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Open AccessArticle

From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach

1
Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Departament d'Economia and CREIP, Av. Universitat 1, Reus 43204, Spain
2
Universitat d'Alacant, Departament de Mètodes Quantitatius i Teoria Econòmica, Alacant 03080, Spain
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Academic Editor: Bahar Leventoglu
Games 2015, 6(1), 32-38; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6010032
Received: 19 November 2014 / Revised: 30 January 2015 / Accepted: 18 February 2015 / Published: 5 March 2015
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)
Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution. View Full-Text
Keywords: bargaining problem; conflicting claims problem; proportionality; bargaining solutions; claims rules bargaining problem; conflicting claims problem; proportionality; bargaining solutions; claims rules
MDPI and ACS Style

Giménez-Gómez, J.-M.; Osório, A.; Peris, J.E. From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach. Games 2015, 6, 32-38.

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