Coordination and Private Information Revelation
AbstractThis paper examines a persuasion game between two agents with one-sided asymmetric information, where the informed agent can reveal her private information prior to playing a Battle-of-the-Sexes coordination game. There is a close connection between the extent of information revelation and the possibility of coordination failure; while, in the absence of any coordination failure, there exist equilibria with full disclosure, in the presence of strategic uncertainty in coordination there exists an equilibrium with no information revelation. We provide a purification argument for the non-existence result, as well demonstrate that it is robust to several extensions, including both-sided asymmetric information and imprecise information revelation. View Full-Text
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Saha, D.; Roy Chowdhury, P. Coordination and Private Information Revelation. Games 2018, 9, 64.
Saha D, Roy Chowdhury P. Coordination and Private Information Revelation. Games. 2018; 9(3):64.Chicago/Turabian Style
Saha, Debdatta; Roy Chowdhury, Prabal. 2018. "Coordination and Private Information Revelation." Games 9, no. 3: 64.
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