Greening the Economy from the Ground Up: How the Minimum Wage Affects Firms’ Pollution Emissions in China
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Policy Background
3. Research Hypotheses
3.1. The Product Structure Effect
3.2. Technological Innovation Effect
3.3. Managerial Efficiency Effect
3.4. Heterogeneity: The Choreography of Regional Disparities
4. Variables Data and Method
4.1. Variables
4.1.1. Core Explanatory Variable
4.1.2. Dependent Variable
4.1.3. Mechanism Variables
4.1.4. Control Variables
4.2. Data Source
4.2.1. China Industrial Firm Panel Database
4.2.2. China Industrial Firm Pollution Database
4.2.3. District and County Panel Data
4.3. Data Matching
4.4. Method
4.4.1. Baseline Regression Model
4.4.2. Causal Forests Algorithm
4.5. Spatial Correlation Analysis
5. Results
5.1. Baseline Regression Result
5.2. Robust Check
5.2.1. Parallel Trends Assumption
5.2.2. Placebo Test
5.2.3. Change the Spatial Matrix
5.2.4. Addressing Endogeneity Concerns: IV Approach
5.3. Heterogeneity Analysis
5.3.1. Level of Economic Development
5.3.2. Magnitude of Minimum Wage Adjustment
5.3.3. Stringency of Environmental Regulations
5.4. Long-Term Effects
6. Mechanism Test
6.1. Labor Productivity Dynamics
6.2. Cost Pass-Through Effect
6.3. Corporate Governance and Environmental Performance
7. Conclusions and Policy Implication
7.1. Conclusions
7.2. Policy Implication
- (1)
- Balancing Economic and Environmental Goals: Integrated Policy Design: Policymakers should consider an integrated approach when designing labor and environmental policies. For instance, wage policies can be synchronized with environmental regulations to ensure mutual reinforcement. This could involve setting minimum wage levels that also account for environmental performance metrics of firms.
- (2)
- Incentives for Sustainable Practices: Financial incentives should be provided, such as tax breaks or subsidies for firms that achieve both wage compliance and environmental standards. This encourages firms to invest in sustainable technologies and practices without compromising economic viability.
- (3)
- Supporting Firms in Transition: Access to Green Technologies: Access to green technologies should be facilitated through grants, low-interest loans, or public–private partnerships. This support can help firms offset the initial costs of adopting cleaner technologies.
- (4)
- Training and Capacity Building: Training programs for management and workers should be implemented covering the benefits and implementation of green technologies. This helps build internal capacity and supports a smoother transition to sustainable practices.
- (5)
- Gradual Implementation of Wage Hikes: Minimum wage increases should be gradually introduced to give firms time to adjust. Coupled with environmental targets, this phased approach can prevent sudden financial strain and encourage sustainable adjustments.
- (6)
- Targeted Regional Implementation: There should be recognition that due to the heterogeneous impact across regions with varying economic developments, there is an opportunity for calibrated, region-specific wage adjustments. In regions at the cusp of industrial transformation, ensuring wage hikes could serve the dual purpose of enhancing worker welfare and inadvertently catalyzing greener production methods.
- (7)
- Incentivizing Green Corporate Governance: The observed interaction between corporate governance structures and environmental outcomes signals a pressing need to incorporate ESG metrics more firmly within corporate performance evaluations. Offering tax incentives or subsidies to firms that excel in green governance could provide the necessary impetus for more sustainable operations.
- (8)
- Inclusive Policy Formulation: Key stakeholders should be identified and engaged, including industrial bodies, labor unions, and environmental groups, in policy formulation. Joint workshops, feedback sessions, and collaborative policy design initiatives can ensure that wage policies are economically viable and environmentally prudent.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variable Name | Average | Standard Deviation | Min | Max | N |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
0.3058 | 0.2015 | 0.4291 | 2.3514 | 19,384 | |
2.4460 | 7.1286 | 0.0464 | 64.0385 | 19,384 | |
did | 0.1760 | 0.1131 | 0.0374 | 0.4333 | 19,384 |
rd | 48.1854 | 8.7020 | 28.3300 | 66.4100 | 19,384 |
Sk | 1.2886 | 0.5895 | 0.4380 | 3.3208 | 19,384 |
sce | 0.0133 | 0.0113 | 0.0016 | 0.0424 | 19,384 |
fne | 1.3300 | 1.2034 | 0.4697 | 9.6221 | 19,384 |
Ffi | 0.0105 | 0.0133 | 0.0000 | 0.0613 | 19,384 |
efu | 0.0405 | 0.0736 | 0.0009 | 0.4277 | 19,384 |
Dcn | 0.0401 | 0.0329 | 0.0011 | 0.1185 | 19,384 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variables | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu |
did | −0.034 *** | −0.174 *** | −1.845 *** | −0.262 ** | −0.303 ** | −0.292 *** |
(−3.83) | (−3.97) | (−12.70) | (−2.26) | (−2.52) | (−5.31) | |
Control | N | Y | Y | Y | N | Y |
city FE | Y | N | Y | N | Y | Y |
id FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Observations | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 |
R-squared | 0.821 | 0.479 | 0.592 | 0.384 | 0.031 | 0.178 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variables | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu |
did | −1.138 *** | −0.770 * | −0.607 ** | −1.391 *** | −1.386 *** | −1.210 *** |
(−3.04) | (−1.85) | (−2.04) | (−6.08) | (−5.87) | (−4.18) | |
Control | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
id FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Year FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Observations | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 |
R-squared | 0.592 | 0.732 | 0.086 | 0.384 | 0.031 | 0.178 |
Test | Statistic |
---|---|
Hausmann Testing | 864.32 *** |
DWH test | 69.57 *** |
Weak correlation test | 83.82 *** |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Phase 1 | Phase 2 | |||
Variables | Minimum Wage | Minimum Wage | ||
iv | −0.267 *** | −0.268 *** | ||
(−3.08) | (−3.10) | |||
Did | −0.195 ** | −0.243 *** | ||
(−2.41) | (−3.06) | |||
Constant | 1.518 *** | 0.477 *** | ||
(95.80) | (2.72) | |||
city FE | N | Y | N | Y |
id FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Year FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Observations | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 |
R-squared | 0.729 | 0.731 | 0.084 | 0.219 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variables | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu | Pollu |
did | −0.001 *** | −0.002 *** | −0.051 *** | −0.048 ** | −1.113 *** | −1.131 *** | −1.103 *** | −1.158 *** | −1.113 *** |
(−2.71) | (−2.63) | (−2.60) | (−2.53) | (−9.43) | (−9.41) | (−7.01) | (−7.16) | (−9.43) | |
Mechanism1 | 0.494 *** | 0.504 *** | 0.556 *** | ||||||
(0.0250) | (0.0242) | (0.0262) | |||||||
Mechanism2 | 4.850 *** | 4.821 *** | 5.343 *** | ||||||
(2.73) | (3.86) | (4.36) | |||||||
Mechanism3 | 0.193 *** | 0.314 *** | 0.155 *** | ||||||
(0.0381) | (0.0382) | (0.0154) | |||||||
Control | N | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N | Y | Y |
id FE | Y | N | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N | Y |
Year FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Observations | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 | 19,384 |
R-squared | 0.821 | 0.479 | 0.592 | 0.384 | 0.031 | 0.178 | 0.821 | 0.479 | 0.592 |
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Ren, H.; Zhu, M.; Lyu, B. Greening the Economy from the Ground Up: How the Minimum Wage Affects Firms’ Pollution Emissions in China. Sustainability 2024, 16, 6020. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16146020
Ren H, Zhu M, Lyu B. Greening the Economy from the Ground Up: How the Minimum Wage Affects Firms’ Pollution Emissions in China. Sustainability. 2024; 16(14):6020. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16146020
Chicago/Turabian StyleRen, Haili, Ming Zhu, and Bofei Lyu. 2024. "Greening the Economy from the Ground Up: How the Minimum Wage Affects Firms’ Pollution Emissions in China" Sustainability 16, no. 14: 6020. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16146020
APA StyleRen, H., Zhu, M., & Lyu, B. (2024). Greening the Economy from the Ground Up: How the Minimum Wage Affects Firms’ Pollution Emissions in China. Sustainability, 16(14), 6020. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16146020