The State Political Doctrine: A Structural Theory of Transboundary Water and Foreign Policy

Abstract

Revealing the complex system of transboundary conflicts would help to understand the behavior of states and anticipate potential actions that would collectively reflect the state doctrine. However, a specific approach to the state political doctrine (SPD) for governing transboundary water has not been formalized. The core academic contribution of this research is to formalize the structure of the SPD for transboundary water, which might assist in fostering water cooperation and peacebuilding in one of the most conflict-prone regions—the Middle East and South Africa—by examining the upstream countries’ behavior. Case studies include Turkey in the Euphrates–Tigris Basins, Israel in the Jordan River Basin, and Ethiopia in the Nile River Basin. The theoretical framework presents a new paradigm that systematically links a state’s essential drivers, political philosophy, and potential actions, employing the Hegelian dialectic of thesis–antithesis–synthesis and the three Doctrines of Being, Essence, and Concept to articulate the state’s behavior and its indispensable core principles for survival. It is integrated with Arnold Toynbee’s challenge-and-response theory to analyze upstream motives. This study reviewed 328 documents and pieces of literature alongside 105 expert discussions. The key findings include the three upstream countries embracing different SPDs to address specific challenges at the state level, where Turkey employs the Water-Bank Doctrine, Israel utilizes the Identity-Seeking Doctrine, and Ethiopia adopts the Nation Rise Power Doctrine. Besides the critical external challenges that limit water availability, such as the impact of climate change, the time factor is a crucial key to shifting the bargaining power and impacting the adopted SPD, thereby affecting water diplomacy and regional water cooperation.

1. Introduction

Managing water resources in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is a cross-boundary challenge that connects security cooperation with peace and stability. The influence of individual governments on the political agenda surrounding water is a pressing concern for peacebuilding. International Relations, as embraced by a state, can reduce or exacerbate water conflicts. Understanding the state’s ideology and the root causes of the water conflicts is essential for achieving regional stability. Over the years, a set of principles or global framework/agreements have been developed such as Integrated Water Resources Management and its evolution [1], the Doctrine of Limited Territorial Sovereignty [2], the Doctrine of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (Harmon Doctrine) [3], Human Rights to Water [4], Precautionary and Sustainability Principles [5], the Ramsar Convention in 1971 [6], and the Helsinki Rules in 1966 [7]. The EU Water Framework Directive was adopted in 2000 [8], and the Mekong River Commission and Nile Basin Initiative were both established in 1995 [9].

1.1. The Evolution of the Doctrine Notion

The concept of doctrine dates back to an ancient era as evidenced by the Latin term “doctrina”, which has held various meanings, including “teaching” or “instruction” [10]. The doctrine notion has been employed to reflect ethical tenets and cultural values [11]; it also indicates structured guidelines for behavior [12]. It is also employed by various philosophers in diverse contexts, such as Plato’s Doctrine of Forms [13], Aristotle and his doctrine of the mean [14], Immanuel Kant with his doctrine of ethics [15], and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel through his three volumes of Science of Logic (1812–1816)—specifically the Doctrine of Being, the Doctrine of Essence, and the Doctrine of Concept [16]—as well as Friedrich Nietzsche’s the doctrine of eternal recurrence [17].

Over time, the notion of doctrine evolves to shape political ideologies, policy making, and strategic needs [18]. In modern times, doctrine is accompanied by formalizing the state’s strategies and foreign policy [19], to be demonstrated and officially declared through specific foreign policies, whether it is the political, military, or economic aspects, such as the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. This was to assert the United States’s regional control over the Western hemisphere [20]. Additionally, the Truman Doctrine, introduced in 1947, aimed to counter Soviet influence by providing military, economic, and political support to countries that resisted Soviet ideologies [21]. Conversely, the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968 permitted legitimate intervention in countries that adopted the socialist ideology [22], while the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 supported allies with resources without direct intervention from the United States [23].

The political doctrine related to managing natural resources is not explicitly revealed. Still, we can recognize that it is embedded within more prominent frameworks, such as the Paris Agreement of 2015 and Goal Number 6, “Clean Water and Sanitation”, which is part of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals [24]. The Dublin Principles, established in 1992, emphasize the importance of integrated water resources management and the recognition of water’s economic value [25]. The Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, adopted in 1997, provided a framework for cooperation between riparian countries over water resources [26]. Some scholars have conducted case studies to shed light on the political doctrine governing natural resources and its reflection of the state’s foreign policy behavior.

1.2. Literature Review

The interconnections between geopolitics and natural resources, particularly water, have been examined globally under various political approaches, including sovereignty, equitable access, conflict and peacebuilding, and water diplomacy. In 1896, the US Attorney General Judson Harmon articulated the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty over transboundary waters with no obligation to the downstream country as a response to the dispute between the United States and Mexico. This was later referred to as the Harmon Doctrine and was widely criticized. It is now considered an outdated principle [27]. Allan (2001) [28] discussed a comprehensive framework in terms of hydropolitics and the global economy. The author presents an approach to water and national politics that integrates society, economy, and the environment, with hydropolitical discourse at the heart of this triangle, considering the geospatial dynamics over time. They provided a cognitive map of the Tigris–Euphrates, demonstrating different scenarios for the period from 1960 to 1990. Griffin (1998) [29] indicated that, due to the droughts in Texas, a doctrine for water rights and reasonable use has been adopted by landlords to avoid potential conflicts regarding water allocation. This doctrine emphasizes the importance of evaluating past practices and aligning them with current needs to ensure efficient water management. Gümplová (2020) [30] suggested a normative reinterpretation of sovereignty over natural resources, utilizing moral principles and human rights from the international law. The author argued that the notion of sovereignty had been employed to address colonialism and suggested limiting its scope to ensure political legitimacy while adopting the justified distribution and governance of natural resources. Adar (2007) [31] addressed the doctrine of limiting the absolute territorial sovereignty of the Nile River under the principles of the Helsinki Rules and the United Nations Watercourses Convention, both of which promote equitable and reasonable utilization, thereby fostering a cooperative framework that ensures no harm to riparian countries. Hassan and Rasheedy (2007) [32] emphasized the national security interest doctrine related to the Nile River as it heavily depends on the Nile River’s water resources (94%). Ethiopia addressed an acute need to secure hydropower energy for economic development, thereby challenging the 1929 and 1959 agreements between Sudan and Britain that allocated significant water shares to Egypt [33].

Arfan et al. (2020) [34] discussed the National Water Policy of Pakistan in 2018 with a focus on the adoption of large-scale infrastructure. The authors highlighted institutional deficits and identified needs, as well as the root causes of ideological conflicts. The study also criticizes the vague adoption of the global norm in terms of water management and recommends sustainable water governance through institutional reforms. Blumm and Wood (2021) [35] examined the Public Trust Doctrine and its evolution through application to safeguard natural resources. The study examined various legal case studies from the United States where legal responsibilities have been established by law. The government is a trustee of resources, such as water, to protect and preserve them for public use in the present and for the future. Lanko and Nechiporuk (2023) [36] analyzed Russia’s water strategy up to 2020, focusing on foreign policy and assuming that water scarcity could promote cooperation. The study criticized the approach to managing water conflicts through multilateral institutions and revealed that Russia’s foreign policy tends to limit cooperation with riparian countries. The authors recommend adopting a flexible partnership strategy by region rather than relying on global water governance frameworks. Duarte-Abadía (2023) [37] examined the influence of utopian ideals on water governance and planning in Spain and Colombia. The research explored the key ideologies of the 19th century that impacted water management, social implications, and environmental challenges. The author noted that a power dynamic influenced water policies in both countries and that the planning process marginalized local communities. Dorr (2023) [38] demonstrated the complex system of local water conflicts and the legal interpretations of public access to Louisiana’s waterways among its users. The author conducted a historical review of the water access law, tracing its origins from European legal traditions to Louisiana’s civil code, highlighting the limited public rights in decision making. The author recommended regulatory reform to strike a balance between private property rights and the protection of public access to water resources.

Ayesha and Naseem (2024) [39] examined the impact of climate change on Pakistan’s foreign policies and highlighted how global warming and extreme weather events have reframed the country’s geopolitical landscape. The research examines how the implications of climate change, including the water–agriculture–economy and health nexus, are compelling the region to adopt new behaviors and foreign policies. The authors justified regional collaboration, diplomatic engagement, and strategic planning to mitigate potential climate-related risks. A comparative analysis has been conducted with various countries, including India and Bangladesh, to incorporate climate change so that it becomes a fundamental part of their foreign policies. A comprehensive plan is necessary for South Asia to achieve a sustainable future. Darwisheh (2024) [40] clarified the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its impact on Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, examining the geopolitical dynamics of the associated transboundary water resources. The research highlights the external foreign policies employed by external actors, particularly the Arab Gulf States (AGSs), through financing the GERD to enhance their geopolitical power. The author presented how the AGS investment in infrastructure and agriculture in the Nile Basin is changing regional priorities and alliances, and how that investment prevents Egypt and Sudan from hindering the Ethiopian dam project [41]. This signified the strategy of soft power that Turkey employed in Somalia after 2011, reflecting the state’s foreign policy aimed at enhancing its global influence. Turkey utilized education, health, infrastructure, and humanitarian diplomacy, as well as investments in Somalia’s state-building efforts, to improve its international image, thereby emerging as a global actor. The research examined the mutual partnership aimed at improving the Turkish state’s global presence.

Zeitoun, Mark, (2007) [42] constructed an applied theory of water conflict and presented the hydro-hegemony in the Jordan River Basin. The author criticized the traditional approaches that demonstrate the presence of water disputes without a deep understanding of the root causes of asymmetric power and institutional structures. The study conceptualized that Israel’s dominance on the JRB, utilizing coercive mechanisms such as technical agreements and forcing strategies, increases inequality. In contrast, multilateral institutions and legal norms may establish a foundation for mutual interest and healthy transboundary negotiations. Yihdego Z, Rieu-Clarke A, and Cascão AE (2016) [43] addressed how the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has reformed the political, economic, and legal dynamics of the Nile River Basin and highlighted the shared benefits and breeding potential tensions. The dam has broken the downstream dominance of Egypt and Sudan, which raises a question about the historical water allocation treaties and claims. The research focuses on the new diplomatic and institutional leverage that Ethiopia offers, providing regional economic development opportunities through the dam’s hydropower, and conversely, considers the potential implications of agri-food security in Egypt, especially during the dam’s filling. The author argued that a benefit-sharing mechanism is essential.

Hussam Hussein (2018) [44] examined the impact of transboundary water governance and security on the Jordan River, Yarmouk River, and Disi Aquifer. The author highlighted the water scarcity narrative of Jordan at the state level and how it shaped the policies of the shared basins. The research focused on water insufficiency, in addition to water mismanagement, under the external challenges of climate change, the overuse by upstream countries, and the impact of refugees. The author addressed the imbalances in regional power and the geopolitical aspects, noting that limited cooperation between riparian countries plays a significant role in Jordan’s water–economic security. Conker Ahmet and Hussam Hussein (2019) [45] explored the regional influence of the hydraulic mission led by the Turkish state, which has been framed under domestic development paradigms and notions of water securitization and nationalism. The authors provided an empirical analysis for the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), the Peace Water Project to Cyprus, and water export initiatives to the Middle East. The study emphasized that the hydraulic mission has served as a political instrument, complementing socioeconomic development for Turkey’s regional leverage as an upstream state.

Marwa Daoudy (2020) [46] investigated how state and non-state actors in Syria used the water infrastructure as a tool to weaponize water using military targets, legitimacy, and cooperation, notably against Kurdish communities between the 1960s and 1970s. Later, ISIS utilized the same hydraulic infrastructure for territorial control to explore how water can serve as both a symbol and a tool for adopting water governance or executing tactical operations. Whittington, Dale, et al. (2025) [47] analyzed the water security implications of the GERD on the downstream country, particularly in Egypt, using a stochastic modeling approach to simulate different operational scenarios: self-interest, compromise, and adversarial. The author doubts that Ethiopia could inflict harm through water impoundment. The study indicated that 93.5% of years see no reduction in Egypt’s 55.5 billion cubic meter water release target, even under adverse operational conditions, emphasizing that “water panic” is driven by the worst-case speculations and misinformation.

1.3. Current Research and Objective

The current research hypothesizes that a specific state political doctrine (SPD) governing natural resources, particularly transboundary water, has not yet been formalized or structured, and is rarely announced by states. However, the foreign policy of the states might reflect the symptoms of the SPD. The SPD is driven by the state’s needs that may shape its core, while also being influenced by external challenges such as climate change, population growth, geopolitical instability, and economic crises. The objective of the current research is to develop a theory of SPD for governing transboundary water, as well as to illustrate its components, drivers, and key influencers. The absence of a clear SPD on the local level and the lack of alignment with regional and global levels might fuel water conflict and tensions, increase anarchy, and hinder peace-building initiatives. The present research is focused on surface water and limited to the MENA region, in particular on three transboundary water basins, i.e., the Euphrates–Tigris Basins (ETBs), the Jordan River Basin (JRB), and the Nile River Basin (NRB), focusing specifically on the upstream countries, i.e., Turkey, Israel, and Ethiopia, for each of the targeted basins, and it discusses the consequences of water shortages on the downstream countries. However, revealing the state behavior patterns of the selected upstream countries would help the downstream actors gain a more predictive understanding of the long-term water and foreign policy orientations. Therefore, the SPD framework is not limited to uncovering the core principles of the upstream states’ transboundary water dynamics; it also provides downstream countries with a strategic overview to formulate the analytical foresight of water diplomacy and identify the potential time of SPD shift, calibrating the downstream states’ legal and technical responses accordingly.

2. Materials and Methods

The theoretical framework reflects the following components: (a) at least two states, upstream and downstream riparian states, focused on the upstream state; (b) anticipating the core drivers that form the state’s adopted principles; (c) the structural anatomy of the state’s drivers that reflect the state’s ideology and perception, embracing a potential International Relations approach, forming the political doctrine, and the potential behavior that will lead to the state’s foreign policy and possible actions, assuming the state’s necessity to survive [48]; (d) the Hegel dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis [49], using the three cornerstone Doctrines of Being, Essence, and Concept, to illustrate the rationality of the state’s behavior based on the Hegel Science of Logic [16]; and (e) four global critical challenges that work as key pressure factors (climate change, geopolitical instability, economic crises, and rapid population growth) where these external challenges have the potential to influence the state political doctrine and to shift/reform the state’s priorities based on the acute demands to utilize the natural resources available, particularly transboundary water. Figure 1 shows the methodology and initial components of the SPD structural theory.

Hegel’s dialectic visualizes the evolution of the state SPD from simple to complex and from abstract to concrete. It began with the Doctrine of Being, illustrating the contradiction between pure being (thesis) and nothing (antithesis), and was later driven by the state’s need as a synthesis that it was becoming. This doctrine is reflected in the state ideology and perception, as indicated under the “indispensable to survive” component of the SPD, driven by the necessity to adopt a specific International Relations paradigm. The second is the Doctrine of Essence, which explores the contradiction between appearance (thesis) and reality (antithesis); ultimately, appearance and reality will form the actuality due to the synthesis. At the Doctrine of Essence stage, the research will outline the potential state’s doctrine with a focus on the governance of natural resources, specifically water. However, even if that doctrine remains unrevealed, it can be reflected through policy behavior and this is what Hegel argued within the Doctrine of Essence, i.e., how the essence manifests itself through appearances. The Doctrine of Essence in this context serves as a bridge between the Doctrine of Being and the third and final doctrine of Hegel, the Doctrine of Concept. This is where the idea is revealed as reality and eventually unified as a concept to reflect the synthesis between being and essence. The Doctrine of Concept will be represented by developing a foreign policy and the possible actions therein. However, the theory of challenge and response, as proposed by Arnold J. Toynbee [50], will be employed to illustrate how the state responds to transboundary water challenges by adopting what Toynbee calls the “golden mean”, representing the SPD as an ideal balance between innovation and the severity level of the challenge. However, this SPD might be influenced by the time factor and the four external drivers mentioned.

The MENA region is the case study of the current research and focused on the upstream countries for the following basins: (a) Turkey at the Euphrates–Tigris Basins (ETBs), (b) Israel at the Jorden River Basin (JRB), and (c) Ethiopia at the Nile River Basin (NRB). The focus has been on surface water resources. The state’s foreign policy behavior in the targeted basins and upstream countries has been examined to assess its perception and behavior toward transboundary water actions, the validity of previous treaties and water agreements, the chronological relations between riparian countries, the root causes of potential foreign policy actions, and linking events to political and economic trends, as well as exploring any potential alignments with regional geopolitics and international principles. Subsequently, each of the targeting basins has been summarized into a single table to facilitate correlation and comparison. The Oregon State University platform has been used to generate the map and metrics of basins of interest [51].

The secondary dataset was collected between October 2023 and January 2025, and a total of 328 articles detailing the inclusion criteria that were relevant to state doctrine, transboundary water conflicts, and MENA region with supporting documents, reports, books, maps, and official letters or agreements were gathered, reviewed, evaluated, screened, and analyzed. The references focused on international studies, following the keywords commonly used to determine the global notion of state doctrine, specifically “state’s doctrine for natural resources/transboundary waters”, “transboundary water and foreign policy”, and “transboundary water and International Relations”. The research then concentrated on the water basins of the MENA region, focusing on the upstream countries Turkey, Israel, and Ethiopia, while emphasizing their geopolitical leverage and historical hydropolitical conflicts. It also addressed the potential of different SPDs in three different cases within the MENA region. All documents were sorted into the following clusters: (a) studies exploring the state’s doctrine and the different aspects thereof, including natural resources; (b) studies focused on foreign policies and International Relations regarding transboundary water resources; (c) records of water disputes and conflicts for the regions of interest; and (d) water projects, treaties, and agreements for the regions of interest. Approximately 27% of the studies were excluded during the screening process because they were irrelevant to the current framework or did not align with the selection criteria. The primary dataset was collected through seven face-to-face focus group discussions conducted from November 2023 to December 2024 to address the transboundary water challenges in the MENA region and foreign policy. In total, 105 specialists with backgrounds in water politics and political science, including academics, executives, policy makers, and representatives from non-governmental organizations, contributed to the intellectual discussion and added value to the research framework.

3. Results

This section will include details on the water and geopolitics in the MENA region, discussing the background of the hydropolitical situation for the key riparian countries within the area of interest: the Euphrates—Tigris Basins (focused Turkey), the Jordan River Basin (focused Israel), and the Nile River Basin (focused Ethiopia). The dialectic of the water dynamics will illustrate the linkage between the temporal factor and the hydropolitics that may shape regional stability and water resource sustainability. Figure 2 shows the basins of interest map;

Table 1. The basins of interest metrics [51].

Basin	Area (km2)	Population (2020)	Upstream Country	Riparian Countries
Euphrates–Tigris Basins (ETBs)	868,989	82,804,133	* Turkey	Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan
Jordan River Basin (JRB)	45,005	13,165,407	Lebanon and * Israel	Jordan, Palestine, Syria
Nile River Basin (NRB)	2,961,325	366,651,792	* Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda	Egypt, Sudan, Abyei, Burundi, Congo, Eritrea, Hala’ib triangle, Kenya, Ma’tan al-Sarra, Rwanda, Tanzania

Note: * The current research samples of upstream countries.

shows the basins of interest metrics.

3.1. Water and Geopolitics in the MENA Region

The MENA region is home to approximately 6% of the global population. Still, it has only 1–2% of the world’s freshwater resources [52], which represents an inherent water security challenge for the region. Globally, the Middle East may be the first region to run out of water. However, the region has been able to cope with this challenge primarily due to its oil and gas revenue [53]. The management of water is the management of dynamic change, which is particularly relevant in a non-equilibrium environment, such as the semi-arid region of MENA [54,55]. The surface waters of the region were not highly engineered until the early 19th century [28], where Iraq was the first riparian country to develop engineering water projects in the basins by constructing the Hindiya barrage on the Euphrates between 1911 and 1914 for flood control [56]. The flood and security concerns of the Euphrates River have been addressed clearly in the British colony correspondence [57]. The upstream countries in the MENA region have justified the large-scale water projects in different ways, whether for national security, regional economic growth, hydrological necessity, or a symbolism for national pride [58]. However, generalizing the MENA is misleading due to the high variety of elements involved [28]. The following section will highlight the hydropolitical background for the basins of interest.

3.1.1. The Euphrates–Tigris Basins (ETBs)—The Water-Bank Doctrine

The Euphrates and Tigris River basins (ETBs) have a long history of major political events that have fueled water conflicts. The early water transboundary disagreement occurred immediately after World War I when the Ottoman Empire collapsed, and new political borders were established to define the current riparian countries, including those of Iraq, Turkey, and Syria [59]. The strategic position of Turkey as an upstream country gives it significant leverage in bargaining for transboundary water. In contrast, Iraq, as the ultimate downstream country, is left in a weak geopolitical position when it comes to negotiating water allocation, and Syria shares only the Euphrates River water resource with the ETBs [60]. Over the last couple of decades, each country has undergone remarkable political and economic changes, including the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which radically shifted the political system [61]. The financial crises in Turkey since 2018 have led to an increase in the inflation rate and other economic challenges [62]. In early 2025, there was the political shift in Syria, with the state becoming a transition authority after almost 13 years of uprising against the Assad regime [63]. Despite its economic challenges, Turkey as an upstream riparian country has gained an advantage from the asymmetric power within the region in the building of massive dams through the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP). The project involves a severe water supply cut-off for Iraq and Syria, where the estimated water supply reductions in Syria and Iraq are 40% and 80%, respectively [64]. The political instability in the region was a fundamental reason behind the lack of a strategic agreement [65]. The traditional water dispute between the two nations might contain a set of standard state behaviors and actions, starting with the upstream state doctrine of first come, first served [66]. To utilize a higher degree of water allocation under the name of development, when its utilization is significant and disagreed on by the downstream state, a common response of the upstream state is to claim sovereignty [67]. While the downstream state usually distrusts any transboundary water development without prior consultation and considers it to be a national security threat [68], the downstream state also overstates the natural flows to leverage its bargaining power and embrace the international law principles [69]. The different narratives driven by the state’s perception shape their response later. In that context, Turkey has established the GAP as a national development project, which Iraq and Syria have perceived as an improper water control action that might lead to a water hegemony [61]. Where Turkey emphasizes sovereignty, Iraq highlights Mesopotamian heritage rights, and Syria expresses food security concerns. Coupled with miscommunication and geopolitical instability, conflict and disconnection will likely result [70].

Turkey faces three significant challenges at the state level: (1) There is an energy shortage, where most Turkish cities experience severe energy and water shortages, particularly in rural areas [71]. About one-half of the power used to meet the Turkish energy demand is imported. A quarter of its power supply production relies on imported fuel [72]. (2) The national security challenge represented by four decades of conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) who are looking for Kurdish autonomy in Southeastern Turkey. The rebel movement has led to regional instability and was used by Syria during the early 1980s–1990s to leverage bargaining power in response to the controlling of the Euphrates River basin by Turkey [73]. (3) Joining the European Union for economic development help Turkey gain a strategic geopolitical advantage [74]. In response to these three challenges, and as a necessity for the Turkish state to survive, the decision was made to establish the GAP massive water project in ETBs, since controlling the water resources in ETBs might help the Turkish state solve the first two challenges. This might lead them to joining the European Union later on [75]. Turkey is employing a multi-theoretical approach in terms of International Relations, and among them, it is embracing the realist approach, which appear in its foreign policy by prioritizing national security and regional influence [76]. The history behind and required response to these challenges might lead Turkey to establish the state’s core principle and SPD to govern its natural resources.

The officials of Turkey have highlighted that the Turkish SPD has, on different occasions, envisioned a potential future for ETB’s riparian countries, promoting regional strategic collaboration through the exchange and trading of water, oil, and power supply [77]. The Turkish state has argued that the disruption of the water infrastructure would negatively influence the region and used the example of the European Coal and Steel Community [78]. The official statement of Turkish Prime Minister in 1992 was that, “We do not say we share their oil resources; they cannot say they share our water resources. This is a matter of sovereignty; we have the right to do anything we like” [79]. This is one of the early signals by Turkish officials that was a direct threat regarding water security toward the downstream countries. In 1987, the Turkish Prime Minister proposed the Peace Pipelines to supply freshwater to the Arab nations as well as to Israel for the prospect of peace in the region [80], acting as a water-bank state leveraging regional power [75]. All of the signals, coupled with the progress of the GAP project and the downstream countries (Iraq and Syria), outraged the downstream countries and left them with the perception that Turkey was trading water for oil with its downstream neighbors [81]. Such statements are considered to be a regression of zero-sum nationalist interest behavior [28]. This pattern of Turkish state behavior reflects the Turkish SPD and the perception of there being a strong bond between their foreign policy and the governing of natural resources, particularly transboundary water.

Besides its agricultural land and rich natural resources, Iraq is in a strategic geographical location that has attracted most empires and colonizers [71]. Historically, modern-day Iraq has been surrounded by four empires: the Ottoman Empire from the north, the Islamic Empire from the south, the Persian Empire from the east, and the Byzantine Empire from the west, which was the continuation of the Roman Empire [82]. This 360-degree security concern appeared in one of the secretly released documents that was the property of Britain that addressed choosing King Faisal as the ruler of Mesopotamia. The British concerns were regarding the foreign relations of Mesopotamia, emphasizing that external defense must remain their responsibility to avoid attacking the new Iraq from the sea, as well as French Syria (west), Turkey, Persia (east), Kurdistan (north), and Arabian desert (south) [83]. The tremendous influence of different empires, alongside the manipulations of Iraq’s borders by European colonizers, left behind a legacy of disparate ethnic and religious groups looking to consolidate into a modern nation-state, which is the key reason for the continued tension between the Iraqi state and its people [84]. This might be the reason why the country has a fragmented/fluid identity. King Faisal stated, “It is my belief that there is no Iraqi people within Iraq”, and he wrote, “There are only diverse groups with no patriotic sentiments” [85]. In his book “Ancient Iraq”, Georges Roux noted that “Iraq required to be viable, two conditions: perfect cooperation between the various ethnic and socio-political units within the country itself, and a friendly or at least neutral attitude from its neighbors. Unfortunately, neither one nor the other ever lasted for any length of time” [86]. It appears here that time is of importance in the presence or absence of political stability in the Iraqi state’s polity, and it influences hydropolitics in ETBs [71]. This may clarify the probability of the absence of state political doctrine in Iraq. The absence of SPD and regional water collaboration in the ETBs’ downstream countries besides the regional and global political tensions might lead to granting access for radical groups to enforce their own water doctrine. Between 2013 and 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have been occupying major dams in Iraq and Syria, adopting the doctrine of water weaponization [87].

Following the end of the Cold War, Syrian exports experienced a significant decline, primarily due to the loss of markets in the Soviet Union and some Eastern European countries. Significantly influencing the local economy of Syria, and the response to that challenge through economic reforms, has had substantial implications for Syria’s water resources and energy demand [71]. Syria and Iran have both used the PKK to negotiate transboundary water against Turkey and Iraq in the Euphrates and Shatt al-Arab rivers, respectively. Driven by the state instinct of the necessity to survive, a mutual security interest has kept both Iraq and Turkey in a state of collaboration, where Iraq has conceded part of its sovereignty by allowing the Turkish army to pursue the PKK fighters within the Iraqi territory [88]. The same was true later between Turkey and Syria after the 1998 Adana Agreement [89]. This is an example of how water and geopolitics are extensively linked, and how the SPD might shift and turn a state’s competitor into a possible ally. The issue-linkage tactic of using the PKK represented the SPD for Syria that remained for a decade [73,75]. However, there is a flip side to that coin, as upstream of the Jordan River Basin, Syria, began to claim absolute sovereignty and adopted the Turkish model. This attitude justifies the Turkish control of the Euphrates River [90]. Subsequently, Turkey refused to recognize the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers as international rivers [91]. Collectively, this reflects the Turkish SPD’s water bank.

Since the Syrian uprising in 2011, Turkey considers the Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) as an extension to the PKK [92]. With the recent political shift, Turkey has established a strategic relationship with the new Syrian transitional administration, Turkish-backed forces, and the new Syrian administration in order to fight the SDF and to prevent the formation of any Kurdish autonomy [93]. The natural boundary of the Euphrates River serves as a strategic dividing line to separate the two forces from any confrontation [94]. The recent historical ceasefire, announced on 1 March 2025, by the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, is intended to bring political stability to the region, de-escalate tensions, and open dialogue with the Turkish state [95]. However, the SDF considered that the ceasefire does not apply to them [96], despite the recent agreement in 11 March 2025, between the Syrian Interim Authorities and the SDF under an effort to unify Syria [97]. As an ultimate downstream country in the ETBs, Iraq has faced severe consequences from Turkey’s large-scale hydraulic infrastructure GAP. In Iraq, the significant reduction in water flow has led to a profound collapse in the wetland ecosystems from 8000 km² in 1966 to 750 km² in 2002 [98], where the estimated marshland area in Southern Iraq is between 8000 and 20,000 km², and where every 1000 km² requires 77 m³/s of freshwater [99], and this has devastated the agriculture sector and reduced crop yields [100], deteriorating water quality that caused widespread health issues [101], particularly in the southern region by increasing the saltwater intrusion [102], declined the hydropower energy production of Iraq’s dams [103], led to mass displacement and social unrest [104], and unleashed geopolitical tension with riparian countries [67]. In response, Iraq’s actions varied, ranging from diplomatic protests to mobilizing military forces along the Syrian border in 1975 [105]. Many questions have been raised about the future of peace and security in the ETBs in reflections on the water-bank SPD of the Turkish state, the issue-linkage SPD of the previous Syrian regime, and the almost absent SPD of Iraq, which needs to be considered.

3.1.2. Jordan River Basin (JRB)—Identity-Seeking Doctrine

Even between bitter enemies, Aaron Wolf noted that water cooperation is more common than conflict [106]. The Jordan River Basin (JRB) is one of the few international basins in which hydropolitical conflict has led to direct armed hostilities between riparian states and peoples. The JRB is also considered the most complex hydropolitical challenge for the international community since it is closely linked to hydropolitics in the Nile and Euphrates–Tigris Basins [71]. The major shift in the political geography of the JRB was witnessed in 1948 by the establishment of the state of Israel [107], where a new riparian player emerged; this event led to a significant change in water dominance where Israel controlled the upper JRB [108]. Nearly 80% of the JRB lies within the boundaries of Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank, where populations depend heavily on its water resources [109]. With rapid population growth, this challenge will become dire.

The difference in elevation between water resources and irrigated land in Israel is about 45 m, which led the state to pump water uphill [71]. In response to this challenge, driven by the need for survival, Israel established the National Water Carriers (NWCs) in 1951 [110]; the NWCs account for approximately 17% of Israel’s total energy consumption. The subsidy cost to water users in Israel was estimated at 40–45% in 1987 [111]. This challenge has been addressed by investing in agriculture technology [112]. However, the NWCs were perceived as a threat by Arab leaders, considering it an intolerable act and theft of shared Jordan River waters, seeking to block the project by controlling upstream water and in taking the Israeli canal system; the former Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir warned that such an action of diverting the headwaters of the Jordan River would represent as an attack of Israeli means of livelihood and would be consider as a threat to peace [108].

Many initiatives for peacebuilding between Israel and the Arab League have been proposed. Between 1952 and 1955, the Johnston Plan, initiated by the Eisenhower administration, was offered [113]. Although the plan gained technical acceptance, it ultimately failed due to the Arab League’s perception that it was a concession that would benefit Israel [114]. The Johnston Plan continues to resound at all discussions of conflict and cooperation over the JRB [71]. Despite the failure of the original Johnston Plan, it has opened an informal channel of discussion with Jordan. It could serve as a springboard for any future regional water negotiations, whether bilateral or multilateral, to extend to the Yarmouk River basin [115]. With the recent dramatic changes that Syria has witnessed following the fall of the Assad regime, the political instability of the landscape may become even more complicated [116]. In the 1960s, two major events occurred, the completion of the NWCs and the Six-Day War, which ended with Israel controlling the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the entire Jordan River Basin [117]. This strategic position enables Israel to control the water resources. Israel is one of the rare states since World War II that has improved its water security and riparian position in the Jordan River Basin (JRB) from an ultimate downstream to an upper riparian status by occupying neighboring territories [71]; this reflects a military response, highlighting the profound necessity of water security.

In 1978, Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords, which included provisions for water cooperation [118]. This was followed by an informal discussion between Jordan and Israel over the JRB water sharing [119]. The United States facilitated the 1994 Peace Agreement between Jordan and Israel, and later with the Palestinians in 1995 [120]. In 1995, the Oslo II Accord between the Palestinian Authority and Israel was signed, which included agreements on the West Bank’s water rights and water infrastructure. However, the ongoing political instability has prevented the implementation of any of them [121]. In 2001, the Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal project was proposed and in 2013, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Jordan, Palestine, and Israel. Given the geopolitical complexity and financial challenges involved, the project’s progress remains slow [122]. In 2008, both Jordan and Israel built a desalination plant in Aqaba, and Israel agreed to sell water to Jordan, followed by signing a new agreement for sharing water in 2017 [123].

As downstream countries, both Jordan and Palestine are already experiencing water scarcity and pressure from water shortages [124]. The water diversion project in Israel harmed downstream countries by resulting in a severe reduction in the JRB flow [125]. Jordan’s water share faced an annual decline due to the diversion of Yarmouk River water into Lake Tiberias, causing ecological crises [126,127]. The unequal distribution of water allocation between Israel and Palestine led to only 39.5% of Palestinians having access to safe drinking water and a profound negative impact on agriculture and the economy [128]. In response, both Jordan and Palestine protested and resisted the Israeli hydro-hegemony [129]. Driven by the need for survival, Jordan utilized water diplomacy to achieve the 1994 Peace Treaty with Israel [130], reflecting a pragmatic resilience doctrine that was considered to have paved the way for the Oslo II Accord in 1995.

Driven by water security, Israel has taken governing water resources on as the state’s priority. The former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett stated, “Water for Israel is not a luxury; it is not just a desirable and helpful addition to our natural resources. Water is life itself” [131]. Israel created a social adaptive capacity to cope with water scarcity [132]. By 2000, about 10% of the national water budget of Israel was dedicated to treat urban wastewater, and 15% of that water was used for agriculture [28]. Israel also introduced water pricing as an economic instrument in agriculture, reflecting the significance of water in the economy and the cost of delivering to farms [133]. Due to the rapid population growth and to cope with anticipated future water scarcity challenges in the JRB, a massive desalination system plan in two phases has been discussed, starting with water desalinization with a projection to achieve 800 million cubic meters of water in the future to serve the three partners, i.e., Israel, Palestine, and Jordan [134]. The Israeli water allocation policy has undergone a dramatic shift in response to environmental and international events such as the proposal of the Dead Sea hydro projects, which served as a valuable symbol to international donors and facilitated the Middle East peace process [28].

Historically, water and agriculture have been used as a vital political instrument to promote a national identity for Israeli settlers. During the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Zionists intended to use efficient practices of agriculture and water use to root the Jewish immigrants and their people’s presence in Palestine as a homeland [135]. In 1935, Prime Minister Sharrett reinforced the national belief in the vital role of agriculture and irrigation. In 1985, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) generated by agriculture fell by 3%. In 2000, the issue of reducing water consumption in agriculture emerged, and the water economy was prioritized by not allowing the agricultural lobby to encourage increased water consumption. This lobby was able to prevent a 20% increase in water price [28]. In the mid-1950s, standing as an example of how SPD shifted due to the new norms and needs, where the agriculture sector was a major force in the national economy since agriculture water was used to foster the national identity and International Relations. By the mid-1980s, it was a minor element at less than 3% of the national economy and was even lesser by 2000. Independently, the weight of the political economy of agriculture remained essential as a symbol of nation building, legitimizing the creation of the state in 1947. Between 1992 and 2000, the Israeli political attitude toward water resources and the peace process shifted due to the water shortages, considering the negotiation to be a risk for the national interest. The administrations of both Rabin and Netanyahu support the policy of increasing the water use of the agriculture sector [28]. This illustrates how the state’s behavior or doctrine might change in response to arising needs.

In recent times, Israel has been leading the way in agriculture technology, is considered to have the world’s most efficient farming practices, and reuses about 86% of the wastewater in the agriculture sector to grow 40% of the crops in the desert [136]. This has highlighted the systematic efforts and considerable investment that have been spent to reach that level. In 2023, the high-tech industry, including Agri-Tech, accounted for nearly 20% of Israel’s GDP, representing a 4.2% growth since 2019. The technology sector contributed 15.5% to the GDP [137]. However, there are assumptions that Israel is adopting a strategy of sharing its know-how and advanced technology regionally and globally to facilitate normalization [138,139,140].

The Israeli investment in water and agriculture technology is serving two goals: locally to foster the national identity of the Israeli settler, and regionally to embrace the pragmatic International Relations that would facilitate its normalization within the surrounding geopolitical environment, particularly with Arab countries through sharing know-how and advanced technology. This is the core principle of the Israel SPD—Identity-Seeking Doctrine. The reason why water could be a source of cooperation rather than long-term conflict is that the solution to water problems for both Palestine and Israel extends beyond the water resources of the JRB and the West Bank, which are shared among Jordan, Israel, and Palestine [28]. However, following the major event of 7 October 2023, when Hamas attacked Israel [141], geopolitical instability, in addition to climate change and rapid population growth, is expected to exacerbate water scarcity and political destabilization in the JRB.

3.1.3. Nile River Basin (NRB)—The Nation Rise Power Doctrine

Driven by the Camp David peace accords with Israel, in 1979, the former Egyptian president Anwar Al-Sadat publicly mentioned the concept of supplying the Nile’s water to Saudi Arabia and Israel through pipelines under the Suez Canal crossing the Sinai desert. He said that “the only reason his country might go to war again with any of its neighbors would be a dispute over water” [142]. However, the idea bears resemblance to Turkey’s Peace Pipeline Project proposal for the region, which aims to act as a water bank to stabilize regional security [143]. Although neither of the proposed projects has been implemented, a significant difference exists between the Egyptian version and the other versions, particularly in terms of geographical positioning. The Egyptian version is the ultimate downstream country for the Nile River Basin, and the Nile’s waters do not originate from Egypt, even assuming there was some to spare [71]. The case study of the NRB is unique for several reasons: (a) Egypt is heavily dependent on a single river shared with eight other countries [144], and (b) the ultimate downstream state (Egypt) is the most economically and militarily vigorous within the NRB [145].

Collectively, three states in the NRB (Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan) have 85% of the Nile’s total territory [146]. Approximately 85% of the water recharge of the Aswan High Dam (AHD) in Egypt originates in Ethiopia, as Lake Tana in Ethiopia is the principal source of the Blue Nile [71]. This fact has given Ethiopia the strongest hydropolitical position. Moreover, Ethiopia has two physical geography aspects that are substantial for hydropolitics: the steep drop in elevation has potential for hydropower generation in Ethiopia [147], and the varied pattern of evaporation over the vast basin where the evaporation rate in Ethiopia is less than others [148]. The annual per capita water availability is expected to decrease by 58% in Egypt and 37% in Ethiopia between 1990 and 2025 [149], with 93% of the primary economic activity relying on agriculture [150].

Politically, the region of NRB was colonized by a European power, except for Ethiopia [151]. The British showed an interest in Sudan and Egypt after discovering that both could produce high-quality cotton for the textile industry [152]. During the Cold War era, the superpower countries tried to woo Egypt into their respective camps with substantial grants consisting of economic and military assistance [153]. Some Arab countries consider Egypt’s capabilities essential for stabilizing the region in order for it to become a strategic link between the regional complexes of MENA [154], particularly after the Arab–Israeli conflict and more recently by its participation in the Gulf War against Iraq [71]. There are claims that Egypt has an interest in the existing power imbalances between Egypt and the other riparian states of the NRB, and it has been accused of using the issue-linkage tactic (similar to the case of Syria against Turkey) by supporting rebellions in Sudan and Ethiopia [111]. In the NRB, Egypt has emphasized the triple doctrines of primary need, prior use, and acquired water rights [71].

To understand the potential SPD for Ethiopia as an upstream state within NRB, we need to understand the motives behind the construction of the Aswan High Dam (AHD) in Egypt. The Egyptian leadership under Nasser wanted to transform Egypt into a modern, industrialized nation with full sovereignty and territorial integrity [155]. The AHD symbolizes national pride, reflecting sovereignty, national security, economic prosperity, and technical accomplishments. Some have branded it Nasser’s “pyramid” [156]. In 1955, the United States, Britain, and the World Bank agreed to finance the construction of the dam [157]. Nassir’s foreign policy was often perceived by the United States and Britain as being aligned with the Soviet Union [158]. The financing has been justified by the fund’s inadequacy in light of Egypt’s economic situation [159]. Nasser and Sadat perceived that Western powers were using debt to humiliate and hinder Egypt’s development [158]. On 26 July 1956, in response, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company (SCC), which had been owned and operated by French and British shareholders since the late 19th century [160]. Egypt established the Suez Canal Authority to collect revenue from canal tolls, thereby self-financing the AHD [161]. This has been a significant challenge for France and Britain, both in terms of their geopolitical position and economic perspective, as Europe’s supplies from Asia have been disrupted [162]. In response, a coalition between Britain, France, and Israel was formed to retake the canal, which led to the Six-Day War [163]. The Soviet Union perceived the entire conflict as an opportunity to alienate Egypt from the West, and responded by pledging large loans on favorable terms—USD 325 million for the AHD [164]. Nasser’s doctrine of nationalizing the SCC and defending against European and Israeli military operations made him a hero in the Arab world but this came with, as Kissinger called it, “a pyrrhic victory” [158].

Although the GERD can be helpful to the NRB by stabilizing flows and reducing flood risk [165], it also comes with a cost for Egypt and Sudan, where the estimated reduction in hydropower generation is 7% in the AHD [166], with the expected profound shrinkage in agricultural land in the Nile Delta and negative impact on fish, aquatic plants, and biodiversity for downstream countries [167,168]. In response, Egypt pursued a diplomatic approach and considered military measures alongside Sudanese armed forces by conducting large-scale military exercises that heightened Ethiopian unease [169,170].

Since the AHD is codified as a success for the national regime and essential to the rising power against colonization [171], the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is also an iconic symbol of sovereignty and the anti-colonial era, and is a national development project [172]. Ethiopia, along with other riparian states, rejected the colonial agreement in 1929, the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, and the Nile Waters Agreement in 1959 between Egypt and Sudan, which was executed without the participation of the upstream riparian countries [173]. Egypt has insisted that any new agreement for water sharing in the basin must be based on the 1959 agreement [174]. In 2011, Ethiopia’s state was driven by the necessity of national development and the need to respond to its acute power supply deficit [175]. Ethiopia announced the GERD construction as the largest hydropower plant in Africa [176]. The downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan, protested and expressed their concerns that the GERD would significantly reduce the water flow, affecting agriculture and the environment [177]. Despite several negotiation rounds mediated by African countries, the United States, and the World Bank, the GERD was constructed. The riparian countries were unable to reach an agreement [178]. By 2015, the Declaration of Principles between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan had been signed. The agreement emphasized the equitable use of water and avoided significant harm to downstream countries [179]. This agreement serves Ethiopian interests by gaining legitimacy and time for the GERD, as well as demonstrating a willingness to cooperate by emphasizing the project’s benefits at the regional level in terms of hydropower and flood control [180]. However, Egypt maintains its opposition strategy toward Ethiopia, and it began diplomatic lobbying to pressure Ethiopia [181]. Despite several mediation and negotiation rounds, Ethiopia rejected the proposal to suspend the filling schedule, and it succeeded in completing the first filling in 2020, followed by the last one, which was recently completed on 10 September 2023 [182]. Currently, GERD is Africa’s largest dam for Bitcoin mining; it has been estimated that 18% of Ethiopia’s hydropower revenue already comes from cryptocurrency mining [183]. By accommodating the GERD, Ethiopia at the state level will be able to secure a stable and clean source of energy, positioning itself as a regional hydropower hub, attracting foreign investment, and opening the door for industrial development, which reflects the Ethiopian SPD—The Nation Rise Power Doctrine.

3.2. The Quantitative Dimensions of Transboundary Water Allocation and the State Political Doctrine

The ETBs’ transboundary watercourses provide a total annual flow that varies between 68 and 84.5 BCM. The primary sources of the annual flow for the Euphrates and Tigris rivers coming from Turkey are estimated at 90% and 40%, respectively [184]. About 74% of utilized capacity is allocated to the agriculture sector [185]. In 1987, an agreement was reached that Turkey would allocate 500 m³/s to flow downstream to Syria and Iraq [186]. Some of the key transboundary agreements are, in 1946, the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborhood between Iraq and Turkey [187], in 1980s–1990s, the Joint Technical Committee on Regional Waters between Iraq, Turkey, and Syria [188], and in 1996 bilateral water allocation agreement between Syria and Iraq of the Euphrates of 42% and 58%, respectively [189]. However, Turkey’s large-scale Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) has had a significant impact on downstream flows. The GAP project would reduce the Euphrates water flow to Syria by 40% and to Iraq by up to 80% [190], and between 1984 and 2015, 86% of the marshlands in Iraq were reduced [191], emphasizing Turkey’s hydro-hegemonic posture in the region and reflecting the SPD function of the Water-Bank Doctrine. Since the 1960s, the total annual flow of JRB transboundary watercourses has been significantly reduced from 1.4 MCM to ~200 MCM, as Israel’s National Water Carrier had reduced the water allocation in Palestine and Jordan by 40% [192]. Some of the key transboundary agreements include the 1994 Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty [193], the 1995 Oslo II Accord between Israel and Palestine [194], and the 2005–2021 Red Sea–Dead Sea Conveyance Project Agreements between Jordan, Israel, and Palestine [195]. Despite high technology usage, the agricultural sector in Israel consumes about 55% of the total water demand [196], which may underscore the SPD of Israel’s Identity-Seeking Doctrine, which aims to maintain control over shared water resources, serving a dual strategy of national consolidation and regional normalization. The majority of the NRB originates in Ethiopia, which contributes to approximately 60% of the flows through the Blue Nile River Basin [197], where its total annual flow is about 84 BCM [198]. The historic 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan allocates them 55.5 BCM/year and 18.5 BCM/year, respectively [199]. The lion’s share of water demand in the NRB is used in the agriculture sector, consuming ~85% [200]. Some of the key transboundary agreements include the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan [201], the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan [202], and the 2015 to present GERD Tripartite Declarations and Talks between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan [203]. The GERD construction has reduced the water allocation to downstream countries by 20% [204]. The expected annual hydropower production is 15.7 TWh [205]. Despite the positive step of having the 2015 Declaration of Principles between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan [179], hydro-political tension remains high, with some scenarios indicating that the impact of the GERD on Egypt would reduce its GDP by 8%, increase the unemployment rate by ~11%, decrease agricultural land by ~53%, and decrease food production by ~38% [206]. The Ethiopia’s Nation Rise Power Doctrine frames the GERD as a symbol of post-colonial sovereignty and an icon for national development.

Table 2. The quantitative metrics of basins of interest.

Basin/Upstream Country	Annual Water Flow	Agriculture Water Use %	Key Transboundary Agreements	The Impact of Dams on Downstream Flow
Euphrates–Tigris Basins (ETBs) Turkey	68–84.5 BCM	74	1946 Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood (Turkey–Iraq) [187]. 1987 Protocol on Economic Cooperation (Turkey–Syria) [186]. 1980s–1990s Joint Technical Committee on Regional Waters (Iraq, Turkey, Syria) [188]. 1996 Bilateral Agreement (Syria–Iraq) [189].	Water flow reduction by 40% (Syria) and 80% (Iraq). Furthermore, 86% of the marshlands in Iraq have been reduced [190,191].
Jordan River Basin (JRB) Israel	1.4 MCM	55	1994 Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty (Israel–Jordan) [193]. 1995 Oslo II Accord (Israel and Palestine) [194]. 2005–2021 Red Sea-Dead Sea Conveyance Project Agreements (Jordan, Israel, and Palestine) [195].	The total annual flow of JRB was reduced to ~200 MCM. And 40% of water allocation was reduced in Palestine and Jordan [192].
Nile River Basin (NRB) Ethiopia	84 BCM	85	1929 Nile Waters Agreement (Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) [201]. 1959 Nile Waters Agreement (Egypt, Sudan) [202]. 2015-present Declaration of Principles (Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan) [203].	The GDP reduced by 8%, increased the unemployment rate by ~11%, decreased agricultural land by ~53%, and decreased food production by ~38% [206].

presents the quantitative metrics for the basins of interest.

3.3. The Dialectic of Water Dynamic, International Relations, and Time Factor

Unlike other commodities, water flow is challenging to own [28]; monitoring water flow is technically challenging. In contrast, the traditional systems of water sharing are time-determined rather than volume-determined [207]. It is also challenging to transport water, as well as oil and gas, through tankers or pipelines for three reasons: cost, environmental concerns, and political considerations [66]. The natural resources that exhibit dynamic movement, particularly water, may lead to regional conflicts as watercourses neither respect political boundaries nor consider a state’s behavior. Instead, they follow two simple sets of rules: gravity and pressure differentials [61]. Conversely, static natural resources, such as minerals, can create conflict within states, often between ethnic and political factions [208].

Understanding International Relations theories can help tackle the dynamics of interstate water conflict and cooperation [209]. The philosophy of International Relations and the management of transboundary waters are closely intertwined, where adopting a specific ideology of International Relations will significantly influence a state’s behavior and actions toward its riparian neighbors. The interlinked nature of International Relations theories and transboundary water is significant when it comes to understanding political perceptions and explaining the situation rather than adopting ill-founded assumptions [28]. Adopting the realism theory, which emphasizes sovereignty, may shape the transboundary water interactions and has led to regional anarchy and the Hydro-Trap, as well as escalating water tensions [61]. Water resources are subject to one of the three major types of disputes that appeared after the colonization era in the Middle East. There is the positional dispute that reflects the exact location of the boundary, the functional dispute where boundaries challenge the dynamic movement of natural resources such as water allocation, oil, or minerals, and territorial disputes that refer to conflicts of ownership and sovereignty regarding a region [210].

One of the key problems with water is the time factor, as time, nature, entropy, and human activities erode and erase the remains of the distant past [66]. As Leonardo Da Vinci said, “In time and with water, everything changes”. With the challenges of transboundary water and International Relations, time is a factor that is often overlooked. The upstream states’ needs drive them to utilize the time factor effectively when constructing a transboundary water project, such as massive dams, while downstream countries are most likely to give less attention to this vital factor [75]. The gaining of the time factor by upstream countries will come at a cost to the downstream countries as a new norm of negotiation and bargaining power will be established. Time, therefore, is not an ally for downstream countries but rather a bitter competitor. When a state’s decision is made independently to develop a transboundary water project, a new norm will emerge and new challenges will also be revealed over time. This might be the reason behind the different levels of challenge, opportunity, and the bargaining power of transboundary water negotiations before and after having the GAP like in the Euphrates–Tigris Basins, the GERD in Nile Basin, and the National Water Carriers (NWCs) in Jordan River Basin.

However, as time passes, some dams will be subject to removal, as the actual cost of maintaining them will exceed their benefits, especially when dams will become old, fill with sediment, and become unsafe and uneconomical. Dam removal is only the first step toward ecological restoration, which is considered to be a long-term process since river healing requires securing a minimum flow, regular monitoring, and tailored policies [66]. In 2021, about 57 dams had been removed in the United States [211]. The concept of sustainability regarding renewable and non-renewable water resources, such as groundwater, is influenced by the amount that can be tapped over time. In contrast, Middle Eastern countries are overpumping groundwater annually, far exceeding their natural recharge capacity [66]. The time factor is naturally embedded within the sustainability concept to ensure continuous yield; this is particularly true for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) where the 2030 Agenda serves as a milestone that measures the progress toward the SDGs using time.

The state perceives and utilizes temporal leverage, particularly with the negotiation process, to achieve treaties or invest in large-scale infrastructure. As in transboundary water, massive dam constructions show a pattern that may be aligned with Hegelian dialectic, starting with setting a plan for water impoundment as pre-event “thesis”, followed by the event of the dam being in operation “antithesis” and post-event by dealing with the consequences of having the dam that may lead to a “synthesis”. At every step, it reveals a challenge versus opportunity, where the time factor could reshape the bargaining positions for both upstream and downstream countries. At the ETBs, Turkey conducted the GAP master plan in 1989 [212], and The Atatürk Dam was completed in 1990 [213]. Turkey mobilized its forces in January 1990 when it cut the Euphrates to fill the reservoir for the Atatürk Dam [214]. The downstream countries, Syria and Iraq, protested and responded by diplomatic escalation. However, Turkey leveraged its bargaining power. Israel established the National Water Carrier (NWC) in 1951 and completed it in 1964 [110,215]. Israel occupied Golan Heights in 1967 and controlled water-rich territories [216]; the downstream countries Jordan and Palestine shifted to diplomacy, while Israel gained a hydro-hegemony position. Ethiopia planned for the GERD dam began in the early 2000s [217]. However, it began to be constructed in 2011, when Egypt was entangled in the political turmoil related to the Arab Spring [218]. In unilateral action, the reservoir has started filling in 2020 [182]. The downstream countries Egypt and Sudan protested and responded by diplomatic escalation, calling the US to act as a mediator [219]. Subsequently, Ethiopia leveraged its bargaining power.

Since the state’s main concern is how to survive and thrive, it will use all the possible means to maintain its political doctrine. The various SPD cases in the current research manifest a dynamic evolution and a time-sensitive structure. Turkey shifted from rigid sovereignty to proposing regional cooperation frameworks, such as adopting the “zero problems” principle, which emphasizes friendly relations with regional states [220], and the Peace Pipeline [143]. Likewise, Israel demonstrated a shift in the SPD from agricultural nationalism to technology–export diplomacy [138], and Ethiopia’s SPD transitioned from being a marginal upstream actor on the NRB to a regional hydropower hub. However, this may serve as an indicator of the SPD dynamics over time as it shifts between soft power and strict policies, depending on the state’s needs and internal and external circumstances.

The importance of the time factor is emphasized in terms of transboundary water. One of the key shortages of the UN conventions for natural resources—International Watercourses [221]—where the law gives the needs of the present the same weight as those of the past [222], leaves the definition of equitable vague, where an equitable notion before establishing the projects of the GAP in ETBs, the NWC in the JRB, and the GERD in the NRB is different than after that water project’s completion [75]. This could be the essence of why there is a need to understand the past and the philosophy of history, which explains the evolution of history over time to reveal rational patterns. Hegel developed his philosophy by introducing the concept of time into the interpretation of the philosophy of history, considering that the consciousness of being is embodied through time [223]. Each generation responds differently to various challenges based on their specific context over time [224,225]—this dynamic is similar to the SPD dynamic loop; both are non-linear but rather highly variable.

3.4. The Price of Local Governance Failure, Where Small Cracks Grow into Wide Breaks

The failures of local governance and the role of non-state actors may severely impact national-level water policy actions [226], influencing the directions of the SPDs for both upstream and downstream countries. At the ETBs, the failure to have inclusive governance, particularly in the southeast, which is home to a majority of Kurdish populations, has led to water access challenges, uneven development plans, and displacement from the dam project areas [227,228]. The “thesis” of governance gaps has been countered by an “antithesis” through the empowerment of rebel groups, such as the strategic sponsorship of the PKK by the Syrian state [229]. Conversely, Turkey emphasized sovereignty and responded to that challenge by controlling water and securitizing its water strategy under the Water-Bank Doctrine to represent a “synthesis”.

At the JRB, the fragile coordination and lack of planning between Israel and the Palestinian Authority led to fragmented local governance of water resources and undermined water-sharing agreements [230], which are considered a “thesis”. Driven by limited water resources and rapid population growth, non-state actors, including local NGOs and resistance movements, have countered the limited access to water resources [42], representing the “antithesis”. These local dynamics contributed to Israel’s national-level decision to respond by conducting unilateral control over water allocations, which led to further water tensions with Jordan. As a “synthesis”, Israel positioned itself as technologically self-reliant and diplomatically indispensable to reinforce its Identity-Seeking Doctrine.

The lack of coherent integration between state and non-state actors, as well as weak collaboration among multi-stakeholders, has led to the undermining of the overall effectiveness of water resource management in Ethiopia [231], which represents the “thesis”. As an antithesis to inadequate water governance, Ethiopia prioritized hydro-development plans to promote economic growth and constructed the GERD [232]. The downstream countries at the NRB have perceived that action as a threat to national security. The pressures of the hydro-political dispute between Ethiopia and its downstream countries may frame the synthesis of the Nation Rise Power Doctrine, which emphasizes hydro-sovereignty.

Collectively, all three cases of local governance failure and the non-state actors could affect the state ideology and reshape the SPD, forcing the state to prioritize water securitization and reinforcing a feedback loop that mutually escalates water tensions. However, over time, when new challenges versus new opportunities emerge, the “synthesis” in the three case studies (the ETBs, JRB, and NRB) could shift to a new norm to address a new “thesis” that might be vulnerable to antithesis and a response to maintain this dynamic loop.

4. Discussion

This section will discuss the key components and drivers for the SPD and integrate them with the Hegel triple doctrines. These are the Doctrine of Being that reflects the state ideology and perception alongside the fundamental purpose for any state to survive and be. The Doctrine of Essence reflects the core principle of founding the SPD for governing the natural resources, particularly water resources by means of the water control narrative. Last is the Doctrine of Concept. By adopting a set of potential actions, they emerge for the state as a foreign policy toward a riparian state. The Hegelian dialectic framework of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis will be employed to reflect the dynamics of the SPD and the significance of the temporal factor in evolution. The theory of challenges and responses, by Arnold Toynbee, will be integrated to demonstrate the root causes of why states behave and act the way that they do. The key exogenous variables will be considered to justify the external pressures on the state that makes them shift, modify, or shape their own SPD.

4.1. The Geometry and Structural Anatomy of State Political Doctrine

The structure of the SPD used to govern transboundary water resources is composed of three drivers: Being, Essence, and Concept.

4.1.1. The Bond Between a State’s Being and Survival: The Cost of Sovereignty

The thesis of pure abstraction and creation for any state begins with the basic needs, such as population, defined territories, government, and recognition from other states [233]. The antithesis in such a context is the unbeing, where the state struggles to maintain rational acts of existence, particularly under the pressure of an anarchic international system that forces the states to compete [234]. This occurs while pursuing power, which ancient and modern scholars have addressed since Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Morgenthau [235,236,237]. The evolution of the state will require adopting an ideology and developing a perception that will later affect the decision making undertaken at different levels of the political economy [238]. This represents the synthesis and state of “becoming”. This concept applies to the individual levels addressed by Thomas Hobbes’s “state of nature”, where individuals need to concede their rights to escape fear and chaos in exchange for the protection of a sovereign [239]. At this stage, based on the state’s interests in terms of security, economy, and political objectives, states will endorse a specific International Relations approach that might be based on absolute sovereignty and nationalism [240,241]. The Doctrine of Being might explain the foundation and root causes of the upstream countries’ behavior and the key drivers of the state’s survival for Turkey in the ETBs, Israel in the JRB, and Ethiopia in the NRB to bridge the security–identity–development dilemma gap and transitioning from being versus unbeing to becoming a new norm for the present time. This might shift later based on time and the evolution of external challenges.

4.1.2. Essence and the Geist of Foreign Policy: Pursuit of National Interest

The state, as a political entity, requires resources to survive and thrive, promoting development and overall well-being. There are several types of resources, including financial, human, technological, and natural. However, some scholars believe that natural resources can be a curse that may attract local or cross-country regressions [242]. Others consider them positively, as sound institutions and proper governance can lead to growth and stability [243]. Either way, the different types of natural resources are a vital element to claim as part of development, such as energy [244], raw materials [245], land use [246], and water resources, which is the focus of the current research [247]. However, transboundary water has emerged as a critical resource as it conflicts with the sovereignty of other riparian states. As a core principle of state existence, the Doctrine of Essence might deeply form the real conduct of the upstream state through the control of transboundary water, representing “reality” in the Hegelian essence narrative, reflecting the thesis. Regardless of the announced foreign policy “appearance” by the upstream state, water control will be perceived as a threat by the downstream state [67], which will respond accordingly, representing the antithesis. The struggle and water tensions between both the upstream and downstream states will shape their SPDs and reflect the rationality of foreign policy and the state’s strategic interests [48] to form what Hegel called the “actuality” as a synthesis, where the essence might also be understood through appearance. As in the Turkish case, the state is driven by necessity to survive and thrive, controlling the transboundary water of the ETBs, which is the means that shapes the Turkish SPD of water bank, appearing as absolute sovereignty in foreign policy. Despite the United States’ peacebuilding initiative, the Abraham Accords aim to normalize relations between Israel and the Arab states [248]. Israel is still considered to be surrounded by an adversarial geopolitical environment due to the long history of tension with its neighbors [249]. In this sense, Israel at the state level is driven by necessity to provide incentives for immigrants and encourage them to settle [250]. Israel is also investing significantly in water and agricultural technology to achieve excellence in water resource management and to share its expertise with the region, fostering normalization. This shapes the Israeli SPD of Identity Seeking, which manifests a foreign policy that supports alliances over isolationism. Ethiopia at the state level was at a crossroads, trying to escape from the colonial shadow and its agreement on the NRB [251], challenging colonial-era treaties and Egypt’s historical dominance [252], and applying sovereignty to promote a hydropower hub in the region by building the GERD. This shapes the Ethiopian SPD of Nation Rise Power, which demonstrates a foreign policy of dam-first diplomacy. Regardless of the differences in the nature and behavior of the foreign policy of the riparian countries in the MENA region, the essence of that policy, which is the adoption of a specific political doctrine for water resource governance, is a common behavior, especially for upstream countries, stemming from knowing the country’s needs and determining its priorities.

4.1.3. Synthesizing Being and Essence: The Concept and the State’s Actions

As a conclusion to the Hegelian logic of science, the Doctrines of Being and Essence will be consolidated to form the Doctrine of Concept that will shape the potential actions of the state toward a riparian country. Unlike the Doctrines of Being and Essence, the Doctrine of Concept is tangible and measurable in the real world. The three key components of the concept doctrine are as follows: (a) universality, represented by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, adopted in 1997 and enforced in 2014 [253]; despite the international water law availability, this global framework has some limitations [222]; (b) particularity: establishing a specific water project in a transboundary water system with a distinct regional influence; and (c) individuality: conducting a specific bilateral treaty or strategic water agreement with concrete terms, such as water allocation, joint projects, monitoring, and evaluation of water flow and quality, which are very rare for the MENA regions.

The state concept will be reflected in a set of actions to respond to a specific threat, including cooperative, non-cooperative, or adversarial approaches. (a) Cooperative is where the state engages in water diplomacy and conducting treaties, such as the friendship treaty between Turkey and Iraq in 1946 and the recent framework agreement in 2024 [254]. The Adana agreement in 1998 between Turkey and Syria [89], the Jordan–Israel–Palestinian Peace Process, and the treaty in 1995 [255], and the Cooperative Framework Agreement in 2010 between Ethiopia and six riparian countries, where Egypt refused to join, are further examples [144]. (b) Non-cooperative is where the state’s national interest is of greater importance than the regional cooperation, such as the GERD dam in Ethiopia, the GAP dam complex in Turkey, and the NWC in Israel. (c) Adversarial is where the state unleashes a water dispute that could lead to geopolitical tensions and escalating economic or military pressure, employing a zero-sum approach. Following the failure of negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia over the GERD, Egypt considered military options against Ethiopia between 2021 and 2023 [256]. Since the 1960s, the JRB has been a matter of dispute among Israel, Jordan, and Palestine. The dispute ended in 1967 with Israel occupying the Golan Heights to secure the water resources [257]. In 1975, Syria reduced the water flow of the Euphrates River at the Tabqa Dam where Iraq mobilized troops to the Syrian border, threatening military action [105]. In 1990, the filling of the reservoir for the Atatürk Dam on the Euphrates River reduced the water supply by approximately 75%, threatening food security and hydropower energy production, which triggered the deployment of Syrian troops to the Turkish border, potentially leading to retaliation [90]. The Doctrine of Concept and potential state actions show a pattern of upstream states trying to control transboundary water as a “thesis”. This action will be perceived as a threat by the downstream state and responding will represent the “antithesis”. The post-conflict state followed by negotiations through proper mediators encouraging the riparian countries to open a dialogue that might end with treaties and agreements will refer to the Hegelian “synthesis”. Figure 3 presents a conceptual model of the key drivers of the SPD structure.

4.2. From Hegel to Toynbee, the Golden Mean of Challenge and Response

In his book “A Study of History”, Arnold Toynbee explored the philosophy of history to illustrate the rise and fall of civilizations. He provided a dynamic approach that anticipated that civilizations are subject to grow and fade based on their responses to specific challenges [50]. He proposed that the ideal conditions for any civilization to grow are related to finding the “golden mean”, which is the optimal balance between a civilization’s capacity and the severity of the challenges that require creative responses from minorities, turning threats into opportunities, and adapting to particular challenges. Toynbee argued that water resources are an essential factor in shaping civilization, and he demonstrated how different civilizations have responded to this factor. The aridity of the MENA region has encouraged them to develop large-scale water management systems, whereas Mesopotamia and Egypt have required sophisticated irrigation systems to cope with the inconsistent flood events. In the context of the Hegelian dialectic, the challenge represents the “thesis”, and the response is the “antithesis”. The “synthesis” requires the golden mean, which is the SPD, to bridge the gap between the challenge and the response. Turkey in the ETBs has been responding to the economic and security challenges presented by the golden mean of the SPD of the water bank, while Israel in the JRB has been responding to the needs of existence, fostering an identity for immigrants by excelling and sharing their expertise in water and agriculture technologies, including repositioning by capturing the Golan Heights, which has been concluded in Israel’s SPD of Identity Seeking. At the same time, Ethiopia is responding to the challenge of the colonial-era water agreement by the SPD of the Nation Rise Power, which is promoting a hydropower hub for the region. Toynbee emphasized that harsh challenges might lead to the decline in the civilization, and that some of the present key challenges are geopolitical instability, climate change disruption, economic crises, and rapid population growth.

4.3. The Potential Impact of Key External Challenges on the State Political Doctrine

There are different kinds of power: the power of a nation (economy, military capabilities, and geography), the power of resources (oil, coal, gas, atomic, water, and solar), and the power of policies (systems that move toward net zero) [258]. However, this kind of power, particularly water resources, shapes and influences the adopted state ideologies and actions undertaken through various key drivers, such as (a) geopolitical influence [259,260], (b) the climate change impact [261,262], (c) the economic crises and resilience [263], and (d) the rapid population growth [264,265]. Nevertheless, there is a ripple effect between these drivers and their impact on water and national security at the state level [104].

In terms of the geopolitical aspects, the emergence of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria as riparian countries is a result of the First World War, which shaped the states’ perceptions and behaviors toward water allocation in the ETBs [61], following the political shift in Iraq. Although the federal government still controls the water resources, a new player emerged with the official founding of the Kurdistan Region as an autonomous entity operating under the Iraqi constitution [266]. The dramatic political shift in Syria, following 13 years of uprising since 2011, ended with the recognition of a new regime by the beginning of 2025. It remains unclear what the perception of the new regime toward the Euphrates Basin is [267]. After the Second World War, Israel was founded as a new riparian state in the Jordan River Basin, alongside Palestine and Jordan, which has impacted the water balance [268]. The regaining of independence by Ethiopia after Italy’s occupation from 1936 to 1941 changed the legacy of Nile colonial water agreements in which Egypt had held a privileged and dominant position over the Nile River Basin [269,270]. Due to the involvement in the larger Arab–Israeli conflict, Egypt is always at the heart of the hydropolitics of the Nile Basin and has become a strategic link between the regional complexes in the MENA region [71].

Climate change impacts precipitation patterns and evaporation rates, particularly in arid regions such as the MENA [271]. The climate change disruption in the ETBs has been addressed by scholars. By the end of 21^st century, Turkey is expected to have an increased mean temperature of about 3–5 °C and a 20–40% decline in precipitation [272]. In Iraq, as the ultimate downstream country for the ETBs, the desertification rate reached 39% [273], with a significant ripple effect on agri-food, socioeconomic development, and national security [104]. The total participation at the JRB was about 5292 MCM/year. However, 88% of this participation is lost due to evapotranspiration, which makes the rest of the available water inside the basin about 987 MCM/year, with nearly half the flow contributed by Israel [274]. The impact of climate change on rainfall variability at the NRB is relatively high [275]; within Egypt, it varies from one region to another, where annual precipitation increased by 37% to 54% by the end of the century, while the southwestern region, the expected low precipitation region, may see a decrease of 35% [276]. Hence, the potential impact of climate change is a factor that may influence the availability of water resources and the structure of the SPD. Water and climate have played a central role in the long evolution of humanity, and the absence of a decent governance system might lead to the doctrine of “first come, first served”, which treats water as a commodity to be owned and controlled [66]. It is anticipated that water practices and climate change are likely to have devastating consequences for the already precarious economy of the MENA region [28].

Economically speaking, the availability and management of water resources is shaping the economic strategies of states by impacting the agricultural sector, energy production, and industrial activities, making it a significant political concern [277]. Water holds significant political weight due to its socioeconomic nature within the context of political economy [28]. Most transboundary water strategic agreements tend to be based on economic needs [278]. Consequently, the water economy is a fundamental tool of national security [106], and exploring the interlinks within the Water–Energy–Food Nexus for arid regions is essential to anticipate challenges and potential economic growth [65].

Rapid population growth is another factor that needs to be considered as it has the potential to influence the state political doctrine since the MENA region has witnessed profound population growth over the past century from just under 110 million in 1950 to about 600 million in 2020, with the expectation of reaching over 1 billion in 2100 [279]. In 2050, this rapid population growth is expected to exacerbate the water scarcity gap in the region as the water demand is projected to increase by 50%, and the water supply is anticipated to decrease by 12% [280].

Given all of these external drivers of geopolitical instability, climate impact, economic development plans, and population growth, this conflict doctrine has laid the foundation for 150 years of legal, political, and sometimes violent disputes over water [66]. These triggers add significant pressure to the water demand and drive the state to adapt/reform its political doctrines accordingly, particularly in the MENA region, where water is deeply politicized [281]. Water availability is considered a matter of national survival [208]. However, even when implementing water policies on the ground, key challenges remain to be considered that are not limited to the following: (a) the rapid variables of asymmetric power dynamics in the region that urge downstream countries, such as Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and Egypt, to leverage their political pressure to negotiate water allocation in better terms; (b) climate change impact as a global challenge that would influence both the water resource availability and the state’s perception toward utilizing the natural resources in general, whether for upstream or downstream countries; and (c) the geopolitical instability such as the PKK ceasefire in the Euphrates–Tigris Basins, the political transition in Syria, and the relative political stability in Iraq. The suggested way forward and potential actionable solutions that may help to mitigate conflicts, develop trust among riparian states, and promote equitable transboundary water governance are not limited to the following: (a) multilateral monitoring mechanisms [282] to ensure accountability, transparency, and data sharing by proposing a joint water committee similar to the Joint Technical Committee that was established to facilitate water resource management between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria in the 1980s [75] that could include an early warning system for water scarcity impacts, climate adaptiveness, and agricultural security; (b) compensation frameworks for downstream states to build trust among riparian countries and benefit-sharing and equitable water use frameworks, such as in the case of the Nile River Basin [283]; and (c) water project joint ventures, such as the large-scale desalination system of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project [284]. Figure 4 presents the structural theory of state political doctrine, and

Table 3. The state political doctrine for transboundary water in the MENA region.

Framework	Foundation	Mediation	Emergence	Status
Hegel’s Science of Logic	Being: Pure abstraction (thesis) Unbeing (antithesis) Becoming (synthesis)	Essence: Reality (thesis) Appearance (antithesis) Actuality (synthesis)	Concept: The unity of being and essence. Adversarial (thesis) Non-cooperative (antithesis) Cooperative (synthesis)	Dynamic progression and ongoing evolution over time
Hegelian Dialectic	Thesis (initial position)	Antithesis (countering)	Synthesis (resolution)
Arnold Toynbee Theory	Challenge (external pressure)	Golden Mean (equilibrium)	Response (adaptation)
Basin (Upstream)	State’s survival threatened	State Political Doctrine	Actions	Consequences
Turkey (ETBs)	Energy shortage, national security, and joining the European Union	Water-Bank Doctrine	Absolute sovereignty	Water control/hegemony
Israel (JRB)	Regional conflicts and identity crises	Identity-Seeking Doctrine	Hegemony and tech diplomacy	Regional domination, excellence in Water Agritech to promote regional normalization
Ethiopia (NRB)	Anti-colonialism agreements and seeking national development	Nation Rise Power Doctrine	Regional hydropower hub	Hydropower dominance

collectively demonstrates the SPDs for the MENA region.

4.4. The Dialectic of the SPD Between Idealism and Dialectical Materialism

The case studies revealed that upstream states, Turkey, Israel, and Ethiopia, often hold significant hydropolitical leverage. They are usually the initiators among the riparian countries in developing the SPDs through baby steps to major transboundary water actions. The small, cumulative actions over time, ranging from planning to water impoundment through the construction of massive dams, would ultimately lead to a tipping point that would lead downstream countries to respond to the water scarcity challenge. In his book “Dialectic of Nature”, Friedrich Engels [285] explored nature through Marxist philosophy, emphasizing dialectical materialism in scientific and natural processes, which is built based on the Hegelian dialectic. This might be the first attempt to link the natural process with Hegelian dialectic. Engels argued that accumulated minor changes (quantity) in a system could eventually reach a tipping point, causing a qualitative leap—a fundamental change in the system’s nature or behavior. Engles addressed that heating water gradually raises its temperature (quantitative change), but at 100 °C, it boils, leading to a qualitative change from liquid to gas. This concept can be applied to the accumulated actions of the upstream countries or even the state’s poor water governance and management on a local level, which gradually accumulates into an intellectual and ideological trend and ultimately reaches a regional moment of transformation in the MENA region over time.

However, a valid question remains, which might be a future research project: is it the only ideology, thoughts, and intellectual assumptions of the state that contribute to the evolution of the SPD, or do the complex system of external challenges and various incidental events that occur in reality directly contribute to the enforcement of the SPD’s form over time? To answer such a question, a flashback to the early-mid 19th century may be required, where a philosophical argument between idealism (Hegel’s dialectic) and materialism (Marx and Engels’ dialectic) exists on whether ideas create the reality or the opposite. Marx argued that he “turned Hegel’s dialectic on its head” by grounding it in material conditions instead of ideas and focusing on real-world socioeconomic contradictions, not an abstract thought [286], despite the two different directions of Hegel’s idealism dialectic and the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engles. The SPD and hydropolitical cycle of transboundary water conflict may suggest that both narratives (idealism and materialism) feed into each other, where ideas lead to reality evolution (Hegel). And reality leads to a change in ideas (Marx and Engels). Likewise, the ideas that the state brings may lead to a change in a certain reality, shaping the SPD. In contrast, the new reality may force the state to adapt to new patterns of perception, such as revising or shifting the course of SPD. The spiral of intellectual–material evolution over time is valid for both the state and leaders since the absence or ambiguity of the SPD fuels anarchy and conflict, as seen in the case of Iraq as the ultimate downstream country of ETBs. In Iraq, facilitating the alignment of the SPDs on a regional level may help establish peace through water cooperation. Hegel considered the state to be the most valuable outcome produced by humans and the beginning of true history for humanity [287]. This could indicate the importance of understanding the state form and behavior in producing its SPD.

5. Conclusions

This research examines the interconnections between transboundary water resources, state political doctrines (SPDs), and foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This case study examines the Euphrates–Tigris Basins (ETBs), the Jordan River Basin (JRB), and the Nile River Basin (NRB), focusing on the upstream countries of Turkey, Israel, and Ethiopia, respectively. It reviews historical conflicts, geopolitical positions, large-scale water projects, and agreements over transboundary water between riparian countries to demonstrate the water governance strategies of the upstream countries at the state level. The strategies reflect the symptoms of the different SPDs within the MENA region that are unformalized and yet govern the natural resources, particularly transboundary water. This research has also highlighted the behavior of the state and how it is reflected in its foreign policies as a set of actions driven by different ideologies and perceptions, aiming to bridge an acute need for the state to survive and thrive. A theoretical approach has been introduced to formalize the SPD, including structural components that reflect how states might develop their ideologies and SPDs in the adoption of a specific approach in International Relations and foreign policy. The research framework employed involves the Hegelian dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Hegel’s key Doctrines of Being, Essence, and Concept, the state’s behavior, the state’s indispensable core principles, and the potential actions taken to survive are reflected on in this research. The challenge-and-response theory, as outlined by Arnold Toynbee in “A Study of History”, has been used to demonstrate how states respond to transboundary challenges and is integrated with Hegel’s theories to bear the SPD as a golden mean.

The findings revealed the state political doctrine (SPD) for each upstream country, where Turkey employed the Water-Bank Doctrine driven by energy shortages, security concerns related to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and its pursuit of European Union membership. This led to Turkey controlling the transboundary water of the ETBs, resulting in prioritizing the national interest and practicing the absolute sovereignty approach by constructing massive, complex dams. Israel is demonstrating a different SPD style in responding to the states’ survival in an adversarial geopolitical environment, employing the Identity-Seeking Doctrine by acting as a hegemonic power and occupying neighboring territories, investing in water and agricultural technologies to settle immigrants. This is undertaken while exchanging the technological know-how to foster regional normalization. Ethiopia adopted the Nation Rise Power Doctrine by building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) to challenge colonial-era agreements, with the aspiration of becoming a regional hub for hydropower. Although the upstream states are showing the different styles of SPD, the core principle of SPD in governing and controlling transboundary water remains the same, reflecting how states act to survive and how that action leads to severe environmental and economic implications for downstream countries, fueling geopolitical anarchy and instability. Conversely, critical external challenges, such as geopolitical instability, climate change impacts, economic crises, and rapid population growth, are limiting water resources—a matter that may necessitate changes or reforms to the SPD. Time emerged as a key factor, playing a significant role in conflicts and collaborative acts where time is not an ally, particularly for downstream countries, which is decreasing their bargaining power. The SPD evolution is also discussed through the local failures of the states such as poor water management or deficits of water governance. The absence of a clear state political doctrine (SPD) may fuel distrust, leading to regional implications and water conflicts, and hindering peacebuilding efforts, as seen in the downstream of ETBs (Iraq and Syria). As time passes, the demand for water resources is increasing, given the aforementioned external challenges that threaten the sustainability of water resources, escalating tensions.

This study is limited to surface transboundary water. It focuses on identifying the SPD for the upstream countries and presenting the potential consequences on the downstream countries. It provides a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the impact of external challenges on water availability. Since transboundary water resources are a determinant of national and regional identity, security, and a tool for sustainable development, formalizing a state’s political doctrine and aligning it with regional ones are crucial for building trust between nations and fostering water diplomacy, leveraging climate adaptation and technological innovations. However, a political philosophy has been discussed to apply actionable solutions not limited to multilateral monitoring mechanisms to ensure accountability, transparency, and data sharing that require a paradigm shift in leadership capacity to maintain the regional alignment of the different SPDs, ensuring peacebuilding over water resources.