1. Introduction
The imperative to simultaneously advance environmental sustainability, economic growth, and social inclusion has propelled green employment to the center of global economic policy discourse. Green jobs—positions that produce goods or provide services contributing to environmental protection, resource conservation, or low-carbon energy—represent a strategic vehicle for reconciling economic competitiveness with climate obligations [
1,
2,
3]. The rapid proliferation of renewable energy infrastructure worldwide, combined with an evolving circular economy paradigm, is reshaping labor markets in ways that create new categories of employment while disrupting others [
4,
5,
6]. For resource-dependent economies, this transformation is simultaneously a risk and an opportunity: a risk because fossil fuel employment faces structural decline, and an opportunity because renewable energy, green construction, environmental services, and sustainable urban development can absorb and upgrade the workforce if appropriate policies are in place.
Saudi Arabia exemplifies this dual character with particular intensity. The Kingdom is the world’s largest oil exporter [
7,
8], yet it has articulated one of the most ambitious green transition agendas of any developing economy through Vision 2030, launched in April 2016. Vision 2030 targets a 50% renewable energy share in the electricity mix by 2030, the planting of ten billion trees under the Saudi Green Initiative, a 30% reduction in carbon emissions, and the creation of hundreds of thousands of private-sector jobs in non-oil sectors [
7,
8]. Crucially, green employment has emerged as an instrument for advancing simultaneously the pillars of Vision 2030’s diversification, female labor force participation, and environmental sustainability [
9,
10,
11].
Despite the magnitude of these ambitions, the empirical literature on the determinants of green job creation in Saudi Arabia is nascent. Most existing econometric studies of green employment focus on advanced economies—the EU, Germany, and the United States—where long data series and institutional comparability have enabled rigorous modeling [
12,
13,
14]. The Saudi Arabian literature on green economy performance has grown rapidly in recent years [
15,
16,
17,
18,
19], yet no study has applied the ARDL bounds testing framework to model the determinants of green employment per se, covering the full Vision 2030 implementation period through 2024.
Beyond employment, the broader environmental economics literature on Saudi Arabia has examined the nexus between renewable energy, economic growth, and environmental quality [
18,
20,
21,
22], the role of financial development in promoting green growth [
17,
23], environmental innovation and its protective role [
24,
25], the non-oil economic transition [
26], and the contributions of green entrepreneurship to sustainable development [
27,
28]. This growing body of Saudi-specific evidence provides an important contextual foundation for the present study, but it has not yet been synthesised within a unified time-series framework that explicitly models green employment as the outcome of interest.
Green technology innovation constitutes a critical mechanism linking environmental and employment outcomes. Khan et al. [
29] document that green technology investments generate employment multipliers exceeding those of conventional capital investments, with particularly pronounced effects in economies with higher renewable penetration. Porter and van der Linde [
30] further argue that well-designed environmental standards stimulate process innovation that generates net competitive gains and employment creation—the ‘innovation offset’ hypothesis. In the Saudi context, where the National Renewable Energy Programme (NREP) has dramatically scaled solar and wind capacity, quantifying how these investments translate into sustained green employment is a pressing analytical priority [
5,
31].
Although a substantial Saudi-specific literature has examined renewable energy, financial development, and environmental outcomes [
15,
17,
18,
19,
20,
21,
24,
25], this body of work has focused on environmental quality, growth, or aggregate sustainability indicators rather than on green employment as the outcome of interest. Sallam et al. [
11] discuss renewable energy and diversification under Vision 2030 using mixed methods, and Yusuf and Shesha [
9] describe green investment as a platform for employment, but neither study models the long- and short-run determinants of green employment within a unified time-series framework that spans the pre- and post-Vision 2030 periods. The contribution of this paper is therefore best framed as filling a specific empirical gap rather than as a methodological breakthrough: it examines, within a single ARDL/ECM specification covering 1990–2024, how renewable capacity, urbanization, financial depth, FDI, and the post-2016 policy regime jointly relate to estimated green employment in Saudi Arabia, and complements this with an EKC test and Toda–Yamamoto causality analysis. Theoretically, the paper articulates three transmission channels through which the energy transition reshapes the Saudi labour market—direct employment in renewable construction and operation, indirect employment via supplier and service linkages, and induced employment through urbanization and reallocation of resources from traditional energy sectors—a perspective consistent with recent evidence that the economic effects of the energy transition depend jointly on the expansion of renewables and on the contraction and reallocation of conventional energy activities [
32]. The Vision 2030 dummy is interpreted as a composite indicator of this regime shift rather than as a clean identification of any single policy instrument, and the corresponding caveats are discussed in
Section 3.5 and
Section 5.1.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature.
Section 3 describes the data and econometric framework, presenting the complete econometric model across its estimation steps.
Section 4 presents the empirical results.
Section 5 discusses the findings.
Section 6 addresses limitations.
Section 7 concludes with policy recommendations.
6. Limitations
This study has several drawbacks. First, while sufficient for the ARDL bounds testing framework under AIC-selected lag orders, 35 annual observations limit statistical power to detect nuanced nonlinearities or complex higher-order lag structures. GaStat’s expanding statistical program will provide quarterly or monthly green employment data, which should enhance precision and short-run dynamic modeling.
Second, the green employment series combines two distinct sources: directly measured GaStat data from 2016 onward and a constructed pre-2016 series based on ILO sectoral green-intensity coefficients applied to industry-level employment. As discussed in
Section 3.1, this construction is consistent with practice in the green-jobs measurement literature for emerging economies [
3,
67,
68], but it introduces measurement uncertainty that the structural break dummy cannot fully absorb. With only nine years of directly measured data, a formal split-sample sensitivity analysis comparing pre- and post-2016 ARDL estimates is infeasible at present; as the directly measured series accumulates further observations, such an analysis will become possible and should be undertaken. The long-run elasticities reported in
Section 4.3 should be read with this measurement caveat in mind.
Third, the post-2016 dummy that captures the Vision 2030 regime is a coarse instrument. It is designed to capture the joint effect of policy launch, capacity scale-up, institutional reform, and the change in the green-employment data source, all of which occurred in close temporal proximity. The estimate of θ = 1.75 should therefore be read as a composite indicator of this regime change rather than as the causal effect of any single policy instrument. Disentangling these channels would require either a longer post-2016 sample with within-period variation or detailed administrative data on programme-level instruments such as NREP auction outcomes, Saudisation enforcement intensity, and green-finance allocations. Specifications using a smooth time trend interacted with a 2016 break, alternative breakpoint years, or cumulative NREP-awarded capacity in place of the dummy are natural directions for follow-up work, conditional on the additional data needed to support them.
Fourth, the EKC analysis in
Section 4.6 operationalises the income–emissions relationship using GDP growth and its square, rather than the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita and its square, which is more conventional in the EKC literature [
42,
50,
53]. The growth rate formulation captures the same quadratic logic but produces a turning point that is expressed in growth rate space and is therefore not directly comparable to the income-level turning points reported in most EKC studies. Re-estimating the EKC equation in standard income-level form is a natural and important extension, and the qualitative finding of no inverted-U relationship over the Saudi sample should be re-examined under that specification before being treated as definitive.
Fifth, the correlation between urbanization and domestic credit reported in
Table 2 (r ≈ 0.74) reflects parallel long-run trends in both series and reduces the precision with which their individual long-run coefficients can be estimated. The estimates reported in
Section 4.3 should accordingly be interpreted as describing the joint contribution of the urbanization–credit cluster rather than as cleanly identified independent partial effects. Specifications that drop one of the two variables, or replace total domestic credit with credit to the private financial sector, would help to characterise the marginal contribution of each component and are also identified as a natural extension.
Sixth, the green employment variable aggregates across job types with different wage quality, skill intensity, Saudization content, and gender composition. The taxonomy of Tănasie et al. [
3] divides jobs into direct renewable energy, energy efficiency, green construction, and environmental services. This allows for more precise identification of policy channels driving each sub-category and for analysis of employment quality and quantity, which can inform targeted interventions to enhance job creation and sustainability in the green sector. Dey’s [
10] firm-level analysis of Saudi enterprises’ green HRM practices demonstrates the value of enterprise-level data alongside macro-level analysis. Seventh, bivariate Toda–Yamamoto causality tests may attribute causal effects through omitted intermediaries to a variable. A multivariate Toda–Yamamoto framework estimated simultaneously across all key variables would provide richer causal mapping and is recommended for future work with larger samples. Toda–Yamamoto tests, like all Granger-type procedures, also identify predictive (statistical) rather than structural causality, and the empirical patterns reported in
Section 4.7 should be read accordingly.
The Vision 2030 structural break dummy measures policy regime shift but cannot pinpoint specific program components, such as NREP auction rounds, Saudisation requirements, green finance incentives, Saudi Green Initiative afforestation, or institutional governance reforms, that contribute most to the estimated long-run multiplier of θ = 1.75. Disaggregated program evaluation using project-level or administrative microdata would solve this attribution question and make the employment multiplier estimate more policy relevant.
Eighth, the single-equation framework assumes weak exogeneity of the regressors for long-run parameters. This assumption is standard in applied ARDL literature [
41] and defensible for Saudi Arabia, where centrally coordinated government tendering determines renewable capacity, but domestic credit and FDI endogeneity cannot be excluded. A systems estimation approach, like a fully identified structural VAR or a GCC-wide panel ARDL exploiting cross-country variation, would address this concern and be a natural extension.
Finally, the study models green employment quantity but not quality—wages, job security, Saudization content, and gender composition. Bracarense and Costa [
6] stress that sustainable and inclusive development requires green employment quality as well as quantity. Adding quality indicators for the labor market would help determine if Saudi Arabia’s green employment expansion is meeting Vision 2030’s social goals.
7. Conclusions
This paper examines the long- and short-run determinants of estimated green employment in Saudi Arabia over 1990–2024 within an ARDL/ECM framework, complemented by an EKC test and a Toda–Yamamoto causality analysis. The methodological tools used here are well established rather than novel, and the contribution of the paper is therefore best framed in empirical and contextual terms: it brings these tools to bear on green employment as the outcome of interest in a resource-dependent economy undergoing a deliberate structural transition, and integrates the results with the recent Saudi-specific literature on renewable energy, financial development, and sustainability. The main empirical patterns can be summarised as follows.
First, the bounds test is consistent with a long-run relationship between green employment and the set of regressors considered (Bounds F = 8.45, exceeding the 5% I(1) critical bound of 3.61). Second, within this relationship the post-2016 dummy used to capture the Vision 2030 regime shift is associated with a positive and statistically significant coefficient (
θ = 1.75,
p = 0.008); we treat this as a composite indicator of the policy regime, the rapid scale-up of renewable capacity, and possible measurement changes that overlap with the launch of Vision 2030, rather than as a clean estimate of any single policy instrument. Third, renewable energy capacity (
θ = 0.145,
p = 0.018) and urbanization (
θ = 0.098,
p = 0.001) are robust and continuously measured correlates of long-run green employment, with Toda–Yamamoto tests indicating a bidirectional predictive relationship between renewable capacity and green employment that is consistent with, but does not in itself prove, a self-reinforcing investment–employment dynamic. Fourth, the error correction term (
δ = −0.520,
p < 0.001; half-life ≈ 1.0 year) implies relatively rapid adjustment to long-run equilibrium. Finally, the EKC hypothesis is not supported in the Saudi sample over 1990–2024: there is no evidence of an inverted-U income–emissions relationship, which is consistent with the structural arguments of Pal and Mitra [
54] and Alsabhan et al. [
22] and suggests that decarbonization in resource-dependent economies is unlikely to occur as an automatic consequence of income growth alone.
These findings are consistent with the view that active policy intervention, backed by renewable energy investment and institutional commitment, plays a central role in green employment growth in a resource-dependent economy undergoing structural change. The evidence from a single country and a thirty-five-year sample is, of course, not strong enough to establish either necessity or sufficiency in a strict sense, and the conclusions should be read accordingly.
Evidence informs seven policy recommendations. Accelerate and deepen NREP auction programs by mandating Saudization and local content, maximizing the domestic employment multiplier per capacity increment. Second, since credit and FDI are insignificant drivers of employment, a comprehensive green finance ecosystem—including green bonds, green lending mandates, and targeted FDI promotion—is needed to redirect financial flows toward green activities. Third, Vision 2030 should prioritize urban sustainability. This means creating jobs and lowering per capita emissions by using integrated frameworks for zero-emission transportation, green buildings, and sustainable water and waste infrastructure. Fourth, public investment appraisal should include a shadow carbon price to create system-wide decarbonization incentives without the politically difficult task of economy-wide carbon taxation. Fifth, develop circular-economy infrastructure and green-skills training programs now to sustain employment growth after renewable construction matures. Sixth, regulatory sandboxes, green venture capital, and SME procurement set-asides should encourage green entrepreneurship, which creates distributed, private sector jobs alongside large-scale infrastructure. Seventh, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, KAUST, and NEOM should build domestic green R&D capacity to transition from being a renewable energy technology importer to a developer and exporter.
A GCC-wide panel extension to exploit cross-country heterogeneity, non-linear threshold models to capture asymmetric policy effects, sectoral decomposition of green employment by job type and quality, a multivariate causality framework estimated simultaneously across all system variables, and quality-adjusted employment indices with wages, Saudisation ratios, and gender composition are for future research. This framework provides a comparable benchmark for monitoring Saudi Arabia’s green employment trajectory as Vision 2030 approaches its 2030 targets and a methodological template for other resource-dependent economies undergoing structural green transitions.