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Games, Volume 3, Issue 4 (December 2012) , Pages 138-156

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Open AccessArticle
Computer Solution to the Game of Pure Strategy
Games 2012, 3(4), 150-156; https://doi.org/10.3390/g3040150 - 08 Nov 2012
Cited by 7 | Viewed by 4475
Abstract
We numerically solve the classical "Game of Pure Strategy" using linear programming. We notice an intricate even-odd behaviour in the results of our computations that seems to encourage odd or maximal bids. Full article
Open AccessLetter
Modeling Inequity Aversion in a Dictator Game with Production
Games 2012, 3(4), 138-149; https://doi.org/10.3390/g3040138 - 23 Oct 2012
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 3951
Abstract
We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production [...] Read more.
We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle). In our model, dictators may also account for the way in which the surplus was generated. More precisely, our model incorporates the idea of liberal egalitarian ethics into the analysis, making it possible for dictators to divide the surplus according to the accountability principle, which states that subjects should only be rewarded for factors under their control. This fairness ideal does not hold subjects responsible for factors beyond their control in the production of the surplus, an idea that is absent in the models of inequity aversion cited above (JEL Codes: D3, D6, D63). Full article
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