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Article

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Innovation Behavior in Manufacturing Enterprises Under a Dual-Carbon Background: Evidence from China

1
School of Management Engineering, Henan University of Engineering, Zhengzhou 451191, China
2
School of Mathematics and Statistics, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2026, 18(12), 6021; https://doi.org/10.3390/su18126021
Submission received: 5 April 2026 / Revised: 30 May 2026 / Accepted: 5 June 2026 / Published: 11 June 2026

Abstract

Under a dual-carbon background, promoting substantive green innovation in manufacturing enterprises has become a central topic in green transition research. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model involving manufacturing enterprises and consumers under market mechanisms and government intervention to analyze the evolutionary patterns and stability conditions of their strategic choices. Using case data and numerical simulations, it explores the role of government guidance in addressing market failures and fostering green innovation in manufacturing. The findings reveal the following: (1) Under market mechanisms, system evolution is influenced by multiple factors. If enterprises prioritize short-term gains by accelerating symbolic green innovation, consumer trust erodes, leading to a shift toward traditional consumption and ultimately driving the system toward market failure. (2) Under government intervention, incentive subsidies must reach a specific threshold to effectively guide manufacturers toward substantive green innovation. Such subsidies also lower the marginal cost of low-carbon consumption, enhancing consumer willingness to purchase green products. Furthermore, government regulation demonstrates positive promoting effects on the green behaviors of both manufacturers and consumers, with a more pronounced impact on the former. (3) The policy combination of incentive subsidies and government supervision significantly shapes evolutionary trajectories through a synergistic mechanism of “reward incentives and regulatory rigidity.” Policy mismatches may trap the system in market failure. Only when subsidy intensity sufficiently compensates for innovation costs and regulatory capacity exceeds enforcement efficiency thresholds can the system stably evolve toward a substantive green innovation, low-carbon consumption state, fostering a virtuous cycle of supply–demand synergy.
Keywords: manufacturing enterprises; green innovation; evolutionary game theory; carbon peaking; carbon neutrality; market mechanism; government intervention manufacturing enterprises; green innovation; evolutionary game theory; carbon peaking; carbon neutrality; market mechanism; government intervention

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MDPI and ACS Style

Su, Y.; Zhang, M. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Innovation Behavior in Manufacturing Enterprises Under a Dual-Carbon Background: Evidence from China. Sustainability 2026, 18, 6021. https://doi.org/10.3390/su18126021

AMA Style

Su Y, Zhang M. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Innovation Behavior in Manufacturing Enterprises Under a Dual-Carbon Background: Evidence from China. Sustainability. 2026; 18(12):6021. https://doi.org/10.3390/su18126021

Chicago/Turabian Style

Su, Yongqiang, and Manman Zhang. 2026. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Innovation Behavior in Manufacturing Enterprises Under a Dual-Carbon Background: Evidence from China" Sustainability 18, no. 12: 6021. https://doi.org/10.3390/su18126021

APA Style

Su, Y., & Zhang, M. (2026). Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Innovation Behavior in Manufacturing Enterprises Under a Dual-Carbon Background: Evidence from China. Sustainability, 18(12), 6021. https://doi.org/10.3390/su18126021

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