1. Introduction
A Multilateral Nuclear Approach (MNA) is both an old and new issue which dates from the 1940s up to the present time. Very few proposals have so far been realized, whereas, most proposals in the 21st century, such as a fuel bank and a low enriched uranium (LEU) reserve, have mainly discussed multinational supply assurance of nuclear fuel. In this article, the authors intend to focus on MNA ensuring not only nuclear fuel supplies, but also nuclear fuel services, including spent nuclear fuel (SNF) reprocessing and management (storage and disposal) by joint funding and/or ownership of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Such a MNA is expected to contribute to sustainability of nuclear energy and nuclear nonproliferation. It could also be a solution to SNF management, which may not be effectively solvable by individual countries alone.
It is indispensable for such an extensive MNA study to find features prior to making detailed proposals. Nevertheless, few papers have dealt with such discussions.
From this viewpoint, the authors reviewed various MNA proposals from the 1940s to the present, and find the reasons which prevented their implementation. We also considered the current environment surrounding nuclear energy use, including the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. Based on those, features to be taken into account for the establishment of MNA are studied.
3. Discussion on MNA Features
By reference to the facts mentioned in previous sections and tables, and based on the seven Labels as MNA assessment elements in the “Pellaud Report”, the authors have drawn out the following 12 features of the MNA in the
Table 4. Those features are not always totally independent, but interdependent of each other. Among them, the most essential features of the MNA are surely (A) nuclear nonproliferation and (B) assurance of supply.
Table 4.
12 features of the MNA.
Table 4.
12 features of the MNA.
| Description of Features |
---|
A | Nuclear nonproliferation: MNA members would need to follow the following norms;
<In general> • NPT ✓ NPT member states’ inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes need to be respected ✓ MNA members would be treated equally without making distinctions between “haves” and “have-nots” of sensitive technologies and facilities
<Safeguards> <Nuclear security> • Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274/Rev.1) • International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism • IAEA Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) and related Nuclear Security Series documents
<Export control>
|
B | Assurance of supply:MNA would provide both front-end and back-end nuclear fuel cycle services, including;
|
C | Access to technology:
• For the purpose of protecting nuclear proliferation and proprietary information, access to sensitive technologies would be limited only to technology holders • transfer of existing sensitive technologies need to be ‘black-boxed’
|
D | Multilateral involvement:
• As described in the “Pellaud Report”, involvement varies with a) supply only arrangement, b) sharing ownership of facility, c) taking part in the management of the facility, d) participating in the operation of the facility, and e) joint research and development, design and construction of facilities, could be possible • The involvement would also vary depend on MNA members, amount of investment (share) to facilities and technologies, etc. • MNA members’ levels of involvement needs to be agreed beforehand
|
E | Siting—choice of host state: Host states would;
• fulfill international norms on nuclear nonproliferation • be politically, socially and economically stable • maintain good relations with neighboring states and the international community • have no territorial disputes, including conflicts on natural resources • have good accessibility to international and domestic ports for transportation of nuclear materials • have necessary and sufficient knowledge, expertise and experience to host and operate MNA facilities, including handling, storage and transportation of nuclear materials • offer “extra-territorial” status to MNA facilities • ensure safe and secure routes for transportation of nuclear material • be equipped with the necessary licensed infrastructure for MNA operations • have the necessary natural environment to host MNA facilities without causing harmful effects or having a negative influence by hosting such facilities
|
F | Legal aspects:
|
G | Political and public acceptance:
|
H | Economics: MNA facilities need to be
|
I | Nuclear safety: MNA members would need to comply with the following international nuclear safety norms;
• Convention on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/449) • Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (INFCIRC/546) • Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (INFCIRC/335) • Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (INFCIRC/336) • Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (INFCIRC/546) • IAEA Safety Standards, etc.
|
J | Nuclear liability: In particular, host states of MNA facilities are requested to;
|
K | Transportation:
|
L | Geopolitics:
• Careful consideration of geopolitical aspects is inevitable when formulating MNA and determining transportation routes • Not to interfere political balance with the U.S., China and Russia, when formulating MNA in the Asian Region, including Kazakhstan and Mongolia as uranium producing states and south-east Asian states as non-supplier states
|
3.1. (A) Nuclear Nonproliferation and (B) Assurance of Supply
Most MNA proposals assure nuclear fuel and services supplies to non-supplier states, in exchange for their adherence to nuclear nonproliferation norms, including NPT and safeguards and nuclear security standards. It makes sense that the MNA originally aims to both promote sustainable nuclear energy use and enhance nuclear nonproliferation, and those two are essential features of the MNA. The former is closely related to other features of (C), access to technologies, as well as (D), multilateral involvement.
Regarding relations between (A), nuclear nonproliferation, and (B), assurance of supply, the extent to which the non-supplier states would take measures for ensuring nuclear nonproliferation is a challenging issue. Since the days of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, the U.S. has constantly been nervous about other states’ access to sensitive nuclear capabilities, while non supplier states have been insisting that their inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as enshrined in Article IV of the NPT, has to be respected, and all the members should be treated equally without discrimination [
30]. This gap has made the MNA’s establishment difficult and the past efforts clearly indicate that a MNA requiring non-supplier states to forgo their rights to develop an indigenous fuel cycle, including sensitive capabilities, would hardly succeed. In addition, as participation in the MNA is voluntary, non-supplier states would therefore be reluctant to participate in the MNA under such a requirement.
In response, and to cope with this situation, most MNA proposals in the 21st century clearly indicate that non-supplier states’ inalienable rights would not be affected by supply assurances by the MNA. In the same way, non-supplier states’ ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) is not required in most of the current MNA proposals. In reality, however, from the nuclear suppliers’ approach, an export control of the NSG Guidelines (INFICRC/254/Rev.10/Part 1) principally requires non-supplier states to ratify the AP in the case of transfers of sensitive technologies and facilities. The NSG Guidelines also requires that transfers of existing sensitive technologies need to be ‘black-boxed’, “seek from recipients an appropriate agreement to accept sensitive enrichment equipment, and enabling technologies, or an operable enrichment facility under conditions that do not permit or enable replication of the facilities” [
31]. This access to technology also depends on how far the MNA member states would be involved in the MNA.
It is understandable that due to the political nature and diplomatic aspect of nuclear nonproliferation, inconsistencies between supplier states and non-supplier states are inevitable and it may not be possible to attain perfect consistency. The real challenge is how to reach a mutually agreeable compromise between them in order to promote sustainable nuclear energy use while enhancing nuclear nonproliferation within MNA framework.
3.1.1. (A) Nuclear Nonproliferation
(A) Nuclear nonproliferation can be analyzed from four viewpoints: NPT, safeguards, nuclear security and export control.
NPT: As mentioned in
Section 3.1, NPT members’ inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under Article IV of the NPT has to be respected. The real challenge is how to enhance nuclear nonproliferation while respecting this right, in a manner which NWS and NNWS as well as suppliers and non-suppliers agree on within a MNA framework.
Safeguards: Application of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards is an obligation for NNWS under NPT, although the AP is not as mentioned in
Section 3.1. In addition, if the MNA has a regional safeguards system, such as EURATOM and/or a Regional System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (RSAC), such as ABACC (the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials), nuclear nonproliferation is expected to be enhanced. Furthermore, such a regional system possesses great potential for promoting confidence-building among MNA member states.
Figure 1 describes safeguards, inspection and material accounting aspects of the MNA.
Figure 1.
Inspection and material accounting system of a Multilateral Nuclear Approach (MNA).
Figure 1.
Inspection and material accounting system of a Multilateral Nuclear Approach (MNA).
Nuclear security: The September 11 terrorist attacks and the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2010 reminded the world nuclear community of the urgent need to strengthen security measures for nuclear materials and facilities, together with nuclear safety. In this context, it would be desirable to set out common international and/or regional nuclear security standards, although this would not be easy since nuclear security issues are deeply involved in national security and sovereignty.
In addition, due to the international nature of the MNA, facilities would consist of international staff of various nationalities and necessary measures against internal threats involving nuclear material and facilities, including the theft of fissile material and sensitive information and sabotage, have to be implemented.
Export control: Nuclear nonproliferation would be strengthened if the MNA members, including host states of MNA facilities, comply with international export control norms of the NSG Guidelines (INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 1) and UNSCR1540. Paragraph 6(a) of the revised Guidelines stipulates six minimum criteria which supplier states could authorize to transfer existing sensitive technologies and facilities to non-supplier states. Therefore, it is understood that if non-supplier states would satisfy such criteria, they could host MNA sensitive facilities, although sensitive technology would be transferred in a ‘black-boxed’ form.
3.1.2. (B) Assurance of Supply of Nuclear Materials and Fuel Cycle Services
As mentioned in
Table 3, an IAEA fuel bank as a supply assurance system of nuclear fuel is on the way to being established. In addition, if the MNA also includes SNF storage and disposal, or a fuel leasing system, it would make the MNA more attractive, since many states have been struggling with their own SNF management. The U.S. National Academy’s “Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges” also points out that “arrangements that would provide assured return of spent nuclear fuel could provide a much more powerful incentive for countries to rely on international nuclear fuel supply than would assured supply of fresh fuel” [
32]. However, the greatest hurdle is to find a state which is able to provide SNF management services, especially SNF storage and disposal services, to other states. In the case of commercial reactors, currently only Russia has a fuel leasing system and it has agreed to take back (to its origin, Russia) SNF from Iran.
3.2. (C) Siting-Choice of Host States
Definite criteria to become a host state of MNA facilities need to be clearly established beforehand. This is especially the case with SNF storage and/or disposal sites, since discussions without identifying a specific location tends to unfruitful, such as in the case of ISFM in the
Table 1. In addition, from a nuclear nonproliferation perspective, host states of sensitive facilities especially need to decide carefully, since NSF storage and disposal facilities require transparent a decision-making process coupled with growing political and public acceptance.
By reference to an IAEA fuel bank proposal and a MESP proposal in the
Table 3, authors draw out various criteria to become MNA host states as in shown in
Table 4, although it is not always necessary for all of them to be requisite conditions.
In addition, due to international conventions and/or domestic laws, certain states cannot host certain facilities. For example, Kazakhstan, a member of the Treaty on A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia, cannot “allow the disposal in its territory of radioactive waste of other States” [
33]. The law in Mongolia on its Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status prescribes that any foreign state shall be prohibited to “dump or dispose nuclear weapons grade radioactive material or nuclear waste” [
34]. Furthermore, “South and North Korea shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities” by a Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992 [
35]. Those states, however, have enough reasons to join a MNA, if other MNA members could host such facilities and provide services to them.
3.3. (D) Access to Technologies and (E) Multilateral Involvement
For the purpose of nonproliferation in 3.1.1 (A) nuclear nonproliferation, how far MNA members have access to technologies needs to be decided beforehand. In the case of the IUEC in Russia and a German MESP proposal in
Table 3, access to enrichment technology is strictly limited only to a technology holder, as in the cases of the George-Besse II in France, URENCO USA and the IUEC in Angarsk, Russia.
This access to technology closely relates to another feature of (E) multilateral involvement. As described in the “Pellaud Report” (see Feature D of “Multilateral involvement” in
Table 4), levels of involvement vary and also depend on MNA members, the amount of investment by MNA members, facilities, technologies,
etc. In general, involvement varies with each MNA and as long as MNA stakeholders agree on the level of involvement and its criteria beforehand, it will not cause problems.
3.4. (F) Legal Aspects
There are many legal requirements for the establishment and operation of a MNA. Such requirements all relate to other features from A to E and from G to L.
Regarding establishment of the MNA, the host states need to have the necessary regulatory bodies and legal framework in place in order to ensure international requirements for nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safety, nuclear liability, and transportation. First, MNA member states need to enter into an agreement for establishing a MNA. The provisions of such an agreement would include purposes, missions, functions and structure of the MNA, a MNA decision-making body and its rules, areas of cooperation, prerequisites for MNA member states, rights, obligations and responsibilities of member states, supply assurances, investments, intellectual property, and titles, ownership and use of nuclear materials, access to technologies and level of involvement, jurisdiction, settlement of disputes, withdrawal from MNA, etc. Such an agreement would also include safeguards, nuclear security, export control, nuclear safety, and transportation aspects of the MNA. Second, MNA member states would conclude a host state agreement with a MNA host state. This agreement would be similar to the IAEA Headquarters Agreement with Austria and would include extraterritoriality, protection of the MNA, and juridical personality of the MNA, etc. It would also need to have licensing and permission, nuclear safety, security, emergency preparedness and nuclear liability related provisions. Thirdly, the MNA needs to conclude various agreements with international organizations and other states, in connection with safeguards, transportation and transit of nuclear materials and SNF, and nuclear liability.
As to the operation of the MNA facilities, various functions of the MNA would avoid and/or solve conflicts with existing international agreements and bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements which individual MNA member states have already concluded with other states. A nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. is a particularly key factor. For example, a Russian proposal on technical storage or reprocessing in 2001, as seen in
Table 3, was blocked by the U.S. since it would not give prior consent for the transfer and storage of the U.S.-origin SNF to Russia. Within the MNA, such action has to be avoided for a smooth operation of the MNA. It is assumed that a MNA consisting of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan would be established in the Asian Region, since all of these states have concluded nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. [
36] and most SNF in Japan and South Korea and all SNF in Taiwan are U.S.-origin. Therefore, transfers of such SNF to a third country for reprocessing and/or storage needs prior consent from the U.S., even if the U.S. is not a member of the MNA.
In order to obtain U.S. consent, the MNA itself needs to be equipped with robust nuclear nonproliferation characteristics, which could be equivalent to satisfying U.S. nuclear nonproliferation requirements. Alternatively, an establishment of the MNA not using the U.S.-origin materials could be possible, although this may require Russian capabilities instead.
3.5. (G) Political and Public Acceptance
In the particular case of SNF storage and disposal facilities, it is necessary to gain political and public acceptance from their host states. In the Pangea Project in
Table 2, the project had been conducted without adequately informing the public. Once it was exposed, it came under heavy criticism by both the Federal and state governments in Australia. Recently, protest movements in Mongolia and internationally arose following reports of “secret documentation detailing an international nuclear waste disposal site that Japan and the United States had planned to build in Mongolia” [
37]. Such experience shows that in order to promote back-end MNA facilities, political and public acceptance through information disclosure and transparent procedures are essential, although all of them are far from easy.
3.6. (H) Economics
Current MNA proposals, especially on nuclear fuel supply assurance in
Table 3, require economic feasibility, since the MNA is expected not to disturb the existing nuclear fuel market.
Regarding reprocessing, the economic advantages of scale and minimization of the number of reprocessing facilities are reported both in the past efforts of the RNFC and the INFCE. Economics is also an important factor for every state when choosing between SNF reprocessing and direct disposal, other than the nonproliferation aspect of reprocessing.
In the case of SNF storage and disposal, it may not be always easy to achieve commercial feasibility, since such commercial market has yet to exist. In addition, in order to calculate necessary expenses, host states, facility locations and transportation routes among MNA member states etc. need to be identified and well researched beforehand, taking into account geopolitical considerations.
In general, the more states to get involved in the MNA, the more investment, advantage of scale and economic efficiency can be expected.
3.7. (I) Nuclear Safety
After the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2010, the strengthening of nuclear safety measures, including implementation of additional measures against severe accidents and emergency preparedness, are recognized more than ever. Without nuclear safety, sustainability of nuclear energy cannot be achieved. Strengthening nuclear security is not a main purpose of the MNA; however, MNA facilities and their host states are required to have necessary safety measures, including nuclear third party liability.
MNA facilities would be placed under the host state’s nuclear safety regulation, even if they were given extra-territorial status and jurisdiction by the host states. Therefore, MNA host states are required to follow international norms on nuclear safety as described in
Table 4, and to have their own solid legal framework and regulatory bodies. They are also required to prepare adequate accident management measures and emergency preparedness for nuclear incidents.
3.8. (J) Nuclear Liability
With regard to nuclear safety, the Fukushima nuclear accident also reminded the international community about improving the international legal framework for nuclear third party liability. The effects of nuclear accidents respect no borders and nuclear accidents could cause damage not only to the state in which the incident occurs, but also neighboring states. In addition, the risk of such damage may discourage foreign investment and overseas nuclear business expansion. An IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which was an implementation of the Declaration of the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in June 2011 pointed out that “Member States work towards establishing a global nuclear liability regime that addresses the concerns of all States that might be affected by a nuclear accident with a view to providing appropriate compensation for nuclear damage” [
38].
3.9. (K) Transportation
Due to the limitation of numbers of nuclear facilities by MNA, frequent and long distance transportation between MNA facilities and participating states is anticipated. In order to ensure safety and secure transportation of nuclear fuel and SNF, MNA supplier states need to comply with certain regulations on transportation of nuclear material, as shown in
Table 4. Furthermore, they need to obtain necessary permissions from related states for landing and/or transit landing of nuclear material and SNF. When deciding transportation routes, one of the MNA features of geopolitical consideration may also be needed.
3.10. (L) Geopolitics
Geopolitics is an essential element when developing national security strategy and international relations, including nuclear energy policy. In relation with a MNA, geopolitical consideration is required when deciding host states of MNA facilities and transportation routes among MNA facilities and participating states.
Assuming that MNA would be established in the Asian Region, including Kazakhstan and Mongolia as uranium producers, Japan and South Korea as services suppliers, and Southeast Asian states as non-suppliers, the relationship with China, Russia and the U.S. is important. In Asia, “in 2009 it [Kazakhstan] became the world’s leading uranium producer”, [
39] while Mongolia “has substantial known uranium resources and geological prospectivity for more” [
40]. If those two states become members of a MNA within the Asian Region, they are expected to be major uranium suppliers. However, they are inland states sharing common borders with both China and Russia and their natural uranium needs to pass through China and/ or Russia for further utilization. In this context, such a MNA requires the maintenance of good relationships with both China and Russia for the smooth transportation of nuclear material, whether or not they are willing to be involved in the MNA.
In relation with Russia, due to the facts that (1) Russia is a neighboring state of both states and historically has close relationships with those states, (2) natural uranium from both Kazakhstan and Mongolia require enrichment, (3) Russia has a huge enrichment capacity of 24 million kg SWU/yr [
41] and Kazakhstan holds a part of these interests, (4) Russia is very much interested in MNA in view of utilizing its enrichment capacity, including IUEC, and (5) Russia has already concluded nuclear cooperation agreements with Asian states, a MNA in the Asian Region needs to be based on good relations with Russia.
In terms of relations with the U.S., since Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian states are under the security umbrella provided by the U.S. and the U.S. has already provided nuclear materials and equipment to those states, therefore, it seems that the U.S.’s involvement cannot be avoided, even thought the U.S. is not a member of such a MNA.
In general, a MNA within the Asian region requires the maintenance of a geopolitical power balance among China, Russia and the U.S.