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Open AccessArticle

Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern- Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity

1
Faculty of Business Administration, Soka University, Tangi 1-236, Hachioji City, Tokyo 192-8577, Japan
2
Department of Information Systems and Operations, Vienna University of Economics, 1020 Wien, Austria
3
Faculty of Business Administration, Rissho University, Shinagawa City, Tokyo 141-8602, Japan
4
Research Center for Ethi-Culture Studies, RINRI Institute, Chiyoda City, Tokyo 102-8561, Japan
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2020, 11(1), 13; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010013
Received: 18 December 2019 / Revised: 11 February 2020 / Accepted: 17 February 2020 / Published: 20 February 2020
Intensive studies on indirect reciprocity have explored rational assessment rules for maintaining cooperation and several have demonstrated the effects of the stern-judging rule. Uchida and Sasaki demonstrated that the stern-judging rule is not suitable for maintaining cooperative regimes in private assessment conditions while a public assessment system has been assumed in most studies. Although both assessment systems are oversimplified and society is most accurately represented by a mixture of these systems, little analysis has been reported on their mixture. Here, we investigated how much weight on the use of information originating from a public source is needed to maintain cooperative regimes for players adopting the stern-judging rule when players get information from both public and private sources. We did this by considering a hybrid-assessment scheme in which players use both assessment systems and by using evolutionary game theory. We calculated replicator equations using the expected payoffs of three strategies: unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and stern-judging rule adoption. Our analysis shows that the use of the rule helps to maintain cooperation if reputation information from a unique public notice board is used with more than a threshold probability. This hybrid-assessment scheme can be applied to other rules, including the simple-standing rule and the staying rule. View Full-Text
Keywords: evolution of cooperation; evolutionary game; private assessment; social dilemma; indirect reciprocity; reputation; image score; Kandori norm evolution of cooperation; evolutionary game; private assessment; social dilemma; indirect reciprocity; reputation; image score; Kandori norm
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MDPI and ACS Style

Okada, I.; Yamamoto, H.; Uchida, S. Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern- Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity. Games 2020, 11, 13. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010013

AMA Style

Okada I, Yamamoto H, Uchida S. Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern- Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity. Games. 2020; 11(1):13. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010013

Chicago/Turabian Style

Okada, Isamu; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Uchida, Satoshi. 2020. "Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern- Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity" Games 11, no. 1: 13. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010013

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