to the negative-peer state of autonomous governance and autonomous governance.
- The knowledge protection behavior and cost input in the knowledge spillover effect have negative effects on the evolution system. The degree of knowledge protection , , the value coefficient of explicit knowledge , , the occupation rate of knowledge transformation platform , and , showed an increasing relationship. With the increase of parameter value, the ABEC region increased significantly. This shows that the increase of the value coefficient of explicit knowledge leads to the two kinds of governments paying more attention to the protection of knowledge. On the one hand, it increases the cost of knowledge spillover, on the other hand, it reduces the knowledge that can be shared and used, which makes both sides more likely to self-governance. At the same time, due to the increase of the occupation rate of the knowledge transformation platform, the load of knowledge transformation increases and the efficiency of knowledge spillover decreases, which is not conducive to the construction of a knowledge collaboration network.
4.4.3. Peer Behavior Evolution Trend in Internal Knowledge Transformation Stage
- The increment of autonomous governance knowledge and are positively correlated with and . With the increase of parameter value, the system converges to the negative-peer state. This shows that when the two players choose the self-governance strategy, the value-added benefits brought by self-focused development are higher than that of knowledge collaborative transformation, so they tend to choose the negative-peer state. There is no doubt that in this development mode, both focus government and non-focus government can construct a green governance mode with local characteristics and expand the stock of government knowledge. However, due to the weak foundation of non-focus government, the knowledge increment of the two is obviously not at the same level, which leads to the further widening of the development gap. This is also the ‘negativity’ of the negative-peer state. From the perspective of revenue, the knowledge incremental revenue of both sides is obviously greater than the knowledge synergy effect revenue in the short term. Because the latter needs continuous investment and stable knowledge exchange channels (low knowledge protection, low platform occupancy rate, etc.), the two types of governments tend to choose autonomous governance.
- The chance loss coefficient , and knowledge protection penalty coefficient , are negatively correlated with , . With the increase of the parameter value, the system converges to a positive-peer state. The higher the value of knowledge opportunity utilization and the greater the punishment to knowledge protection forces both sides to choose the actively lead and actively participate strategy. As a rational decision, when one party is idle or the redundant knowledge is too much, the other party needs corresponding knowledge to make up for it. The knowledge collaborative transformation activity can not only enlarge the value of knowledge, but also reduce punishment by opening knowledge and promoting the green collaborative development of the region.
4.4.4. Influence of External Constraints of Knowledge Management on the Evolutionary Trend of Behavior of the Peer
4.5. The Influence of Explicit and Tacit Knowledge Level on the Final Peer State
- (1) In Figure 5a, when the tacit knowledge level of the focus government and non-focus government is low as a whole (), both sides eventually tend to be in a negative-peer state (0,0). Among them, the non-focus government’s willingness to actively participate will first have a small increase, and with the evolution of time, the willingness to participate will decline. The willingness of the focus government to actively lead will first decline significantly, then decline steadily and stay in the state of self-governance. Therefore, both sides experience the evolution process from consistent direction peer to negative peer. (2) When is constant and is higher, the speed of non-focus government converging to the state of self-governance slows down but accelerates the decline of focus government’s willingness to actively lead. When remains unchanged and is lower, the willingness of non-focus government to actively participate is stronger, and the decline speed of willingness further slows down and the convergence speed of focus government to self-governance is also slower than that of the higher state. (3) In the early stage of knowledge transformation, the benefit of the non-focus government’s knowledge learning effect is greater than the expenditure of knowledge externalization, so its willingness to actively participate has increased. The larger the knowledge gap and the lower the level of tacit knowledge, the lower the decline rate of willingness to participate. For the focus government, the higher the level of tacit knowledge, the higher the cost of knowledge externalization and the faster the decline of participation willingness. The increase of the knowledge gap further enlarges the imbalance of the focus government, which leads to its choice of independent governance strategy.
- In Figure 5b, (1) when the tacit knowledge level of the focus government and non-focus government is higher as a whole () or the tacit knowledge gap is larger, both sides tend to be in a negative-peer state (0,0). Different from the feedback in Figure 5a, when the level of tacit knowledge is high, the willingness of active participation of the focus government and non-focus government rapidly declines and the speed of convergence to a negative-peer state (0,0) accelerates, and there is no transition period of a consistent-direction-peer state. (2) As the tacit knowledge level of the non-focus government is higher than that of the focus government, the willingness of the non-focus government to actively participate in the decline is faster, while the decline rate of the focus government is slower. (3) When the level of tacit knowledge on both sides is high, the benefits of learning and imitation will narrow. When the knowledge gap increases significantly, the positive will of the focus government and the non-focus government will first increase slightly.
- In Figure 6a, (1) when the explicit knowledge level of focus government and non-focus government is low as a whole (), both sides eventually tend to be in a negative-peer state (0, 0). Among them, the willingness of non-focus governments to actively participate increases slightly at first and then decreases slowly. The focus government’s willingness to actively lead continues to decline, and the decline rate gradually slows down. Similar to the mechanism of tacit knowledge, with the increase of knowledge, the focus government’s willingness to lead decreases and increases rapidly, and the expansion of the knowledge gap also leads to the decline of leadership intention. However, the willingness of non-focus government to participate in the process of change is different. When the knowledge gap is large, the willingness of non-focus government to participate in the process of change is low. (2) With the decrease of their explicit knowledge level, the willingness curve of active participation rises. However, when the knowledge gap expands, the role of the knowledge spillover effect on non-focus government is reduced, and it is difficult for non-focus government with a weak foundation to obtain favorable resources and generate substantial benefits through the knowledge spillover effect. In the background there are external investments but as profits and the focus government’s active will are not strong, the non-focus government tends to finally move to autonomous governance mode. It can be seen that the knowledge gap limits the role of the knowledge spillover effect, leading to a negative-peer state of the system.
- In Figure 6b, (1) when the explicit knowledge level of the focus government and non-focus government is higher as a whole () or the explicit knowledge gap changes, the final state of both side changes. With the obvious increase of the explicit knowledge gap, the positive will of both sides continues to decrease, which is faster than that in Figure 6a. This reflects the existing problems of regional green development: In order to build better and faster in the green advantage industry and give play to the ‘first mover’ advantage, the focus government will speed up the pace of independent development, leading to the widening gap of explicit knowledge, such as the management experience of local governments among regions. (2) When both sides are in a state of a high level of explicit knowledge, the benefit of the knowledge spillover effect is significantly higher than that of external expenditure. At this time, although the focus government undertakes more external investment due to the rise of the stock of non-focus government knowledge, the focus government can also accept part of the spillover knowledge and make up for its own shortcomings. The two sides present the collaborative situation of mutual benefits and a win-win relationship, forming a (1,1) positive-peer state.
5. Conclusions and Suggestions
- Good trust and communication between governments are the basis of the knowledge learning effect. The key to the formation of the knowledge synergy effect is to enhance the complementarity of the knowledge structure among governments and give way to the interests of non-focus governments. The two kinds of government ability of cooperative knowledge development determine the strength of the knowledge reciprocity effect. With the increase of the knowledge effect, focus governments and non-focus governments will maintain a positive-peer state.
- The increase of tacit knowledge exchange cost will restrain the effect of knowledge learning. If the two kinds of governments form a relatively closed concept of knowledge utilization, overemphasize higher-value knowledge, enhance protection, and the infrastructure of knowledge utilization is not in place and the knowledge transformation platform is overcrowded, it will lead to the weakening of the knowledge spillover effect. With the attenuation of the two kinds of knowledge effects, focus government and non-focus government will stabilize the negative-peer state.
- The more active the knowledge transformation activities within the two types of government, the stronger the ability to mine their knowledge, which will inhibit the willingness of knowledge interaction and lead to the formation of a negative-peer state.
- The higher the opportunity income of the two types of intergovernmental external knowledge transformation activities, the greater the restriction of knowledge protection, and the higher the degree of punishment of the central government on knowledge closure behavior, the stronger the binding force of intergovernmental cooperation contract will be, promoting the formation of a positive-peer state.
- The knowledge learning effect only exists in the early and middle stages of green governance. When the willingness to manage is high, the effect of learning is limited. When the difference of management intention is large, both sides’ enthusiasm to participate in the collaborative transformation of knowledge increases, but because the high willing side bears too much cost, the collaborative relationship may break down.
- The knowledge spillover effect plays an important role in the later stage of green governance. With the increase of the capacity gap, the knowledge acceptance and transformation of non-focus government spillovers are limited, limiting the knowledge spillover effect. When peer interaction is positive, knowledge spillover will bring benefits.
- Improve the efficiency of external knowledge absorption and strengthen the perception of external knowledge. The non-focus government should take the initiative to get close to the focus government, learn from the other party’s green governance will, optimize the knowledge structure of management ability, and improve the elasticity of complementary knowledge stock. The non-focus government should make the proportion of low knowledge cooperative income distribution and the flexibility of knowledge stock properly and gain more knowledge income through increased overall interests. The non-focus government should actively absorb the focus government’s management talents, open the exchange of posts and enterprises, and improve the absorption capacity of external explicit and tacit knowledge.
- Reduce the cost of knowledge outflow and avoid the collaborative crisis caused by knowledge ‘private possession.’ In knowledge learning, the cost of observation and communication should be controlled reasonably. In knowledge spillover, optimize the knowledge docking channels and platform space, reduce the occupancy of knowledge conversion platforms, share common experience, planning, and schemes, and enhance all governments’ behavior enthusiasm. The regional government should form a unified program document and build a platform for knowledge transformation across regions. The green development policies of local governments can be seamlessly linked and a shared government platform can be established to gradually eliminate the constraints of geography on development.
- Correctly guide the internal knowledge transformation process. Through internal knowledge transformation, some governments increase knowledge increment significantly and obtain more knowledge increment benefits. However, the government should take a long-term view, reasonably evaluate the situation of its knowledge increment in the region and clarify the opportunity loss of knowledge investment and the damage of knowledge protection punishment to its interests. As far as the green development environment is concerned, restrictive punishment measures can be implemented to reduce the bad behaviors of ‘free-riding’ and the belief that ‘knowledge is not open’.
- Create an excellent positive-peer environment and improve the local government audit and guidance mechanism. The central government should assess the local government’s decision-making situation in time and regulate the bad behavior reasonably. The government should pay attention to the good government images and reputations, encourage local cooperation, and curb the relatively closed government behavior and refusal to exchange knowledge.
- Local governments should be encouraged to choose the appropriate group state, ensuring that their development is not biased, decisions are not blind, and management is followed. The non-focus government, if it is not encouraged, can enter into a positive-peer state. Non-focus government can use the knowledge learning effect in the early stage to increase the willingness of green governance, promote the improvement of management ability with the help of the transfer of internal tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge, and then enter the period of rapid green development with the help of the knowledge spillover effect. As for the focus governments, they are not encouraged to choose to lead actively. In the early stage, the non-focus government’s awareness of green governance is weak, relying on the focus government’s unilateral wake-up effect, which is low and easy to undermine their own positive will. The non-focus government can gradually lead the regional collaborative governance and take the initiative to carry out knowledge spillover in the middle and later stages by following independently. Therefore, this paper encourages the formation of negative-peer, consistent-direction-peer, reverse-peer, and positive-peer development paths. All kinds of companion states are reasonable and necessary. The government should rationally analyze the path of green governance decision-making to formulate appropriate development plans.
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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|Active Participation||Autonomous Governance|
|Focus govenment||active leadership||;||;|
|Equilibrium Points||Local Stability|
|Related Parameters||Parameter Value||Related Parameters||Parameter Value||Related Parameters||Parameter Value||Related Parameters||Parameter Value|
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Liu, H.; Yao, P.; Wang, X.; Huang, J.; Yu, L. Research on the Peer Behavior of Local Government Green Governance Based on SECI Expansion Model. Land 2021, 10, 472. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10050472
Liu H, Yao P, Wang X, Huang J, Yu L. Research on the Peer Behavior of Local Government Green Governance Based on SECI Expansion Model. Land. 2021; 10(5):472. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10050472Chicago/Turabian Style
Liu, Hongda, Pinbo Yao, Xiaoxia Wang, Jialiang Huang, and Liying Yu. 2021. "Research on the Peer Behavior of Local Government Green Governance Based on SECI Expansion Model" Land 10, no. 5: 472. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10050472