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Article

Game Analysis on Energy-Saving Behavior of University Students Under the “Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality” Goals

1
Beijing Key Laboratory of Heating, Gas Supply, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Engineering, Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Beijing 100044, China
2
College of Environmental and Energy Engineering, Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Beijing 100044, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2025, 17(20), 9209; https://doi.org/10.3390/su17209209
Submission received: 9 September 2025 / Revised: 24 September 2025 / Accepted: 30 September 2025 / Published: 17 October 2025
(This article belongs to the Section Sustainable Education and Approaches)

Abstract

With the continuous increase in the number of university students and the improvement of living standards, energy waste in universities has become a significant challenge, hindering progress toward Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality (CPCN) goals. As universities serve as the final educational stage before students enter society, effectively integrating disciplinary research with energy-saving education has become a crucial topic in today’s world. The evolutionary game analysis reveals that three key factors—the severity of resource waste, the reputational benefits from sustainable education, and the enhancement of students’ self-quality—significantly drive the game equilibrium toward a positive outcome. Conversely, university indifference to energy-saving education and high behavioral constraint costs for students lead the equilibrium toward a negative state. Based on this, this paper puts forward corresponding suggestions to promote the sustainable development of universities and help realize the CPCN goals. These suggestions are aimed at enhancing the importance of energy-saving education in universities, optimizing energy-saving management strategies and encouraging students to actively participate in energy-saving behavior, to provide practical reference for universities to promote social sustainable development.

1. Introduction

Since the United Nations Conference on the human environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, education on the background of sustainability has been a widespread concern [1]. Although clean energy is limiting growth, total energy-related CO2 emissions still reached a record high of 37.4 Gt in 2023 [2]. It has been confirmed that only relying on science and technology support is not enough to reduce global carbon emissions, and it is necessary to restrict people’s energy-saving behavior. In the context of global warming, calling for the importance of future scientific education research, energy-saving, and emission reduction in universities may require scholars to have a wide range of abilities to study the natural world [3].
By the end of 2023, there are 3074 universities in China, and the total number of students in various forms of higher education has reached 47.7 million [4]. As most Chinese universities ignore their responsibilities in the integration of energy-saving education and energy-saving management, the current situation of university students’ energy-saving behavior is not optimistic. In 2021, The State Council initiated the Action Plan for Achieving the Carbon Peak before 2030 and Carbon Neutrality by 2060 (CPCN), which emphasizes strict control of energy intensity and reasonable management of total energy consumption [5]. As key institutions for social education, universities should not remain on the periphery of environmental responsibility. Instead, they must commit to utilizing natural resources responsibly and integrating energy-saving education into student development.
The Talloires Declaration was initiated in 1990 by Jean Mayer, President of Tufts University (USA), following a conference of university leaders in Talloires, France, with the aim of affirming the obligation of the world’s universities to advance sustainable development through higher education and to continually contribute wisdom and efforts toward promoting sustainability in academia and the progress of human civilization. By September 2021, 520 universities from more than 60 countries and regions have signed Talloires Declaration [6], and the United States is one of the first countries to implement the plan. At present, the United States have 173 signed universities, ranking first in the world. Under the Green University Alliance’s “sustainable campus” goal, 48 universities in Taiwan have also signed. In contrast, only two universities in mainland China—Fudan University and Renmin University of China—have signed the declaration. Against the backdrop of China’s “Double First-Class” initiative and CPCN goals, the overall lag in energy-saving education and management in Chinese universities remains a major obstacle to achieving world-class status in higher education.
Despite international commitments, most studies on university sustainability focus on policy advocacy or general management, lacking analytical models of how students’ energy-saving behavior evolves. Recent works in the broader energy field have explored advanced optimization approaches [7]. These studies highlight the importance of methodological innovation in energy research. However, while technical optimization has been extensively investigated, little is known about how university policies, incentives, punishments, and individual costs interact to shape student behavior, limiting practical guidance for campus sustainability under the CPCN goals. To address this gap, this paper applies evolutionary game theory to model the strategic interaction between universities and students. By constructing a dynamic replication system and analyzing its stability, we explore the conditions under which cooperative, energy-saving behavior can emerge and persist under university policies, incentives, punishments, and individual constraints.

2. Literature Review

As an old Chinese saying goes, “it is easy to move from frugality to extravagance, but difficult to move from extravagance to frugality.” Economic conditions have an important influence on energy-saving behavior. The better the economic conditions, the higher the people’s demand for the quality of life, and the higher the standard of indoor comfort, so the greater the cost of energy [8]. Since China joined the WTO, the superior economic conditions have made the consciousness of saving resources of university students increasingly weak, and they have no sense of responsibility for energy-saving. A study found that although most students had the intention to save energy, more than 70% of students showed a high willingness to save energy [9]. However, there was a gap between the actual behavior and the intention to save energy. The use of water and electricity is based on their personal comfort, and the waste phenomenon on campus is very serious. According to the survey of university students’ daily energy use behavior, about 70% of students’ screens are always on after using the computer, and more than 90% of girls’ dormitories have illegal electrical equipment [10]. In the context of summer air conditioning usage, it is observed that nearly all students tend to set the temperature below the national standard of 26 °C (78.8 °F). Additionally, it is common to witness lights remaining on in unoccupied classrooms [11]. Through descriptive and quantitative research on university students’ energy-saving awareness, the data show that their energy-saving awareness needs to be improved before they graduate [3].
In 2000, the United Nations Millennium Summit signed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a plan with eight goals aimed at reducing global poverty levels. In 2015, the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit adopted 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to guide global development from 2015 to 2030. According to the statistical database of The Commercial Buildings Energy Consumption Survey (CBECS), the total energy consumption of school buildings is higher than the comprehensive energy consumption of all kinds of office buildings [12]. Emissions not only rely on technological innovation, but also the impact of user behavior on building energy consumption is still large; up to 71% of the energy demand change is caused by user behavior [13]. Along with the enrollment expansion of higher education in China, energy consumption of universities has become an important part of terminal energy consumption.
Education for Sustainable Development (ESD), proposed by United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), aims to cultivate talents for a sustainable society by reshaping curricula and promoting global collaboration. Many universities worldwide have incorporated sustainability into teaching and management, such as Okayama University’s “Table for Two” [14] initiative in Japan, Erasmus University’s sustainable development courses [15], and the University of Bologna’s joint programs and micro-certificates [16]. These cases highlight how integrating sustainability into education enhances both social responsibility and institutional competitiveness. Universities with higher sustainable education will be in an advantageous position in the future competition. According to an EUA data report released in September 2021, 90% of respondents believe that environmental sustainability and greening activities make their institutions more attractive, thus helping to recruit and retain students and staff [17]. In China, universities such as Tsinghua and Fudan [18,19] have also established institutes and forums on sustainable development, with Fudan ranking 27th globally in the THE Impact Rankings 2022 and first in SDG7 (Affordable clean energy). While international and domestic progress has been made, the implementation of the SDGs remains a challenge, as universities often face short-term objectives and lack systematic approaches to long-term sustainability [20].
Regional sustainable development is the main part of the overall sustainable development of society, and the interaction between sustainable balance and efficient development between local and global should be paid attention to in the construction of green universities. Universities with rich experience in sustainable education should play a leading role as organizers and bring together regional universities to share experience in energy-saving education and seek a common path to green development. The “One Belt and One Road” University and Sustainable Development Conference hosted by Chongqing University discussed the role and responsibility of universities in promoting sustainable development to address global challenges. Chinese “E8 League” jointly initiated the establishment of “University Alliance for Sustainable Development in the Yangtze River Delta”, and released the CPCN University Action Initiative [21].
Green development has become an inevitable requirement of the new era in the field of higher education; one of the ways to embody the concept of green development is the construction of a green university. A green university is a complex task because it involves structural changes in various areas of the university that affect not only students but all stakeholders in the campus. This is a necessary process, because many universities have excessive power consumption, causing pollution to the social environment and an economic dilemma [22]. Therefore, it is the responsibility of higher education managers to develop and apply environmental management strategies as the main tool to promote sustainability, both as a competitive advantage and to create a comfortable learning environment for students. At present, energy-saving research in Chinese universities is primarily focused on science and technology, while the management of user behavior is relatively lacking, resulting in insufficient awareness of energy-saving on campuses. University students’ energy-saving behavior is influenced by economic conditions and values. Even if they have a good sense of energy conservation, some students still choose to ignore the waste of public resources. Therefore, it is crucial to establish a comprehensive energy-saving management system. As the future leaders of society, university students can improve their energy-saving behavior on campus by standardizing their actions and offering reasonable suggestions. From a long-term perspective, even after graduation, students can continue to follow good energy-saving practices in society, promoting energy-saving and emission reduction with a highly responsible attitude. This is of great practical significance for the construction of green universities and an energy-saving society in China.

3. Material and Methods

3.1. Evolutionary Game Theory

Evolutionary game theory comes from genetic ecologists Fisher and Hamilton’s game analysis of animals and plants in response to population conflicts and cooperation [23]. In the game, with the continuous transformation and adjustment of decisions by individuals, the group will gradually reach a state of equilibrium, that is, evolutionary stable equilibrium (ESS). According to the group behavior explanation [24], it is not necessary for a population’s individuals to have sufficient knowledge of the overall game, and it does not require individuals to have any desire or ability of complex reasoning; it only needs to assume that individuals can accumulate experience and compare the advantages and disadvantages of pure strategies to maintain the Nash equilibrium. But there is a problem. According to the evolutionary dynamics in snowdrift games [25], the evolution of cooperative behavior tends to be inhibited when the interaction between players is spatially limited, i.e., when players only interact with nearby players. In the context of energy-saving behavior in universities, the interaction of students can be seen as a repeated snowdrift game. To promote energy-saving cooperation among university students, incentive mechanisms and policies should be designed to enhance positive interaction among students.
Applying game theory to the design incentive mechanism [26], it proves that collective action can optimize community energy use. When students make energy-saving decisions in shared resources, such as electricity in dormitories and study rooms, they can achieve energy-saving goals through cooperative game. Evolutionary game not only focuses on the strategy choice between individuals but also involves the dissemination of knowledge and information. The eye-tracking experiments explore the influence of different types of knowledge on students’ intention to save energy [27]; students can adjust their behavior by learning how to save energy more effectively. An energy-saving behavior game can be regarded as a dynamic game, and students may gradually shift from non-cooperative behavior to cooperative behavior, forming a stable mode of energy-saving behavior. Evolutionary game theory provides theoretical support for understanding and optimizing this process, especially in designing effective incentive mechanisms and educational programs [28].
The infinite repetition game of the participants under limited rationality is like the process of dynamic adaptation and knowledge learning of animals in nature. Similarly, it is also the case in the energy-saving game between universities and students. Under the premise of the existence of energy-saving policies in universities, the group of students who comply with energy-saving behavior are constantly changing, and it also affects the rest of the individuals in the group. If the group continues to expand, it will lead other students to gradually adopt this strategy. Therefore, it is feasible and reasonable to use evolutionary game theory to study students’ energy-saving behavior in universities.

3.2. Game Analysis of Students’ Energy-Saving Behavior

The game decision of university and students on energy-saving behavior is shown in Figure 1. Suppose that the university makes an energy-saving policy for students’ daily life, starting from point A and moving to point B . If students follow the rules, resources will be saved. If students break the rules, then the game moves to point C . If the university ignores students’ wasteful behavior, resources will be wasted; if the university punishes the students, the game moves to point D . If all the students are punished and obey the rules, it can ensure that students comply with the energy-saving policy. Students directly following the rules is the ideal result for the university, but that is not true in real life. If students try to evade the rules and the university will punish them, then they must follow the rules; it is better to follow the rules at point B . Therefore, if students know that the university will punish them for breaking the rules at point B , the game is over here. If students know that the university will not punish them for wasting resources at point C , students will ignore the rules at point B . At that time, more and more students will break the rules, and the price of management will increase, resulting in a decline in the willingness of the university to take tough measures, and then the university will continue to compromise at point C , thus forming a vicious circle. Therefore, the key to energy-saving lies in what decision the university will make at point C . Meanwhile, we know that the establishment of energy-saving policies in a university is only the first step of energy-saving management, and the key lies in whether implementation is strong. However, in the process of teaching, most universities ignore the mission of cultivating “green” graduates in the new era; they put more emphasis on the employment of students, while lacking in the cultivation of their social responsibilities.

3.3. Basic Hypothesis

H1. 
University and students meet the relatively rational economic man hypothesis.
H2. 
University formulates management policy to restrict students’ energy-saving behavior. According to the Chinese CPCN goals, the university has the responsibility for sustainable education management and needs effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to ensure the implementation of the policy.
H3. 
For university, the probability of implementing energy-saving policy for students is   α ( 0 α   1 ) . University implements the policy, and if students comply with the policy, university resources will be saved, and the benefits of the university is   E . The benefits of enhancing the social status of universities through sustainable education is   F   [29], but the cost of education is   G . If students do not comply with the policy, the punishment measures of university force students to comply with the rules. Suppose there is a waste of resources in the early stage of the game, the income of university decreases to   m E ( 0 < m < 1 ) , and the cost of university administration rises to   n G ( 1 < n ) .
H4. 
For students, the probability that students comply with the policy is   β ( 0 β   1 ) . Students may have to bear certain financial costs to comply with energy conservation policies, such as purchasing energy-saving equipment and paying for excess energy bills [30], the constraint cost of students is   L . But the improvement of students’ self-quality and social responsibility, the benefit is   M , and university gives students some incentive rewards, the benefit is   K . If students do not comply with the policy and university carries it out, they will be punished with a cost,   T . After being punished, students need to continue to comply with the policy, and the constraint cost of students rises to   p L ( 1 < p ) . At the same time, students’ own sense of social responsibility is passively improved, but the benefit decreases to   q M ( 0 < q < 1 ) .
H5. 
If university does not implement the policy and students do not comply with the policy, the benefit of students and university are both   0 . That is the current state of energy conservation management in most Chinese universities.
According to the basic hypothesis, list university and students’ game payoff matrix, as shown in Table 1.

3.4. Dynamic Replication Equation

The university and students are not independent of each other in the game, and the strategy choice of either side will affect the decision of the other side. Through the historical experience in the process of trial and error to dynamically adjust the α and β , this state is the dynamic replication described in evolutionary game theory. Suppose that the expected payoff of the university from implementing and not implementing the policy are denoted by U 1 and U 2 , and the average expected payoff of the university is U ¯ .
U 1 = β ( E + F G ) + ( 1 β ) ( m E n G + F ) U 2 = β E + ( 1 β ) × 0 U ¯ = α × U 1 + 1 α × U 2
The dynamic replication equation of university is
F α = d α d t = α U 1 U ¯ = α 1 α m E n G + F β m E n G + G
Suppose that the expected payoff of students to comply and not to comply with the policy are denoted by V 1 and V 2 , and the average expected payoff of students are denoted by V ¯ .
V 1 = α ( M L + K ) + ( 1 α ) ( M L ) V 2 = α q M p L T + 1 α × 0 V ¯ = β V 1 + 1 β × V 2
The dynamic replication equation of students is
F β = d β d t = β V 1 V ¯ = β 1 β M L + α p L q M + T + K

4. Result

4.1. Stability Analysis

When F α = 0 , F β = 0 , there are five local equilibrium points: E 1 0 , 0 , E 2 0 , 1 , E 3 1 , 0 , E 4 1 , 1 , E 5 α * , β * = L M p L q M + T + K , m E n G + F m E n G + G . Based on the study [31,32], the stability analysis of the equilibrium point can be obtained by analyzing the local stability of the Jacobian matrix of the system, and the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic equation replicated by both sides is
J = F α α   F α β F β α   F β β
The Jacobian matrix of this paper can be obtained by substituting the data into (4-1).
J = 1 2 α [ m E n G + F β m E n G + G ] α 1 α m E n G + G β 1 β ( p L q M + T + K ) 1 2 β [ M L + α ( p L q M + T + K ) ]
According to Lyapunov stability theory [31,33], a sufficient and necessary condition for the equilibrium point of a replicated dynamic system to satisfy the evolutionary stability strategy is that all the eigenvalue signs of the Jacobian matrix are negative. For example, substituting the equilibrium point E 1 0 , 0 into the Jacobian matrix yields
J 1 = m E n G + F 0 0 M L
The eigenvalue of J 1 is λ 1 = m E n G + F , λ 2 = M L . Similarly, the eigenvalues of the other four local equilibrium points are shown in Table 2.
For the convenience of discussion, we number the stability conditions of each equilibrium point: m E n G + F < 0 ①, M L < 0 ②, F G < 0 ③, because α * = L M p L q M + T + K ( 0 , 1 ) , β * = m E n G + F m E n G + G ( 0 , 1 ) , adding condition q M p L T K < 0 ④.
Discussion 1.
Ifis true, butandare not, there is only one stable equilibrium point, E 2 . According to condition, q M   is greater than the sum of the punishment, honor, and constraint cost of students due to energy-saving behavior, so students will comply with the policy. That is, in real life, regardless of whether university implements the policy, the students will choose to perform energy-saving behavior. For universities, the ideal outcome is simply to issue the policy and have students voluntarily comply. The duplicate dynamic phase diagram of the game system is shown in Figure 2.
Discussion 2.
Ifandare true, butis not, the condition of E 4   stability is satisfied. Therefore, there are two stable equilibrium points,   E 1   and   E 4 . If   E 1   is the final evolutionary equilibrium point, which is contrary to the ideal result, students waste resources and university will not take measures, which will have a negative impact on university energy-saving education. If the final evolution result is   E 4 , the improvement in the university’s social reputation gained by implementing the policy is greater than the cost incurred. At the same time, students will choose to comply with the policy because of the sense of honor and the punishment for non-compliance is too large, and the result will evolve towards the ideal situation. The duplicate dynamic phase diagram of the game system is shown in Figure 3.
The broken line formed by the points   E 2 , E 5 , and E 3 in Figure 3 is the dividing line where the evolutionary game model converges to E 1 and E 4 . When the initial state is inside the quadrilateral E 1 E 2 E 5 E 3 , the game system will eventually converge to the point E 1 . When the initial state is inside the quadrilateral E 2 E 5 E 3 E 4 , the game system will eventually converge to the point E 4 . It is known that the probability of the equilibrium evolving towards the E 4 point is proportional to the area of the quadrilateral E 2 E 5 E 3 E 4 . Next, we use the area S of the quadrilateral E 2 E 5 E 3 E 4 to analyze the positive and negative relationship between each variable and the ideal equilibrium E 4 , as shown in Table 3.
S = 1 1 2 α * + β * = 1 1 2 ( L M p L q M + T + K + m E n G + F m E n G + G )

4.2. Simulation Analysis

Assigning values to the situation in Discussion 2, E = 80 ,   F = 120 ,   G = 100 ,   m = 0.5 ,   n = 2 ,   M = 100 ,   K = 20 ,   T = 30 ,   p = 1.2 ,   q = 0.8 . Then using MATLAB R2023a to draw the trajectory of evolution to the equilibrium point with different initial conditions, as shown in Figure 4.
It can be seen from Figure 4 that different initial strategies of both parties have different evolutionary results, indicating that the initial strategies are very critical to the evolutionary results. In this game, the initial state (whether it is university management, policy, or students’ behavior awareness) plays a decisive role. Once the group behavior reaches a stable E S S , individuals cannot achieve better results even if they change their own strategies [33]. In the context of energy-saving behavior in university, this means that all students should consciously participate in energy-saving actions, and this behavior is not easy to be replaced by other non-energy-saving behaviors. Students’ knowledge level is positively correlated with energy conservation, and in the field of education, it is necessary to design how children in a region should learn about renewable energy from primary school [34]. University has a responsibility to regulate students’ environmental awareness, so that students not only carry out this energy-saving behavior on campus, but also carry it into their future careers and lives [35].
The influences of important parameters on system evolution are discussed below, assuming that the initial decision probability of both parties is 0.5; the evolution results are shown in Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8.
The results of evolutionary game show in Figure 5 that the evolution rate will change with the difference in university reputation value. If the university is given a high reputation value, it means that the university has a strong guiding and motivating effect on energy-saving behavior, and the students’ energy-saving behavior may be more easily stimulated. Once the reputation is formed, it is the unique and greatest resource of a university, as the core problem of a diversified mega-university is to maintain and improve its reputation [36]. Data from QS World University Rankings shows a strong connection between sustainability efforts and academic reputation, emphasizing the importance of sustainability in attracting students and improving institutional prestige [37]. High-reputation universities are often able to provide better incentives, educational resources, and policy support to accelerate the spread and stabilization of energy-saving behaviors.
It can be seen from Figure 6 that the strength of students’ binding force directly affects the behavior choice of the university and students. When the students’ binding force is too low, the external incentive of energy-saving behavior is weak. In this case, the university may enhance their awareness of energy-saving and management measures to guide students to participate, thus forming a situation where both sides actively act. However, when the binding force of students is too high, it means that university may face strong management pressure and costs. University is often faced with multiple management tasks, and energy-saving management often fails to become the top management priority, especially in the context of limited budgets and time [38]. Excessive binding force may require the university to provide more stringent systems and control measures, which may lead to higher management costs, but also make students feel their behavior is limited, and a lack of sufficient autonomy and enthusiasm. Therefore, the appropriate balance of students’ binding power is the key to achieving the goal of energy-saving management in a university. Appropriate binding can motivate students to participate actively, if the university provides more convenient and energy-efficient facilities, such as smart lighting, energy-saving air conditioning, solar hot water systems, etc., while excessive binding can be counterproductive, resulting in higher administrative costs and behavioral rebound.
As shown in Figure 7, the establishment of a punishment mechanism can steer the evolution result development towards the ideal state. By setting up certain punishment mechanisms, such as fines, credit deductions, or restrictions on certain benefits, universities can impose costs on students who neglect energy-saving practices, thereby motivating the proactive adoption of such measures. This approach helps prevent free-riding behavior [39], where some students benefit from others’ energy-saving efforts without contributing themselves. Punishment mechanisms thus ensure broader participation and support the collective achievement of energy-saving goals. In practice, evidence from the students to achieve energy savings in universities (SAVES) project [40] shows that in five countries, across 17 universities and involving more than 50,000 students, sustained electricity savings of about 7% were achieved over two academic years through dormitory energy-saving competitions, suggesting that incentive and sanction mechanisms can indeed promote behavioral change on a large scale.
As illustrated in Figure 8, if the income generated from improvements in literacy following energy-saving behavior is inadequate, students may perceive that the investment required for such behaviors is disproportionate to the returns, leading to a lack of motivation to actively engage in energy-saving practices. Over time, this weak incentive can slow the spread of energy-saving practices within the student population, leading more individuals to abandon such behaviors and steering the system away from the ideal evolutionary equilibrium. Conversely, when the literacy-related benefits—such as heightened environmental awareness, stronger social identity, and long-term economic savings—are substantial, students are more likely to recognize the value of energy-saving actions. These tangible gains can encourage wider involvement and help establish energy-saving behavior as a prevailing norm through repeated social interaction.

5. Discussion

The simulation method has important rationality in this study, because it can simulate the evolution process of students’ energy-saving behavior in different situations and verify the stability and adaptability of the game model through repeated experiments. This method can not only overcome the limitation of theoretical analysis but also provide strong support for practical policy making. Next, we will discuss how other key factors in the game model play a role in the simulation to achieve energy-saving behavior in university students.
First, this study assumes the existence of energy-saving policies in universities. However, many Chinese universities currently lack specific policies to regulate students’ energy-saving behavior, and even where such policies exist, they are often shelved without implementation. While stringent regulatory measures could establish a rigorous energy-saving system, an overreliance on control may suppress students’ autonomy and creativity, hindering their independent development [41]. Policy mandates alone are insufficient to foster active student engagement in energy-saving. According to self-determination theory, sustained behavioral self-regulation depends on the fulfillment of basic psychological needs when pursuing meaningful outcomes [42]. Substantial improvement in students’ energy-saving practices can only be achieved through a combination of managerial support and educational guidance [43]. Communication approaches that emphasize autonomy and intrinsic motivation are more likely to encourage voluntary participation, whereas controlling methods—such as compulsory requirements—may undermine enthusiasm [44]. Thus, it is imperative for Chinese universities to develop an energy-saving management system that balances sustainability goals with humanistic values, fostering both campus development and student well-being.
Second, university reputation, as a social perception system formed during the growth of university, has become the key to competition among universities and is also an important guarantee for obtaining high-quality students and financial support. Competition among universities is essentially a competition for reputation, and due to excessive focus on reputation, some universities may be inclined to chase short-term academic results or ranking indicators, while neglecting social responsibilities and cultural innovation [36]. Most Chinese universities are publicly funded, and while administrators are expected to emphasize energy-saving education and management as part of their public mandate, this aspect is frequently overlooked. Studies indicate that academic research output, particularly the volume of highly cited papers, exerts the strongest influence on the reputation of Chinese universities [45]. In the case of public–private universities, a trade-off often exists between reputation enhancement and cost reduction. A stronger reputation lowers the cost of attracting capital and increases resource inflows, whereas reputation-building itself demands substantial investment [46]. Therefore, in advancing green university initiatives, Chinese institutions should strategically integrate teaching and research, positioning energy-saving management as a core strategy for achieving CPCN goals. Such an approach not only supports campus sustainability objectives but also reinforces the binding effect within the game model by elevating institutional reputation. This, in turn, motivates students to actively participate in energy-saving behaviors, guiding the system toward a desirable evolutionarily stable state.
Thirdly, the fundamental contribution of universities under the CPCN goals should begin with reforms on the consumption side. As students’ energy-saving behavior often exhibits a gap between awareness and action, it is essential to guide them in adopting more economical and environmentally friendly habits by reforming the current patterns of resource use. Students who have received environmental education exhibit higher engagement in energy-saving behaviors, particularly in low-carbon actions. A survey study on Chinese university students found that approximately 83% of students reported adopting energy-saving measures in their daily lives, such as turning off unused appliances and lights [47]. Incentive policies can effectively promote urban green development [48], different types of incentive mechanisms, such as monetary rewards and the motivation of social responsibility, and significantly encourage individuals to adopt more environmentally friendly behavior [49]. Students’ behavior is deeply influenced by the external environment. If universities can foster a strong energy-saving cultural atmosphere through effective publicity, education, and system construction, they can subtly shape students’ values, encouraging them to actively participate in energy-saving actions. People are more likely to adopt behavior aligned with social and environmental welfare when driven by social norms or a sense of moral responsibility [50]. Universities can introduce incentives to transform energy-saving outcomes into individual benefits for students, like to community programs in California [51], which aim to promote broader environmental behavior through social and moral incentives. By integrating educational initiatives, cultural cultivation, and incentive mechanisms, universities can foster an environment that promotes environmental stewardship. This holistic approach not only advances sustainable development on campus but also extends its impact to broader societal sustainability and environmental conservation.
Fourth, the lack of an integrated approach combining management and teaching research often poses a significant challenge for universities striving to achieve sustainability [52]. While universities like MIT and the University of Cambridge showcase their strategic plans for sustainable development and statements on environmental initiatives on their websites, detailed information on sustainability goals and practical implementations is often difficult to access [35]. Similarly, few universities in China have outlined clear plans for leveraging instructional technology to enhance students’ sustainability skills during their academic years. For instance, the Renewable Energy Education course [53], developed by the Australian Renewable Energy Cooperative Research Centre, serves as a comprehensive energy science curriculum. This course is tailored to meet the needs of graduates from various universities, equipping them with environmental knowledge essential for sustainable development. Universities should embrace the concept of sustainable development to guide educational research, foster talent for society through sustainability-focused education, and award honorary certificates to students who complete such programs. These certifications should extend beyond academic recognition, offering moral encouragement at the national level. For instance, a sustainability certificate can enhance a graduate’s employability by demonstrating their commitment to sustainability, a quality increasingly valued by employers, thereby leveraging the benefits of “Industry-University-Research” collaboration.

6. Conclusions

This study applies evolutionary game theory to analyze energy-saving behavior among university students. Our findings reveal that such behavior is governed not only by individual awareness but also by institutional policies, socio-cultural factors, and peer influence. The proposed game model offers practical incentives and penalty mechanisms to promote behavioral change and support CPCN goals. These measures enhance the social responsibility of both universities and students, providing valuable insights for higher education institutions worldwide.
However, this study has certain limitations. First, it primarily focuses on student behavior, while overlooking the influence of other stakeholders, such as government agencies, on energy-saving actions. Second, the model’s assumptions are somewhat simplified, not fully capturing external economic factors, cultural variability, or the complexities of policy implementation. Future research could expand the game model to include additional stakeholders and incorporate real-world case studies, which would enhance the scientific rigor of the study and provide more actionable policy recommendations.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization and methodology, C.Z.; Writing—original draft preparation, C.Z.; Supervision, Q.Z.; Writing—review and editing, Q.Z. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This work was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture (BUCEA). And sponsored by the BUCEA Post Graduate Innovation Project [DG2024028].

Data Availability Statement

The original contributions presented in this study are included in the article.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Figure 1. Game tree of energy-saving behavior between university and students.
Figure 1. Game tree of energy-saving behavior between university and students.
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Figure 2. Game deductive phase diagram I.
Figure 2. Game deductive phase diagram I.
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Figure 3. Game deductive phase diagram II.
Figure 3. Game deductive phase diagram II.
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Figure 4. Dynamic evolution process of university and students.
Figure 4. Dynamic evolution process of university and students.
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Figure 5. Influence of university reputation F on evolution results.
Figure 5. Influence of university reputation F on evolution results.
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Figure 6. Influence of student constraint cost L on evolution results.
Figure 6. Influence of student constraint cost L on evolution results.
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Figure 7. The influence of punishment T on the evolutionary results.
Figure 7. The influence of punishment T on the evolutionary results.
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Figure 8. Influence of student cultivation M on evolution results.
Figure 8. Influence of student cultivation M on evolution results.
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Table 1. Game payoff matrix between university and students.
Table 1. Game payoff matrix between university and students.
Scheme 1.Strategies for University
Implement Policy
α
Non-Implement Policy
1 − α
Comply with policy
β
M L + K ,   E + F G M L ,   E
Non-comply with policy
1 − β
q M p L T ,   m E n G + F 0 ,   0
Table 2. Local stability analysis of equilibrium points.
Table 2. Local stability analysis of equilibrium points.
Point of EquilibriumEigenvalueCondition of StabilityResult
E 1 0 , 0 λ 1 = m E n G + F
λ 2 = M L
m E n G + F < 0
M L < 0
E S S
E 2 0 , 1 λ 1 = F G
λ 2 = ( M L )
F G < 0
( M L ) < 0
E S S
E 3 1 , 0 λ 1 = ( m E n G + F )
λ 2 = 1 q M + ( p 1 ) L + T + K
λ 2 > 0 Instability
E 4 1 , 1 λ 1 = ( F G )
λ 2 = [ 1 q M + ( p 1 ) L + T + K ]
( F G ) < 0 E S S
E 5 α * , β * λ 1 = α * 1 α * ( m E n G + F )
λ 2 = β * 1 β * ( p L q M + T + K )
t r j = 0
d e t j 0
Instability
Table 3. Effects of parameters on evolution equilibrium.
Table 3. Effects of parameters on evolution equilibrium.
Impact Parameters Partial   Derivative   of   S The   Effect   on   S
L <0
M >0
T , K >0
p , m >0
q , n <0
E >0
G <0
F >0
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Zhang, Q.; Zhang, C. Game Analysis on Energy-Saving Behavior of University Students Under the “Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality” Goals. Sustainability 2025, 17, 9209. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17209209

AMA Style

Zhang Q, Zhang C. Game Analysis on Energy-Saving Behavior of University Students Under the “Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality” Goals. Sustainability. 2025; 17(20):9209. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17209209

Chicago/Turabian Style

Zhang, Qunli, and Chaojie Zhang. 2025. "Game Analysis on Energy-Saving Behavior of University Students Under the “Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality” Goals" Sustainability 17, no. 20: 9209. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17209209

APA Style

Zhang, Q., & Zhang, C. (2025). Game Analysis on Energy-Saving Behavior of University Students Under the “Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality” Goals. Sustainability, 17(20), 9209. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17209209

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