Going with the Flow: How Local Water User Associations Have Shaped Water Resource Management in Chile

Abstract

Effective and sustainable water resource management requires flexibility and adaptation to local contexts. Our study analyzes the emergence and evolution of local water self-governing associations, reviewing how their struggles and conflicts, both with the public sector and among locals themselves, have been pivotal to achieving agreements and actions towards sustainable water management. Using an adapted version of the Combined Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) and social–ecological system (SES) framework, also known as CIS, we conducted a comparative analysis of two distinct Chilean cases. This research highlights the critical role of historical factors alongside institutional support, political landscapes, and financial realities in shaping current water management practices. The findings suggest that when the actors are aligned and actions are taken to support local water user management, more efficient, sustainable, and less conflict-ridden water resource management occurs. Furthermore, this study reveals how the experiences, struggles, and successes of these local user associations have shaped national policies, particularly regarding the development of monitoring mechanisms and the promotion of public–private cooperation in water governance. These efforts have not only fostered more resilient water management systems but have also demonstrated the power of grassroots organizations in shaping broader sustainable policies.

1. Introduction

By 2030, global water demand is projected to outstrip supply by 40% [1]. Faced with this scenario, effective water governance that fosters collaboration and collective action is crucial [2,3]. Such governance can help establish sustainable practices in water use that encourage economic development, social inclusion, and the preservation of the environment [4] while also helping to decrease disputes over water resources.

Traditionally, water governance structures involve a division of responsibilities between the national and local levels. Public institutions at the national level often handle tasks like resource planning, initial allocation, and system oversight [5,6]. However, the effectiveness of this centralized approach hinges on successful collaboration with local institutions, which can take various forms, including public agencies, concessions, and private organizations [5,6]. Considering the latter, research suggests that self-governed systems, where local user communities establish their own rules and norms, can be particularly effective in adapting water management practices to local needs [7,8,9]. These decentralized, multi-level governance structures, characterized by limited autonomy within a broader framework, mirror the complexities of social–ecological systems and may offer advantages in managing such systems’ challenges [10].

In the context of local water associations, the concept of commons refers to the shared management of natural resources by a community or group of users. Hence, a community signifies more than merely a collection of people; it constitutes a unified social entity characterized by mutual reliance and a common sense of identity [11]. This identity often arises from a variety of sources, including geographical ties, cultural values, and common experiences related to water management, such as sharing a hydraulic infrastructure [11]. Polity, in this context, refers to the political capacity of a community or group to mobilize resources and influence decision-making processes that affect their water management practices, which can involve engaging with external stakeholders such as state agencies, NGOs, and other user groups to advocate for their interests and ensure equitable access to water [12,13]. The integration of these concepts—commons, community, and polity—forms a commonality that not only sustains local water associations but also promotes resilience and adaptive governance in the face of environmental challenges and socio-political dynamics as well [13].

These concepts align with broader trends in global water governance, which advocate for multi-level governance structures that integrate local, regional, and national levels to perform their distinct roles without overlap or gaps [14,15]. Even though national water governance structures establish overarching policies that define local water management practices [16], successful local initiatives can also serve as pilot examples, scaling up towards the development of national policies [17]. This interplay highlights the complex relationship between national and local levels, towards the emergence of commonality. National governments typically plan and develop water resources with the goal of water security, improving national or local welfare, achieving self-sufficiency, preserving environmental quality, and reducing conflicts [16]. Here, effective and sustainable water governance requires a dynamic exchange among these levels, where national policies provide a framework, while local user associations can adapt, innovate, and become a community, potentially influencing future national water management strategies [18,19].

Because of its high climatic and hydrological diversity, a specific water system was developed in Chile, where the government assigns robust water rights per basin, managed by private associations formed by rights holders [20]. Thus, the distribution of water management powers is divided between national public agencies and locally managed private associations [14,15]. The benefits of such decentralized systems include increased responsiveness to local conditions, enhanced stakeholder participation, improved resource stewardship, and reduced conflicts [21,22].

However, the Chilean system faces challenges in the implementation of this model. Many local water associations struggle to govern water resources efficiently, exhibiting considerable variability in their management outcomes [23,24]. In some areas, local associations have yet to be established, particularly regarding groundwater associations [25]. They generally have low management capacity and participation of users; they lack monitoring systems and possess limited infrastructure [24,26,27]. Despite these challenges, local successes in water management have had a demonstrable impact on national policies, promoting a shift towards more decentralized and user-centered approaches [18,24,26].

Even though the system faces challenges that require ongoing attention, the structure has fostered localized decision-making, enabling tailored solutions that address specific regional challenges [24,28,29]. The argument is that these local successes have acquired commonality and, with that, have demonstrably influenced national water management policies, prompting consideration for more decentralized and user-centered support in the country.

Thus, the aim of this paper is to study and analyze two Chilean local water systems that have embarked on some form of local collective water management and their impact on nation-wide policies and water conflicts. Both cases with their distinct public–private frameworks, enable the study of how local water collective action is sustained under different circumstances and challenges. Through this study, it was possible to identify the advantages and deficiencies of the case study’s decision-making dynamics in water governance towards fulfilling sustainable local water management. It was also possible to unravel how seemingly positive local practices have promoted national policies and shaped the water management system at a larger scale. Therefore, this article illustrates how two different cases have created inventive solutions to deal with and surmount a complex system, emphasizing continuous initiatives resulting in sustainable water management and reduced water unrest and offering useful lessons on flexible approaches for comparable obstacles elsewhere. Unlike previous research that examined localized successes and challenges of these systems [18,23,30,31], this article explores how these local practices and contestations have changed over time and actively shaped national water policies. By focusing on the intersection between local collective action and national water governance, this study presents new insights into the dynamic interplay between community-level practices and government policies.

The structure of this article starts by presenting the details of the method and data used in Section 2. Afterward, the results regarding the analysis of the case studies are exhibited, together with the linkages to national policies. This article continues with a section of discussions reflecting on the broader policy and management lessons learned from the Chilean case study and how they are applicable to problematic water systems elsewhere in Section 4. Finally, some conclusions are pointed out in Section 5.

2. Method: A Framework Adapted to Water Systems

The foundational framework that was customized for local water associations is introduced next, aiming for its use in particular case studies. Following this, a comprehensive account of these case studies is provided, together with details of the data used for analysis.

2.1. The Framework

To analyze these cases, the combined Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) and social–ecological system (SES) framework was used, CIS for short [32]. The framework emphasizes the analysis of action situations within the broader social–ecological system. Here, action situations represent specific contexts where actors interact and make decisions about water resources. As seen in Figure 1, the framework highlights the relationship among the resource system, the resource units, the actors, and the governance system and how these interact in the action situations with external social, economic, and political settings to produce diverse outcomes. This framework underscores that these interactions form an iterative cycle where variables continually influence and are influenced by changing conditions.

Traditionally, SES research relied on analyzing variables within a system. The combined framework departs from this approach, prioritizing the study of action situations. This shift aligns with Elinor Ostrom’s later work [33], in which she incorporated the concept of “action situations” explicitly into the SES framework. In the combined frameworks, Cole et al. [32] suggest merging the components of action situations, interactions, and outcomes (separate entities in the IAD framework) into a single unit within the SES framework. This simplification allows for a clearer focus on the dynamic interplay within action situations. The combined framework acknowledges feedback loops within the system; hence, outcomes from action situations can influence the surrounding context, potentially triggering changes in the broader SES. This “endogenous determination” of contextual conditions is a crucial aspect to consider. Finally, the framework proposes a temporal progression of events, providing for a cyclical process where context influences action situations, in turn producing outcomes that reshape the context for future action situations, which is also closer to reality when observing water SES.

2.2. Applying the CIS Framework to the Chilean Cases

By applying the CIS framework to the Chilean water system, we delved into specific action situations involving water governance and reviewed its dynamics while acknowledging the endogenous determination and cyclical process. For the Chilean case, we focused on detailed elements, based on the CIS framework (

Table 1. Elements defined for the current analysis and their description, together with their link to their original frameworks.

Original CIS Components	Elements Defined for the Current Study	Description and Explanation of Elements
Resource systems	Climatic and Social Context (CSC)	The unique climatic characteristics of the area, for example, if it has faced long periods of drought or variable precipitation patterns, combined with its social landscape, shapes decision-making within action situations related to water governance. These factors influence how actors perceive water, prioritize decisions, and allocate resources.
	Political structure (PS)	How the system is organized, specially at the decision-making level, which affects the action arena and interactions among actors. For example, differentiation from more centralized water management, or if it has promoted a more decentralized system.
	Infrastructure (I)	Existing or limited water infrastructure, such as dams, canals, and irrigation systems. These directly affect interactions and outcomes within action situations. For example, limited infrastructure can lead to competition for scarce resources and conflict over access.
Resource units	Local economy (LE)	Economic activities and structures that are directly or indirectly dependent on water resources. The local economy is intricately linked to water availability and management practices. These can significantly impact economic productivity, livelihoods, and job security.
Actors	User Characterization (UC)	Local water management may involve several or few groups of water users. These could be farmers, urban residents, industrial users, and environmental organizations, among others. Their interests, knowledge, and power dynamics significantly influence decision-making within action situations.
	Institutional Support (IS)	Formal institutions, such as government agencies with water management mandates, and informal institutions, such as user associations and customary practices. They play a critical role in facilitating or hindering collaboration. Effective institutions can provide a framework for coordination and conflict resolution, while weak or absent institutions can exacerbate tensions.
Governance systems	Monitoring and evaluation systems (MESs)	These systems assess water use, environmental impacts, and compliance with regulations. Effective ones provide data for informed decision-making, and accountability and ensure sustainable water management practices. Conversely, weak monitoring and evaluation systems hinder transparency and can lead to resource misuse.
	Financial realities (FRs)	Financial resources available for water management, user fees, and cost-sharing mechanisms. These significantly shape decision-making within action situations. Limited funding can restrict investment in infrastructure improvements and constrain the ability to implement effective water management practices. User fees and cost-sharing mechanisms can incentivize efficient water use and promote collaboration.

and Figure 2).

Through the perspective of action situations within the CIS framework, we attained a more profound comprehension of the local water governance system in Chile. This approach allowed us to identify key challenges and opportunities for promoting sustainable water management and achieving water security at the basin level reducing conflicts.

2.3. Case Studies Analyzed and Data Used

To analyze water resource self-management in Chile, two collective water management cases with different structures and results were studied. To provide context for the location of the two case studies, Figure 3 illustrates their location within Chile.

2.3.1. Aconcagua Case Study: Public–Private Governance Structure

The first case study focuses on public–private water governance structures, characterized by significant private-sector participation in the local water management system. Here, the Aconcagua basin is an interesting case since it crosses the Valparaíso Region in north-central Chile from east to west (see Figure 4). Its economic activities are primarily agriculture, mining, and industry. These sectors compete for water with urban uses, supplying Valparaíso and other important cities of the region and rural communities, and with environmental uses [35]. They have also been subject to conflict, regarding distributing water among different uses, water pollution, and disagreements regarding water infrastructure, among others [35]. The Aconcagua Plan emerged in September 2018 and included the formation of a technical committee among representatives of the five surface self-managed vigilance committees, four of the Aconcagua River, and one from Putaendo river, its tributary, as well as the public sector, represented by the General Directive of Water (Dirección General de Aguas, DGA) [36]. They continuously met until November 2020, organizing and formulating short-, medium-, and long-term actions for the basin.

The information to support this case study came from the analysis of secondary literature, together with almost 90 workshop meeting minutes, complemented by an interview with a local vigilance committee manager.

This case study provided insights into how the collaboration between the local public sector and user associations has influenced water governance and management practices reducing water conflicts. The analysis revealed the key strengths and weaknesses of this structure, shedding light on its effectiveness in addressing the challenges posed by the mega-drought and the hydroclimatic diversity in Chile.

2.3.2. Copiapó Case Study: Private Groundwater Association with Public Support

In contrast, the second case represents a groundwater-conflicted basin. Copiapó is located in a highly productive area in the Atacama Region in north Chile, where withdrawals far exceed the average recharge of the alluvial aquifer [31], leading to significant water conflicts (see Figure 5). It also presents a high degree of heterogeneity among the actors involved, encompassing representatives from different economic activities. These characteristics are commonly found in other intra-national water basins facing growing water scarcity [35]. In Copiapó, the first groundwater self-managed user community was created, and over time, four additional areas were organized as well. As a result, the entire aquifer of the water basin is now collectively managed by groundwater communities [35]. Thus, this case study delved into a particular structure, where the local collective water management system is predominantly led by users with minimal involvement of the public sector. By examining this model, this study identified the dynamics of decision-making, resource allocation, and the impact of user associations on national policies and unrest.

Groundwork was conducted by the authors between the years 2012 and 2015. The work involved different instances of participation with local water users, including the development of reports and their written operational rules that were used as material. For any missing information and to verify the whole case study, the manager was contacted and interviewed.

This analysis elucidated the differences in governance and management approaches between the two structures and provided valuable insights into their respective abilities to drive sustainable water management practices at the local and national levels.

3. Results

The methodology was applied in two Chilean basins, representing different institutional schemes and situational issues. These were selected since they represent multiple problems a water social–ecological system faces, namely, scarcity issues, summer floods, the need to distribute water among multiple users, conflicts among users, and groundwater monitoring and enforcement, among others. Both cases have some form of local collective water management, with different structures that allowed us to test the framework under different institutional schemes. Thus, the location of this study and its methodology allowed us to understand water systems under the added complexity of institutional fragmentation.

3.1. Surface Vigilance Committee Alliance in the Aconcagua Basin

Our analysis of the valley’s water management focuses on two distinct periods as follows: pre-2018 and post-2018. This distinction is crucial because the year 2018 marked a significant shift in governance processes. The development of the Aconcagua Plan and the establishment of a working committee involving all five vigilance committees from the Aconcagua and Putaendo rivers represented the first attempt at basin-level water management in the area. The results of the Aconcagua case study are presented below, accompanied by a summary table (

Table 2. Summary of elements analyzed for the Aconcagua case study.

Elements	Aconcagua Situation Pre-2018	Aconcagua Situation Post-2018
Climatic and Social Context (CSC)	- Ongoing drought significantly impacting agriculture.	- Extraordinary water scarcity in 2018 led to agreements among Vigilance Boards for water redistribution. - Creation of the Aconcagua Roundtable to monitor agreements and manage conflicts.
Political structure (PS)	- Water management by user-organized vigilance boards with no public agency participation. - Judicial resolution defining five hydrological sections with individual surveillance boards.	- Formation of an Executive Committee and Aconcagua Roundtable including both private users and public sector representatives such as the DGA and the National Irrigation Commission (whose Spanish acronym is the CNR). - Public sector plays a mediator role.
Infrastructure (I)	- Lack of coordinated infrastructure development.	- Infrastructure plans and public investment promoted, including headwater reservoir study and installation of wells. - Improved infrastructure for water management.
Local economy (LE)	- Important agricultural activity. - Agricultural and mining activities impacted by drought. - Decreasing investments.	- Efforts to ensure water availability for farmers. - Improved water distribution efficiency and long-term planning, resulting in better water management.
User Characterization (UC)	- Competing demands among user groups (mining, agriculture, urban populations). - Vigilance boards manage water with limited integrated participation.	- Inclusion of private and public sector representatives in decision-making processes. - Active participation in monitoring and managing water distribution.
Institutional Support (IS)	- Absence of public agencies in water management.	- Increased involvement of public agencies (DGA, CNR, Ministry of Public Works (MOP)) in meetings and decision-making. - Public sector support in monitoring and enforcement.
Monitoring and evaluation systems (MESs)	- Lack of comprehensive monitoring and evaluation.	- Implementation of monitoring systems. - DGA committed to calibration and supervision of monitoring stations. - Evaluation of water management improvements and outcomes.
Financial realities (FRs)	- Limited financial investment in coordinated water management.	- Investment in infrastructure and public projects. - Financial resources allocated for monitoring and management improvements.

).

3.1.1. Pre-2018, Dispersed Private Management with Little Public Intervention

From a social point of view (CSC), the Valparaíso region is characterized by a population density of 93.9 inhabitants/km², the second highest in Chile, made up mostly of low-income families, with a regional average of nearly USD 6500/year, compared with the national average of USD 10,300/year [37]. Furthermore, from an economic point of view (LE), the Aconcagua River basin is important for agricultural activity, especially in the production of fruits and vegetables for export, producing around 40% of the country’s total avocados, 30% of grapes, and 30% peaches [38].

The ongoing drought (CSC) has significantly impacted agricultural activities (LE) in the region, reducing irrigation water availability and consequently affecting farmer production and income [39]. Water scarcity, a persistent challenge in the area (CSC), has historically fueled competition and conflicts among various user groups, mainly among mining, agriculture, and urban populations (UC) supplying drinking water to Valparaíso and surrounding communities [40]. These competing demands have led to conflicts regarding water distribution, pollution, and infrastructure development.

From a political view (PS), water management in the Aconcagua River basin has been a subject of controversy. The responsibility for the administration of water resources has been placed on water users themselves organized in vigilance boards (UC), with no participation of public agencies (IS) [35]. Through judicial resolutions, the DGA defined five hydrological sections for the Aconcagua River basin in the late 1800s, requiring a surveillance board organized for each [35,41]. This was pinpointed as the aspect that initiated conflicts in the area since it limits integrated water management at the basin level [36,41]. Ultimately, it is said that the lack of coordination among the hydrological sections and the absence of a comprehensive plan for water management in the area have generated conflicts and tensions between the actors involved [36,41]. This administrative division of the basin exacerbated the conflict between large upstream farmers and smaller downstream farmers, as upstream users often prioritized their water needs without considering the downstream impacts.

Despite an attempt to manage water resources with a basin-level organization through the “Acta de Aconcagua” in 2001, not all the vigilance boards of the river were involved, and it was mainly led by public agencies, such as the Ministry of Public Works (MOP), congress persons, and mayors [42]. This lack of comprehensive participation led to further tensions and inefficient water management practices.

3.1.2. From 2018 to 2022, Private River Basin Association with Public Support

Because of the extraordinary situation of water scarcity in 2018, representatives of the vigilance boards of the Aconcagua River signed an agreement to redistribute water among sections. In 2019, this led to a new agreement and the development of the Aconcagua Roundtable, with the vigilance boards of each of the sections of the river and the public sector, to monitor and ensure the execution of the agreement, manage conflicts, and propose compliance measures [41,43]. The public sector is incorporated into the roundtable, through the participation of representatives of the DGA, the National Irrigation Commission (CNR), and others [44]. The goal of the Aconcagua agreement is to deliver water to those who do not have it, leaving no one behind. The focus is to guarantee water for human consumption; provide water to farmers regardless of their size; and address medium- and long-term challenges (meeting minutes 15). For this, representatives of the three main sections were present at each meeting of the Aconcagua Roundtable, occasionally accompanied by the drinking water and sanitation company, the main user of the fourth section, and the Putaendo river representative from the fifth and final section [35,44].

The presence of the public sector, through the DGA (IS), was crucial throughout the meetings, as they were requested to supervise agreement compliance, act as mediators, and commit resources [35,36]. An example of this includes actions of the DGA on monitoring issues (MESs), committing to expedite the calibration of monitoring stations (meeting minute 1), as well as ensuring that users carry out distribution agreements (meeting minutes 2 and 3) [35]. In addition, the meetings were attended by other public actors such as a regional representative of the MOP, regional representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, Directorate of hydraulic infrastructure, and CNR, among others; and private actors, namely, the local water company and rural domestic water supply committees, depending on the topics addressed in each meeting [44]. The roundtable does not include other private entities such as mining companies or other producer associations, nor does it include members of civil society (indigenous, environmental, or tourism representatives); thus, is not consistent with integrated participation and collaboration principles [35,44].

The political implications of the roundtables extended beyond local political decisions. For instance, users canceled a decision made by the municipality to halt some well operations, arguing that the mayor does not have legal power over water management (meeting minute 15). Consequently, the MOP was requested to use its authority to resume well operations, and the DGA was requested to carry out the necessary inspections to ensure the process was not halted again [35].

Similarly, because of the meetings, local infrastructure plans and other public investments were promoted (I). Faced with the pressure of the meetings, the Undersecretary of the MOP had to initiate a study of the headwater reservoir of the basin, in an infrastructure plan encompassing different hydraulic projects across the watershed, and the installation of several wells in communities in need (meeting minute 31) (IS).

Also, given the pressing circumstances and demands from the users, it was possible to adapt rules to respond to needs quickly. In the period of extreme drought, a complete cut-off of water use was carried out in upstream sections, with the aim of allowing the river to recover in downstream sections and to deliver water to those who were not receiving it [35]. This agreement, although it is formal and very rigorous, has been modified, always with the approval and consensus of the rest of the board. An example of this is the deal to maintain the floodgates open for 36 h, letting more water go to downriver users, even though the limit should have been only 24 h according to the technical standards (meeting minute 9). Another solution taken promptly by the roundtable was the initiative to assign vigilance boards the responsibility of monitoring and cleaning channels that lead to the river (meeting minute 13). These channels were being filled with water from a battery of wells installed during the emergency and had been continuously vandalized.

After these actions had taken place, users considered that the alliance led to better coordination, improved distribution efficiency with the consequent greater availability of water, reduced conflicts, and developed long-term planning [35]. For example, in a meeting, it was pointed out that the season had been better than the previous ones in terms of water management, even though it had brought less available water (meeting minute 18). The attendees agreed that the operation of the agreement and the committee was carried out in an environment of trust. Additionally, the users pointed out that the main value of the agreement and water table formation was its own existence since it has been a space to debate long-term issues, as well as the distribution of water on a voluntary and consensual basis (meeting minute 14).

In addition to reviewing short-term issues such as the weekly river operation agreements, medium- and long-term issues were also discussed in the meetings, revealing that planning constitutes an important objective for the group (meeting minute 15). An example of this is the review of major infrastructure work projects that involve the entire section of the river, the establishment of monitoring systems (meeting minutes 1–14), the strategy of holding meetings and leaflets, and other strategies to inform the rest of the community about the meetings extensively (meeting minutes 3 and 6) [35]. The latter was supported by the public sector since the MOP proposed and promoted a Strategic Communication Plan to maintain coordination and disseminate consistent messages through various media (meeting minutes 24) [35].

3.2. Groundwater Communities in the Copiapó Basin

The Copiapó basin, situated in a fertile region of northern Chile, is an area of intense groundwater conflict marked by excessive water extraction [33]. A project to assess the formation and empower groundwater communities was conducted by the authors between the years 2012 and 2015. Thus, this period serves as a demarcation point, allowing for an analysis of conditions and developments both before and after 2012. Detailed results are presented next, together with a summary table (

Table 3. Summary of elements analyzed for the Copiapó case study.

Elements	Copiapó Situation Pre-2012	Copiapó Situation Post-2012
Climatic and Social Context (CSC)	- Arid climate with extremely low annual precipitation. - Significant overexploitation of groundwater aquifer.	- Improved organization among groundwater users. - Persistent issues of trust, social justice, and transparency.
Political structure (PS)	- First groundwater community (called CASUB) formed in 2004. - Lacked knowledge on legal regulations and compliance with user duties.	- Private alliances among groundwater communities. - Development of official rules and structured management.
Infrastructure (I)	- Lautaro Dam had issues with water filtration.	- Joint management of three upstream communities. - Downstream groundwater community bought surface water rights to participate in the surface vigilance committee.
Local economy (LE)	- Agriculture focused on fruit production for export, vineyards, and vegetable farming. - Mining sector includes various metal productions.	- Improved water management supports local agriculture and mining. - Enhanced coordination among users improves efficiency.
User Characterization (UC)	- High dependence on basin’s water resources. - Discrepancies and conflicts between water users and vigilance committee.	- Periodical gatherings with active user participation. - Continuous contact among different groundwater communities despite legal limitations.
Institutional Support (IS)	- Weak management system with significant gaps. - No support from public agencies.	- Alliances with regional public agencies. - External technical advisors for specific topics.
Monitoring and evaluation systems (MESs)	- Inconsistencies in values and gaps in information and monitoring systems.	- Development of comprehensive monitoring plans. - Establishment of transparent accounting methods and conflict resolution processes.
Financial realities (FRs)	- Financial subsistence issues. - Poor compliance with user duties such as fee payment.	- Funding for monitoring system partially supported by public agencies. - Neutral organizing agent ensures balanced funding scheme.

).

3.2.1. Pre-2012, Extreme Overallocation with Little Monitoring and Conflicts

The climate in the Copiapó basin is arid, with an average annual precipitation of just 28 mm [45] (CSC). Groundwater recharge of the basin equals 3.7 m³/s (DGA, 2011), while permits for groundwater use have been issued up to 23 m³/s [46,47], later rectified to 19.6 m³/s [45], revealing that the aquifer was significantly overexploited. Also, inconsistencies in values and research findings reveal gaps in the information and monitoring systems (MES), affecting the basins’ general water accounting [31,45].

The Atacama Region, where the Copiapó basin is located, has historic economic activities of agriculture and mining (UC). Both sectors heavily depend on the basin’s groundwater resources, making water stress (CSC) a critical factor that can significantly impact the local economy (LE). Evidence of discrepancies and conflicts between water users and the vigilance committee were also common (UC), highlighting weak management [45].

The only large infrastructure in the valley corresponds to the Lautaro Dam (I), located 15 km. downstream of the Copiapó River’s source, with a total volume of 42 million m³ [47]. Its original construction did not account for the water filtration through its gravel and sand base, resulting in the recharge of up to 50% of its volume, and the formation of an important groundwater aquifer downstream [47]. Prior to 2012, there was a project in development, Lautaro 2.0, to line the dam to limit infiltration, but up to this day, it is still under study [48] (I).

Because the river does not flow all the way to the city, the only water source for areas downstream is groundwater. To manage it, in 2004, the first groundwater community was developed (PS), the CASUB [49]. However, until 2012, the community still lacked knowledge of the legal regulations governing water use rights, had poor compliance with user duties on issues such as fee payment, participation in assemblies, and knowledge of their statutes, and used precarious monitoring mechanisms [45]. Thus, the water management system had significant gaps in terms of institutional development, monitoring systems, and financial subsistence that were not helping alleviate the overallocation problem.

3.2.2. Post-2012, Moving towards More Sustainable Water Management Practices

Since the initiative began in 2012, it has been evident that in the Copiapó valley, users, particularly those utilizing groundwater, have coordinated their efforts, customizing rules and mechanisms to suit their requirements. This can be seen when developing a monitoring plan with a public agency’s agreement to fund it partially [50] and establishing alliances with other groundwater communities [31]. The continuity of the community can be attributed to leaders’ awareness of local priorities, official rules in place, and the neutral formation of the community [48].

The alliance between groundwater communities has been harder to sustain since they were not allowed to establish just one community across the aquifer, and supra-organizations do not have an official and legal figure [51]. The communities creatively solved this issue by establishing the same set of rules and naming the same manager and technical team to perform periodical operations [35,50]. This led to the joint management of three upstream communities [50]. Moreover, these communities were composed of comparable user profiles—predominantly that of farmers—and harbored fewer members than downstream communities, a factor that may account for their cooperation [9]. The two other downstream communities, even though they have different boards and managers, are continuously in touch [52]. Another creative solution to the river’s full alliance was performed by the downstream groundwater community, as they bought surface water rights to become a part of the surface vigilance committee, the community that controls and operates the upstream Lautaro dam, which significantly affects groundwater aquifers [35,52]. Thus, the community demonstrated its resilience by taking an approach that was independent of official approval and went beyond, yet it did not violate conventional norms.

Additionally, a relevant aspect of Copiapó’s groundwater management is the composition of a community Board of Directors, which includes representatives from water supply and sanitation companies, mining companies, medium and large agricultural companies, and small-scale agriculture, by norm [50]. This diverse representation was truly applied, since decision-making within the Board of Directors is conducted on a one-vote-per-director basis, unlike in the general assembly of the community, where decisions are made according to how many water rights each user has [52]. This structure ensures that all major stakeholders have a say in the governance and management of the aquifer, balancing the interests of various sectors and fostering collaborative decision-making.

The major issues for coordination are related to the high heterogeneity encountered, regarding the different purposes and situations of users involved, the technology used, and the information they possess [49]. Despite these challenges, the communities developed monitoring plans to establish monitoring devices gradually in all wells and created an alliance with a public agency to fund this monitoring system partially [31,52]. Also, they developed a set of official rules that are written and known by everybody [50,52]. Efforts were made to clarify all granted water rights and continuously update the user registry [49].

Even though the users are the ones who make all the decisions, they develop alliances with the regional offices of specific public agencies when needed. Also, they hired staff to support operational aspects, and generally engage with technical advisers for specific topics. They work together to vote and make routine decisions, which are recognized as legitimate both within and outside of the community. Mechanisms and special dispositions have been developed to support smaller groups that raised complaints about being overlooked [31].

3.3. Lessons Learned from the Cases

Both cases show the critical role of commons in managing shared resources, community in fostering collective action and trust among users, and polity in developing a political agency to influence broader policy decisions. These elements have been instrumental in navigating the socio-environmental challenges and achieving sustainable water management in the area.

The Aconcagua case underscores the significance of well-defined roles in decision-making, the importance of adaptable and evolving regulations, and the necessity for consensus, openness, effective oversight, and a system to file grievances. It shows the importance of gaining trustful data and information to quantify the outputs of different actions, leading to an unprecedented water distribution agreement that should be strengthened, or at least secured. In the end, these early clashes that led to partnerships have created a mutually beneficial scenario, greatly helped local water consumers, and secured the water basin’s future viability.

Conversely, the Copiapó case highlights the importance of clear accounting practices for tracking water flow and individual withdrawals and for informing decisions made during meetings. This should also apply to formal conflict resolution processes. Special attention should be placed on the funding scheme, from the community’s origin, regarding the neutrality of the organizing agent, up to their operations and monitoring funding. Even though public support is needed, public agencies should have limited power to allow the local organization to empower in the decision-making process. In this case, as well, the collaboration and innovative resolution of challenges have led to sustainable water management practices that benefit all stakeholders involved, ensuring the long-term health and viability of the water basin.

4. Discussion Regarding Self-Managed Water Resource Associations

The comparative analysis of two distinct Chilean cases reveals the critical role of historical factors, institutional support, political landscapes, and financial realities in shaping current water management practices. The findings suggest that by aligning these elements to support local water users’ associations, positive outcomes emerge, leading to more efficient, sustainable, and less conflictive water resource management. These results align with studies by Hoogesteger et al. [13], which emphasize the importance of community involvement and adaptive governance in managing common-pool resources, as well as with theories for sustainable management of common-pool resources, highlighting the necessity of clear boundaries, collective-choice arrangements, and effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms [8,9,32].

The combined case studies pointed out several essential elements for the success of community water management initiatives. These include the following: (i) the significance of institutional support, particularly from public bodies, in backing local water organizations; (ii) the presence of solid mechanisms for resolving conflicts and coordinating efforts is vital for the effective administration of water resources among various stakeholders; (iii) the capacity to adopt and refine technologically advanced and inventive approaches is fundamental to achieving sustainable water management; (iv) the importance of dependable equipment and systems to track water usage for transparency; and (v) establishing long-term financial plans for the sustenance and backing of community water groups.

The importance of institutional support has been echoed in previous works arguing that strong backing from public agencies enhances the legitimacy and operational capacity of local water associations [12,53]. Conflict resolution mechanisms are central for inclusive and flexible coordination frameworks to address the complexities of water resource management [11,53]. The necessity for technological innovation, reliable accountability systems, and long-term financial strategies have also been acknowledged before for the sustainability of community-based resource management [16,54,55]. Together, these elements, provide a framework that can be helpful when analyzing other contexts. However, each water management system has its own particularities, and these conclusions cannot be blindly extended to other water basins.

In the Aconcagua case, the participation process was promoted for policy development processes. A discussion was held on a bill regarding basin-level water associations, where the Parliamentary Commission requested that the vigilance committees make presentations (as recorded in meeting minute 31). This participation process was instrumental in shaping current policies to establish strategic basin organizations (Mesas Estratégicas de Recursos Hídricos) by the DGA (Res. Ex. 333 on 27 February 2024). Here, the struggles of conforming to a basin-wide organization have influenced national policies, particularly in promoting public–private cooperation and user participation.

The Copiapó basin has also been leading national policies regarding groundwater. Following the implementation of their groundwater monitoring system, the DGA issued a resolution in 2016 (Res. Ex. 2129 on 29 July 2016), ordering holders of groundwater use rights (covering almost all groundwater users from the Valparaíso region in Central Chile to the north) to adjust their extraction control systems and periodic information reporting. While causality cannot be proven, this modification underscores the government’s commitment to improving water management through advanced monitoring and data transmission technologies, likely influenced by the successful system implementation in the Copiapó case.

To fund the implementation of these new technologies, strategies were derived from the Copiapó case as well. Here, specific public funding was opened, targeting the monitoring of groundwater flows in specific water basins. This approach demonstrates how creative solutions developed by local communities for their specific challenges can be adapted to other scenarios, leading to broader national policies.

The experiences and successes of these local user associations have significantly influenced national policies. The development of monitoring mechanisms and the promotion of public–private cooperation in water governance have been directly shaped by the practices observed in the Aconcagua and Copiapó basins. Both cases faced significant challenges and conflicts before being recognized as successful, including struggles against the public sector and disputes between large and small farmers, among others. These confrontations were crucial in proving the viability and effectiveness of their approaches. Consequently, the national institutional scheme has adapted to incorporate successful ideas from local communities, demonstrating the importance of bottom-up approaches in water management policy development.

5. Conclusions

The successful implementation of local water practices can significantly influence the development and refinement of national water policies. By examining cases where local initiatives have yielded positive results, policymakers can identify effective strategies and adapt them to broader regulatory frameworks. For instance, the pilot project conducted in the Copiapó Basin demonstrated the value of local solutions in addressing groundwater monitoring challenges and tensions. Despite numerous struggles with the public sector, by 2016, the initiative was recognized as a success, prompting modifications to national legislation to incorporate its principles. The updated regulation now includes provisions that mandate the installation and maintenance of measurement systems for flow rates, extracted volumes, and static or dynamic levels, as well as the transmission of this information. Decentralization benefits these processes by empowering local communities, fostering greater stakeholder engagement, and ensuring that water management practices are tailored to specific regional needs.

Although every situation is different, owing to its particular hydro-climatic conditions and history, Chile’s water basins share challenges such as battling bureaucratic systems and dealing with conflicts and power imbalances between large- and small-scale stakeholders. These commonalities were highlighted to illustrate how they can serve as references for other areas despite differences in topography, demographics, and economy.

This approach underscores the importance of allowing local entities the flexibility and adaptability needed to develop context-specific solutions. It not only enhances the sustainability of water resources but also promotes more resilient and adaptive water governance systems. Local stakeholders, who are intimately familiar with their unique environmental and socio-economic conditions, are often best positioned to devise and implement effective water management practices. When these local practices prove successful, they offer valuable insights and models that can be scaled up or adapted for national policy.

The integration of local practices into national policy frameworks not only enriches the relevance and effectiveness of regulations but also fosters innovation and responsiveness within the water management sector. By maintaining a degree of flexibility at the local level, national policies can accommodate diverse conditions and emerging challenges, ensuring sustainable and resilient water management across different regions.

Moreover, the combined IAD-SES framework enhanced our understanding of the complexities inherent in local water systems. By pinpointing failures and facilitating context-specific solutions, this framework supports cooperative efforts, strengthens community engagement, and fosters sustainable water management practices. Ultimately, it empowers local associations to collaborate effectively, promoting efficient, equitable, and sustainable water governance across diverse regions.

The combined IAD-SES framework also proved applicable for studying and analyzing local water communities elsewhere, as demonstrated by its successful application in two distinct cases. While these cases share similarities inherent to their national context, they also encompass a variety of water challenges typical of other regions worldwide. The framework has shown efficacy at the local level by analyzing local water systems, yet its potential extends to explaining complex dynamics at higher levels of water management. Its adaptability suggests promising applications in sub-national and national water SES.

To sum up, the synergy between community-level practices and government policies is key to improving water management and minimizing disputes. Encouraging local innovation and adaptability, while leveraging successful examples to shape national regulations, creates a dynamic and responsive approach that benefits both local communities and the nation as a whole.