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Article

Coordination and Private Information Revelation

by 1,*,† and 2,†
1
Faculty of Economics, South Asian University, Akbar Bhawan, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi 110021, India
2
Economics and Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 7, S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110016, India
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
These authors contributed equally to this work.
Games 2018, 9(3), 64; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030064
Received: 18 July 2018 / Revised: 31 August 2018 / Accepted: 3 September 2018 / Published: 5 September 2018
This paper examines a persuasion game between two agents with one-sided asymmetric information, where the informed agent can reveal her private information prior to playing a Battle-of-the-Sexes coordination game. There is a close connection between the extent of information revelation and the possibility of coordination failure; while, in the absence of any coordination failure, there exist equilibria with full disclosure, in the presence of strategic uncertainty in coordination there exists an equilibrium with no information revelation. We provide a purification argument for the non-existence result, as well demonstrate that it is robust to several extensions, including both-sided asymmetric information and imprecise information revelation. View Full-Text
Keywords: private information revelation; coordination; strategic uncertainty private information revelation; coordination; strategic uncertainty
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MDPI and ACS Style

Saha, D.; Roy Chowdhury, P. Coordination and Private Information Revelation. Games 2018, 9, 64. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030064

AMA Style

Saha D, Roy Chowdhury P. Coordination and Private Information Revelation. Games. 2018; 9(3):64. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030064

Chicago/Turabian Style

Saha, Debdatta; Roy Chowdhury, Prabal. 2018. "Coordination and Private Information Revelation" Games 9, no. 3: 64. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030064

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