Next Article in Journal
A Note on Pivotality
Previous Article in Journal
Indirect Evolution and Aggregate-Taking Behavior in a Football League: Utility Maximization, Profit Maximization, and Success
Open AccessArticle

Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities

Department of Economics and Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research, University of Bern, Schanzeneckstrasse 1, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2019, 10(2), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020023
Received: 2 March 2019 / Revised: 8 May 2019 / Accepted: 10 May 2019 / Published: 15 May 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theoretic Models in Natural Resource Economics)
  |  
PDF [274 KB, uploaded 15 May 2019]
  |  

Abstract

We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions that satisfy all agents’ participation constraints and, in addition, a fairness constraint implying that no coalition of agents should be better off than it were if all non-members of the coalition would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), is the only welfare distribution satisfying both constraints. In addition, we show that this result holds true for numerous extensions of our model. View Full-Text
Keywords: downstream externalities; downstream incremental distribution; optimal emission abatement; river pollution downstream externalities; downstream incremental distribution; optimal emission abatement; river pollution
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).
SciFeed

Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Steinmann, S.; Winkler, R. Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities. Games 2019, 10, 23.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics

1

Comments

[Return to top]
Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top