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Article

Collaborative Governance Mechanisms for Farmers’ Low-Carbon Transition: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective

School of Social Development and Public Policy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
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Sustainability 2025, 17(24), 10921; https://doi.org/10.3390/su172410921 (registering DOI)
Submission received: 30 October 2025 / Revised: 3 December 2025 / Accepted: 4 December 2025 / Published: 6 December 2025

Abstract

Farmers’ low-carbon transition has become a critical issue for achieving sustainable agricultural development. Fundamentally, this transition is driven by multi-actor collaboration and is subject to stochastic disturbances. However, the collaborative governance mechanisms that facilitate farmers’ low-carbon transformation remain insufficiently understood, particularly under the influence of random factors. To address this gap, we construct a four-party game model involving farmers, government, enterprises, and financial institutions by employing a stochastic evolutionary game approach that incorporates random disturbance factors to capture real-world uncertainty. Numerical simulations are conducted to examine how different policy tools and external environments shape the system’s evolutionary path. The results show the following: (1) In the early transition stage, external uncertainties cause notable fluctuations in strategy evolution, during which the government, farmers, and enterprises gradually form a collaborative mechanism, while financial institutions remain reluctant to participate due to risk and policy uncertainty. (2) Government subsidies, profit returns, and risk-sharing mechanisms exhibit a substitutive relationship, and an appropriate mix of these tools can effectively enhance the willingness of farmers and enterprises to adopt low-carbon practices. (3) Excessive government incentives may crowd out the role of green credit from financial institutions. (4) The profit-sharing ratio among farmers exerts the strongest motivational effect in the early stage, while higher levels of risk-sharing and reputation benefits are more effective in stabilizing the system structure and enhancing transition resilience. This study reveals the dynamic mechanisms of multi-actor interaction in agricultural low-carbon transition and provides theoretical and policy insights for differentiated government strategies and collaborative emission reduction.
Keywords: farmers; financial institutions; low-carbon transition; evolutionary game; stochastic disturbance farmers; financial institutions; low-carbon transition; evolutionary game; stochastic disturbance

Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Zhao, D.; Xia, S. Collaborative Governance Mechanisms for Farmers’ Low-Carbon Transition: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective. Sustainability 2025, 17, 10921. https://doi.org/10.3390/su172410921

AMA Style

Zhao D, Xia S. Collaborative Governance Mechanisms for Farmers’ Low-Carbon Transition: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective. Sustainability. 2025; 17(24):10921. https://doi.org/10.3390/su172410921

Chicago/Turabian Style

Zhao, Deyu, and Shang Xia. 2025. "Collaborative Governance Mechanisms for Farmers’ Low-Carbon Transition: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective" Sustainability 17, no. 24: 10921. https://doi.org/10.3390/su172410921

APA Style

Zhao, D., & Xia, S. (2025). Collaborative Governance Mechanisms for Farmers’ Low-Carbon Transition: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective. Sustainability, 17(24), 10921. https://doi.org/10.3390/su172410921

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