Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance
AbstractEconomic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying particular attention to the work of young researchers, this essay surveys the progress made over the last decade towards understanding these phenomena, and discusses open research topics of importance to economics and the broader social sciences. View Full-Text
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Newton, J. Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance. Games 2018, 9, 31.
Newton J. Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance. Games. 2018; 9(2):31.Chicago/Turabian Style
Newton, Jonathan. 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance." Games 9, no. 2: 31.
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