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The Effects of Excluding Coalitions

Institute for Theoretical Economics, University of Leipzig, D-04109 Leipzig, Germany
HR Department, TU Dresden, D-01062 Dresden, Germany
Games 2018, 9(1), 1;
Received: 2 November 2017 / Revised: 13 December 2017 / Accepted: 18 December 2017 / Published: 1 January 2018
PDF [649 KB, uploaded 1 January 2018]


One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players affect the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model these exclusions in cooperative game theory, the excluded coalitions value ( φ E value) was introduced. This value is based on the Shapley value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. In this article, we deduce some properties of this new value. After some general results, we analyze the apex game that could be interpreted as a team situation and the glove game that models markets where sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees have a common interest for cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the market players of the scarce side to a higher extent. View Full-Text
Keywords: excluded coalitions; quarreling; φE value; Shapley value; cooperative game theory excluded coalitions; quarreling; φE value; Shapley value; cooperative game theory
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).

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Hiller, T. The Effects of Excluding Coalitions. Games 2018, 9, 1.

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