Persistent Vulnerability after Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Response: The Case of Salgar, Colombia

Abstract

Community-based disaster management (CBDM) has replaced traditional models of disaster risk reduction (DRR), giving the community a more participatory role in the planning and implementation of risk mitigation and preparedness strategies, disaster response, and post-disaster recovery measures. This shift in disaster response approaches has impacted understandings of vulnerability and resilience, leading scholars and policy makers to move away from a physical definition of vulnerability and to incorporate social variables. However, in Colombia, a traditional DRR approach still prevails. The National Risk Management Policy employs a top-down approach to risk reduction and disaster management, relying on the action of governmental authorities without community participation in the design or implementation of risk management planning and strategy. This article reveals the deficiencies of traditional DRR approaches. The Colombian government’s post-disaster resettlement project after a 2015 landslide in Salgar, Antioquia that resulted in 98 people dead or missing did not contribute to the reduction of vulnerability for the resettled community. To accurately measure post-disaster vulnerability and resilience, a new holistic model of indicators that includes both social and biophysical variables that illustrate and measure the relevance of preexisting vulnerabilities was developed. Local data was collected through 178 surveys administered to the inhabitants of Salgar’s three post-disaster resettlement sectors—La Habana, La Florida, and Las Margaritas—to construct an accurate picture of the populations affected by the disaster. Our results show that in the case of Salgar, social vulnerabilities persist even in the physical components of the resettlement sites where new infrastructure would be expected to reduce hazardous conditions and exposure to risk.

1. Introduction

The transition from a disaster risk reduction (DRR) to a community-based disaster management (CBDM) strategy in disaster management implies a fundamental transformation in the approach to the response to critical events in the present and in the future. Unlike DRR, CBDM is built on the assumption that communities should participate in and devise their own mitigation measures in order to further develop their response capacities.

Cardona (2003) describes this shift in approaches to disaster and risk management beginning in the 1940s, when it was led by specialists in the natural sciences and based in the study of large magnitude natural phenomenon like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, or large landslides, until the current approach where the social dimensions of vulnerability are included and take on greater relevance [1]. Three main approaches were developed during this time: (1) The threat-risk analysis approach, (2) the social construction of risk, and (3) an integrated or holistic approach [2,3]. However, as Lampis (2013) notes, disaster response is always political [4]. Conducting research about disaster response is inherently political in that it implies taking sides in the face of scientific positions based on the researcher’s understanding of the relationship between human and natural systems, which may or may not conflict with that of state institutions, the actors that ultimately define what is vulnerability and who is vulnerable as well as how to manage and reduce risk. In the majority of cases, a strong emphasis is placed on mitigation. To make matters more complicated, key concepts including risk, vulnerability, and adaptive capacity are used in an indistinct manner; Adger (2006) explains that these concepts have different meaning according to the discipline and approach from which the research is conducted [5]. For example, from a social construction of risk approach, “‘vulnerability’ is defined as the inverse function of the capacity of individuals, groups, households, and communities to prevent, resist, confront, and recover from the impact or effect of events that result in an active loss, be it material or immaterial” [4] (p. 23). This definition of vulnerability implies a recognition of the preexisting vulnerabilities derived from the economic policies assumed by the country in accordance with specific models of national development. In 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) added that the concept of vulnerability should account for the capacity of the social system to respond to the hazards to which its territory is exposed [6]. Thus, a holistic or integrated approach combines “characteristics of internal (social) vulnerability with that of a social unit (a population or a place) with its exposure to the risk factors present in the surrounding biophysical environment” [4] (p. 24).

Despite the advances made in academic discussions, few instruments for the measurement of vulnerability in face of disaster exist. In particular, “in Latin America, the most commonly used methodologies for measuring vulnerability part of the structure for the risk assessment and vary depending on their scope and objective (…) The consideration of social elements that can affect the development of social networks and adaptation capacity is deficient in many of these methodologies and impairs the evaluation of the resilience of the potentially affected population” [7] (p. 1). Most of the current measurement systems for Latin America are structured from an integrated or holistic approach. For example, Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley (2003) structure their model based on the relationship between biophysical vulnerability and social vulnerability [8]. Chardon (2004), who builds on Cutter’s territory–threat model, incorporates the idea of geosystems from a multidisciplinary and multidimensional perspective [9]. Thomas Bohórquez (2013) and Álvarez-Ríos et al. (2019) create mechanisms for measurement using the PCA (Principal Component Analysis) method [10,11]. In 2018, the National Unit for Risk Management (Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo—UNGR) created the Risk atlas of Colombia with the goal of establishing a reliable mechanism for the holistic evaluation of social vulnerability across all the national territory, building on the MOVE (Multi-dimensional and Holistic Framework for Assessing Vulnerability) and CAPRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) projects advanced by Cardona et al. (2010) and Birckmann et al. (2013), respectively [12,13]. In 2020, Roncancio, Cutter and Nandocci, using the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) developed for the United States, created the Social Vulnerability during Natural Hazards Assessment using data from the 2005 census provided by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) and the 2009 data of the Selecting Beneficiaries of Social Programs (SISBEN) [7]. The multiplicity of existing measurement mechanisms gives rise to the question of which of the mechanism used to assess vulnerability and resilience after disasters will best support models of intervention that privilege community resilience to national disasters as the only viable alternative for the reduction of vulnerability in contrast with traditional disaster management models? The measurement model presented below builds from an integrated or holistic approach, using a combination of biophysical and social variables. However, the social and economic dimensions are privileged with the goal of “understand[ing] the pre-existing social vulnerability throughout the territory as a first step in national disaster risk reduction” [7] (p. 2). In contrast with the analysis carried out by Roncancio, Cutter, and Nandocci (2020) where the minimum scale continues to be the city and secondary data continues to be the main source of information used, our model produces an approximation of the micro scale within the communities affected by disasters by using primary information gathering [7]. Our local-level, primary-research-based methodology gives us real insight into the reach of the capacities of resistance created in the post-disaster intervention in the communities as well as their possible future impacts. The measurement model developed in this article addresses a gap in the resilience measurement models inventoried by Ostadtaghizadeh et al. (2015), who state that “Although local data are not always available, community disaster resilience assessment needs local- or community-level data. None of current models has assessed spatial indicators of community disaster resilience such as elevation” [14] (p. 11).

However, the result of the pilot of the application is not encouraging. Countries like Colombia continue to implement top-down responses to emergencies. According to the National Risk Management Policy, departmental and municipal governments are the institutions obliged to fulfill the actions described in the policy. Therefore, communities are disenfranchised and do not have a relevant role in the definition of risk mitigation, prevention, or response planning or in the execution, which results in actions that do not generate community capacities. The municipality of Salgar is a paradigmatic case in point. On 18 May 2015, at 2:00 am, a dam failure at Cerro Plateado on La Liboriana Creek resulted in a torrential flood that swept away everything in its path: houses, animals, belongings, and the two bridges that connected the banks of the creek. Some 98 people died or went missing. The State response was the traditional one: survivors were resettled into three housing complexes, two located in urban environments and one in a nearby rural area. Since 2017, the surviving families have inhabited the new housing complexes, but their social vulnerabilities persist. In some cases, their conditions have actually worsened, causing some of the families to return to the site of the tragedy.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the traditional disaster risk management approach did not contribute to the reduction of social vulnerability in the case of the municipality of Salgar, Antioquia. First, we explain the recent paradigm shift in the predominant risk management models and assess the importance of resilience in this transformation. Then, we evaluate the existing measurement models with regard to vulnerability and resilience during disasters and contextualize the Salgar case study. Next, we propose a new method for evaluating vulnerability and resilience using an indicator model that we created to assess the primary information we collected in relation to the dimensions proposed by the models analyzed. To close, the findings are presented and distilled into a general conclusion about the multiple persistent vulnerabilities in the post-disaster case study.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. The Changing Paradigm of Risk Management: From Management to Resilience

The traditional disaster management model “that evolved since World War II overly emphasizes technical and programmatic guidelines in response and mitigation strategies, disregarding the dynamics and roles of state actors, good governance and effective local community participation” [15] (p. 1765). A number of internal and external factors in the prevailing risk management model have prompted a paradigm shift away from traditional top-down disaster management models. First, traditional disaster management models exhibit little success in addressing the needs of vulnerable populations [16]. Second, the parallel occurrence of catastrophic events of all kinds during the last decade has collapsed ideas of development, leading to major development setbacks both with regard to economic growth and human development [17] (p. 9). Furthermore, the exponential increase in the occurrence of small and medium-scale disasters has intensified the devastation of disaster-related losses [17].

Thus, the major shifts in disaster management discourse in recent years have focused on moving away from a reactive, top-down mode to a proactive, community-centered mode and shifting away from relief and response to disaster risk reduction (DRR) and community-based disaster management (CBDM) as a function of improved community resilience to natural disasters [16]. At the heart of CBDM is the belief that risk management based on local resources and capacities can reduce vulnerability [16]. This new strategy directly involves the most vulnerable in the planning and implementation of risk mitigation and preparedness strategies as well as response and recovery measures [16].

The focus of community-based disaster management is the capacity for resilience, understood as the ability of subjects and organizations to cope with risk [17] (p. 9). As stated by Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, and Pfefferbaum (2008) community resilience is composed of a set of four domains of adaptation that are the basis for disaster preparedness: Economic Development, Social Capital, Information and Communication, and Community Competence [18]. Collective resilience implies an institutional exercise of attacking existing resource inequality for the effective contribution of the community to disaster risk reduction, which is achieved by involving the population in decision-making for planning and mitigation, strengthening organizational networks, protecting social supports, and giving community members access to information to be able to act in the face of uncertainty. This is a process of strengthening agency, understood as post-disaster adaptive capacity, which is expressed in the wellbeing of the population with regard to mental health and quality of life [18] (p. 127). In short, resilience is “a process that links a set of adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation following a disturbance” [19] (p. 4). In short, DRR is focused on relief and response and, more often than not, is applied in a top-down manner from state actors to the community, whereas CBDM prioritizes community resilience from a bottom-up perspective (Figure 1).

In 2005, the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) developed the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015 to strengthen the resilience of nations and communities affected by disasters. The HFA strategy prioritized the community level in DRR to engage with communities and make them self-sufficient. Building off the Hyogo Framework, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 established four goals to shift DRR practice away from reactive management to proactive resilience building: (i) understanding disaster risk; (ii) strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk; (iii) investing in disaster reduction for resilience and; (iv) improving disaster preparedness for effective response and to “build back better” in recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction [20]. Similarly, the “International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) framework for community resilience asserted, a resilient community strengthens the ability of its constituent individuals and households, and possesses a number of resilience-enhancing features, including that it: (i) is knowledgeable, healthy and capable of meeting its basic needs; (ii) is socially cohesive; (iii) offers economic opportunities; (iv) possesses well-maintained and accessible infrastructure and services; (v) effectively manages its natural assets; and (vi) is well-connected” [19] (p. 4).

Thus, as shown above, community-based disaster management (CBDM) is a bottom-up approach covering the stages of prevention and mitigation, preparedness, emergency response, and recovery [21]. The approach is based on community participation that involves at-risk populations from planning, identifying disaster-related risks, decision making on risk reduction, and problem solving to final implementation, employing community consultation to minimize response failures. Therefore, this approach considers communities as the principal producers of knowledge about their vulnerability conditions and agents capable of making the best decisions to contribute to their wellbeing. Therefore, the community is the one who carries out the comprehensive assessment of the hazards to which they are exposed, their specific vulnerabilities, and their capacities, which are the basis for disaster risk reduction activities, projects, and programs [16].

The concepts community-based disaster management (CBDM), community-based disaster risk reduction (CBDRR), community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM), and community-based disaster preparedness (CBDP) are used as synonyms in the literature [16]. The approach aims to prepare communities to respond to unexpected events through their active participation in local government and the effort of volunteers. The participation of people focuses not only on the CBDM processes but also on its content to take control of their environment as a criterion to guide the decisions and actions of governments and public administrators [16]. This approach implies that the role of institutions is “to support and promote their own [community’s] feelings of competence and capacity in the stages of disaster mitigation, including preparedness, response and recovery” [22]. The problems for practical implementation in communities at risk and the development of public policies are clear in the Colombian case, where, as we show below, DDR continues to be the principal approach.

2.2. Risk Management in Colombia

The institutional regulatory framework in Colombia has not been conceptualized from a holistic or comprehensive perspective of risk management; the development of legislation in this area has been framed in reaction to disasters. Since 1922, regulations began to be issued to create entities to respond to emergency or public order situations. For example, Decree 313 of 1922 recognized the Colombian Red Cross as an auxiliary to the army’s sanitation service so it could be incorporated into the League of International Red Cross Societies; Law 142 of 1937 established the rights and duties of the Red Cross as a National Institute of Assistance and Public Charity, and Law 49 of 1948 provided for the creation of National Relief in case of Public Calamity.

The first Colombian law regulating disasters was Law 9 of 1979, by which sanitary measures were established and an emergency committee was created at the national, departmental, and municipal levels. Title VIII of the law states the purpose of disaster regulation: as preventive measures. Articles 496 to 498 establish vulnerability analysis for facilities that provide public services, be they publicly or privately operated. Additionally, it dictates that these entities must take the applicable preventive measures depending on the result of the vulnerability analysis. Although a procedure for vulnerability analysis was established, vulnerability was conceived of as the impact on public service facilities and was not considered from other perspectives. In the 1991 Political Constitution, the State’s obligation regarding disaster prevention and attention was defined. In Law 99 of 1993, strict measures were established for the protection of the environment and responsibility for environmental protection was assigned to the Regional Autonomous Corporations. In 2012, Law 1523 was adopted, setting the national policy for disaster risk management, establishing the National System for Disaster Risk Management, and providing some other provisions. Article 1 of said law states:

Disaster risk management is a social process oriented to the formulation, execution, follow-up, and evaluation of policies, strategies, plans, programs, regulations, instruments, measures, and permanent actions for the knowledge and reduction of risk and for disaster management, with the explicit purpose of contributing to the safety, well-being, quality of life of people, and sustainable development.

[23]

Furthermore, in Article 6, the law articulates the general objective of the national risk management system: “to carry out the social process of risk management in order to provide protection to the population in the Colombian territory, improve safety, welfare, and quality of life, and contribute to sustainable development” [23].

Nonetheless, Law 1523 emphasizes technical and programmatic guidelines oriented towards the design of response and mitigation strategies, along the same lines as the traditional disaster management model. The possibly problematic role of state actors was clearly disregarded as the National Unit for Disaster Management was created as the organizational structure for the Disaster Risk Management System, along with the Planning Instruments, the Disaster Management Process, Information Systems, and Financing Mechanisms. The community does not constitute a determinant player; community involvement is sought only in the process of emergency relief reporting assigned to local Disaster Relief Committees. The exclusion of the community from decision making, planning, and implementation occurs even though Law 1523 supposedly takes as its base the principles of good governance and effective local community participation.

Moreover, although Law 1523 of 2012 defines disaster risk management as a social process, in the formulation component, technical analysis is privileged above the perception of risk by the different social groups involved due to the leadership organized by the law. In Article 37, departmental, district, and municipal authorities and their risk management Councils are given authority to formulate and deliver the disaster risk management plan and response in their respective jurisdiction. Interestingly, according to Article 28, risk management councils are made up of nine members, none of whom correspond to the community impacted by the disaster. The members include: (1) the governor, mayor, or their representative, (2) the director of the risk management entity, (3) the directors of the public service entities, or their representatives, (4) a representative of each of the autonomous regional corporations and sustainable development corporations in the respective territorial jurisdiction, (5) the director of the Colombian civil defense in the jurisdiction, or their representative, (6) the director of the Colombian Red Cross in the respective jurisdiction, (7) the departmental delegate of firefighters, or the commander of the respective municipal firefighters, (8) a secretary appointed by the department of the municipality, and (9) the commander of the police force in the respective jurisdiction, or their delegate.

The form of incorporating risk management into the planning process was determined through Decree 1807 of 2014. Basic studies identify zones in conditions of risk. However, this same decree delegates the vulnerability analysis to different land managers, thereby limiting the identification of areas exposed to risk. Additionally, the follow-up detailed studies of potential at-risk zones identified in the basic studies, through which conditions of vulnerability are defined, only consider physical factors. Additionally, even though the current National Plan for the Management of Disaster Risk 2015–2025 states that it uses the Hyogo Framework as an organizing principal, it does not follow through with the commitment to the promotion of community resilience in the face of disasters that characterizes the Hyogo Framework. For example, in the national plan, community resilience is mentioned only once, in the chapter about Strategies for the Achievement of Proposed Objectives, in the component of Informed Society and Conscious Participation in Disaster Risk Management. All that is stated is that citizen education and public consultation strategies for the dissemination of information will promote the creation of a culture community participation before disasters [24]. Similarly, during the negotiation of the new Action Framework Hyogo II, the Colombian government identified five priorities including the adoption of a Community Focus, in which all Disaster Risk Management intervention should be designed and implemented by the community for the community [25]. In light of the government’s professed commitment to community centered disaster management, a thorough revision of the prevailing models of risk management until today in the country and their impact on the development of community capacity becomes even timelier and more important.

2.3. Resilience and Vulnerability Measurement and Operationalization Process

The international literature has documented the effort to measure both vulnerability and resilience to determine the impact of risk management, in some cases for specific events such as earthquakes. In the Colombian case, the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management (Unidad Nacional de Gestión de Riesgo de Desastres, Spanish acronym UNGRD) created the Colombian Risk Atlas in the framework of the Global Assessment Report (GAR). This tool makes a probabilistic flood hazard assessment, and as will be seen below, Salgar has a high comprehensive risk according to the holistic risk index. In the case of resilience, these measurements seek to respond to the assessment of community disaster resilience approach. An examination of the principal existing measurement models follows below.

2.3.1. Vulnerability Measurement

Currently, many models for the measurement of risk exist. MOVE (Multi-dimensional and Holistic Framework for Assessing Vulnerability) and CAPRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) are two examples. MOVE is a framework that provides a conceptualization for the multidimensional nature of vulnerability and links the concept to social conditions and processes. This framework also introduces “the concept of adaptation into disaster management” [13] (p. 199). There are also models for specific hazards, for example, the Global Earthquake Model (GEM) for seismic hazards. All the aforementioned risk assessment models are premised on “vulnerability and disaster risk assessment from a holistic view” [13] (p. 197), and all use probabilistic models. They use the limited available information to best predict future scenarios and consider the high uncertainty involved in the analysis. Therefore, risk assessments need to be prospective, anticipating scientifically credible events that might happen in the future [12]. This approach means that the models classify vulnerability and risk according to different dimensions like exposure, susceptibility, social response capacities, or lack of resilience. An important point about this approach is the understanding that the “vulnerability assessment cannot be limited to the identification of deficiencies” [13] (p. 198).

In the Colombian context, the Universidad de los Andes developed the CAPRA risk management evaluation model in 2017. CAPRA is a techno-scientific methodology and information platform that models probabilistic metrics to analyze different types of natural hazards, exposure, vulnerability, and risk assessment at various territorial levels. It was developed with the technical and financial support from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the International Strategy of United Nations for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) [12,26]. The CAPRA methodology assesses three elements: (1) exposure, (2) vulnerability, and (3) structural analysis.

To analyze seismic hazards in particular, Cardona et al. created the Risk Management Index in the GEM [12]. This index incorporates data from cadastral databases to identify building locations, as well as relevant information for estimating replacement cost and structural vulnerability. Additionally, field surveys, aerial and satellite imagery, and exposure databases have been developed at building-by-building resolution. On the national scale, proxy models have been developed using socioeconomic data from the most recent census [27]. From the institutional position, UNGRD created the Colombian Risk Atlas. This atlas was built in the framework of the Global Assessment Report (GAR). This tool makes a probabilistic flood hazard assessment similar to the flood hazard evaluation developed under the GAR15 [28,29]. The Colombian Risk Atlas defines the processes and goals of risk assessment, stating:

Comprehensive risk assessment aims to reveal risk from a developmental perspective using, on the one hand, potential physical loss or damage as physical risk, which is directly linked to the occurrence of events, and on the other, capturing how underlying risk factors or amplifiers that are not dependent on the hazard–social, economic, or environmental—can worsen risk conditions due to a lack of capacity to anticipate, resist, or respond to and recover from adverse effects.

[29] (p. 101)

With similar strategy to MOVE and CAPRA, the Colombian Risk Atlas uses three components: (1) holistic risk, (2) relative physical risk, and (3) impact factor. The last component includes the elements of social vulnerability and resilience. “Impact factor reflects social fragility and lack of resilience, aspects that aggravate the direct impact or physical risk and resilience, and that are, in turn, drivers or underlying causes of increased risk or future disasters, as seen from a holistic perspective” [29] (p. 104). The UNDGR uses two aspects—social fragility and lack of resilience—as indicators for the evaluation of impact factor.

As clarified by the UNGRD (2018), to analyze the impact factor, “16 socioeconomic indicators available in databases in the country were used. These were selected taking into account the availability of information for most municipalities in Colombia considering also that they reflect the socioeconomic and governance reality of each municipality” [29] (p. 104). However, the available information falls short of representing the complexities of vulnerability and resilience in the territory. Furthermore, it only reaches a municipal scale, ignoring the distances with regard to social vulnerability existing between the different sectors within a municipality, especially the great differences in vulnerability between rural and urban sectors. According to the index, Salgar has a high holistic risk level. Likewise, the relative physical risk is high, with a score of 1.00 on a scale of 0.00 to 1.00. In contrast, Salgar’s impact factor is moderate according to UNGRD probabilistic calculations, with a score of 0.62 in a range between 0.00 and 1.00 [29].

For the purposes of this paper, susceptibility is the “predisposition of the elements at the risk (social and ecological) to suffer harm” and “lack of resilience” refers to the “limitations with regard to access to and mobilization of community resources or a social-ecological system in response to an identified hazard” [13] (p. 200). However, the UNGRD analyses have two weaknesses: first, their analyses only reach, in the best cases, the municipal scale, and second, the fragility and resilience components are limited because they are highly dependent on the secondary information existing in the official national databases. The data used to assign impact factor is based on information collected through government-conducted research, so the impact factor for the case of the municipality of Salgar is questionable.

2.3.2. Resilience Measurement

Conceptual approaches to resilience measurement and its operationalization process are still incipient. In a literature review of the subject, Ostadtaghizadeh et al. (2015) point out that there is a scarcity of studies that specifically address measurement and operationalization issues because there is a lack of agreement on how the concept of resilience translates into a measurable framework [14]. The absence of comparable conceptualizations regarding domains, variables, and indicators creates problems for systematic research on resilience, practical implementation in communities at risk, and the development of public policies. In particular, existing models often fail to include social and psychological factors. Therefore, valid and reliable measures of social capital that can be extended to all cultures and various hazards should be strengthened. Furthermore, it is necessary to quantify the relationships and interdependencies between variables and particularly between levels of analysis. In short, the authors highlight the presence of two models of community resilience to disasters—one that measures the level of disaster resilience based on the current state of resilience characteristics, the other with a process and outcome approach, which measures both the process and the outcome of actions and programs that could increase the level of disaster resilience in the community. Almost all existing studies are qualitative in nature and omit spatial indicators and data at the local or community level.

The current literature classifies resilience indicators into five domains: social, economic, institutional, physical, and natural. After discarding articles that did not present any assessment tool or model, or that were not original, or did not come from a peer reviewed journal, Ostadtaghizadeh et al. (2015) identified 10 models, tools, or indices that had been used to assess community disaster resilience [14]. Of these, only three—the Baseline Resilience Index for Communities (BRIC), Climate Disaster Resilience Index (CDRI), and Community Disaster Resilience Index (CDRI)—used similar indicators to assess the process and outcome aspects of disaster resilience. The dimensions used to measure community resilience in the articles analyzed above are presented in

Table 1. UNGRD indicators used for holistic risk calculation. Source [29] (p. 104).

Indicator	Descriptor	Definition
Social fragility	People in misery	Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index, People living. in extreme poverty [%]
	Housing	Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index, Housing component [%]
	Overcrowding	Critically overcrowded housing [%]
	Drinking water and water and basic sanitation services	Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index, Services component [%]
	Dependent population	Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index, Dependency component [%]
	Infant mortality rate	Crude mortality rate in children under 1 year of age. [per 100 1ive births]
	Illiterate population	Illiterate population [%]
	Unemployment	Working age population without formal employment [%]
Lack of resilience	Governability	Comprehensive Performance Index
	Risk management	Municipal Risk Index, risk management component
	Income	Per capita taxable income
	Income	Non-taxable income per capita
	Economic importance	Value added per capita
	Population	Percentage of population in head of household (INV)
	Business density	Business density per 10,000 inhabitants
	Health centers	N. IPS per 1000 inhabitants

.

Ostadtaghizadeh et al. organize the ten models that they review into two main groups:

We can classify the models of community disaster resilience in two groups. The first group measures the level of disaster resilience based on the existing status of disaster resilience characteristics. The second group has a process and outcome approach that measures both the process and the outcome of actions and programs which could increase the level of disaster resilience in the community. While disaster resilience processes and outcomes are developed and implemented based on the basic indicators, it seems that the first group could assess the level of community disaster resilience rather than the second group.

[14] (p. 11)

The authors point out that the majority of the models for measuring community resilience are qualitative, which invited scholars to development quantitative measurements in order to approach the phenomenon from the local and community level, thereby avoiding the blindness which can be produced through the use of national data: “National data are often out of date and inadequate for local level” [14] (p. 11). Moreover, a more micro quantitative approach allows scholars to overcome the obstacles related to the availability of and access to local information. In this article, we collected primary information through surveys to overcome the aforementioned obstacles of availability and access.

Moreover, in addition to the measurement process for vulnerability presented below, multiple scales for measuring resilience were used to create a complementary instrument that was also applied. The scales included The Resilience Scale (RS), a modified version of the Coping Strategies Scale, the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS), the Flood Risk Perception Scale, and the F-Copes Scale of the Personal Evaluation of Family Functioning in Crisis Situations Scale [30,31,32,33,34]. In the research program that gave rise to this article, the researchers also carried out a validation of the FRAS (Family Resilience Assessment Scale) for Colombia [35]. However, the results from the application of this instrument for the measurement of resilience are outside the scope of this article.

3. Context

The municipality of Salgar is located on the eastern bank of the Cauca River in the southwest of the Department of Antioquia. The municipality was founded in 1880 as part of the Antioquian colonization, because homesteaders and businessmen found terrain favorable for the development of new export products, particularly coffee. Due to these historical practices of logging and commercial farming, vegetation in the region has changed from secondary forest to grass and clean crops, which destabilize the soil and generate erosion. Cardona (2018) explains:

This [19th century Antioquian] colonization reproduced a model of society-nature relationship based on practices such as indiscriminate logging of native forests and jungles, massive soil exploitation with permanent burning techniques, location of cattle and pigs, opening of train and vehicle tracks in the middle of the slopes, soil exploitation with mining drilling practices, which over time resulted in risk conditions in the face of natural hazards. These risk conditions have materialized on many occasions in disasters caused by natural geological and hydrological phenomena (landslides, avalanches, rising rivers and streams, torrential floods), which have left a high number of people dead and injured, as well as material losses.

[36] (p. 125)

Disaster risk is the result of the possible occurrence of events and the fragility of elements that are susceptible to damage. It could be said that risk is the result of exposure to different threat factors, which go beyond those of natural origin, and which are burdened by the conditions of the socio-cultural, economic, political, physical, spatial, or environmental context. Disaster risk is not only associated with the occurrence of intense hazardous events but also with conditions of vulnerability. Vulnerability is closely associated with unsustainability and poor governance in areas prone to hazardous events [29] (p. 101). In Salgar, the risk from landslides in the La Liboriana basin has been exacerbated by the historical changes in land use and vegetal cover.

The most recent and largest disaster event in Salgar occurred on 18 May 2015, at 2:00 a.m., when a torrential flood generated by a dam failure at Cerro Plateado on La Liboriana Creek swept away everything in its path including housing, animals, belongings and two bridges that connected the two banks of the creek. Some 98 people died or went missing. To understand risk management in the municipality of Salgar, it is important to analyze the role of institutions in making decisions regarding when and how to intervene to prevent disasters. For example, since 1999, the municipality has carried out risk analyses, which repeatedly showed the township of La Margarita as a critical risk zone, under threat of flooding. However, the municipality of Salgar lacked a real plan for prevention and emergency attention that included the community in the construction of prevention processes. When asked why a preventive intervention had not been carried out in the town of La Margarita, the mayor of Salgar replied that “there were other priorities” [36] (p. 169).

Following the disaster, families living in the affected zone were relocated to three separate settlements: two urban and one rural. The relocation process responded to two models and had two protagonists. The State, from its risk management policy, first built two apartment complexes; each complex was three stories high and measured 42 m² per dwelling. The complexes were located on the periphery of the urban core in the sectors La Florida and La Habana to avoid the threat situation represented by La Liboriana Creek. The construction took 24 months, and the houses were delivered to the municipality in July 2017. In the two years it took to build the resettlement complexes, the survivors stayed in the homes of extended family members or friends.

The second model was rural housing located in the town of Las Margaritas, where each house measures approximately 80 m² in area. These houses were divided into two sectors according to the financier. On the one hand, the State in its risk management policy, and on the other hand, some political actors in the region who donated land and, with the support of a national NGO, built the houses. The houses consist of a single floor with two bedrooms, a kitchen, a bathroom, and a small patio with a green area for cultivation. Both constructions have a similar typology, trying to emulate the traditional rural construction of Antioquia. However, the villagers appreciate the houses built by local politicians more and highlight some differentiating attributes [36].

Table 2. Domains used for assessment of community disaster resilience in the studied articles. Note. The authors of this article have created their own representation of the domains used for resilience based on the assessment found in [14] Ostadtaghizadeh et al., 2015, p. 7.

Dimension	Baseline Resilience Index for Communities (BRIC)		Climate Disaster Resilience Index (CDRI)	Community Disaster Resilience Index (CDRI)
Social
Economic
Institutional
Infrastructure
Community Capital
Physical
Natural
Human

. depicts a map of the Municipality of Salgar, highlighting the La Liboriana Creek basin where the tragedy occurred in 2015 in light green, and pointing out the sites to which the survivors were relocated. The area marked in grey represents the urban center where the resettlement sites of La Florida and La Habana are located. As can be seen on the map, the Las Margaritas resettlement site is rural and a considerable distance away from the urban core of the municipality (Figure 2).

Survivors were randomly assigned to one of the three resettlement sites as part of the relocation process. In consequence, the new settlements did not correspond to the origin of the settlers, which resulted in “disintegration of the social fabric, represented by the community organizations of the corregimiento and the local markets that people had previously attended. In these places, buyers were recognized and sometimes they could buy on credit and pay later. Moreover, the resettlement resulted in the separation of large groups of families that shared common sectors” [36] (p. 171).

4. Materials and Methods

This article is a product of the research program “Vulnerability, Resilience and Risk of Communities and Supplying Basins Affected by Landslides and Avalanches” code 1118-852-71251, contract 80740-492-2020 between Fiduprevisora and the University of Medellin with resources from Minciencias: The National Financing Fund for Science, Technology, and Innovation—Francisco José de Caldas Grant. We employ an empirical-analytical research paradigm as defined by Vasco (1989) who argues that the purpose of academic research is social transformation [37]. Analytical–empirical analysis assesses the empirical, observable world to identify and deconstruct problems in order to propose solutions or alternatives [37]. Our research is empirical in the approach used to evaluate persistent vulnerability conditions but is analytical in aim: to understand how the tenets that underlay the concept of CBDM are met or not in contexts of resettlement sectors. The chosen research method follows a deductive-inductive-deductive model, in which we first take a theoretical approach to the criteria of measuring vulnerability and resilience to later present a descriptive analysis of the case.

The analyses presented below are part of the quantitative approach to the case study, which consisted of the application of a survey of 50 questions, divided into sections of up to 13 sub-questions, and which revolved around the following topics: health, care policies for vulnerable populations, food security, housing, level of schooling, employment, income, critical social or natural events, victims of the armed conflict, forced displacement, or other stressful events, and risk management.

The survey used in this study was constructed in agreement with the Interinstitutional Council of La Primavera (another research site in the research program that was the origin of this article). Three instruments developed and applied by the organization Corporación Región, the municipal government of Barbosa, and the company Trasnmetano for the socioeconomic characterization of the settlement population on the slopes of La Primavera in the municipality of Barbosa, Antioquia were consolidated into a single survey for the characterization of the socioeconomic situation in the resettlement communities in Salgar. With a base in these three instruments, a comparative matrix was created to identify topics of interest for public and private actors, as well as the community, all of whom validated the instruments in a series of deliberative sessions in the Interinstitutional Council. The axes of analysis and main questions included in each category were also reviewed by the Interinstitutional Council and community representatives. These topics and their associated questions were, in turn, revised and complemented by a panel of multidisciplinary experts made up of the researchers that made up the research program. The dimensions of analysis for the program were defined in this revision process.

To be a participant in the study, it was decided that respondent had to fit the following criteria: (1) the interview respondent must be of legal majority (18-years of age or above); (2) the person should be part of a family nucleus. (3) the family represented by the interview respondent should inhabit one of the housing projects in one of the three resettlement areas. On 28 and 29 June 2022, a total of 178 surveys were applied by the company Pronósticos SAS to inhabitants of La Florida (97 respondents), Las Margaritas (56 respondents), and La Habana (25 respondents).

The matrix presented below, which will be the basis for the analysis of the results, was constructed based on the elements common to all measurement models used for assessment of community disaster resilience in the articles studied above [14] (p. 7). Not all the dimensions and indicators suggested by the three measurements could be evaluated in the case study due to limitations in the availability of information at the required scale of analysis (settlement scale). Only the dimensions and indicators that corresponded to the information collected in the survey could be evaluated, resulting in the matrix of dimensions and indicators shown in

Table 3. Matrix of dimensions and indicators. Note. Own elaboration.

Dimension	Component	Indicator
Social	Health	Percentage of children with complete vaccination schedule
		Percentage of children with positive screening for acute malnutrition that are attended to by the health system
		Percentage of children under two (2) yeas of age attending growth and development checkups
		Percentage o children who are in food and nutrition security programs
		The household presents moderate or severe food insecurity
	Food safety	Presence of cultivated lands
		Types of crops
		Breeding of small livestock
	Education	Academic level of the population
Economic	Employment and Income	Occupation
		Types of employment
		Income
		Productive activities
		Financial education
Physical (Internal habitability)	Overcrowding	Number of people living in the house
		Number of rooms in the house
		Housing condition
		Subsidies received
		Grants received for home improvement
		Second home
Infrastructure (External habitability	Social facilities	Educational Infrastructure
		Health Infrastructure
		Recreational infrastructure
		Meting places
	Mobility	Transportation
		Access to settlement
Hazard, risk, and contamination	Risk	House located in a high-risk area
		House affected by a damaging event if natural or anthropogenic origin
	Contamination	Stagnant water near the house
		Garbage dumps near the house
		The house has livestock breeding grounds
		The street where the house is located has sewage water
		The street where the house is located is paved
		Unpleasant odors and/ or the presence of insects or rodents in the house

.

The results of the application of the matrix to the data collected in the resettlement sectors are presented below.

5. Results

From a community-based disaster management (CBDM) perspective, the mitigation of physical risks creates conditions for the generation of response capacities in vulnerable communities. For this reason, the measurement of socio-economic variables takes on fundamental relevance. Health, food security, education, employment, and income are key factors that strengthen individuals’ and communities’ ability to cope with hazards present in their environments. The primary research for this project was conducted in the resettlement areas of the municipality of Salgar seven years after the dam failure and flood of La Liboriana Creek occurred. The findings are contrasted with the conditions of internal and external habitability of the territories and the persistent threat and risk factors. The purpose of the comparison is to determine whether the physical and social interventions carried out in Salgar by the State and local politicians can be considered community-based disaster management (CBDM).

5.1. Health

Factors such as vaccination, food insecurity and nutrition status, and availability of nutrition monitoring programs are used to measure and assess health. All of these programs are designed to act preventively, focusing primarily on children under 5 years of age. In all three settlements, the percentage of children with a complete vaccination schedule in the surveyed families is very low. The rate is lowest in the settlement of La Habana (See

Table 4. Results: children under five (5) years of age that have the complete immunization schedule.

Do the Children in the Household under Five (5) Years of Age Have the Complete Immunization Schedule for Their Age?	La Florida		La Habana		Las Margaritas
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Does not apply	74	41.6%	22	12.4%	42	23.6%
No	2	1.1%	0	0.0%	3	1.7%
Yes	21	11.8%	3	1.7%	11	6.2%
Total	97	54.5%	25	14.0%	56	31.5%

). La Florida has a higher percentage because it is located very close to the urban center. Therefore, the settlement is a common recipient site during vaccination campaigns. In contrast, Las Margaritas is a rural settlement, and La Habana is located close to rural areas. As a result, they are less common sites for vaccination campaigns, and health care in the resettled communities depends on these campaigns.

In the settlements analyzed, a very low percentage of children with positive screening for acute malnutrition are attended to by the healthcare system (See

Table 5. Results: positive acute malnutrition screening and treatment for children older than six (6) months and younger than five (5) years.

Are Children Older than Six (6) Months and Younger than Five (5) Years Who Are Screened Positive for Acute Malnutrition Treated by the Healthcare System?	La Florida		La Habana		Las Margaritas
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Does not apply	75	42.1%	22	12.4%	44	24.7%
No	19	10.7%	3	1.7%	12	6.7%
Yes	3	1.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	97	54.5%	25	14.0%	56	31.5%

). This situation coincides with the previous question and has to do with the lack of healthcare coverage.

The percentage of children under two (2) years of age attending growth and development checkups is very low. Attendance is lowest in the rural settlements (See

Table 6. Results: children under two (2) years of age attending growth and development checkups.

Do Children under Two (2) Years of Age Attend Growth and Development Checkups?	La Florida		La Habana		Las Margaritas
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Does not apply	77	43.3%	23	12.9%	46	25.8%
No	5	2.8%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Yes	15	8.4%	2	1.1%	10	5.6%
Total	97	54.5%	25	14.0%	56	31.5%

). However, it is important to note that a high percentage of those surveyed responded that the question does not apply. The question remains as to whether the population in this age group is actually very low, since in our field visits and tours we observed many children in the settlements. The answer as to why attendance is so low in the growth and development control programs may be due more to the lack of information about preventative health programs.

5.2. Food Security

The results regarding food security mirror the results from the previous question about health. The percentage of children who are in food and nutritional security programs is very low; 82% of respondents did not answer the question or stated that the question does not apply to them. We hypothesize that the lack of dissemination of information about preventative healthcare programs by the mayor’s office is the principal cause for the lack of applications. The percentage of households that report moderate or severe food insecurity is particularly worrisome. Percentages range between 5.6% and 14% among the three settlements. In La Florida and Las Margaritas, only 2.8% of children are in food and nutrition security programs. There is considerable lack of knowledge regarding these programs. Indeed, between 1.7% and 10.1% of respondents in each resettlement community did not answer the question, they did not know what food security refers to, and they do not know about the programs. We hypothesize that lack of participation in food security programs could be related to respondents’ academic level, where the predominant education is primary school.

5.3. Origin

The population affected by the 2015 flood and landslide at La Liboriana Creek can be classified into rural or urban origin, where rural families lived on their farms away from a town center, and urban families lived within the town center. Families were randomly assigned to the resettlement without taking into account their origins. Of the three settlements, the one with the largest population of rural origin is Las Margaritas with 53 families of rural origins, which corresponds to 29.8% of the sample. In La Florida, 29 families indicated rural origins, 16.3% of the sample, and La Havana had the lowest number of families with rural origins: 6 families, or 3.4% of the sample.

5.4. Education

Regarding the academic level of the population, the highest percentage of the population in the three settlements (27.8%) has incomplete primary education, followed by 18.0% with incomplete high school. Some 12.1% of the population of the three settlements do not have any type of education. Not having an educational background is an obstacle to undertaking prevention campaigns in the face of threat and risk situations. In addition, the lack of education does not allow the communities to assume a more leading role in the decision-making process regarding the projects to be prioritized and the actions to be led.

5.5. Employment and Income

The employment and income dimension is composed of the following indicators: occupation, types of employment, income, financial education, and productive activities that constitute employment in the settlement. These indicators do not only show the income and employment characteristics of the inhabitants but also the capacities generated in the territory to support productive initiatives. Regarding employment, housewives or female heads of household constitute the highest percentage of the population (28.0%), followed by 26.0% who are self-employed independent and informal workers; 7.0% of the population is unemployed (See

Table 7. Occupation.

Occupation	La Florida	La Habana	Las Margaritas	Total	Percentage
Housewife Female head of household	79	21	40	140	28%
Un-employed	26	2	6	34	7%
Salaried employee (with contract)	25	12	13	50	10%
Student	69	18	27	114	23%
Self-employed (Formal)	10	3	4	17	3%
Self-Employed (Informal)	63	11	54	128	26%
Other	4	1	6	11	2%
Total	276	68	150	494	100%

).

Only 10% of the population has a labor contract. The sector with the largest participation among the respondents is self-employment and informal work with 26%. Indeed, a large part of the population is engaged in coffee harvesting during the harvest season, and the work derived from this productive activity is temporary (See

Table 8. Type of employment.

Permanent or Temporary Employment	La Florida	La Habana	Las Margaritas	Total	Percentage
Permanent	16	8	7	31	49%
Temporary	19	6	7	32	51%

Note. Percentages are calculated using a base of 63, which corresponds to the total number of individuals with Permanent or Temporary Employment.

).

In all three settlements, respondents are evenly divided between temporary and permanent positions with temporary employment 51% and permanent employment 49%. There is no predominance or marked tendency towards one of the two types of employment (See

Table 9. Income in current legal monthly minimum wages (CLMMW).

Income	Less than 0.5 CLMMW	Between 0.5 and 1 CLMMW	Between 1 and 1.5 CLMMW	Between 1.5 and 2 CLMMW	Between 4 and 5 CLMMW	Total
La Florida	44	42	6	1	1	94
La Habana	13	8	2	0	0	23
Las Margaritas	28	34	14	5	0	81
Total	85	84	22	6	1	198
Percentage	43%	42%	11%	3%	1%	100%

Note. Percentages are calculated using a base of 198, which corresponds to the total number of individuals that work by house in Salgar.

). Most of the population is employed in agricultural activities related to the coffee harvest; however, some only work during the harvest under temporary contracts while others are permanently linked to this activity.

It is of great concern that 43% of the population earns less than half the current legal monthly minimum wage and 42% earns between half and one minimum wage; only 15% of the settlement’s population earns more than one minimum wage (See

Table 10. Financial education.

Has Anyone in the Household over the Age of 18 Received Financial Education on Any of the Following Topics: Savings, Credit, or Insurance?	La Florida		La Habana		Las Margaritas
	#	%	#	%	#	%
No	87	48.9%	25	14.0%	53	29.8%
Yes	10	5.6%	0	0.0%	3	1.7%
Total	97	54.5%	25	14.0%	56	31.5%

). The predominance of incomes below half the minimum wage is due to the informality of the jobs offered in the area, most of which are linked to the coffee production sector.

Of those surveyed in La Florida, only 5.6%, none in La Habana and 1.7% in Las Margaritas have received financial education. These low or null percentages make it difficult for this population to access resources associated with projects, credits, or other assistance.

Table 11. Productive activities developed in the settlements.

Does the Settlement Develop Productive Activities That Generate Employment for the Resident Population?	La Florida		La Habana		Las Margaritas
	#	%	#	%	#	%
No	93	52.2%	23	12.9%	52	29.2%
Yes	4	2.2%	2	1.1%	4	2.2%
Total	97	54.5%	25	14.0%	56	31.5%

shows that the highest percentage of those interviewed (52.2% in La Florida, 12.9% in La Habana and 29.2% in Las Margaritas) stated that they did not engage in productive activities in the settlement. The relocation proposal only dealt with the physical intervention represented by urban planning and housing. It did not consider the inclusion of new economic or productive activities that would guarantee the economic sustainability of the housing project. The population living in these settlements is employed as salaried workers in the municipal capital or seasonally during the harvest on the coffee farms.

In general, all the socio-economic variables measured continue to be deficient in the resettlement areas, which generates a situation of persistent social vulnerability that limits capacity building and collective agency among the communities.

5.6. Productive Activities

When respondents were asked if productive activities linked to food security were developed in their settlement, the percentages of respondents who answered yes were very low: 2.2% in La Florida, 4.5% in La Habana, and 11.8% in Las Margaritas. This finding suggests that many families had to change their productive base following relocation because the houses that were given to them did not have an area for the development of livestock, agriculture, or any other rural productive activity. Most of the families that lived from agricultural or livestock production before the disaster changed their productive activity to commerce, services, or became employees in larger, commercially oriented farms. The change in economic activity is also due to the fact that the plots assigned to reassigned families are so small that families can only produce enough to feed themselves, if that, and do not allow for commercial production.

The three resettlement zones have different housing typologies. The La Florida and La Habana resettlements, located in the urban core of Salgar, consist of apartment complexes. There is one community garden per complex that measures approximately 20 m². In La Florida, the garden is located within the complex, at the of the buildings. In La Habana, the garden is not located within the complex, but rather on a lot nearby in the neighborhood. In contrast, in Las Margaritas, the resettlement project consists of isolated, single-family houses. Each house comes with a small yard, measuring between 6 m² and 9 m². According to the resettlement plan, these community gardens and yards were included in the resettlement design to give community members places to engage in rural productive activities like cultivating crops or raising domestic animals. However, survey results show that these plots are too small to be used in such a manner. For example, although 16.9% of respondents in Las Margaritas indicated that they have space to grow crops in the yards adjacent to their homes, only 7.9% of the families in Las Margaritas have developed agricultural activities on their plots; they cultivate comestible plants like aromatic herbs, vegetables, and fruit trees. However, these plots are not large enough to sustain crops of corn, potatoes, or beans, which make up the base of the Colombian diet.

In the urban resettlements, the situation is even more dire. In the case of La Florida, only 9% of respondents indicated that they have a space for cultivation or animal husbandry, and in the case of La Habana, 5.6%. These spaces are within the communal or collective garden that corresponds to the entire building. Shared gardens are a foreign concept that do not correspond to rural Colombian agricultural practice, where each family is responsible for its own farm. When they came to the apartment buildings, families were not told the gardens were communal nor was the concept of communal gardening or communal land management explained. As a result, some of the “community” garden spaces have been appropriated by a few inhabitants as if they were private gardens. The other community members have been denied access to the space and prevented from using it. This situation has given rise to new forms of competition and conflict, delegitimized communal organization, and disempowered community leaders who have been unable to resolve the new form of conflict (

Table 12. Type of plant cultivation in the houses.

Does Your Household Have Any Type of Plant Cultivation? (Check Several)		La Florida		La Habana		Las Margaritas
		#	%	#	%	#	%
No		85	47.8%	19	10.7%	42	23.6%
Yes		12	6.7%	6	3.4%	14	7.9%
Total		97	54.5%	25	14.0%	56	31.5%
Vegetables	No response	85	47.8%	19	10.7%	42	23.6%
	No	7	3.9%	2	1.1%	7	3.9%
	Yes	5	2.8%	4	2.2%	7	3.9%
Total		97	54.5%	25	14.0%	56	31.5%
Medicinal or aromatic	No response	85	47.8%	19	10.7%	42	23.6%
	No	9	5.1%	4	2.2%	9	5.1%
	Yes	3	1.7%	2	1.1%	5	2.8%
Total		97	54.5%	25	14.0%	56	31.5%
Fruit trees	No response	85	47.8%	19	10.7%	42	23.6%
	No	7	3.9%	3	1.7%	11	6.2%
	Yes	5	2.8%	3	1.7%	3	1.7%
Total		97	54.5%	25	14.0%	56	31.5%
Others	No response	85	47.8%	19	10.7%	42	23.6%
	No	8	4.5%	3	1.7%	9	5.1%
	Yes	4	2.2%	3	1.7%	5	2.8%
Total		97	54.5%	25	14.0%	56	31.5%

).

Regarding the type of plants grown in their homes, 7.9% of those interviewed in Las Margaritas stated that they have some type of plant grown on their plot, compared to 3.4% in Habana, and 6.7% in Florida. The highest percentage of respondents in Las Margaritas grow vegetables with 3.9%, followed by 2.8% in Florida, and 2.2% in Habana. The preference for this type of crop has to do with the fact that most of the resettled population comes from rural areas and had vegetable gardens in their place of origin. However, the number of respondents who continue to grow vegetables in their new settlements is still very low considering precisely that these practices are common in rural environments.

The percentage of families that raise animals in the resettlement sites is very low, ranging from 1.1% in La Florida to 2.8% in Las Margaritas. In the case of La Florida and La Habana, this is because there is no green or free area linked to the house that could be used for raising domestic animals. In the case of Las Margaritas, although there is a green area next to the house and it is private, the proximity of the houses makes raising animals difficult because the noise and odors could bother the neighbors.

5.7. Internal Habitability

Housing conditions were analyzed according to the guidelines established in the legal and theoretical framework for internal habitability. Internal habitability is disaggregated into different factors that together account for the habitability conditions.

5.7.1. Housing Typology

Since the houses in the three settlements are the product of housing programs for the relocation of families affected by the disaster, it is not necessary to analyze variables such as condition, tenure, access to public services, structure, and materiality, since they are understood as basic conditions of a housing plan. However, a relevant factor in the analysis is the typological change in the settlement of La Florida and La Habana, since most of the families came from the rural area with single-family or peasant dwellings and were relocated to multi-family dwellings with common areas, which they did not have to consider in their original habitat.

5.7.2. Overcrowding

The houses in the relocation projects in La Habana and La Florida have two bedrooms. It should also be noted that the rooms are small; each bedroom measures approximately 7.5 m². In this sense, they offer comfortable conditions for families with a maximum of four people. In La Florida and La Habana, 39.9% and 12.9% of the dwellings have two bedrooms, respectively. In La Florida, 39% of those surveyed indicated that an average of two to four people live in their homes. In La Habana, 12% of those surveyed indicated that between two and four people live in their homes. However, 1.2% and 6.8% of the families surveyed in La Habana and La Florida, respectively, have more than four people per dwelling, which is an indicator of overcrowded conditions. This situation is worrisome for 5.6% of the families in La Florida, where there are five people in each dwelling. These dwellings do not have space for expansion, progressive development, or future growth, leading to the persistence of overcrowded conditions. In some cases, overcrowding leads to the cohabitation of adults and children in the same room, or the use of the social area as a permanent or nighttime living space.

A different situation is found in Las Margaritas where 25.8% of the houses have three rooms, and their design allows for their growth to meet the needs of the family. In some cases, there has been expansion for productive activities, in other cases to add one more bedroom. In Las Margaritas, 9% of respondents stated that two people live in their dwelling, while 8.4% responded that there are three people living in their dwelling. Overall, 28% of the survey respondents in Las Margaritas indicated that between one and four people live in each house.

5.8. External Habitability

A critical factor with regard to external habitability is the issue of mobility, because although the settlements located in the urban area are comparatively close to facilities that offer education, healthcare, and recreational services, in cases where the distance makes pedestrian access difficult, the limited income of the families analyzed above becomes a limiting factor with regard to access to education, healthcare, and recreational services.

Hazard, Risk, and Contamination

Although the three projects are planned projects that should have discarded areas exposed to threat and risk in the site selection, a noticeable percentage of the respondents mentioned how their homes have been affected by an event of natural or anthropogenic origin. Respondents in all the three settlements suffer health problems due to contamination. They note signs of contamination like unpleasant odors and/or the presence of insects or rodents. In La Habana, the street where the resettlement house is located has sewage running through it, and 2.8% of respondents stated that they are directly exposed to the sewage. Another worrying factor with regard to environmental contamination is the presence of garbage dumps near the house, which produce bad odors, insects, and rodents that can be vectors for disease. In La Florida, 23% of those surveyed identified the presence of unregulated dumps nearby, whereas in La Habana, 7.9%, and in Las Margaritas 5.1%. Additionally, 5.6% of La Florida residents were affected by runoff water that generates landslides on the slopes near the multi-family building and flooding in the first level apartments.

Table 13. Perception of hazard, risk, and contamination conditions.

Question	Response	La Florida		La Habana		Las Margaritas
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Is your home located in a high-risk area?	No	88	49.4%	24	13.5%	51	28.7%
	Yes	9	5.1%	1	0.6%	5	2.8%
Is there stagnant water near the house?	No	81	45.5%	21	11.8%	53	29.8%
	Yes	16	9.0%	4	2.2%	3	1.7%
Are there garbage dumps near the house?	No	56	31.5%	11	6.2%	47	26.4%
	Yes	41	23.0%	14	7.9%	9	5.1%
Does the house have animal breeding grounds?	No	94	52.8%	21	11.8%	52	29.2%
	Yes	3	1.7%	4	2.2%	4	2.2%
Does the street where the house is located have sewage water?	No	93	52.2%	24	13.5%	51	28.7%
	Yes	4	2.2%	1	0.6%	5	2.8%
Is the street where the house is located paved?	No	5	2.8%	4	2.2%	32	18.0%
	Yes	92	51.7%	21	11.8%	24	13.5%
Are there unpleasant odors and/or the presence of insects or rodents in the house?	No	80	44.9%	19	10.7%	43	24.2%
	Yes	17	9.6%	6	3.4%	13	7.3%
Has your home ever been affected by a damaging event of natural or anthropogenic (human) origin?	No	87	48.9%	23	12.9%	54	30.3%
	Yes	10	5.6%	2	1.1%	2	1.1%

shows the perception of risk by the inhabitants of the three settlements. When asked if their current house was located in a high-risk zone, few of the inhabitants of the three settlements still consider themselves to live in high-risk zones. In La Habana, only 0.6% of respondents felt that they were living in a high-risk zone, whereas in Las Margaritas and La Florida, 2.8% and 5.1% of respondents considered their houses to be located in risk zones. Respondents assumed that the selection of the relocation sites excluded properties with threat and risk conditions, a situation that unfortunately does not hold true for all the houses. In the La Florida settlement, for example, some houses are affected by flooding from runoff. For this reason, when the population of La Florida was asked if there is stagnant water, 9% of those surveyed indicated that there was. Furthermore, the population of the settlements perceive the presence of garbage dumps near their homes as a health risk, as stated by 23% of respondents in La Florida, 7.9% in La Habana and 5.1% in Las Margaritas. Although the resettlement processes were carried out in order to avoid exposing the population to new threats, in the case of Salgar, risk conditions persist in the new homes. In addition, contamination and the resulting problems detrimentally impact the quality of life for the resettled families.

6. Discussion

The post-landslide risk management process carried out in the Municipality of Salgar and its associated disaster risk reduction (DRR) demonstrates the limitations of the traditional disaster management model in regards to the reduction of social vulnerabilities that worsen the impact of disasters. As can be seen in the application of the vulnerability and resilience measurement matrix to the results of the survey applied to the inhabitants of the resettlement areas eight years after the tragedy, the social indicators of health, food security, education, and employment did not improve.

6.1. Social Dimension

With regard to healthcare, the low levels of childhood vaccination in the three resettlement sectors stand out. The research shows that childhood vaccination levels are correlated with the distance from the city’s urban core. The scores were lowest in La Habana and Las Margaritas. The same pattern was observed with regard to nutritional, growth, and development health checks. The farther away from the urban core, the less participation in these programs, which showcases the limitations in the institutional presence in peripheral sectors, as well as the lack of importance given to preventative programs. Moreover, inhabitants were provided with little information regarding healthcare options and programs, as seen in the survey results. The situation is aggravated by food insecurity. Again, survey responses reveal the limited amount of information about these programs effectively disseminated by the mayor’s office.

Low levels of educational attainment in the three sectors mean that the government must pay attention to how information is disseminated to make it truly accessible. Almost 27.8% of the population have not finished primary school, and 12.1% have no formal education at all, which can become a major obstacle for achieving individual or community resilience. The situation demands a greater commitment on the part of the institutionality to the diffusion of information so that the community can make use of the programs available to them. Moreover, the situation highlights the importance of preparing the community for active participation in decision making. The limitations with regard to the effective dissemination of information to the citizens go in opposition to the commitment established in the National Policy for Rick Management, which claims that access to information and community participation are the fundamental basis for the creation of resilience. Here, it is evident that the problems association with ineffective information sharing, and knowledge transfer are converted into causes for the persistence of multiple social vulnerabilities and, in turn, social vulnerabilities like limited access to education limits community capacity in the face of threat and risk situations and prevents the community from assuming a more leading role in the decision-making process.

6.2. Economic Dimension

Prior to the tragedy of La Liboriana, an important percentage of the resettled families in rural or semi-urban zones on the shores of the creek. However, during the resettlement process, policymakers and institutional agents did not take into account the people’s place of origin or lifestyle when assigning housing. Thus, people from rural areas were relocated to apartment buildings in urban zones, which made previous practices that contributed not only to food security but also to income for rural families, like crop and livestock production, practically impossible. The survey results show the devastating effects of this decision: the practice of productive activities tied to food security are now practiced in the resettlement zones by only a very small percentage of the respondents, 2.2% and 4.5% in the urban settlements, and 11.8% in the rural settlement. The low percentages demonstrate a significant change in the productive activities of the families due to the limited areas for cultivation or animal husbandry.

Moreover, these small green spaces in the urban settlements have become causes for conflict as a few individuals coopt the so-called shared productive spaces for private use. Community members, used to living in independent single-family homes were not prepared for the process of communal management that is implied by the physical structure of the apartments where joint management of the communal areas is needed to ensure successful coexistence in the buildings. Instead, the resettlement has resulted in conflicts that have delegitimized and made community leadership opaque. The three resettlement zones are characterized by increased precarity in employment and depressed incomes due to the high percentage of homemakers, female-headed households, independent, and informal workers. Economic precarity is explained in part by the economic patterns of the city, in particular, the regional focus on coffee production. Settlers in all three zones are economically tied to the cultivation of coffee, which offers mainly seasonal employment. This precarity in employment is also expressed in the fact that settler’s incomes do not exceed the minimum wage. To make matters worse, low levels of financial education makes accessing financial resources, productive projects, and economic assistance more difficult.

Another aggravating factor is that the resettlement proposal did not include new productive activities to guarantee the economic sustainability of the people living in the resettlement projects. The lack of funding for job training to help resettled families transition to the urban environment means that families must access such training on their own, which in many cases is not feasible with regard to time or money, due to the low income that they are able to generate without help. The lack of foresight in economic planning is evident in the fact that the highest percentage of those interviewed (52.2% in La Florida, 12.9% in La Habana, and 29.2% in Las Margaritas) stated that they did not engage in productive activities in the settlements. A large part of the population that lived from food production or animal husbandry activities in rural areas had to be employed as salaried workers in the municipal capital or seasonally during the harvest on the coffee farms.

6.3. Habitability

The analysis of habitability in the three settlements has been divided into two components: internal habitability, which corresponds to the living conditions inside the dwelling, and external habitability, which is related to the conditions of the environment or social infrastructure that accompanies the dwelling.

6.4. Physical (Internal Habitability)

In the evaluation of internal habitability, we observed that it is adequate when the family group is composed of a maximum of four people. However, most families have more than four members, leading to overcrowding. Considering that internal habitability should demonstrate the greatest improvements as a result of the resettlement process, the degree of overcrowding of the population is worrying. Another relevant factor in the analysis of habitability is the typological change in the settlements of La Florida and La Habana. Most of the families came from rural areas with single-family or peasant dwellings but were relocated to multi-family dwellings with common areas, which they did not have to consider in their original habitat.

6.5. Infrastructure (External Habitability)

With regard to external habitability, the three settlements have educational, healthcare, and recreational infrastructure fairly close by. The evaluation of this component is affected by the transportation systems and the state of the road. In the case of Las Margaritas, poor road conditions make it difficult for the population to travel to social services and limits institutional response in the event of a disaster. Another factor that makes external habitability conditions inadequate is the lack of recreational and social areas for the population. The settlements furthest away from the urban core (La Habana and Las Margaritas) have the fewest recreational and social spaces.

6.6. Hazard, Risk and Contamination

The threat and risk dimension reproduces everything observed in the previous dimensions, demonstrating that the persistence of risks is related to the persistence of conditions of vulnerability. Moreover, situations of environmental risk continue to be present in the resettlement zones, especially the threats of flooding, standing waters, and contamination sites. In short, the housing projects fail to meet the stated objective of the resettlement plan: to reduce the community’s exposure to risk. Physical threats persist and they worsen the social conditions that the inhabitants of the three zones find themselves in. As a result, the resettlement process and policies of care following the La Liboriana tragedy have not created the circumstances in which the community can develop the capacities necessary to assume a leadership position in disaster management and risk reduction planning and decision making. The recreation of the conditions of vulnerability is due to the limitations in the current resettlement processes in Colombia, which fail to address the totality of the factors involved and are not designed to facilitate capacity building, a concept that the new community-based disaster management (CBDM) models promote.

7. Conclusions

In Colombia, national disaster management legislation, though couched in a superficial recognition of the Hyogo Framework, ignores the complexity of the mandate to promote community resilience in the face of disasters. Instead, post-disaster recovery planning and implementation is assigned to state actors, and resilience development strategies are limited to activities like information sharing, citizenship education and engagement, or public consultancy. These actions are insufficient to achieve real community participation in disaster-mitigation and recovery or resilience building, the stated goals of the Colombian government’s risk management legislation.

The failure of Colombia’s Government to deliver on the promise of community-centered policy is evident in post-disaster interventions like those carried out in the municipality of Salgar after the flooding of La Liboriana Creek. Eight years after the tragedy occurred, the balance of vulnerability and resilience in the resettlement zones is not encouraging. Physical vulnerabilities continue to be present, and social vulnerabilities have been exacerbated as illustrated by the low percentage of people with access to healthcare, education, and dignified employment. Moreover, the resettlement, instead of building the sense of community and solidarity needed to develop resilience and leadership in risk management, has fractured the social fabric, delegitimized community leadership, and created a culture defined by individual interests because planners did not try to understand the origin conditions of the settlers. In conclusion, the current resettlement processes failed to facilitate capacity building, a concept that community-based disaster management (CBDM) models promote.

Furthermore, this article has explored the limitations in the existing means of measuring vulnerability in the face of disaster. These limitations include insufficient integration of social and physical indicators in the measurement of vulnerability and the scale of information collection. When data is collected on the national or state level, opposed to the local territorial level, blindnesses can result due to incomplete information or lack of local specificity. The main contributions of the proposed measurement model, therefore, are the combination of social and biophysical variables and the use of specific local data to understand the impacts of pre-existing conditions of social vulnerability on disaster relief efforts. A micro-analysis at the local level permits policy makers to address communities’ specific needs and suggest locally relevant responses for strengthening community resilience in post-disaster interventions. It also allows community members to define their needs and desires and to take part in post-disaster relief efforts.

We recognize that one of the limitations of the model presented is its dependence on the collection of primary information, which can be expensive and time-consuming. Also, a revelation bias might exist, especially in cases where the legal inhabitants of the houses have rented or sold their house illegally. Therefore, it is possible that some of the respondents and current residents were not direct victims of the disaster but responded to the survey nonetheless. In future measurement formulations, we suggest the inclusion of some variables linked to social organization and leadership and citizen engagement and participation, topics for which quantitative information was not collected in the survey.