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Favoritism and Fairness in Teams

Economics Experimental Lab, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2018, 9(3), 65;
Received: 6 August 2018 / Revised: 1 September 2018 / Accepted: 4 September 2018 / Published: 6 September 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)
We experimentally study how people resolve a tension between favoritism and fairness when allocating a profit in a team production setting. Past research shows that people tend to favor their ingroup at the cost of an outgroup when allocating a given amount of money. However, when the money to be allocated depends on joint production, we find that most players allocate proportionally according to others’ relative contributions, irrespective of their social identity affiliations. We discuss the implications of our findings on how distributive norms could shape team cooperation. View Full-Text
Keywords: favoritism; fairness; team production; social identity; distributive norm favoritism; fairness; team production; social identity; distributive norm
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MDPI and ACS Style

Dong, L.; Huang, L. Favoritism and Fairness in Teams. Games 2018, 9, 65.

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Dong L, Huang L. Favoritism and Fairness in Teams. Games. 2018; 9(3):65.

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Dong, Lu, and Lingbo Huang. 2018. "Favoritism and Fairness in Teams" Games 9, no. 3: 65.

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