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Article

From Silos to Synergy: Improving Coordination in Local Flood Management

1
Chair of Engineering Hydrology and Water Management, Technical University of Darmstadt, 64287 Darmstadt, Germany
2
Institute of Political Science, Technical University of Darmstadt, 64283 Darmstadt, Germany
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Water 2025, 17(15), 2212; https://doi.org/10.3390/w17152212
Submission received: 30 May 2025 / Revised: 17 July 2025 / Accepted: 23 July 2025 / Published: 24 July 2025
(This article belongs to the Section Water and Climate Change)

Abstract

Flood risk governance has gained increasing attention as climate change and urbanization amplify flood risks. While much of the literature has focused on national and supranational governance frameworks, sectoral integration, and public participation, there remains a critical gap in understanding horizontal coordination within municipal administrations—particularly in medium-sized cities. This study examines how local governments coordinate flood risk management across different departments and administrative units, identifying key challenges and enabling factors. Using a case study of Mörfelden-Walldorf, a medium-sized city in southern Hesse, Germany, we analyze the internal governance dynamics shaping flood resilience. The research highlights institutional fragmentation, sectoral silos, and resource constraints as key barriers to effective coordination while also identifying mechanisms that facilitate cross-departmental collaboration. By integrating insights from the public administration literature with flood governance scholarship, this study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of local-level flood risk governance. The findings provide practical implications for enhancing municipal flood resilience through improved governance structures and coordination mechanisms.

1. Introduction

Floods are among the most frequent and costly natural hazards. Climate change is expected to affect precipitation patterns, thereby increasing global flood risks [1,2]. While the impacts are anticipated to vary regionally [3], projections for Europe—and particularly for Germany—indicate an increase in the intensity and frequency of such events [4,5]. Urban areas are especially vulnerable to flood risks, making climate adaptation and effective flood management a crucial element of urban development strategies aimed at enhancing resilience [6]. Beyond improving technical infrastructure, it is essential to integrate flood management into adaptive and anticipatory planning and administrative processes. This requires an interdisciplinary and comprehensive approach to flood prevention.
Especially since 2008, flood risk governance (FRG) has emerged as a critical research domain, reflecting the growing complexity of flood risk management (FRM) in response to climate change and socio-economic transformations [7,8]. Increasing flood risks due to changing precipitation patterns and urbanization have necessitated a shift from traditional flood protection to more integrated and adaptive governance approaches [9,10]. This paradigm shift is underpinned by the recognition that flood resilience is not merely a technical challenge but one requiring coordination of multiple actors across governance levels, sectors, and jurisdictions [11].
A central debate in the FRG literature revolves around how governance arrangements shape the ability of societies to mitigate and respond to flood risks. Morrison et al. [12] provide a systematic review of flood risk governance scholarship, identifying stakeholder engagement, the evolution of FRM policies, their implementation and performance, and the development of governance frameworks as key research avenues relating to governance. While significant progress has been made in these areas, gaps remain in understanding how governance structures facilitate or hinder resilience-building efforts [13].
Stakeholder engagement is one of the most researched areas in FRG. Studies highlight the role of public participation, co-production, and collaboration of public and private actors in shaping FRM outcomes [8,14,15]. The engagement of a wide range of stakeholders enriches the decision-making process by incorporating multiple viewpoints and experiences, thus infusing valuable expert and local knowledge into flood risk management strategies [16,17]. However, research predominantly focuses on participatory mechanisms at broader governance scales [11], often overlooking intra-governmental coordination, particularly at the municipal level. While (local) governments play a central role in FRM, they are frequently treated as monolithic entities, neglecting the internal institutional complexities and coordination challenges within the bureaucracy [18].
The literature on FRM policies and their evolution provides critical insights into the assumptions and consequences of different governance models. The transition from centralized flood protection to multi-level governance frameworks has been extensively analyzed, particularly in European contexts [19]. However, many studies focus on policy shifts at the national and supranational levels, with limited attention to how these changes manifest at the municipal level and what structural barriers local governments face in implementing FRM strategies [20].
An emerging yet crucial aspect of the FRG literature examines governance frameworks and arrangements that enable or constrain resilience-building efforts. Studies have analyzed institutional fragmentation as a barrier to effective flood management, emphasizing the need for stronger integration of actors and sectors [12]. Flood management intersects with various policy areas and is often affected by an institutional disconnect between responsible departments that inhibits coherent FRM policies. For example, flood management is usually the responsibility of spatial planning and water management departments, which have their own priorities regarding the use of land and natural resources [21]. Linking flood risk management strategies within water governance and across different policy areas is found to create more integrated and resilient governance structures [22,23,24]. While these studies have made important contributions, the role of horizontal coordination within municipal administrations—how different departments and agencies interact and share responsibilities—remains an underexplored yet critical issue.
Institutional fragmentation in flood management exists not only between sectors but also across governance levels. Particularly in Europe, flood management is divided between centralized water management and decentralized spatial planning, mostly at the local level [25,26,27]. Some studies, therefore, emphasize the need for multi-level governance approaches that balance top-down regulatory structures with bottom-up initiatives [13,28]. However, a key research gap remains in defining the actual and necessary division of responsibilities between actors. There is a growing recognition of the shift from state-centric flood protection to shared responsibilities between governments, private actors, and communities [28]. Yet, systematic insights on how to allocate responsibilities effectively, particularly within municipal administrations, are still lacking [29].
In addition, FRG research concentrates mostly on large metropolitan areas, while medium-sized cities are frequently overlooked. Large cities typically possess well-developed flood management infrastructure, specialized governance frameworks, and significant financial and human resources to implement resilience measures [19,30]. In contrast, medium-sized cities often lack these capabilities and must navigate more fragmented institutional structures with fewer resources [14,15]. Understanding how this kind of city manages flood risk governance, allocates responsibilities, and coordinate across different administrative units is crucial for developing more inclusive and scalable governance models. Research indicates that governance challenges in smaller urban contexts are distinct from those in metropolitan regions, necessitating tailored policy approaches [13,20]. Also, FRG research has traditionally focused on riverine cities and coastal cities [8]. However, inland cities increasingly face pluvial flood risks from extreme precipitation events exacerbated by climate change, thereby necessitating expanded research efforts.
In summary, while significant progress has been made in understanding flood risk governance, critical gaps persist. Research has extensively covered sectoral integration, public participation, and policy evolution, yet the horizontal coordination within municipal administrations remains underexplored. Addressing this gap is essential for the effective implementation of horizontal coordination and integrated flood risk management strategies at the local level, especially for medium-sized cities. We aim to contribute to the literature on flood risk governance by emphasizing the internal dynamics of municipal governments, thereby building a bridge to the public administration literature. Thus, this study aims to contribute to the discourse by examining the internal governance dynamics of municipal governments and by identifying barriers and enabling factors for improved horizontal coordination in local flood governance. Additionally, we aim to gather more evidence on flood governance in cities that are not directly located near large water bodies but still face flood risks due to heavy rainfall events. To this end, we conduct an illustrative case study to identify and systematize relevant factors for further research. The case study focuses on Mörfelden-Walldorf located in southern Hesse, Germany, which is representative of a medium-sized city and sensitive to heavy rainfall events. We follow the classification of the German Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development, and understand a medium city as one with between 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. Similar thresholds are also applied in other European countries and have been used in comparative scientific analyses across Europe [31]. Thus, the findings may be applicable not only to comparable German cities but also to other European municipalities with similar administrative structures and urban characteristics. However, it should be noted that in other global contexts, cities of this size are often classified as small, and differences in governmental systems may limit the transferability of the conclusions.
In the following section, we present the analytical framework, which draws on insights from the public administration literature. Subsequently, we outline the methodology and data employed in this study. Following this, we provide an in-depth examination of the case of Mörfelden-Walldorf, detailing its general characteristics and the flood management responsibilities of and in local administration, as well as the existing concepts and instruments in place. We then analyze the extent and forms of coordination that occur, and, finally, we discuss the key barriers to coordination that have been identified.

2. Analytic Framework

As the literature review shows, coordination is seen as a prerequisite for an integrative coordinative governance system and is considered essential for effective flood risk management. From a conceptional perspective, however, defining coordination is challenging because it is a rather ambiguous term, and there is no textbook definition as meanings vary between and within social science disciplines [32]. Coordination is based on a coordination problem, which according to Schelling [33] is not confrontative in nature and is illustrated by the fact that the actors involved prefer the same outcome but lack the necessary information to achieve it by unilateral action [34]. The need for coordination arises from the functional interdependencies between actors, whose respective actions in turn affect a desired outcome, and thus coordination can be generally defined as “the extent to which organizations attempt to ensure that their activities take into account those of other organizations” [35] or simply as “managing interdependencies between activities” [36]. In public administration, coordination problems are mostly associated with the division of labor and specialization in government and bureaucracies across all levels. While departmentalization enables efficient and parallel handling of single issue problems, complex problems such as flood risk management create the need for coordination [37]. Here, the necessity for coordination arises not only from a lack of necessary information but also from an overlap of authority, where multiple actors are responsible, or from an underlap, where no actors are responsible [38].
Even with a broad definition of coordination, it remains a complex concept and an empirical phenomenon due to its multiple dimensions. In general, a distinction can be made between horizontal and vertical coordination [39]. Horizontal coordination takes place between equal actors at the same level, while vertical coordination takes place between actors at different levels and involves a hierarchical relationship. Especially horizontal coordination is often challenging because actors have a certain degree of autonomy and coordination is usually voluntary [40], as shown in the governance of natural resources [41,42]. Scharpf [43], on the other hand, distinguishes between negative and positive coordination. The mode of negative coordination describes processes in which the negative effects of an actor’s actions and decisions on affected actors are avoided through anticipation or bilateral adjustment. The primary goal of negative coordination is to minimize disturbances from other actors by limiting involvement to that which is strictly necessary. Formally, negative coordination can be realized through co-signing procedures. Positive coordination, on the other hand, involves placing the action options of all affected actors on the table and typically addressing them simultaneously in multilateral negotiations to increase the aggregated benefit of all actors. Inter-ministerial working groups are typical examples of positive coordination. While positive coordination is generally harder to achieve, it is associated with greater coherence than negative coordination [44].
Of course, coordination can also vary in its scale. A popular concept is Metcalfe’s [45] nine-level coordination scale, which ranges from independent decision-making by actors to a joint government strategy. However, Metcalfe’s scale also has shortcomings: it is very detailed and lacks clear criteria or elements from which distinct degrees can be distinguished [46]. Another approach would be a more simplistic one based on Cejudo and Michel [47], where the coordination scale describes a range from (1) a regular yet informal exchange of information between actors, to (2) formal information exchange but unilateral action, and, finally, to (3) formal information exchange with joint decisions and goal-setting (the latter mostly in the form of positive coordination).
This highlights that the key to a coordination scale lies in the degree of institutionalization of coordination, which manifests in both structure and duration. Structures, in particular, can be differentiated. The weakest structure is represented by personal links between individuals. In organizations, shared education, professional socialization, or common work experiences can foster bonds, creating a foundation for coordination. Beyond personal connections, informal linkages play a significant role. These arise from spontaneous interactions between individuals, establishing informal channels of communication as they engage with one another in their organizational roles. Such interactions can take various forms, including telephone calls, ad hoc meetings, or exchanges of emails [48]. Additionally, Alexander [48] identifies several micro-level coordination structures that go beyond informal arrangements. These include the role of a boundary spanner, whose function is to facilitate coordination between two or more interdependent organizations. However, this role is indirect in that coordination is only part of, or incidental to, their other responsibilities. This differs from the coordinator, whose sole or main function is to coordinate the activities of the members of an organizational system. An alternative is an inter-organizational group (“task forces, working groups, and so on”), an informal and often temporary arrangement made up of members of affected departments but without decision-making powers [49]. These ideal microstructures can be roughly translated to the meso level. A coordinating unit exists to facilitate coordination without having specialized tasks. It enjoys greater organizational autonomy than an inter-organizational group because it has its own staff rather than having to rely on staff from specialized units. The lead organization instead not only performs its line functions but also takes responsibility for coordinating the activities of all other organizations in the system. Along with the inter-organizational group, this is one of the most common structures for coordination in governmental contexts. Finally, there is the option of a single organization that internalizes all relevant tasks requiring coordination. A typical example of this approach is the creation of super-ministries [50].
Although coordination is always considered important in the literature, it is often found to be non-existent or failed. As research in natural resource management suggests, even when formal coordination mechanisms exist, they frequently fail to facilitate meaningful information exchange or resolve coordination problems [51,52]. Consequently, several barriers to coordination have been identified. One barrier results directly from the guiding structure of organizations: the division of labor and specialization. Departmentalization actively channels actors’ perceptions, resulting in selective perception. Thus, they only focus on problems within their area of expertise, fail to perceive interdependence, and do not consider the need for coordination [53]. In addition, there are factors that increase the transaction costs of coordination. These include path dependencies: if there are already established routines and processes for addressing problems, this leads to positive feedback effects that make it more difficult to change the approach. Establishing coordination structures requires abandoning or modifying entrenched processes, which might not be pursued due to path dependencies [49]. Also, transaction costs increase with the complexity of governmental structures and the number of responsible actors [54]. In other words, the more complex the governmental structures, the more extensive the coordination overlap becomes. However, transaction costs can also arise simply from “real costs” (budget, time, personnel, and geographic proximity) amid scarce resources, thereby directly affecting the coordination capacity of organizations [49]. Beyond transaction costs, conflicts of vested interest can also pose barriers to coordination. As mentioned above, coordination problems are not inherently confrontative issues; however, they can be overshadowed by secondary conflicts. This includes turf protection, which describes the tendency of organizations and individual units to defend their jurisdiction against others. Coordination processes are perceived as a threat because they may alter these boundaries, leading to resistance against such processes [55]. Additionally, in governmental settings and in cases of interorganizational coordination, political interests or strategic party considerations can also hinder coordination, especially when responsibilities are held by different parties [56]. Finally, particularly in the analysis of small-scale organizations, idiosyncratic factors related to the individuals involved may also play a role. These may include negative attitudes toward coordination with other organizations, differences in professional backgrounds and thus perspectives on problems, or insufficient training and experience in collaborative work [48]. Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual elements used to assess horizontal coordination.
For the subsequent analyses, we focus on horizontal coordination between administrative units within the city administration. In a first step, we examine the scale of coordination of flood risk management currently in place. In a second step, we analyze how the observed scale can be explained by the existing structures and/or by known barriers and enabling factors.

3. Methods and Data

3.1. Case Selection

The here-selected case Mörfelden-Walldorf represents a medium-sized German city in the state of Hesse and the Rhine-Main Metropolitan Region. As of 2023, it has a population of approximately 32,196 residents [57] and covers a total area of approximately 4389 hectares [58]. There are no significant elevations in the area except for the Oberwaldberg, a former landfill site. Within the territory of Mörfelden-Walldorf, there are eight flowing water bodies in the form of streams and five standing water bodies in the form of lakes, see Figure 2. A large portion of the municipality’s area consists of forested land (~55%) and agricultural land (~20%). In total, 484 hectares are sealed surfaces, and 70% of the actual settlement area is sealed, which is at the upper end of the typical degree of sealing for settlement areas, ranging between 40 and 80% [59].
Mörfelden-Walldorf is located in a temperate climate zone with no dry season and a warm summer (CfB in the Köppen classification). The average annual precipitation has recently been 593.8 mm (2013–2023), whereas, historically, it has been 657.8 mm (1961–1990). The state of Hesse estimates the probability of heavy rainfall in Mörfelden-Walldorf to be high and also notes a high level of vulnerability [60]. The city has, to date, repeatedly experienced heavy rainfall events (09.08.1981, 09.06.2007, 21.06.2007, 29.07.2014, 29.05.2016, 30.05.2016, 23.09.2018, and 18.08.2019), with the most severe incidents occurring in 2007, leading to “large-scale flooding” with entire streets being under water and significant property damage (Interview 2). Data from the nearest station of the German Meteorological Service in Frankfurt show the following daily rainfall values (in mm, with hourly maximum in parentheses) for the selected events: 09.08.1981: 109.7 (n/a), 09.06.2007: 9.8 (9.0), 21.06.2007: 20.7 (25.0), 29.07.2014: 31.0 (10.7), 29.05.2016: 45.1 (15.2), 30.05.2016: 6.6 (17.3), 23.09.2018: 13.2 (10.2), 18.08.2019: 13.6 (13.0). During the event on 21.06.2007, the fire department had to deal with over 500 call-outs [61]. To date, no personal injuries have been reported. The types of damage that have occurred so far include flooded streets and cellars, which are the result of the sewer network being overloaded (Interview 3). Flooded cellars were caused by water ingress through cellar windows or from the sewer system due to missing, defective, or blocked backflow flap valves. Additionally, trees were often uprooted or at risk of toppling over as a result of heavy rainfall following prolonged drought (Interview 6). Consequently, it can be assumed that the topic of flood prevention is actively addressed within the city. Thus, the case provides a good example for medium-sized, flat, and exposed cities with potential risk areas.

3.2. Methodology

For the analysis of coordination and barriers and enablers to coordination, this study utilizes qualitative information from semi-structured expert interviews to obtain in-depth and non-publicly accessible information. The expert interview method was selected because it is well suited for gathering factual and experiential knowledge, enabling “[experts] to provide efficient access to specific domains of knowledge” [62]. A total of six semi-structured expert interviews were conducted, involving eleven participants. The selection of experts was based on the relevance to flood management of their respective offices and institutions in Mörfelden-Walldorf. Interviewees included politically responsible individuals, employees of municipal utilities and relevant departments, a member from the fire brigade, and representatives from an engineering firm that carried out an analysis of the sewer system in Mörfelden-Walldorf with regard to flood risks. The interviews were conducted in December 2022 and January 2023.
An interview guide was developed for conducting the expert interviews and consists of different thematic blocks. These are introduced by main questions that serve as central prompts for discussion and can be supplemented by follow-up questions [63]. The thematic blocks cover general information about heavy rainfall events in Mörfelden-Walldorf, disaster management, and the management of green and open spaces, as well as water bodies, (political) strategies, concepts, and instruments currently in place or planned in the city, as well as structural measures related to flood management. Given the exploratory nature of the study, open-ended questions were used to allow for flexibility and to explore unexpected themes that emerged during the interviews. The full interview guide can be found as Supplementary Material. As the interviewees in this study had expertise in different areas, only a subset of the thematic blocks was covered in each interview. Comparability between interviews was not an aim of the study; therefore, it was not necessary to cover the same thematic blocks in each interview. The interviews were audio recorded and subsequently transcribed. To ensure the anonymity of the individuals and institutions involved, the names of the interviewees are not disclosed in the study. In addition to the interviews, official documents from the city of Mörfelden-Walldorf were also analyzed.
In the following sections, the role of cities in Germany in flood prevention will first be outlined, including the key actors responsible in Mörfelden-Walldorf (and in other cities), as well as the concepts and instruments currently in place. Subsequently, the coordination of these efforts will be analyzed.

4. Results from Qualitative Analysis

4.1. The Role of Municipalities in Flood Risk Management in the Federal System

In order to analyze flood governance in municipalities, it is essential to consider the German federal system in an institutional context. Germany is a federal state divided into the federal level and the state level, which consists of 16 Länder or states. The states have a multi-level administrative structure of up to four tiers of administration in larger states: (1) the state level itself and (2) the regional districts (Regierungsbezirke), which are responsible for the implementation of certain federal and state policies and supervise lower-level administrations, as well as the (3) counties (Landkreise) and (4) the municipalities (There is considerable variation within the German administrative system as not all states have regional districts. Additionally, there are 107 county-free cities (kreisfreie Städte), which are municipalities that also perform the functions typically assigned to counties. For a detailed description, see [64]). Counties and municipalities together constitute the local government and implement both tasks delegated by higher levels as well as their own original tasks, whereas counties typically handle more “supra-local” responsibilities than municipalities [64]. Mörfelden-Walldorf is located in the state of Hesse, within the regional district of Darmstadt and the county of Groß-Gerau, as illustrated by Figure 3.
In water and flood management, the federal government is primarily responsible for the overarching legal framework, while the Länder and municipalities are responsible for implementation and specification. However, the overall framework for flood protection is determined by the EU Floods Directive (2007/60/EC), which was incorporated into the Federal Water Act on 1 March 2010 [65]. Since then, a central component of flood management has been the mandatory three-stage flood planning [66]: In the first step, the responsible authorities in the states are obliged to identify areas where there is a significant flood risk. In the second step, the state authorities must produce hazard and risk maps based on the identified risk areas. Flood hazard maps assess areas in terms of the probability and intensity of flood events. Risk maps analyze the possible negative consequences of floods, such as the population affected and economic damage incurred. In the third step, authorities are required to draw up Flood Risk Management Plans. These should include objectives and measures to reduce both the probability of flood events and their adverse consequences. In the states, “upper water authorities” located at the level of the regional district are responsible for the three-stage flood planning. In Hesse, a Flood Risk Management Plan was presented for the first time in December 2015 and was updated in December 2021 [67]. These regulations, however, primarily address fluvial floods. There are no comparable mandatory regulations for pluvial floods.
Municipalities also play an important role as assigned to them by the Basic Law. They are responsible for providing most local public services to citizens and for implementing federal and state legislation [64]. In this context, they are generally responsible for wastewater disposal and the operation of local water infrastructure. This includes technical flood protection measures, such as the construction of retention basins. In addition, they are responsible for spatial planning, i.e., the designation of settlement areas and the assessment of flood risk within these areas. While there is a wide restriction on designating settlement areas within the (fluvial) flood zones defined by Flood Risk Management Plans [68] in all other areas—including (pluvial) risk areas outside designated flood zones—the decision ultimately lies with the municipality and must be weighed against other planning interests [69].
Accordingly, municipalities play a crucial role in flood prevention. They do receive support from the state, but this is rather limited, especially if a municipality is not located in an official risk area as defined by the regional district’s flood management plans. Regarding pluvial floods, the main instrument of support by the state is the provision of a Heavy Rain Information Map (Starkregen-Hinweiskarte), which provides an overview of risk exposure and helps municipalities to better assess their own situation [60]. However, the heavy rainfall hazard map has a resolution of only 1 km2, making it unsuitable for precise local planning (The Heavy Rain Information Map is available through a web viewer provided by the state of Hesse. The viewer now also includes a flow path map, which, however, is currently not available for flat cities such as Mörfelden-Walldorf: https://umweltdaten.hessen.de/mapapps/resources/apps/starkregenviewer/index.html?lang=de; accessed on 12 May 2025). Municipalities are, therefore, encouraged to carry out or commission further analyses. Furthermore, municipalities are strongly recommended to develop a comprehensive municipal action plan for flood prevention, ideally as part of an integrated water-sensitive urban development strategy [70]. However, this poses particular challenges for smaller municipalities. In Hessian municipalities with between 25,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, very few action plans for heavy rainfall or integrated water-sensitive urban development strategies could be identified.

4.2. Municipal Actors in Flood Management

Local government in Hesse follows the principle of representative democracy. The citizens of a municipality elect a mayor every six years. In addition, the citizens elect the municipal council (Stadtverordnetenversammlung) every five years. The municipal council acts as the local legislative chamber, deliberating and deciding on matters affecting the municipality and supervising local government [71]. Similar to other parliamentary systems, it organizes itself into committees that focus on specific policy areas. In Mörfelden-Walldorf, these are the Main Committee responsible for finance and economics, the Committee for Planning, Construction, and Mobility; the Committee for Social Affairs, Culture, and Integration; and the Committee for Climate, Environment, Supply, and Disposal.
The council also elects the members of the executive board (Magistrat), which is presided over by the mayor. The board collectively oversees the local administration. The local administration is typically organized as a single-line system with strict hierarchies and clearly defined areas of competence. Below the level of the mayor and his deputies (the other executive board members), it is functionally differentiated according to various policy areas, resulting in a highly specialized division of labor and a strongly hierarchical structure. The central organizational unit is the Amt or office, which acts as the central unit responsible for carrying out municipal tasks and often acts autonomously in its external interactions. The offices are assigned to departments, which represent the areas of responsibility of the deputies [72,73], see Figure 4.
As in other cities, flood management in Mörfelden-Walldorf cuts across administrative structures, involving multiple departments. The general responsibility for water management and the operation of the water infrastructure lies with the Stadtwerke. The Stadtwerke are not a direct part of the local administration but a municipal-owned company that provides utility services on behalf of the public and operates under the supervision of the executive board in the case of Mörfelden-Walldorf the first deputy mayor. The Stadtwerke monitor and control technical drainage systems are responsible for adapting the sewer network to flood risks. Thus, the Stadtwerke play a key role in the city’s flood risk management.
Within the administration, the main responsibility lies with the city planning office (Stadtplanungs und Bauamt), which is responsible for spatial planning. The central instrument of urban planning in Germany is the development plan (Bebauungsplan), which defines the zoning of different districts, determines infrastructure measures, and sets specific requirements for (mostly new) buildings [74]. While the municipal council must approve the development plan, the city planning office is primarily responsible for drafting it. With regard to flood management, the city planning office must include flood risk reduction and preparedness measures in the development plan (e.g., provisions for green roofs and facades).
The office for the environment (Amt für Umwelt) is also involved in flood management. It is responsible for the local implementation of environmental regulations, environmental planning, and climate adaptation. This includes the management of green and open spaces and open water bodies under the supervision of the county. Thus, the office for the environment plays a role in particular in the identification of retention areas.
Disaster management is primarily organized at the county level, but municipalities also have responsibilities, particularly through the office for public order (Ordnungsamt) and the local fire brigade. The latter plays a crucial role as it is responsible not only for fire protection but also for technical assistance. This includes responding to both minor and major local floods. While administrative responsibility is transferred to the county level in the event of a disaster—bringing other organizations into play—the operational and tactical implementation of response measures remains with the fire brigade [75]. Consequently, the capacity and preparedness of the local fire brigade are critical factors in effective flood prevention and response.
Finally, the budget office also plays a role. Although it has no technical jurisdiction, it is responsible for drafting the annual budget and thus for allocating funds for flood management and related measures. However, the budget must also be approved by the municipal council, meaning it is usually subject to political debate.
In summary, it can be stated that in the field of flood management, interdependencies exist between various actors in public administration that need to be addressed as emphasized by the German Association for Water, Wastewater and Waste [76]. It is important to note, however, that the example presented here represents a medium-sized city; larger cities typically have more specialized departments.

4.3. Concepts and Instruments in Place

To date, neither an integrated concept for flood prevention nor a comprehensive water-sensitive urban development strategy has been developed for Mörfelden-Walldorf (Interview 1). In terms of risk assessment, the city primarily relies on data provided by the state as it does not possess its own flood risk map or heavy rainfall map.
However, there are other general concepts that address partially flood prevention and the city implements and plans specific measures related to flood prevention, which are summarized in Table 1. These measures include general frameworks reacting to climate change with regard to urban development and encompass flooding and storm water but also specific regulatory and financial instruments established for water management.
On 13 December 2022, the city council approved a motion to review the implementation of a “Sponge City Concept”. The aim of the resolution was to assess the extent to which the Sponge City Concept could be applied to all new municipal construction projects as well as private buildings in Mörfelden-Walldorf, thus practically implementing water-sensitive urban development. Key elements of the concept include redirecting surface water to infiltration areas, utilizing rainwater as a design element in the redevelopment of public squares and streets, reopening watercourses, implementing green roofs and facade greening, and removing sealed surfaces while planting new trees [77]. The review was conducted by the city planning office, which concluded that such a concept could be introduced as a “self-commitment” for municipal new construction projects. For private construction projects, the concept could be regulated and enforced through the development plans. However, it was noted that the principles underlying this concept have already been practiced for several years mostly via the development plans. For example, the requirement to infiltrate rain water on private properties is typically prescribed in development plans. Additionally, in some development plans, green roofs are in specific cases explicitly mandated [77]. This illustrates that the city tackles important aspects of flood management via different concepts, which, for coherence, need to be coordinated.

5. Discussion

The responsibility for the flood management concepts and instruments presented above are dispersed throughout the city administration, mirroring the general responsibility allocation and indicating the crosscut nature of flood management (Table 2). In interviews with the administration, individuals from other departments referred to the Stadtwerke as the responsible department when asked about an overarching concept for heavy rainfall management (Interview 1; Interview 5). There is neither a dedicated flood coordinator nor a climate adaption officer. A climate protection officer was first appointed in 2011 to 2016 to focus on climate protection in general and has been in place again since April 2021. The position was, and is, funded by the Federal Ministry for the Environment. However, the climate protection manager is not involved in flood management. The dominating coordination structure in place is that of the lead organization: In the city administration, one unit is primarily responsible for dealing with the issues and secondarily for coordinating with other offices. Procedurally, the coordination of individual flood management topics remains in the mode of negative coordination. The responsible unit consults other offices for their opinion on proposed concepts or instruments. Even aside from the aforementioned concepts, coordination is always ad hoc and issue-related as it is, for example, in development plans, where it is also obligatory. Only the city planning office and the office for the environment hold regular meetings to exchange information on current issues, such as the here-identified instruments (Interview 5). Apart from that, there is no formalized committee for regular coordination. This is not just the case in flood management but the general modus operandi within the administration, as illustrated by the total inexistence of regular meetings between the Stadtwerke, city planning, and the office for the environment (Interview 1).
Moreover, the lead office always coordinates with others at the end of the formulation process, when a draft has already been completed and possible changes are minimal. During the formulation stage, there is no formal coordination only informal links between individuals (Interview 3). One interviewee highlighted this with regard to the development plans, noting that a finished concept is typically presented, which is sometimes problematic in terms of drainage. This aligns with the findings of Dearborn and Simon [53]: the leading unit naturally has its selective perception of the optimal utilization of space. The city planning office, which is responsible for the development plans, primarily focuses on structural aspects and the most economical use of space (Interview 2). The ex ante integration of drainage aspects into the finished draft concepts then often turns out to be difficult. For example, the Stadtwerke were only marginally involved in the formulation of the Inner Development Concept and were only able to submit an opinion at the end of the drafting process. One of the consequences of this was that a potential area in the final draft of the Inner Development Concept was located in an area designated by the Flood Risk Management Plan, where, according to federal law, the designation of building areas is restricted. Therefore, ex post coordination was required to amend the proposal that had already been finalized.
The interviews revealed only one instance of a higher level of coordination in the area of flood management. In June 2021, the deputy responsible for public order established a disaster management expert group with the objective of developing a general disaster management concept. The working group comprised the public order office, the main office, the IT department, the Stadtwerke, the fire brigade, the local chapter of the Red Cross, and representatives from the county‘s disaster management unit [78]. The group‘s work largely followed the mode of positive coordination, with key areas of focus being jointly developed and addressed through workshops, and was viewed as an important improvement for the local disaster management (Interview 6).
In general, it can be stated that coordination of flood management in Mörfelden-Walldorf is rather low. However, this can be interpreted in different ways. Some interviewees perceive it as efficient as it helps to avoid redundant structures (Interview 5). Others advocate for establishing more regular and positive forms of coordination, rather than only reacting in crisis situations when urgent action is required (Interview 1). Meanwhile, another interviewee believes that providing more coordination would be useful, but, in the context of limited capacity, more regular and earlier negative coordination would be preferable to more intense positive coordination (Interview 2).

5.1. Barriers to Coordination

Regardless of the desirability of greater formal coordination of drainage and flood management, the previous section suggests that the actual costs associated with coordination are a major barrier. In local administrations of medium-sized cities such as Mörfelden-Walldorf, staff capacity is limited to the extent that even the routine management of certain issues is constrained. For instance, the development of the Integrated Urban Development Concept is significantly delayed due to the absence of one responsible staff member. Allocating additional capacity for more positive forms of coordination remains extremely challenging. As research on climate adaption suggests, this is likely symptomatic for comparable cities. In a survey, 74% of Hessian municipalities stated a lack of staff resources as a barrier to climate adaptation activities [79].
One key challenge identified in the literature is the complexity of actor constellations, particularly with regard to cross-cutting issues such as flood management [80]. As shown, multiple units within the city administration are responsible for different aspects, resulting in a high number of relations that cannot be processed simultaneously. While bilateral exchanges do take place, there are no larger coordination formats. Limited resources intensify this problem. For example, in the context of development plans, external planning offices are frequently commissioned to formulate concepts and expert reports, often without considering flood management (Interview 2). This becomes problematic as these offices have one contact point in the administration (usually the city planning office) and are not integrated into administrative feedback loops. Consequently, drainage and flood prevention frequently play a minor role in the drafting of development plans. At the same time, the development of new residential or commercial areas is frequently driven by private project developers for whom concerns regarding drainage and flood prevention are often of secondary importance in the planning process (Interview 2).
A frequently cited barrier in the literature is the influence of political interests, which can overshadow technical issues and coordination processes [56]. Whilst some interviewees acknowledged partisan differences between the mayor (Green Party) and the first deputy (Christian Democratic Party—CDU) in certain matters at the time (2022), these did not pose a barrier in the areas of drainage and flood management (Interview 1). Instead, political agency can serve as an enabling factor. For instance, the local fire brigade had long advocated for the establishment of a disaster management expert group. This effort gained momentum, particularly after the CDU assumed the office of the deputy responsible for public order in 2021. With this change in leadership, the local fire brigade found a “political ally”, which ultimately facilitated the establishment of the expert group (Interview 6). However, it must also be recognized that the flood disaster in the Ahr valley in particular has raised public awareness and thus also increased the pressure on political decision-makers on all levels (Interview 1).
A more case-specific barrier, though likely relevant to several medium-sized cities, is the geographic proximity of offices. Due to its structure as a twin city, public administration in Mörfelden-Walldorf is spread across multiple locations, including the offices responsible for flood management. The city planning office and the office for the environment are located in the city hall in Mörfelden, while the public order office is based in Walldorf. Additionally, the Stadtwerke have their own separate location in Walldorf. Although the significance of physical distance may seem anachronistic in the “digital age”, it remains a factor for coordination (Interview 1 and 5). As coordination is mostly ad hoc and relies heavily on informal links, physical separation complicates low-threshold exchanges. Therefore, it is not surprising that informal coordination between the city planning office and the environmental office is more firmly established and occurs more regularly than with actors located at other sites.
The lack of coordination between specific offices can partly be attributed to the personal traits of those involved but also to a gatekeeping mentality, where information is shared reluctantly. This suggests that turf protection remains a factor, as identified by Tseng and Penning-Rowsell [81] as a “micro-political” barrier in FRM. While there has been a noticeable shift over the past 20 years toward a more positive perception of coordination in the city administration, some individuals continue to resist such efforts, posing a significant barrier (Interview 1).

5.2. Options for Enhancing Coordination

In light of the previous findings, as well as from insights from interviews and the literature, coordination could be improved by adapting existing structures and removing institutional barriers. However, the interviews also suggest that for a medium-sized city like Mörfelden-Walldorf, rather than aiming for extensive meso-level coordination structures, which may be unrealistic given limited administrative capacity, targeted micro-level structures could be more feasible. Specifically, overcoming the barriers of spatial separation and a gatekeeping mentality requires low-threshold mechanisms that foster regular exchange and trust among actors. Several potential models emerge from the analysis:
(1) Establishing a dedicated working group for flood risk governance, including individuals from responsible offices, could facilitate structured coordination. However, this is known from larger German cities such as Ludwigshafen or Kaiserslautern [70]. Given existing capacity constraints, such an approach may only be feasible if it remains lightweight but still meets at a sustainable frequency. The precedent set by the disaster management expert group demonstrates that such coordination can be achieved under the right circumstances but relies on some form of agency by (political) leadership. Also, a political mandate to develop a climate adaptation concept or a specific heavy rainfall concept could be a basis for a shared vision of the administration. It has been posited that such a vision could encourage stronger coordination and increased commitment among stakeholders [82].
(2) Assigning a designated flood governance coordinator within the municipal administration could enhance interdepartmental alignment. Yet, considering the capacity for flood governance responsibilities in a medium-sized city, employing a full-time coordinator is not reasonable. One potential alternative would be integrating this role within an existing position, such as the already existing climate protection manager, thereby leveraging existing institutional structures. Another option could be inter-municipal cooperation. For example, small and medium-sized cities within the Städteregion Aachen (North Rhine-Westphalia) jointly created a position for a flood coordination officer, demonstrating a collaborative approach to addressing shared challenges [83].
(3) Strengthening the role of informal networks and boundary spanners—individuals who naturally connect various departments—may present the most feasible approach, also suggested by research on municipal environmental resource management [82]. Such a role could emerge organically by identifying and supporting key individuals in the responsible offices who already facilitate cross-departmental coordination. Strengthening their ability to act as intermediaries could significantly enhance coordination without requiring formal structural changes.
(4) Beyond structures and positions, informal linkages play a critical role in coordination. Encouraging more frequent interaction through events, joint workshops, or team-building activities could enhance trust and reduce institutional silos. While such measures may not change the governance in place and directly lead to coordination, they could lower the identified barriers to information exchange such as a gate-keeping mentality and improve coordination over time.

6. Conclusions

This paper analyzed flood risk governance in Mörfelden-Walldorf, with a focus on the role of the city administration, identified key barriers, and proposed potential solutions to address them. In summary, it can be seen that Mörfelden-Walldorf is aware of the local pluvial flood risk and is actively taking steps to prepare for it. However, the case study highlights the critical role of coordination in flood risk governance yet reveals that, in practice, coordination remains predominantly limited to ad hoc coordination and regular but informal information exchange between actors and persists in the mode of negative coordination in late stages of problem-solving. This aligns with the broader public administration literature, which emphasizes that coordination is often reactive rather than proactive, materializing only when problems become pressing and require urgent resolution. The case of Mörfelden-Walldorf illustrates this phenomenon as the absence of structured ex ante coordination has led to ex post coordination efforts—essentially a “firefighting” approach to flood governance. This reactive mode of coordination underscores the necessity of developing more robust coordination mechanisms. However, advocating for coordination for its own sake is neither feasible nor desirable. Instead, the findings suggest that strategic coordination mechanisms should be designed to address specific governance gaps. For instance, the challenges that emerged in the implementation of the Inner Development Concept illustrate how a lack of prior coordination in planning processes necessitated time-consuming adjustments later. This indicates that while coordination cannot be expected to resolve all issues preemptively, more structured coordination mechanisms could reduce inefficiencies and administrative bottlenecks.
The findings of this study suggest that while coordination is essential, it must be strategically designed to fit the local administrative context. For a medium-sized city like Mörfelden-Walldorf, smaller administrative structures can facilitate shorter communication paths and closer interpersonal links, potentially enabling more agile coordination processes compared to larger cities. At the same time, they face distinct resource constraints that limit the feasibility of larger-scale coordination mechanisms. Instead, targeted micro-level interventions, such as strengthening boundary-spanning roles or fostering informal networks, may provide the most effective and realistic solutions for enhancing flood governance coordination. Future research should further investigate the effectiveness of such interventions, particularly in how they influence long-term governance resilience and adaptation capacity in local flood risk management.

Supplementary Materials

The following supporting information can be downloaded at: https://www.mdpi.com/article/10.3390/w17152212/s1, Supplementary material—Interview guideline.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, W.d.B. and L.F.; methodology, W.d.B.; investigation, W.d.B.; writing—original draft preparation, W.d.B. and L.F.; writing—review and editing, M.K.; supervision, M.K. and B.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This work has been funded by the LOEWE initiative (Hesse, Germany) within the emergenCITY center [LOEWE/1/12/519/03/05.001(0016)/72].

Data Availability Statement

The data presented in this study are available in part on request from the corresponding author due to privacy and ethical restrictions related to interview confidentiality.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the interviewees from the city of Mörfelden-Walldorf for their generous participation in this research. Their insights and expertise provided essential contributions to the empirical foundation of this study.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest. The funders had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript; or in the decision to publish the results.

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Figure 1. Conceptual elements of horizontal coordination.
Figure 1. Conceptual elements of horizontal coordination.
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Figure 2. Area of Mörfelden-Walldorf and hydrographic network.
Figure 2. Area of Mörfelden-Walldorf and hydrographic network.
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Figure 3. Location of Mörfelden-Walldorf within the state of Hesse.
Figure 3. Location of Mörfelden-Walldorf within the state of Hesse.
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Figure 4. Simplified administrative structure of Mörfelden-Walldorf. Competences for flood management highlighted in red.
Figure 4. Simplified administrative structure of Mörfelden-Walldorf. Competences for flood management highlighted in red.
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Table 1. Concepts and instruments in flood risk management adopted by Mörfelden-Walldorf.
Table 1. Concepts and instruments in flood risk management adopted by Mörfelden-Walldorf.
NameDateDescription and Relation to Flood Management
Drainage Ordinance01/1999Regulates the use of the sewer system. Introduces water discharge fees for properties based on area size. Incentives rainwater infiltration, surface unsealing, green roofs, and rainwater harvesting by property owners.
General Drainage Plan02/2012Wastewater and stormwater management concept for the urban catchment area. Based on hydrodynamic modeling and load calculations, it defines measures for expansion and reinforcement of the sewer system.
Climate Protection Master Plan12/2021Strategic framework for climate protection adopted by the municipal council. Calls the administration to formulate action plans in key areas such as climate adaptation, including creation of water infiltration facilities, unsealing measures and the maintenance of urban green spaces.
General Disaster Management Concept09/2022Comprehensive framework for disaster preparedness and response. Establishes a crisis response unit, structures emergency communication, and ensures the continuity of critical services during floods and other emergencies.
Inner Development Concept10/2022Short- to medium-term land-use planning framework. Flood protection was a key consideration in site selection, excluding areas near water bodies or involving the reduction of inner-city green corridors.
Stadtgrün statt Graustadt10/2022Funding program supporting voluntary urban greening. Eligible measures regarding rainwater retention are, e.g., green roofs, facades, and the unsealing and greening of paved front yards. Contributes to flood prevention through increased surface permeability.
Integrated Urban Development Concept (MöWa2o3o)in prep.Long-term urban development strategy that addresses the risks of heavy rainfall and flooding. It aims to guide municipal development plans and construction projects, incorporating the assessment of risk areas for both fluvial and pluvial flooding in city planning.
Table 2. Coordination of flood risk management concepts and instruments.
Table 2. Coordination of flood risk management concepts and instruments.
Concept/InstrumentResponsible UnitLevelStructure
Climate Protection Master PlanEnvironment1–2Lead organization
Inner Development ConceptCity planning1–2Lead organization
Integrated Urban Development Concept (MöWa2o3o)City planning1–2Lead organization
General Disaster Management ConceptFire brigade4Inter-organizational group
General Drainage PlanStadtwerke1Lead organization
Drainage OrdinanceStadtwerke1Lead organization
Stadtgrün statt GraustadtEnvironment1–2Lead organization
Note: Levels: 1 = ad hoc coordination, 2 = regular yet informal exchange of information, 3 = formal information exchange but unilateral action, and 4 = formal information exchange with joint decision-making.
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de Boer, W.; Flath, L.; Knodt, M.; Schmalz, B. From Silos to Synergy: Improving Coordination in Local Flood Management. Water 2025, 17, 2212. https://doi.org/10.3390/w17152212

AMA Style

de Boer W, Flath L, Knodt M, Schmalz B. From Silos to Synergy: Improving Coordination in Local Flood Management. Water. 2025; 17(15):2212. https://doi.org/10.3390/w17152212

Chicago/Turabian Style

de Boer, Wibke, Lucas Flath, Michèle Knodt, and Britta Schmalz. 2025. "From Silos to Synergy: Improving Coordination in Local Flood Management" Water 17, no. 15: 2212. https://doi.org/10.3390/w17152212

APA Style

de Boer, W., Flath, L., Knodt, M., & Schmalz, B. (2025). From Silos to Synergy: Improving Coordination in Local Flood Management. Water, 17(15), 2212. https://doi.org/10.3390/w17152212

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