This is an early access version, the complete PDF, HTML, and XML versions will be available soon.
Open AccessArticle
Collaborative Governance Mechanisms for Farmers’ Low-Carbon Transition: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective
by
Deyu Zhao
Deyu Zhao and
Shang Xia
Shang Xia *
School of Social Development and Public Policy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2025, 17(24), 10921; https://doi.org/10.3390/su172410921 (registering DOI)
Submission received: 30 October 2025
/
Revised: 3 December 2025
/
Accepted: 4 December 2025
/
Published: 6 December 2025
Abstract
Farmers’ low-carbon transition has become a critical issue for achieving sustainable agricultural development. Fundamentally, this transition is driven by multi-actor collaboration and is subject to stochastic disturbances. However, the collaborative governance mechanisms that facilitate farmers’ low-carbon transformation remain insufficiently understood, particularly under the influence of random factors. To address this gap, we construct a four-party game model involving farmers, government, enterprises, and financial institutions by employing a stochastic evolutionary game approach that incorporates random disturbance factors to capture real-world uncertainty. Numerical simulations are conducted to examine how different policy tools and external environments shape the system’s evolutionary path. The results show the following: (1) In the early transition stage, external uncertainties cause notable fluctuations in strategy evolution, during which the government, farmers, and enterprises gradually form a collaborative mechanism, while financial institutions remain reluctant to participate due to risk and policy uncertainty. (2) Government subsidies, profit returns, and risk-sharing mechanisms exhibit a substitutive relationship, and an appropriate mix of these tools can effectively enhance the willingness of farmers and enterprises to adopt low-carbon practices. (3) Excessive government incentives may crowd out the role of green credit from financial institutions. (4) The profit-sharing ratio among farmers exerts the strongest motivational effect in the early stage, while higher levels of risk-sharing and reputation benefits are more effective in stabilizing the system structure and enhancing transition resilience. This study reveals the dynamic mechanisms of multi-actor interaction in agricultural low-carbon transition and provides theoretical and policy insights for differentiated government strategies and collaborative emission reduction.
Share and Cite
MDPI and ACS Style
Zhao, D.; Xia, S.
Collaborative Governance Mechanisms for Farmers’ Low-Carbon Transition: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective. Sustainability 2025, 17, 10921.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su172410921
AMA Style
Zhao D, Xia S.
Collaborative Governance Mechanisms for Farmers’ Low-Carbon Transition: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective. Sustainability. 2025; 17(24):10921.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su172410921
Chicago/Turabian Style
Zhao, Deyu, and Shang Xia.
2025. "Collaborative Governance Mechanisms for Farmers’ Low-Carbon Transition: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective" Sustainability 17, no. 24: 10921.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su172410921
APA Style
Zhao, D., & Xia, S.
(2025). Collaborative Governance Mechanisms for Farmers’ Low-Carbon Transition: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective. Sustainability, 17(24), 10921.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su172410921
Note that from the first issue of 2016, this journal uses article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details
here.
Article Metrics
Article metric data becomes available approximately 24 hours after publication online.