Equilibrium Selection in Hawk–Dove Games

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

Dear Referee,

We would like to thank you for your detailed and constructive comments. Looking back on the cumulative impact of the comments, we recognize that they have greatly improved the paper and sharpened its message.

We have provided a point-by-point response to your comments in the attached document. Hopefully, we have addressed all the issues raised to your satisfaction.

Needless to say, we are open to any new comments/suggestions and will try our best to address them if granted the opportunity.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Mario, Nikita

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

See attached.

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

The English is perfect except that “none equilibrium” should be “no equilibrium”. See attached report for suggestions on clarity.

Author Response

Dear Referee,

We would like to thank you for your detailed and constructive comments. Looking back on the cumulative impact of the comments, we recognize that they have greatly improved the paper and sharpened its message.

We have provided a point-by-point response to your comments in the attached document. Hopefully, we have addressed all the issues raised to your satisfaction.

Needless to say, we are open to any new comments/suggestions and will try our best to address them if granted the opportunity.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Mario, Nikita

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 3 Report

The manuscript conducts a detailed investigation into the application of various equilibrium selection methodologies to the Hawk-Dove game, framed within the context of a uniform price auction involving players with differing production capacities. The exploration encompasses the tracing procedure developed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the robustness to strategic uncertainty approach by Andersson Argenton and Weibull (2014), and the quantal response method delineated by McKelvey and Palfrey (1998).

Abstract and Introduction (Pages 1-5)

- The introduction and abstract proficiently establish the study's context, highlighting the Hawk-Dove game's pertinence in the domain of industrial organization. The manuscript articulates its aim to scrutinize equilibrium selection in scenarios characterized by multiple equilibria. Nonetheless, there are areas for refinement:

- The introduction's length is excessive and warrants condensation.

- The authors excessively detail the results, which could be more succinctly summarized.

- A more robust rationale is needed for the relevance of the Hawk-Dove game in analyzing a uniform price auction, including a discussion on whether this approach is novel.

Model Framework (Pages 6-8)

- The transition from conventional game-theoretic models to an auction-based framework is innovatively attempted but requires clearer exposition for enhanced comprehensibility, especially for readers less versed in auction theory.

Methodology and Analysis (Pages 8-19)

- The manuscript commendably applies three distinct equilibrium selection methods, demonstrating their varying predictions under different conditions like demand levels. This approach significantly enriches the understanding of strategic behaviors in economic models.

Conclusion and Practical Implications

- The conclusion adeptly synthesizes the research findings. However, it could be further augmented by discussing the implications of these findings in practical realms, such as policy formulation and market design. Moreover, the inclusion of insights into quantum game theory, particularly the tendency of entangled players to adopt the dove strategy as per Allan B. (2018) in "Social Action in Quantum Social Science," would be a valuable addition.

Technical Detail and Accessibility

- The technical rigor of the paper is commendable. Incorporating more real-world case studies would enhance its appeal and accessibility to a wider audience.

Minor Points

- The manuscript contains some linguistic errors, likely typographical, that need correction for clarity and professionalism.

The manuscript contains some linguistic errors, likely typographical, that need correction.

Author Response

Dear Referee,

We would like to thank you for your detailed and constructive comments. Looking back on the cumulative impact of the comments, we recognize that they have greatly improved the paper and sharpened its message.

We have provided a point-by-point response to your comments in the attached document. Hopefully, we have addressed all the issues raised to your satisfaction.

Needless to say, we are open to any new comments/suggestions and will try our best to address them if granted the opportunity.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Mario, Nikita

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

The revision addresses my comments in sufficient depth and detail, therefore I would advice accepting the paper.

Kind regards,

Author Response

We attach the letter to referee 1.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

The revised paper reads much better. The authors have sufficiently addressed all my major concerns. 

A couple of suggestions on the new Annex 3. It would be easier on the readers if the authors provided an explicit example of a uniform-price auction with parameters and tie-breaking rule where the tie-breaking rule matters. Figure 12 is besides the point -- yes, BoS is different from H-D, but how does the tie-breaking rule determine which game is being played? Also, in the second paragraph of Annex 3, "Battle" is misspelled. 

Author Response

We attach the letter with our answers.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 3 Report

Thank you for the updates.

No comment.

Author Response

We attach the letter to referee 3.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf