Next Article in Journal
Modeling Soil Water–Heat Dynamic Changes in Seed-Maize Fields under Film Mulching and Deficit Irrigation Conditions
Next Article in Special Issue
Analysing Irrigation Farmers’ Preferences for Local Governance Using a Discrete Choice Experiment in India and Pakistan
Previous Article in Journal
Cryptosporidium Oocysts Removal by Upflow Direct Filtration: Pilot Scale Assessment
Previous Article in Special Issue
Impact of Institutional Features on the Overall Performance Assessment of Participatory Irrigation Management: Farmers’ Response from Pakistan
Open AccessFeature PaperArticle

Farmer Cooperation in Participatory Irrigation in South Asia: Insights from Game Theory

Aither Consulting, Melbourne VIC 3000, Australia
UniSA Business, University of South Australia, Adelaide SA 5001, Australia
School of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Western Australia, Crawley WA 6009, Australia
Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad 380015, India
Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad 38000, Pakistan
US-Pakistan Center for Advanced Studies in Water, Mehran University of Engineering and Technology, Sindh 76062, Pakistan
Pakistan Agricultural Research Council, Islamabad 44000, Pakistan
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Water 2020, 12(5), 1329;
Received: 26 March 2020 / Revised: 20 April 2020 / Accepted: 29 April 2020 / Published: 8 May 2020
Participatory irrigation, where farmers are given greater control and management responsibility, has been a topic of controversy for many years. Initially seen as a panacea for dealing with weaknesses in state-run irrigation, participatory irrigation has generated mixed results, especially in South Asia. Part of the challenge of understanding the conditions that promote and undermine participatory irrigation is that it is seldom deployed in the same way. For example, irrigation fees collected by farmers are not handled in the same manner, even within a single country. In some instances, a large portion of collected monies is retained locally and in others, only a small portion is kept for local use. In this paper, we use game theory to contemplate how the portion of irrigation fees retained locally might impact on the effectiveness of participatory irrigation. We show that there are multiple plausible equilibria, and that allowing farmers to retain more funds locally might shift behaviour from an uncooperative equilibrium to a cooperative outcome. However, we also find that it is unlikely for there to be a singular fix and we use empirical evidence to demonstrate the conundrums of making participatory irrigation sustainable. View Full-Text
Keywords: participatory irrigation management; game theory participatory irrigation management; game theory
Show Figures

Figure 1

MDPI and ACS Style

Hone, S.; Crase, L.; Burton, M.; Cooper, B.; Gandhi, V.P.; Ashfaq, M.; Lashari, B.; Ahmad, B. Farmer Cooperation in Participatory Irrigation in South Asia: Insights from Game Theory. Water 2020, 12, 1329.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats
Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Access Map by Country/Region

Search more from Scilit
Back to TopTop