Scenario Archetypes: Converging Rather than Diverging Themes
1.1. Contextual History of GSG
- What approaches and methods are appropriate for examining long-range socio-ecological prospects in a coherent and scientifically-grounded way?
- What policy adjustments in the near term are necessary to assure a vibrant and verdant civilization for the future?
- What are the implications for our values, behaviors, and lifestyles of taking seriously the concern for the well-being of people who are distant in space and time, and of the wider community of life with whom we share the biosphere?
|World end-state||Scenario variants||Archetypal Social Visions|
|‘Conventional’||Market Forces (MF)||A world that evolves gradually, shaped by dominant driving forces|
|Policy Reform (PR)||A world that is influenced by a strong policy push for sustainability|
|‘Great Transitions’||New Sustainability Paradigm (NSP)||A world where new human values and new approaches to development emerge|
|‘Barbarization’||Fortress world (FW)||A world that succumbs to fragmentation, environmental collapse, and institutional failure|
2. Comparing GSG Scenarios Variants with those from the Literature
|(MF) [ 21]||(PR) ||(NSP) [ 21]||(EC) ||(FW) [ 21]||(B) |
Business as Usual [19,81]
Markets First [17,18]
Economy First 
Global Orchestration 
Big is Beautiful 
Global Economy [78,90]
Great Escape 
World Markets [22,23,39,40,56,58,59,60,67,68,79,83]
Market World [11,42]
Blinkered Evolution 
New Frontiers 
Market Forces 
Business as usual 
Free Markets 
Riding the Tiger 
Triumphant Markets 
World Markets 
High Growth (F-0) 
GO for GROWTH 
Growing on 
Perpetual Motion 
Carry on Consuming 
Economy First [34,35]
High Emissions 
Market Forces 
Uncontrolled Demand 
Technology, Economics & the private sector 
Policy variants [14,15]
Policy First [17,18]
Global sustainability [22,39,40,58,59,60,67,68,79,81,83]
Knowledge is King 
Big Crisis 
Strong Europe 
Global Co-operation 
Policy Rules [34,35]
Global commons 
Green World 
Strong government 
Fruits for a few 
SUCCEED through SCIENCE 
Green policy 
Policy reform 
Leading the way 
Urban Colonies 
Low emissions 
Business as usual (F-1) 
|Jazz  |
Values and Lifestyles 
Sustainability First [17,18]
Sustainable Behavior 
Global Sustainability [22,39,40,58,59,60,67,68,79,83]
Global Responsibility 
Green World 
Living on the No.8 wire 
Civic Renewal 
CONNECT for LIFE 
Global Orchestration 
Global Commons 
Great Transitions 
Sustainable world 
The Triple Whammy 
Factor Four 
|Sustainability First [17,18]|
Local stewardship [22,39,40,58,59,60,67,68,79,81,83]
Transformed World 
Adapting Mosaic 
Local Resilience 
Tribal Trading 
Independent Aotearoa 
Lettuce Surprise U 
Evolved Society 
Regional Communities 
Sustainability Eventually [34,35]
Building Lifeboats 
Medium/Low Emissions 
|Security First [17,18]|
Fortress Europe 
Fortress World [11,25,30]
National Enterprise [39,41,59,60,68,83]
Order from Strength 
Clustered Networks 
Transatlantic Market 
Continental Markets [54,78]
Fortress Britain 
Provincial Enterprise [22,40,58,67,79,81]
Fortress Europe [34,35,42]
Lords of Misrule 
Turbulent Neighborhoods 
Boom and Blame 
Last Man Standing 
Brown Tech 
KEEP it LOCAL 
|A2  |
Decline to Disaster 
2.1. Conventional Worlds
‘MF is constructed as a future in which free market optimism remains dominant and proves well-founded ’. ‘Market-driven globalization, trade liberalization, institutional modernization—relies centrally on the self-correcting logic of competitive markets to address global challenges .’ Populations and the global economy expand and free trade and deregulation drive growth. The availability of sufficient resources—raw materials, land, water, energy—and the means of maintaining ecological resilience in such a huge economy are critical uncertainties. The challenge of satisfying bio-physical sustainability constraints is compounded by the challenge of maintaining social and economic sustainability in a world of profound inequalities between rich and poor countries, and within each country ’.
- First Raise Our Growth—FROG!—a familiar world where economic growth and success is a major concern and where human social systems are unable to meet the challenge of sustainable development, ;
- ‘Business as usual’—a continuation and extrapolation of current trends with limited investment in water infrastructure, ;
- ‘A1’—an integrated unsustainable world of very rapid economic growth , and
- ‘Markets First’—a world based upon market driven developments [17,18] (later developed to ‘Economy First’ [34,35], in which Globalization and Liberalization are embraced, economic growth is high and multinational companies dictate environmental standards, the close relationship being shown in Figure 1b).
|Performance in MF ||Worsens
|Generic qualitative patterns of change that resonate with other scenario sets||Emphasis on individuals, low public participation in governance. Uncontrolled urbanization and an increasing ageing population. A consumerist world where the rich get richer.||The focus is on economic efficiency. However, access depends on what you can pay for. Innovative technologies respond to consumer demands.||Strongest economy with International decision-making. However there is low government intervention in a highly efficient formal economy in which most people work.||Environment worsens due to high environmental impacts. Increase in pollutants, CO2 emissions, resource use/capita and water stress (quality and quantity of groundwater decrease). Net deforestation.||Weak social and environmental policies.|
- ‘Riding the Tiger’—a linear continuation of the current era ;
- ‘Triumphant Markets’—a world of materialism, consumerism, free trade and market integration, ;
- ‘World markets’—where material wealth and greater mobility is to the detriment of society and the environment ;
- ‘High growth (F-0)’—a throw away economy with a free market model ;
- ‘Go for Growth’—where economic growth continues to be driven by consumption and new technology ;
- ‘Growing on’—where high economic growth is at the expense of social cohesion and environmental sustainability ;
- ‘Perpetual Motion’—a society driven by constant information, consumption and competition ;
- ‘Carry on consuming’—where UK supply chains are dominated by a handful of companies and global competition has put greater reliance on production and processing within the European region ;
- ‘Bazaar’—a market world where free market policies, corporate restructuring and entrepreneurship offer a model for the rest of the world ;
- ‘High emissions’—contributing to high environmental impacts;
The PR path requires unprecedented political will for establishing the necessary regulatory, economic, social, technological, and legal mechanisms . This strong policy is used to meet social and environmental sustainability goals following widespread concern over environmental deterioration, social conflict, and economic instability. This leads to a marshalling of political will to implement comprehensive government action aimed at redirecting and constraining the global economy to achieve a broad set of social and environmental goals . PR assumes the emergence of a massive government-led effort to achieve sustainability without major changes in the state-centric international order, modern institutional structures, and consumerist values . For example PR is assumed to have adopted the best available technologies and yet behaviour has remained relatively unchanged . There is a deep and widespread commitment to economic equity and strong and harmonized policies are implemented that, by redirecting the world economy and promoting technological innovation, are able to achieve internationally recognized goals for poverty reduction, climate change stabilization, ecosystem preservation, freshwater protection, and pollution control .
- Global Ecosystem Organization—‘GEOpolity’—a world where an environmental and social crisis looms and the response is to build an interlocking governance structure coordinated at the international level, ;
- ‘Technology, Economics and the private sector’—where private sector initiatives lead research and development, and globalization drives economic growth, but the poorest countries are left behind ;
- ‘B1’—world that emphasizes global solutions to economic, social, and environmental sustainability with reductions in material intensity and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies  , and
- ‘Policy First’—where strong actions are undertaken by governments in an attempt to reach specific social and environmental goals, [17,18]; developed to ‘Policy Rules’ where Europe is at the forefront of a new socio-economic paradigm of public/private partnerships and leads a global shift in direction, water framework directive compliance is higher than ever—the close relationship can be seen in Figure 1 [34,35].
|Performance in PR ||
|Generic qualitative patterns of change that resonate with other scenario sets||Emphasis on more community. Medium public participation in governance. Less chaotic urbanization and a growing population. User behaviors relatively unchanged.||Focus on general efficiency and environment. Promotion of technology transfer and diffusion. Best practice technology. Dependence on increases in technological efficiency to reduce consumption.||Strong economic growth with International decision making. High government intervention in an efficient and fair formal economy in which most people work.||Environment improves due to reduced environmental impacts. Reduction in Pollutants, CO2 emissions (20% of 1990 levels reached by 2050), resource use/capita and water stress. Moderately reduced deforestation.||Strong social and environmental policies|
- ‘Leading the way’—UK Government takes a hands on approach to ensure the transition to a low-carbon economy; investment in environmental research and technology is high ;
- ‘Prosperous stewardship’—a global player in economic terms with high regulation, innovation and a dry climate ;
- Urban Colonies—good environmental practice is at the heart of the UK’s economic and social policies; new urban planning policies; consumption has fallen; resource use is now a fundamental part of the tax system and disposable items are less popular ;
- ’ Low emissions’—resulting in reduced environmental impacts ;
- Innovation—Previously Alchemy, in this world people work in regulation and compliance; environmental concerns are the problem of manufacturers and service providers — supply side regulation (for water) is an accepted integral part of the economy ;
- ‘Business as usual—B-A-U’ describes strict controls for land-use planning, a balance between growing volumes and increasing recycling rates, and adoption of techno-fixes for carbon capture —as such it describes perfectly a policy-centric B-A-U for the UK; and
- ‘Powerdown’—refers to the path of self-limitation, cooperation and sharing; an orderly equitable transition to a low-carbon economy, which mirrors the steps being taken within a PR world .
2.2. Great Transitions
NSP sees new humane globalization (rather than localism) change the character of urban industrial society . A values-led change catalyzed by the push of deepening crises and the pull of desire for a just, sustainable, and planetary civilization. This new paradigm is rooted in human solidarity, universal access to education and health care services, ecological resilience, reduced consumerism (technology is as good as it gets but matched also by a step-change in behavior ), improved well-being, e.g., creativity, leisure, relationships, and community engagement) and quality of life . NSP is a more cosmopolitan vision than EC, because it is a world that would transcend and transform urban and industrial civilization, and maintain global linkages and solidarity, rather than retreat into localism . The improved social cohesion reduces conflict; crises may still linger, but the world is able to confront them with enhanced institutions for reconciliation and cooperation .
- Jazz—where markets are harnessed for finding solutions to sustainable development ;
|Performance in NSP ||Significant improvement
|Generic qualitative patterns of change that resonate with other scenario sets||Strongest emphasis on community. Highest public participation in governance. Large reduction in population. Significant voluntary Improvement to user behavior.||Best practice technology . Focus on general efficiency and environment. Promotion of Technology transfer and diffusion, encouragement of open source.||Sustainable economic growth with no dominant scale for decision making. Place of work is variable by region and societal group.||Lowest pressure on natural environment.Greatest reduction in pollutants, CO2 emissions, resource use/capita and water stress. Net reforestation.||Strongest social and environmental policies. Human well-being and the environment are central to long-term planning initiatives.|
- ‘Hearts’—Environment wins, Society Wins—This is a world in which demography, politics, economics, and sustainability gel. It is the future that the Brundtland Commission pointed us towards ;
- ‘Triple Whammy’—based upon a combined approach to environmental, social and economic sustainability ; and
- ‘Factor Four’—a more sustainable, low-impact food system that improves significantly demand-side management in addition to re-use, recycling and composting .
Eco-communalism envisions a patchwork of semi-isolated and self-reliant communities; quite sustainable with high equity, low economic growth, low populations [8,63] with a bio-regional focus, a highly localist vision and face-to-face democracy, . EC contrasts with NSP by: embracing the principles of strong decentralization; small-scale technology; and economic autarky . It has been suggested by Gallopin et al.  that an EC world could emerge out of an NSP world, if powerful consensus arose for localism, diversity and autonomy. Just as likely, however, it could emerge from the recovery of Breakdown . A major threat to sustainability could come from the possibility that some of the more or less isolated communities develop into aggressive, expansionist forces that attempt to dominate neighboring communities .
- ‘Local stewardship’—a world with conservative values, regional/national governance, locally-based financial and other services, and small-scale intensive agriculture and manufacturing [41,59,60]—like Denmark, Sami  — this relationship being confirmed by Pridmore , EA  and Pinnegar et al. , the last of these authors include also:
- ‘Delta’—an early version of EA’s ‘Survivor’ scenario, and:
- ‘Adaptive Mosaic’—a world of local regional co-management; common property institutions; integration of local rules regulating trade; local, non-market rights; local communities; local equity and cooperatives .
Authoritarian rule, elites in “fortresses”, poverty & repression outside; an authoritarian response to the threat of breakdown; from protected enclaves, elites control an impoverished majority and manage critical natural resources [9,10,33] Strategic mineral reserves, freshwater and important biological resources are put under military control, as are favored resort areas, including nature and hunting preserves, from which the poor are excluded . This is a world in which wealth, resources and conventional governance systems are eroding and alliances are formed to protect the privileges of rich and powerful elites in their bubbles of privilege. Outside the fortress, the majority is mired in poverty, denied access to scarce resources and restricted in mobility, expression and basic rights . Authorities employ geo-engineering techniques to stabilize the global climate, while dispatching militia to multiple hotspots in an attempt to quell social conflict and mass migration. But the results are mixed: emergency measures and spotty infrastructure investment cannot keep pace with habitat loss and climate change; inadequate food and water to desperate billions . Technology is maintained in the fortresses, even with some continued innovation, but deteriorates elsewhere. Local pollution within the fortress is reduced through increased efficiency and recycling. Pollution is also exported outside the enclaves, contributing to the extreme environmental deterioration induced by the unsustainable practices of the desperately poor and by the extraction of resources for the wealthy . In this kind of future, sustainable development is not in the cards, a half-remembered dream of a more hopeful time . Global equity is very low, though it could be high within the fortress, and outside. For those unfortunate enough to be born poor, life is Hobbesian: nasty, brutish, and short. A general uprising of the excluded population is plausible and the collapse of FW could lead to Breakdown [8,23,53].
- GEO-4, 2008, this was developed by Duel et al.  into ‘Fortress Europe’ as shown in Figure 1b; a world in which Europe closes its borders and concentrates on a series of security issues, a central goal of which is self-sufficiency; co-operation is are difficult, alliances change and water conflicts intensify) and
- AEO’s ‘Fortress World’ scenario, the later being developed from the former .
|Performance in FW ||Worsens Substantially
|Generic qualitative patterns of change that resonate with other scenario sets||Focus on individuals Lowest public participation in governance due to its breakdown. Human wellbeing, the environment and natural resources are victimised to meet security demands.||However, there is a huge increase in R&D for military. The emphasis is on security of supply and access to technologies is closely guarded.||A weak economy with national decision making Disintegration of economic and social fabric accompanied by emergent underground economies.||Highest pressure on natural environment. Increase in pollutants, CO2 emissions, resource use/capita and water stress (quality and quantity of groundwater decrease). Net deforestation.||Weakest social and environmental policies.|
- ‘Lords of Misrule’—a fortress world with socio-political backlashes and regressive development in institutions ;
- WBCSD’s ‘Rivers’ scenario—a world of ‘Haves and Have-nots’ ;
- ‘Turbulent neighborhoods’—a world of physical security, muscular military action and the formation of a fortress Europe ;
- ‘Boom and Blame’—a world of privileged enclaves and ghettoized communities ;
- ‘Last man standing’—the way of war and competition operate in this world—globally disconnected, a survivalist approach ;
- ‘Brown Tech’—a world in which the security of the “haves” is a constant issue with gated communities, and apartheid style townships and barriers for the “have-nots” ;
In this variant, the vicious cycle of chaos, conflict and desperation spiral out of control. The security apparatus within remaining privileged areas cannot contain the tide of violence from disaffected individuals, terrorist organizations, ethno-religious groups, economic factions, and organized crime. Collapse of civil order becomes widespread, as populations become increasingly desperate and governments weaken. Refugees fleeing from chaotic zones destabilize neighboring areas, inadvertently contributing to widening waves of disorder. To stem migration, increasing resources are devoted to police powers, border security, and control of the activities of citizens. The global economic, finance and governance systems founder, though the media lingers to spread fresh news of upheaval. The retreat of globalization is particularly devastating for industrial economies highly dependent on trade and imported natural resources. The results are: rising unemployment, economic depression, political instability, and outbreaks of civil disorder, even in rich countries. This self-reinforcing chain of events eventually leads to a general disintegration of social, cultural, and political institutions, deindustrialization (to varying degrees in different regions), and in many regions a return to semi-tribal or feudal societal structures. With the collapse of markets and investment generally, technological progress halts—and the level of technological capability regresses. Population eventually begins to decrease as mortality rates surge with economic collapse and environmental degradation. Many couples, deeply pessimistic about the future, choose not to bring children into the world. In a bitter irony, equity increases but only because everybody gets poorer. Breakdown conditions could persist for many decades before social evolution to higher levels of civilization again becomes possible .
- IPCC’s ‘A2’ scenario —a fragmented unsustainable world. It is interesting to note that Raskin does not align ‘A2’ with FW and yet this shows that incredible similarities do exist.
3.1. Archetypes: Are the Three World End-States Proposed by GSG Appropriate?
|Archetypes ||Scenario Sub-Group : [7,8,9,10,12,13,16,21 and 84—126] Those highlighted in bold are also included in Table 2||No Scenarios||Link to GSG|
|‘Current Trends’||Conventional: no significant change and/or continuation of current trends|
High Growth: government facilitates business, leading to prosperity
Asia Shift: economic power shifts from the West to Asia
Economy Paramount: emphasis on economic values deterioration in environmental and social conditions
|‘Sustainable Development”||Our common Future: increased economic activity is made consistent with improved equity and environmental quality|
Low consumption: conscious shift from consumerism
|‘Pessimistic’||Breakdown: Collapse of Human Society|
Fractured World: Deterioration into antagonistic regional blocs
Chaos: Instability and Disorder
Conservative: World economic crash is succeeded by risk-averse regime
|‘High-Tech Optimist’||Cybertopia: information and communication technology facilitate individualistic, diverse and innovative world|
Technotopia: technology solves most of humanity’s problems
|Archetypes||Details (refer also to Figure 3)||Link to GSG|
|‘Business as usual’||A world that prioritizes government and the economy.||MF|
|‘Sustainability‘||A world that prioritizes the environment - through efficiencies of scale in urban settings, or through decentralization and focus on communities and locales.||PR, NSP|
|‘Paradigm shifts’||A world where current assumptions about future governance or the economy are overturned. They are often connected to worldview and value shifts that are enabled by new technologies.||EC|
|‘Collapse (vulnerability)‘||A world with economic difficulties, social schisms and/or environmental degradation.||FW|
|‘Technological Age’||A ‘high tech’ world transformed primarily by technological fixes.||-|
|Archetypes||Details (refer also to Figure 1a)||Link to GSG|
|‘The Global Market’||Global developments steered by economic growth result in a total dominance of international markets with a low degree of regulation. Environmental problems are being dealt with when solutions are economically interesting||MF|
|‘Global Sustainability’||A globalized world with an increasingly proactive attitude of policy-makers and the public at large towards environmental issues and a high level of regulation. Three main variations can be discerned. One where the global solution is technology change, one with strong governance structures and one with a broadly supported paradigm shift.||PR, NSP|
|‘Regional Sustainability’||A regionalized world, where most—broadly supported initiatives improve the state of the environment and move toward sustainable solutions are bottom-up with a major role for NGOs and multi-level governance structures||EC|
|‘Continental Barriers’||A regionalized world based on economic development. The market mechanism fails, leading to a growing gap between rich and poor. In turn, this results in increasing problems with crime, violence and terrorism, which eventuates in strong trade and other barriers||FW|
3.2. Scenario Variants: Are Six Variants Appropriate?
3.3. Can GSG Scenarios be Used with an ‘Axes of Uncertainty’ Approach?
Conflict of Interest
- Kahn, H. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios; Praeger: New York, NY, USA, 1986. [Google Scholar]
- Schwartz, P. The Art of the Long View; Doubleday: New York, NY, USA, 1991. [Google Scholar]
- Van der Heijden, K. Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation and The Sixth Sense; John Wiley and Sons: NY, USA, 1997. [Google Scholar]
- Van Asselt, M.B.A.; de Niet, R.; Peters, S.S.M.; Rijkens-Klomp, N.; Rotmans, J.; Slooff, W. Towards Visions for a Sustainable Europe: An Overview and Assessment of the Last Decade of European Scenario-studies; ICIS: Maastricht, The Netherlands, 1998. [Google Scholar]
- Hunt, D.V.L.; Lombardi, D.R.; Atkinson, S.; Barber, A.; Barnes, M.; Boyko, C.T.; Brown, J.; Bryson, J.; Butler, D.; Caputo, S.; et al. Using Scenarios to Explore Urban UK Futures: A Review of Futures Literature from 1997 to 2011; Working Document; 2012.
- Electris, C.; Raskin, P.; Rosen, R.; Stultz, J. The Century Ahead: Four Global Scenarios; Technical Documentation; Tellus Institute: Boston, MA, USA, 2009. [Google Scholar]
- Kemp-Benedict, E.; Heaps, C.; Raskin, P. Global Scenario Group Futures: Technical Notes; Polestar Series Report Number 9; Stockholm Environment Institute: Stockholm, Sweden, 2002. [Google Scholar]
- Gallopin, G.C.; Hammond, A.; Raskin, P.; Swart, R. Branch Points: Global Scenarios and Human Choice. A Resource Paper of the Global Scenario Group; PoleStar Series Report Number 7; Stockholm Environment Institute: Stockholm, Sweden, 1997. [Google Scholar]
- Raskin, P.; Banuri, T.; Gallopín, G.; Gutman, P.; Hammond, A.L.; Kates, R.; Swart, R. Great Transition: The Promise and Lure of the Times Ahead; Stockholm Environmental Institute: MA, USA, 2002. [Google Scholar]
- Raskin, P.; Gallopín, G.; Gutman, P.; Hammond, A.L.; Swart, R. Bending the Curve: Toward Global Sustainability; Stockholm Environmental Institute: MA, USA, 1997. [Google Scholar]
- Hammond, A.H. Which World? Scenarios for the 21st Century; Island Press: IL, USA, 1998. [Google Scholar]
- WBCSD, Exploring Sustainable Development: Global Scenarios 2000–2050, Summary Brochure; World Business Council for Sustainable Development: Geneva, Switzerland, 1997.
- OECD, The World in 2020: Towards a New Global Age; Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation: Paris, France, 1997.
- OECD, Environment Outlook; Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation: Paris, France, 2001.
- OECD, Environmental Outlook to 2030; Environment & Sustainable Development, Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation: Tehran, Iran, 2008; 1.
- IPCC, Emissions Scenarios: Summary for Policy Makers. In Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change); Nakicenovic, N. (Ed.) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, England, 2000; pp. 3–12.
- UNEP. Global Environment Outlook 3; United Nations Environment Programme: Nairobi, Kenya, 2002. Available online: www.unep.org/geo/geo3/ (accessed on 03 September 2011).
- UNEP, Global Environment Outlook 4; United Nations Environment Programme: Nairobi, Kenya, 2007.
- Gallopin, G.C.; Rijsberman, F. Three global water scenarios. Int. J. Water 1997, 1, 16–40. [Google Scholar]
- WWV. World Water Vision Commission Report 2000. A Water Secure World: Vision for Water, Life and the Environment; Earthscan: London, UK, 2000. Available online: http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Library/Publications_and_reports/Visions/CommissionReport.pdf (accessed on April 2012).
- Raskin, P. Global Scenarios in Historical Perspective. In Ecosystems and Human Well-being Scenarios; Island Press: IL, USA, 2005; Volume 2, pp. 35–44. [Google Scholar]
- Pridmore, A.; Bristow, A.; May, T.; Tight, M. Climate Change, Impacts, Future Scenarios and the role of Transport; Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research: Norwich, UK, 2003.
- Pinnegar, J.K.; Viner, D.; Hadley, D.; Dye, S.; Harris, M.; Berkout, F.; Simpson, M. Alternative Future Scenarios for Marine Ecosystems (AFMEC); Technical Report; Cefas: Lowestoft, Suffolk, UK, 2006. [Google Scholar]
- De Vries, B.J.M. Scenarios: Guidance for an Uncertain and Complex World? In Sustainability or Collapse? An Integrated History and Future of People on Earth; Costanza, D., Graumlich, L., Steffen, W., Eds.; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2005; pp. 379–397. [Google Scholar]
- Ochola, M.C.; Abdelrehim, A.; Ayugi, P.J.; Ayeni, B.; Asamoah, J.; Gowa, E.; Roberts, J. Africa Environment Outlook 2; United Nations Environment Programme: Washington, DC, USA, 2006; pp. 412–480. [Google Scholar]
- Busch, G. Future European agricultural Landscapes—What can we learn from existing quatitative land use scenarios studies? Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. 2006, 114, 121–140. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- EA, Water Resources for the Future: A Strategy for England and Wales; UK Environment Agency: Bristol, UK, 2001.
- Taylor, R.; Frame, B.; Delaney, K.; Brignall-Theyer, M. Four Future Scenarios for New Zealand: Work in Progress, 2nd ed; Manaaki Whenua Press: Lincoln, New Zealand, 2007. [Google Scholar]
- Rothman, D.S. A Survey of Environmental Scenarios. In Environmental Futures: The Practice of Environmental Scenario Analysis. Developments in Integrated Environmental Assessment—Volume 2; Alcamo, J., Ed.; Elsevier: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2008; pp. 37–65. [Google Scholar]
- Makropoulos, C.; Memon, F.A.; Shirley-Smith, C.; Butler, D. Futures: An exploration of scenarios for sustainable urban water management. Water Policy 2009, 10, 345–373. [Google Scholar]
- NESC, Natural England Scenario Compendium; Natural England Commissioned Report NECR031; Natural England Reports: Bristol, UK, 2009; p. 115.
- Kok, K.; Gramberger, M.; Karl-Heinz, S.; Jager, J.; Omann, I. Report on the New Methodology for Scenario Analysis, Including Guidelines for Its Implementation, and Based on an Analysis of Past Scenario Exercises. The CLIMSAVE Project. 2011. Available online: http://www.climsave.eu (accessed on April 2012).
- Raskin, P.D.; Electris, C.; Rosen, R.A. The century ahead: Searching for sustainability. Sustainability 2010, 2, 2626–2651. [Google Scholar]
- Kämäri, J.; Alcamo, J.; Bärlund, I.; Duel, H.; Farquharson, F.; Flörke, M.; Fry, M.; Houghton-Carr, H.; Kabat, P.; Kaljonen, M.; et al. Envisioning the future of water in Europe—The SCENES project. E-Water 2008, 1–28. [Google Scholar]
- Duel, H.; Meijer, K.; Loos, L.; Kämär, J. SCENES: Exploring the European Water Futures. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: Reducing Water-Related Risks in Europe, Brussels, Belgium, 6–7 July 2010.
- Morita, T.; Robinson, J.; Adegbulugbe, A.; Alcamo, J.; Herbert, D.; Lebre, E.; Nakicenovic, N.; Pitcher, H.; Raskin, P.; Riahi, K.; et al. Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation Scenarios and Implications. In Climate Change 2001: Mitigation; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2001; pp. 115–166. [Google Scholar]
- Zurek, M.B. A Short Review of Global Scenarios for Food Systems Analysis; GECAFS Working Paper 1; GECAFS International Project Office: Wallingford, UK, 2006. [Google Scholar]
- Westhoek, H.J.; van den Berg, M.; Bakkes, J.A. Scenario development to explore the future of Europe’s rural areas. Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. 2006, 114, 7–20. [Google Scholar]
- Sami, The Future of Services to the Public; Saint Andrews Management Institute: St Andrews, UK, 2007.
- Foresight, Environmental Futures; Office of Science and Technology, Department of Trade and Industry: London, UK, 1999.
- OST. Foresight Futures 2020: Revised Scenarios and Guidance; Office of Science & Technology, Department for Trade & Industry: London, UK, 2002. Available online: www.foresight.gov.uk (accessed on 07 July 2011).
- PMSU. Net Benefits: A Sustainable and Profitable Future for UK Fishing; Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, Cabinet Office: London, UK, 2004. Available online: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/strategy/assets/ria.pdf (accessed on April 2012).
- Defra, WR0104: Lifestyle Scenarios: The Futures for Waste Composition; Summary Report; A project for Defra’s WREP: Brook Lyndhurst, London, UK, 2007.
- Keith, A.; O’Brien, R.; Prest, M. The Future of the Global Economy to 2030; Outsights Ltd: London, UK, 2008. [Google Scholar]
- Bertrand, G.; Michalski, A.; Pench, L.R. Scenarios Europe 2010: Five Possible Futures for Europe; Working Paper; European Commission, Forward Studies Unit, 1999.
- SEEDA, Taking Stock: Managing Our Impact. An Ecological Footprint of the South East Region; South East England Development Agency: London, England, 2003.
- OST, Foresight—Drugs Futures 2025: The Scenarios; Office of Science and Technology: Outsights Ltd: London, UK, 2005.
- Steedman, P.; Schultz, W. Future Scenarios for the UK Food System. A Toolkit for Thinking Ahead; Food Ethics Council: Brighton, UK, 2009. [Google Scholar]
- Ratcliffe, J. Imagineering global real estate: A property foresight exercise. Foresight 2001, 3, 453–475. [Google Scholar]
- Hulme, M.; Jenkins, G.L.; Lu, X.; Turnpenny, J.R.; Mitchell, T.D.; Jones, R.G.; Lowe, J.; Murphy, J.M.; Hassell, D.; Boorman, P.; et al. Climate Change Scenarios for the United Kingdom: The UKCIP02 Scientific Report; Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia: Norwich, UK, 2002.
- EA, Exploring the Future: Guidance Toolkit for Using Environment Agency Scenarios 2030; Science Report: SC050002/SR2; UK Environment Agency: Bristol, UK, 2006.
- EA, Demand for water in the 2050’s; Briefing Note; UK Environment Agency: Bristol, UK, 2010.
- Raskin, P. World Lines: A framework for exploring global pathways. Ecol. Econ. 2008, 65, 461–470. [Google Scholar]
- MEA, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Scenarios; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment; Island Press: IL, USA, 2005; 2.
- Go-Science, Land Use Futures: Making the Most of Land Use in the 21st Century; The Government Office for Science: London, UK, 2010.
- UKWIR, 21st Century Distribution Networks; UK Water Industry Research Limited: London, UK, 2010.
- Heinberg, R. Powerdown: Options and Actions for a Post Carbon World; New Society Publishers: Gabriola, Canada, 2003. [Google Scholar]
- ERAGEnergy Systems in 2050 Energy Review: Working Paper; Advisory Group, Cabinet Office Performance and Innovation Unit2001.
- Evans, E.P.; Ashely, R.; Hall, J.; Penning-Rowsell, E.C.; Sayers, P.; Thorne, C.; Watkinson, A. Foresight Future Flooding, Volume I and Volume II; Office of Science and Technology: London, 2004.
- Evans, E.P.; Simm, J.D.; Thorne, C.R.; Arnell, N.W.; Ashley, R.M.; Hess, T.M.; Lane, S.N.; Morris, J.; Nicholls, R.J.; Penning-Rowsell, E.C.; et al. An Update of the Foresight Future Flooding 2004 Qualitative Risk Analysis; Cabinet Office: London, UK, 2008. [Google Scholar]
- SA, Raising Our Game: Can We Sustain Global Civilization? SustainAbility: London, UK, 2007.
- CA, The State of the Countryside, 2020; The Countryside Agency: West Yorkshire, UK, 2003.
- Raskin, P. The Great Transition Today: A Report from the Future; GTI Paper Series; Tellus Institute: Boston, MA, USA, 2006. [Google Scholar]
- Huntington, S.P. The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs 1993, 72, 2–49. [Google Scholar]
- HFPFutures Working GroupWorkshop Report. Kings College, London, UK, 12 October 2007.
- UKCIP, Socio-Economic Scenarios for Climate Change Impact Assessment: A Guide to Their Use in the UK Climate Impacts Programme; UKCIP: Oxford, UK, 2001.
- Watson, J.; Tetteh, A.; Dutton, G.; Bristow, A.; Kelly, C.; Page, M. UK Hydrogen Futures to 2050; Working Paper 46; Tyndal Centre for Climate Change Research: Norwich, UK, 2004. [Google Scholar]
- Berkhout, F.; Hertin, J. Foresight futures scenarios: Developing and applying a participative Strategic Planning tool. GMI 2003, 37, 37–52. [Google Scholar]
- HSE, HSE futures Scenario Building: The Future of Health and Safety in 2017; Research Report RR600; Health and Safety Executive: Bootle, UK, 2007.
- Holmgren, D. Future Scenarios: How Communities Can Adapt to Peak Oil and Climate Change; Chelsea Green Publishing: Vancouver, Canada, 2009. [Google Scholar]
- NERR, England’s Natural Environment in 2060—Issues, Implications and Scenarios; Research Report NERR031; Natural England Reports: Bristol, UK, 2009.
- Hala, W.E.; Marien, M. Global megacrisis: Four scenarios, two perspectives. Futurist 2011, 26–33. [Google Scholar]
- Raskin, P.; Kamp-Benedict, E. Global Environmental Outlook Scenario Framework; Background paper for UNEPS third Global Environmental Outlook Report (GEO-3); Stockholm Environmental Institute: Stockholm, Sweden, 2004. [Google Scholar]
- Schilling, W. Urban Drainage: Quo Wadis. In Proceedings of the XXX IAHR Conference (International Association of Hydraulic Engineering and Research), Thessaloniki, Greece, August, 2003.
- Wilson, P. Africa in the Global Scenarios. In Africa 2025: Launching Africa’s Long-Term Perspective Study; Sall, A., Mureithi, L., Eds.; African Futures: Midrand, South Africa, 1999; pp. 51–69. [Google Scholar]
- Tibbs, H. Sustainability. Deep. News 1999, 10, 1–71. [Google Scholar]
- EEA, Land-Use Scenarios for Europe: Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis on a European scale. EEA Technical report No 9; EEA: Copenhagen, Denmark, 2007.
- EURuralis, EURuralis 1.0 A Scenario Study on Europe’s Rural Areas to Support Policy Discussion [CD-ROM], Alterra: Wageningen, The Netherlands, 2004.
- Long-Term Reductions in Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the UK. 2002. Available online: www.berr.gov.uk/files/file38187.pdf (accessed on 30 August 2010).
- Mooij, R.; Tang, P. Four Futures of Europe; CPB: Den Haag, The Netherlands, 2003. [Google Scholar]
- PIUThe Energy Review; The Policy and Innovation UnitThe Cabinet Office: London, UK, 2002.
- Shell, Shell Energy Scenarios to 2050; Shell International BV: Den Haag, The Netherlands, 2008.
- UKCES, Horizon Scanning and Scenario Building: Scenario for Skills 2020: A Report for the National Strategic Skills Audit for England 2010; Evidence Report 17; UK Commission for Employment and Skills: London, UK, 2010.
- Barney, G.O. Global 2000 Revisited:What Shall We Do? The Critical Issues of the 21st Century; Millennium Institute: Arlington, VA, USA, 1993. [Google Scholar]
- Bossel, H. Earth at a Crossroads: Paths to a Sustainable Future; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1998. [Google Scholar]
- Coates, J.F.; Jarratt, J. What Futurists Believe: Agreements and Disagreements; World Future Society: Bethesda, MD, USA, 1990; Volume 14. [Google Scholar]
- Coates, J.F. Factors Shaping and Shaped by the Environment: 1990–2010. Futur. Res. Q. 1991, 7, 5–55. [Google Scholar]
- Coates, J.F. Long-term technological trends and their implications for management. Int. J. Technol. Manag. 1997, 14, 579–595. [Google Scholar]
- Cornish, E. 92 Ways Our Lives Will Change by the Year 2025; The World Future Society: Bethesda, MD, USA, 1996; Volume 30. [Google Scholar]
- Costanza, R. Four visions of the century ahead: Will it be star trek, Ecotopia, big government or mad max? Futurist 1999, 33, 23–29. [Google Scholar]
- CPB, Scanning the Future: A Long-Term Scenario Study of the World Economy 1990–2015; SDU Publishers: Den Haag, The Netherlands, 1992.
- Duchin, F.; Lange, G.-M.; Thonstad, K.; Idenburg, A. The Future of the Environment: Ecological Economics and Technological Change; Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 1994. [Google Scholar]
- GBN, Twenty-First Century Organizations: Four Plausible Prospects; GBN: Emeryville, CA, USA, 1996.
- Glenn, J.C.; Gordon, T.J. 1997 State of the Future: Implications for Action Today; American Council for the United Nations University: Washington, DC, USA, 1997. [Google Scholar]
- Glenn, J.C.; Gordon, T.J. 1998 State of the Future: Issues and Opportunities; American Council for the United Nations University: Washington, DC, USA, 1998. [Google Scholar]
- Henderson, H. Looking Back from the 21st Century. Futur. Res. Q. 1997, 13, 83–98. [Google Scholar]
- Hughes, B.B. Rough Road Ahead: Global Transformations in the 21st Century. Futur. Res. Q. 1997, 13, 83–107. [Google Scholar]
- IDEA (Innovators of Digital Economy Alternatives) Team, Creating the Future: Scenarios for the Digital Economy; Simon Fraser University: Vancouver, Canada, 1996.
- Kahane, A. Scenarios for energy: Sustainable world vs. global mercantilism. Long Range Plan 1992, 25, 38–46. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Kinsman, F. Millennium: Towards Tomorrow’s Society; W. H. Allen: London, UK, 1990. [Google Scholar]
- Linden, E. The Future in Plain Sight: Nine Clues to the Coming Instability; Simon & Schuster: New York, NY, USA, 1998. [Google Scholar]
- McRae, H. The World in 2020: Power, Culture and Prosperity; HarperCollins Publishers: London, UK, 1994. [Google Scholar]
- Meadows, D.H.; Meadows, D.L.; Randers, J. Beyond the Limits; Chelsea Green Publishing Company: Post Mills, VT, USA, 1992. [Google Scholar]
- Mercer, D. Future Revolutions: A Comprehensive Guide to the Third Millennium; Orion Business Books: London, UK, 1998. [Google Scholar]
- Millennium Project. American Council for the United Nations University 1997. Available online: http://www.millenniumproject.org/millennium/scenarios/index.html (accessed on 17 July 2011).
- Nakicenovic, N.; Grubler, A.; McDonald, A. Global Energy Perspectives; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1998. [Google Scholar]
- Olson, R.L. Alternative images of a sustainable future. Futures 1994, 26, 156–169. [Google Scholar]
- Price, D. Energy and human evolution. Popul. Environ. 1995, 16, 301–319. [Google Scholar]
- Ramphal, S. Our Country, the Planet: Forging a Partnership for Survival; Island Press: Washington, DC, USA, 1992. [Google Scholar]
- Repetto, R. The Global Possible; Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, USA, 1985. [Google Scholar]
- Rotmans, J.; de Vries, H.J.M. Perspectives on Global Change: The TARGETS Approach; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1997. [Google Scholar]
- Rotmans, J.; van Asselt, M.B.A.; Anastasi, C.; Greeuw, S.C.H.; Mellors, J.; Peters, S.; Rothman, D.S.; Rijkens-Klomp, N. Visions for a sustainable Europe. Futures 2000, 32, 809–831. [Google Scholar]
- Schindler, C.; Lapid, G. The Great Turning: Personal Peace, Global Victory; Bear & Company Publishing: Santa Fe, NM, USA, 1989. [Google Scholar]
- Schwartz, P. The new world disorder. Wired 1995, 3, 104–107. [Google Scholar]
- Schwartz, P.; Leyden, P. The long boom: A history of the future 1980–2020. Wired 1997, 5, 115–131. [Google Scholar]
- Science Advisory Board (SAB), Beyond the Horizon: Using Foresight to Protect the Environmental Future; Report No. EPA-SAB-EC-95-007/007A; Science Advisory Board, US EPA: Washington, DC, USA, 1995.
- Shinn, R.L. Forced Options: Social Decisions for the 21st Century; Harper & Row Publishers: San Francisco, CA, USA, 1982. [Google Scholar]
- Stokke, P.R.; Boyce, T.A.; Ralston, W.K.; Wilson, I.H. Visioning (and preparing for) the future: The introduction of scenarios-based planning into Statoil. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 1991, 40, 131–150. [Google Scholar]
- Sunter, C. The New Century: Quest for the High Road; Human and Rousseau (Pty) Ltd./Tafelberg Publishers Ltd: Cape Town, South Africa, 1992. [Google Scholar]
- Svedin, U.; Aniansson, B. Surprising Futures: Notes from an International Workshop on Long-Term World Development; Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research: Friibergh Manor, Sweden, 1987.
- Toffler, A. The Third Wavel, Morrow: New York, NY, USA, 1980.
- Van den Bergh, M. Charting a Course: Preparing for the Oil and Gas Business of the 21st Century. Speech presented at the State University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands. 1996.
- Wallerstein, I. The Capitalist World Economy—Middle-Run Prospects. Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance 1989, 14, 279–288. [Google Scholar]
- Wilkinson, L. How to Build Scenarios. In Wired; Conde Nast Publications: San Francisco, CA, USA, 1995; pp. 74–81. [Google Scholar]
- World Bank, World Development Report 1995—Workers in an Integrating World; World Bank: Washington, DC, USA, 1995.
- WRI, The Transition to a Sustainable Society; World Resources Institute: Washington, DC, USA, 1991.
- Kai, N. Review: Which world? Scenarios for the 21st century. Environ. Sci. Policy Sustain. Dev. 1998, 40, 25–26. [Google Scholar]
- Stout, D. Office of Science and Technology. The Use of Scenarios in Foresight 1994—1999. An Information Document Prepared for the OST. 2002. Available online: www.foresight.gov.uk (accessed on 18 July 2011).
- Raskin, P. Personnel communication. 2011. [Google Scholar]
© 2012 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
Hunt, D.V.L.; Lombardi, D.R.; Atkinson, S.; Barber, A.R.G.; Barnes, M.; Boyko, C.T.; Brown, J.; Bryson, J.; Butler, D.; Caputo, S.; Caserio, M.; Coles, R.; Cooper, R.F.D.; Farmani, R.; Gaterell, M.; Hale, J.; Hales, C.; Hewitt, C.N.; Jankovic, L.; Jefferson, I.; Leach, J.; MacKenzie, A.R.; Memon, F.A.; Sadler, J.P.; Weingaertner, C.; Whyatt, J.D.; Rogers, C.D.F. Scenario Archetypes: Converging Rather than Diverging Themes. Sustainability 2012, 4, 740-772. https://doi.org/10.3390/su4040740
Hunt DVL, Lombardi DR, Atkinson S, Barber ARG, Barnes M, Boyko CT, Brown J, Bryson J, Butler D, Caputo S, Caserio M, Coles R, Cooper RFD, Farmani R, Gaterell M, Hale J, Hales C, Hewitt CN, Jankovic L, Jefferson I, Leach J, MacKenzie AR, Memon FA, Sadler JP, Weingaertner C, Whyatt JD, Rogers CDF. Scenario Archetypes: Converging Rather than Diverging Themes. Sustainability. 2012; 4(4):740-772. https://doi.org/10.3390/su4040740Chicago/Turabian Style
Hunt, Dexter V. L., D. Rachel Lombardi, Stuart Atkinson, Austin R. G. Barber, Matthew Barnes, Christopher T. Boyko, Julie Brown, John Bryson, David Butler, Silvio Caputo, Maria Caserio, Richard Coles, Rachel F. D. Cooper, Raziyeh Farmani, Mark Gaterell, James Hale, Chantal Hales, C. Nicholas Hewitt, Lubo Jankovic, I. Jefferson, J. Leach, A. Rob MacKenzie, Fayyaz Ali Memon, Jon P. Sadler, Carina Weingaertner, J. Duncan Whyatt, and Christopher D. F. Rogers. 2012. "Scenario Archetypes: Converging Rather than Diverging Themes" Sustainability 4, no. 4: 740-772. https://doi.org/10.3390/su4040740