Next Article in Journal
From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach
Previous Article in Journal
Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games
Open AccessArticle

Selection-Mutation Dynamics of Signaling Games

Department of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California at Irvine, 3151 Social Science Plaza A, Irvine, CA 92697, USA
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Ulrich Berger
Games 2015, 6(1), 2-31;
Received: 26 September 2014 / Accepted: 10 December 2014 / Published: 9 January 2015
We study the structure of the rest points of signaling games and their dynamic behavior under selection-mutation dynamics by taking the case of three signals as our canonical example. Many rest points of the replicator dynamics of signaling games are not isolated and, therefore, not robust under perturbations. However, some of them attract open sets of initial conditions. We prove the existence of certain rest points of the selection-mutation dynamics close to Nash equilibria of the signaling game and show that all but the perturbed rest points close to strict Nash equilibria are dynamically unstable. This is an important result for the evolution of signaling behavior, since it shows that the second-order forces that are governed by mutation can increase the chances of successful signaling. View Full-Text
Keywords: selection-mutation dynamics; replicator dynamics; signaling games; structural stability selection-mutation dynamics; replicator dynamics; signaling games; structural stability
Show Figures

Figure 1

MDPI and ACS Style

Hofbauer, J.; Huttegger, S.M. Selection-Mutation Dynamics of Signaling Games. Games 2015, 6, 2-31.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Article Access Map

Only visits after 24 November 2015 are recorded.
Back to TopTop