Do Social Networks of Listed Companies Help Companies Recover from Financial Crises?
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Relevant Literature
3. Data and Methodology
- Logit regression:
- Cox regression:
4. Empirical Findings
Descriptive Statistics
- (1)
- Degree centrality of general networks:
- (2)
- Closeness centrality of general networks:
- (1)
- Degree centrality of bank networks:
- (2)
- Closeness centrality of bank networks:
- (1)
- Degree centrality of general networks:
- (2)
- Closeness centrality of general networks:
- (1)
- Degree centrality of bank networks:
- (2)
- Closeness centrality of bank networks:
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Control Variable | Definition | Reasons |
---|---|---|
SEO | Seasoned equity offering is a dummy variable that equals one if the company launch SEO, and zero otherwise. | SEO is more likely to increase a company’s net worth, which is one of the ways of overcoming the financial crisis. The company can borrow money from investors to raise the required funds to help make up for losses, expand operations, or invest in a new business to get out of financial problems. Thus, SEO can help companies going through financial difficulties and shorten the duration of the crisis. |
Non-operating | Ratio of non-operating income to total income = net non-operating income ÷ total income × 100% | This ratio represents the amount of various income and expenses that are not directly related to a company’s production and operation activities in its net revenue. The financial crisis companies themselves are not performing well. They usually overcome their insufficient funds through non-operating income. Therefore, a higher non-operating expenditure ratio will help companies survive the crisis. |
Growth rate of depreciable fixed assets (depFixedAsset) | Growth rate of depreciable fixed assets = (depreciable fixed assets ÷ depreciable fixed assets at the same period last year − 1) × 100% | The ratio indicates the change in depreciable fixed assets from one period to another. The higher the ratio, the more likely the company will invest in depreciable assets, which will reduce working capital. The lower the growth rate of depreciable fixed assets, the more likely the company will survive financial crises and shorten its duration of crises |
Account Receivable turnover rate (accountsreceivable) | Receivable turnover rate = Net credit sales/accounts receivable | Account Receivables turnover ratio is an accounting measure used to determine how efficiently a company collects accounts receivables. If the ratio is smaller, it means that the company has a high risk of raising bad debts; on the other hand, if the recovery rate is faster, it means that the company has abundant working capital which can be utilized. The higher the turnover rate, the more likely the company can survive in financial crisis. |
Debt ratio (debt_ratio) | Ratio of total debts to total assets = Total debts/total assets × 100% | Debt ratio measures the percentage of a firm’s assets that are financed by debts. On the one hand, a higher debt ratio presents a higher default risk. On the other hand, however, a higher debt ratio implies that the company can raise its funding via external resources more easily. Thus, the higher the debt ratio, the more likely the company can survive in financial crisis. |
Making or repayment of long-term loans (longtermloan) | An increase (decrease) in the amount of money borrowed from banks or other financial institutions over 1 year in log value | The term “long-term loan” refers to the increase of money borrowed by a company from a bank or other financial institution for a term of more than one year. However, the variable here means an increase or decrease in the amount of the long-term loan. The money must be returned with paying interest, which will increase the operating costs of the company. Reducing long-term borrowing thus helps companies in financial distress and shortens their crisis period. |
Company size (companysize) | Total assets of the company in log value | The size of the company is often measured by its total assets. When a large company has a financial crisis, it is often difficult to survive due to its large scale and high funding gap. On the other hand, small companies are more likely to survive the crisis due to their small scale and low funding gap. Therefore, tightening the company’s scale is one way to cope with the crisis and shorten its crisis period. |
Revenue growth rate (revgrowth) | Revenue growth rate = (current revenue − revenue of last year) ÷ (revenue of last year) × 100% | A stable and positive revenue growth rate means that the company is in a state of stable growth, which leads to an increase in sales. Therefore, an increase in revenue helps companies in financial crisis to survive. |
Cash flow right (cashflow) | Cash flow right = (right to direct distribution of earnings + Σ product of shareholding percentage between each control chain), excluding the shares held by the foundation of ultimate controllers and shares held by affiliated groups | Cash flow rights represent the financial claims of shareholders against the companies [44]. In essence, it is the right to distribute earnings to the ultimate controller, which means that ordinary shareholders can receive dividends from the company’s operating profits. Cash flow rights provide shareholders with a greater understanding of the firm’s goals and level of risk tolerance [45]. If cash flow rights are higher, it means that the shareholders have a larger capital contribution to the company. Therefore, the higher the cash flow right is, the more likely the company is to survive and shorten the financial crisis. |
Compensation | Average annual salary for board directors and supervisors in log value | The compensation of directors and supervisors is an essential factor in corporate governance. If remuneration of directors and supervisors is higher, it means that the company should spend more. By reducing costs and expenses, the company can reduce operating costs, which is a method of saving money to overcome the financial crisis. Therefore, the less the average salary of each director and supervisor is, the less likely the financial crisis will occur. |
Personnel change | Number of personnel changes among chairmen, general managers, and financial executives over the last 3 years | The turnover of senior executives often means that the company’s operating performance is not good. If the number of changes in the chairman, general manager and financial director is more frequent, it means that the company has a higher chance of major adverse events. Therefore, the fewer changes of the chairman, general manager and financial director, the more likely the company can survive the crisis and the shorter the crisis period. |
CEO duality | The chairman does not work concurrently as the general manager: 0; the chairman works concurrently as the general manager: 1. This variable is a dummy variable. | The economic system in Taiwan is dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises and family businesses. It is quite common that the chairman also serves as the general manager or CEO, which is often referred to as CEO duality. Yang and Zhao [46] indicate the benefits of CEO duality in saving information costs and making quick decisions. However, with the concentration of power in one person and the lack of supervision mechanism, concurrent positions may lead to company earnings manipulation or increase the possibility of financial crisis. Thus, if the chairman does not have the position of general manager, the more likely the company can survive the crises and shorten the duration of crises. If there is no concurrent appointment, it is 0; if there is concurrent appointment, it is 1. This variable is a dummy variable. |
Seniority | Seniorities of chairmen, general managers, and financial executives (chairmanseniority, ceoseniority, and cfoseniority) | The seniority of the chairman, general manager and financial director is one of the important bases of company’s operational performance. Although seniority represents higher salary costs, the employee seniority often has a positive correlation with company stability and organizational commitment. Thus, the higher the seniority, the more likely the company can survive the crisis and the shorter the crisis period. |
Appendix B
Variable | Definition | Reason | |
---|---|---|---|
General network variables | Degree_C | Total interpersonal relationships of chairmen | Degree (degree centrality, general network) means the number of direct connections that the chairman, general manager, or financial director or company members (directors, managers, and other executives) have with other individuals (of firms) in the network. The connections can be made with individuals who share the same educational background, work experience, or training courses, etc. Degree centrality shows how strategically important the directors or executives are within their network [47]. Not only is it influenced by the connections of the directors or executives themselves, but also by those who are connected to their connections. Based on Brass and Burkhardt [48], executives or directors with a high degree of centrality are more likely to have a higher level of visibility within the network, as well-connected executives tend to have stronger relations with other executives. This social capital help companies in financial crisis to survive the crisis and shorten the crisis period. |
Degree_G | Total interpersonal relationships of general managers | ||
Degree_F | Total interpersonal relationships of financial executives | ||
Degree_M | Total interpersonal relationships of company members | ||
Degree_AM | Average interpersonal relationships of company members | ||
Close_C | Sum of shortest distances for chairmen | The Closeness (closeness centrality, general network) is the inverse of the sum of the (shortest) distances between a director or executive and all other individuals in a network. It indicates how efficiently the director or executive can obtain information from other individuals in the network. Closeness centrality is an indirect connection measure to capture information collection ability. A higher close score for the director or executive implies a shorter distance to other connected individuals of other companies, further allowing the director or executive to be able to acquire efficient information or financial resources. | |
Close_G | Sum of shortest distances for general managers | ||
Close_F | Sum of shortest distances for financial executives | ||
Close_M | Sum of shortest distances for company members | ||
Close_AM | Average shortest distance for company members | ||
Bank network variables | Degree_BC | Total bank relations of chairmen | Degree (degree Centrality, bank network) means the number of direct connections that the chairman, general manager, or financial director or company members have with other individuals (of banks) in the network. The connections could be with those who have the same educational background, working experience, and on-job training, etc. Degree centrality shows how strategically important the directors or executives are within their network [47]. Not only is it influenced by the connections of the directors or executives themselves, but also by those who are connected to their connections. Based on Brass and Burkhardt [48], executives or directors with a high degree of centrality are more likely to have a higher level of visibility within the network, as well-connected executives tend to have stronger relations with other executives. This social capital help companies in financial crisis to survive the crisis and shorten the crisis period. |
Degree_BG | Total bank relations of general managers | ||
Degree_BF | Total bank relations of financial executives | ||
Degree_BM | Total bank relations of company members | ||
Degree_BAM | Average bank relations of company members | The Closeness (closeness centrality, bank network) is the inverse of the sum of the (shortest) distances between a director or executive and all other individuals in a network. It indicates how efficiently the director or executive can obtain information from other individuals in the network. Closeness is an indirect connection measure to capture information collection ability. A higher close score for the director or executive implies a shorter distance to other connected individuals of other companies, further allowing the director or executive to be able to acquire efficient information or financial resources. | |
Close_BC | Sum of shortest distances for chairmen | ||
Close_BG | Sum of shortest distances for general managers | ||
Close_BF | Sum of shortest distances for financial executives | ||
Close_BM | Sum of shortest distances for company members | ||
Close_BAM | Average shortest distance for company members |
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Variables | Whole Name | Unit | Mean | Std | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SEO | Seasoned equity offering | dummy | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0.0 | 1 |
Non-operating | Ratio of non-operating income to total income | % | −31.00 | 180.09 | −1574.7 | 52 |
depFixedAsset | Growth rate of depreciable fixed assets | % | −18.65 | 29.05 | −96.4 | 54 |
accountsreceivable | Receivable turnover rate | % | 37.09 | 246.37 | 1.0 | 2220 |
debt_ratio | Ratio of total debt to total assets | % | 64.22 | 21.72 | 1.82 | 142.27 |
longtermloan | Making or repayment of long-term loans | NT$ (10 billion) in log | 3.06 | 0.63 | −2.30 | 3.91 |
companysize | Company size | NT$ (10 billion) in log | 9.03 | 0.64 | 8.12 | 11.00 |
revgrowth | Revenue growth rate | % | −8.17 | 43.17 | −97.5 | 165 |
cashflow | Cash flow right | % | 19.96 | 17.62 | 0.0 | 95 |
compensation | Average compensation for board directors and supervisors | NT$ (thousand) in log | 4.25 | 1.69 | 1.10 | 7.17 |
personnel change | Number of personnel changes among chairmen, general managers, and financial executives | Times | 2.56 | 2.83 | 0.0 | 12 |
CEO duality | Whether the chairman works concurrently as the general manager. If yes, dummay variable = 1, 0 otherwise | dummy | 0.40 | 0.49 | 0.0 | 1 |
chairmanseniority | chairman seniority | Years | 13.47 | 9.16 | 0.0 | 36 |
ceoseniority | CEO seniority | Years | 11.67 | 9.21 | 0.3 | 36 |
cfoseniority | CFO seniority | Years | 6.55 | 6.04 | 0.1 | 36 |
Degree_M | Total interpersonal relationships of company members | 23,150.44 | 26,387.58 | 2218.0 | 173,797 | |
Degree_AM | Average interpersonal relationships of company members | 1348.20 | 1733.08 | 130.5 | 11,586 | |
Degree_C | Total interpersonal relationships of chairman | 1366.57 | 2600.77 | 15.0 | 15,800 | |
Degree_G | Total interpersonal relationships of general managers | 1006.77 | 1884.29 | 16.0 | 15,748 | |
Degree_F | Total interpersonal relationships of financial executives | 1327.70 | 2759.17 | 15.0 | 19,453 | |
Close_M | Sum of shortest distances for company members | 395,994.63 | 168,189.88 | 169,479.8 | 1,270,891 | |
Close_AM | Average shortest distance for company members | 22,347.47 | 1215.39 | 19,775.4 | 27,548 | |
Close_C | Sum of shortest distances for chairmen | 22,430.46 | 1629.25 | 19,542.1 | 29,740 | |
Close_G | Sum of shortest distances for general managers | 22,227.36 | 1447.21 | 17,392.5 | 29,710 | |
Close_F | Sum of shortest distances for financial executives | 22,353.27 | 1675.92 | 17,875.5 | 30,973 | |
Degree_BM | Total bank relations of company members | 2516.93 | 3600.65 | 201.0 | 24,866 | |
Degree_BAM | Average bank relations of company members | 152.57 | 250.31 | 12.6 | 1658 | |
Degree_BC | Total bank relations of chairmen | 135.72 | 371.67 | 0.0 | 2259 | |
Degree_BG | Total bank relations of general managers | 91.02 | 265.90 | 0.0 | 2259 | |
Degree_BF | Total bank relations of financial executives | 162.49 | 409.22 | 0.0 | 2922 | |
Close_BM | Sum of shortest distances for company members | 29,139.63 | 15,037.92 | 7227.3 | 104,153 | |
Close_BAM | Average shortest distance for company members | 1641.76 | 429.99 | 425.1 | 2992 | |
Close_BC | Sum of shortest distances for chairmen | 1690.21 | 633.00 | 0.0 | 3393 | |
Close_BG | Sum of shortest distances for general managers | 1579.07 | 696.11 | 0.0 | 3393 | |
Close_BF | Sum of shortest distances for financial executives | 1703.74 | 638.72 | 0.0 | 3650 | |
N | 81 |
Model 1 | Model 2 | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Degree | Degree# | Closeness | Closeness# | ||
SEO | −1.21 | −1.56 | −1.52 | −2.54 * | −2.75 * |
(−1.39) | (−1.52) | (−1.50) | (−1.67) | (−1.77) | |
nonoperating | −0.00 | −0.00 ** | −0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 |
(−1.11) | (−1.98) | (−0.56) | (−0.68) | (0.62) | |
depFixedAsset | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
(0.97) | (0.20) | (0.17) | (0.86) | (1.13) | |
accountsreceivable | 0.07 | 0.11 * | 0.09 | 0.11 ** | 0.12 ** |
(1.38) | (1.77) | (1.52) | (2.23) | (2.51) | |
debt_ratio | 0.02 | 0.03 * | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
(0.96) | (1.75) | (1.57) | (1.14) | (1.17) | |
longtermloan | −10.08 ** | −2.60 | −8.90 * | −15.41 | −21.49 ** |
(−2.06) | (−0.68) | (−1.71) | (−1.37) | (−2.36) | |
companysize | −1.68 *** | −2.59 *** | −2.18 *** | −2.11 *** | −1.95 *** |
(−2.91) | (−3.21) | (−2.95) | (−2.59) | (−2.77) | |
revgrowth | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.01 |
(0.12) | (0.81) | (0.28) | (−0.16) | (−0.79) | |
cashflow | 0.03 | 0.04 ** | 0.04 * | 0.04 * | 0.03 |
(1.26) | (2.16) | (1.69) | (1.67) | (1.36) | |
compensation | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0.05 | −0.10 | −0.05 |
(0.04) | (0.60) | (0.39) | (−0.54) | (−0.32) | |
personnel change | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.27 | 0.29 |
(0.59) | (0.52) | (0.37) | (1.30) | (1.47) | |
Ceo duality | −1.56 ** | −1.33 | −1.16 | −1.71 * | −1.55 * |
(−1.99) | (−1.62) | (−1.49) | (−1.69) | (−1.78) | |
Degree_M/Close_M | 0.00 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | |
(1.47) | (1.09) | (−0.96) | (−1.28) | ||
Degree_AM/Close_AM | −0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
(−0.77) | (−0.42) | (0.52) | (0.57) | ||
Chairmanseniority | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.03 | |
(1.36) | (1.14) | (0.62) | (0.34) | ||
Degree_C/Close_C | −0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
(−0.33) | (−0.56) | (0.36) | (0.19) | ||
Ceoseniority | −0.14 * | −0.13 * | −0.07 | −0.06 | |
(−1.82) | (−1.75) | (−0.98) | (−0.91) | ||
Degree_G/Close_G | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 * | −0.00 * | |
(−0.93) | (−0.70) | (−1.85) | (−1.95) | ||
Cfoseniority | 0.14 * | 0.12 * | 0.14 * | 0.14 * | |
(1.74) | (1.62) | (1.76) | (1.74) | ||
Degree_F/Close_F | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | |
(−1.21) | (−0.84) | (−1.10) | (−1.07) | ||
intercept | 46.24 *** | 28.01 ** | 44.57 ** | 85.99 ** | 105.23 *** |
(2.67) | (2.22) | (2.24) | (2.32) | (3.15) | |
N | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 |
pseudo R2 | 0.25 | 0.37 | 0.33 | 0.40 | 0.39 |
AUC | 0.82 | 0.89 | 0.87 | 0.90 | 0.89 |
goodness-of-fit test | 65.37 (p = 0.39) | 56.08 (p = 0.43) | 59.53 (p = 0.31) | 58.79 (p = 0.34) | 59.70 (p = 0.31) |
Model 1 | Model 2 | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Degree | Degree# | Closeness | Closeness# | ||
SEO | −1.21 | −1.35 | −1.27 | −1.73 | −1.82 |
(−1.39) | (−1.42) | (−1.32) | (−1.51) | (−1.54) | |
Nonoperating | −0.00 | −0.00 ** | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
(−1.11) | (−2.01) | (−0.91) | (−1.38) | (−0.38) | |
depFixedAsset | 0.01 | 0.00 | −0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
(0.97) | (0.06) | (−0.03) | (0.39) | (0.40) | |
Accountsreceivable | 0.07 | 0.12 * | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
(1.38) | (1.93) | (1.53) | (1.20) | (1.49) | |
debt_ratio | 0.02 | 0.03 * | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
(0.96) | (1.86) | (1.61) | (1.53) | (1.45) | |
Longtermloan | −10.08 ** | −1.79 * | −11.39 ** | −11.40 | −15.56 ** |
(−2.06) | (−1.66) | (−2.10) | (−1.36) | (−2.41) | |
Companysize | −1.68 *** | −2.86 *** | −2.44 *** | −1.96 ** | −1.90 ** |
(−2.91) | (−3.56) | (−3.16) | (−2.29) | (−2.29) | |
Revgrowth | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | −0.00 |
(0.12) | (0.75) | (0.28) | (0.32) | (−0.07) | |
Cashflow | 0.03 | 0.04 ** | 0.04 * | 0.03 | 0.03 |
(1.26) | (2.34) | (1.86) | (1.51) | (1.43) | |
Compensation | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0.05 | −0.12 | −0.11 |
(0.04) | (0.59) | (0.32) | (−0.75) | (−0.81) | |
personnel change | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.06 |
(0.59) | (0.34) | (0.32) | (0.47) | (0.38) | |
Ceo duality | −1.56 ** | −1.39 | −1.21 | −1.10 | −0.99 |
(−1.99) | (−1.62) | (−1.46) | (−1.33) | (−1.29) | |
Degree_BM/Close_BM | 0.00 ** | 0.00 ** | 0.00 | −0.00 | |
(2.56) | (2.11) | (0.00) | (−0.15) | ||
Degree_BAM/Close_BAM | −0.02 ** | −0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
(−2.04) | (−1.53) | (0.87) | (1.01) | ||
Chairmanseniority | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.06 | |
(1.56) | (1.32) | (0.97) | (0.83) | ||
Degree_BC/Close_BC | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | |
(−1.26) | (−1.37) | (−0.18) | (−0.33) | ||
Ceoseniority | −0.16 ** | −0.15 ** | −0.14 ** | −0.14 * | |
(−2.03) | (−1.98) | (−1.97) | (−1.94) | ||
Degree_BG/Close_BG | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | |
(−1.18) | (−0.82) | (−1.54) | (−1.53) | ||
Cfoseniority | 0.15 * | 0.14 * | 0.14 * | 0.14 | |
(1.81) | (1.66) | (1.66) | (1.58) | ||
Degree_BF/Close_BF | −0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
(−1.28) | (−0.82) | (0.38) | (0.75) | ||
Intercept | 46.24 *** | 27.58 *** | 54.56 ** | 51.95 ** | 64.48 *** |
(2.67) | (3.67) | (2.54) | (2.00) | (2.97) | |
N | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 | 76 |
pseudo R2 | 0.25 | 0.41 | 0.36 | 0.35 | 0.33 |
AUC | 0.82 | 0.90 | 0.89 | 0.88 | 0.87 |
goodness-of-fit test | 65.37 (p = 0.39) | 52.87 (p = 0.57) | 56.56 (p = 0.42) | 58.59 (p = 0.35) | 61.34 (p = 0.26) |
Model 3 | Model 4 | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Degree | Degree# | Closeness | Closeness# | ||
SEO | −0.05 | −0.49 | −0.51 | −0.27 | −0.10 |
(−0.14) | (−1.11) | (−1.09) | (−0.56) | (−0.20) | |
nonoperating | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.01 |
(−1.42) | (−0.40) | (−1.38) | (−0.90) | (−1.38) | |
depFixedAsset | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.01 | −0.00 |
(−1.12) | (−1.02) | (−0.49) | (−0.79) | (−0.23) | |
accountsreceivable | 0.00 * | −0.00 | 0.02 *** | −0.00 ** | 0.01 |
(1.85) | (−0.15) | (3.48) | (−2.49) | (0.56) | |
debt_ratio | −0.01 | −0.02 | −0.02 | −0.01 | −0.02 |
(−0.91) | (−0.97) | (−1.07) | (−0.76) | (−0.81) | |
longtermloan | −0.28 | −0.25 | 3.55 | −0.33 | 6.00 ** |
(−1.54) | (−1.31) | (1.43) | (−1.10) | (2.08) | |
companysize | −0.12 | −0.02 | 0.41 | 0.03 | 0.69 |
(−0.38) | (−0.05) | (0.77) | (0.03) | (0.88) | |
revgrowth | 0.01 ** | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 |
(2.10) | (0.74) | (0.79) | (0.82) | (1.27) | |
cashflow | 0.01 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
(1.03) | (0.19) | (−0.20) | (−0.30) | (−0.21) | |
compensation | −0.01 | −0.04 | 0.02 | −0.07 | 0.05 |
(−0.27) | (−0.51) | (0.26) | (−0.80) | (0.36) | |
personnel change | −0.03 | −0.12 | −0.12 | −0.05 | −0.06 |
(−0.52) | (−1.31) | (−1.05) | (−0.41) | (−0.46) | |
Ceo duality | −0.73 * | −0.52 | −0.81 | −0.32 | −0.79 |
(−1.75) | (−0.95) | (−1.33) | (−0.57) | (−1.31) | |
Degree_M/Close_M | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | |
(−0.40) | (−0.80) | (−0.11) | (−0.20) | ||
Degree_AM/Close_AM | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
(0.20) | (0.80) | (0.22) | (1.20) | ||
Chairmanseniority | −0.03 | −0.05 ** | 0.01 | −0.02 | |
(−1.28) | (−2.02) | (0.22) | (−0.85) | ||
Degree_C/Close_C | −0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
(−1.01) | (−1.00) | (1.28) | (0.62) | ||
Ceoseniority | −0.05 | −0.03 | −0.07 * | −0.03 | |
(−1.09) | (−0.57) | (−1.77) | (−0.75) | ||
Degree_G/Close_G | 0.00 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | |
(0.53) | (0.37) | (−1.45) | (−1.16) | ||
Cfoseniority | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.02 | −0.01 | |
(−0.28) | (−0.03) | (−0.54) | (−0.21) | ||
Degree_F/Close_F | 0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 *** | 0.00 | |
(0.26) | (−1.17) | (3.09) | (0.58) | ||
N | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 |
pseudo R2 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.07 |
Harrell’s C | 0.53 | 0.62 | 0.64 | 0.69 | 0.64 |
Model 3 | Model 4 | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Degree | Degree# | Closeness | Closeness# | ||
SEO | −0.05 | −0.34 | −0.58 | −0.52 | −0.45 |
(−0.14) | (−0.65) | (−1.11) | (−0.96) | (−0.82) | |
nonoperating | −0.00 | 0.00 | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.01 |
(−1.42) | (0.39) | (−1.24) | (−0.51) | (−1.12) | |
depFixedAsset | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.01 | −0.00 |
(−1.12) | (−1.03) | (−0.51) | (−0.97) | (−0.37) | |
accountsreceivable | 0.00 * | −0.00 | 0.02 ** | 0.00 | 0.02 *** |
(1.85) | (−1.52) | (2.08) | (0.91) | (2.74) | |
debt_ratio | −0.01 | −0.03 | −0.03 | −0.02 | −0.02 |
(−0.91) | (−1.41) | (−1.22) | (−0.95) | (−0.85) | |
Longtermloan | −0.28 | −0.24 | 4.71 * | −0.33 | 4.83 * |
(−1.54) | (−1.22) | (1.82) | (1.65) | (1.69) | |
Companysize | −0.12 | 0.04 | 0.35 | −0.77 | 0.52 |
(−0.38) | (0.07) | (0.67) | (−0.82) | (0.59) | |
Revgrowth | 0.01 ** | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
(2.10) | (0.21) | (0.55) | (1.23) | (1.08) | |
Cashflow | 0.01 | 0.00 | −0.00 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
(1.03) | (0.25) | (−0.09) | (0.77) | (0.09) | |
Compensation | −0.01 | −0.10 | −0.00 | −0.05 | 0.05 |
(−0.27) | (−1.47) | (−0.03) | (−0.47) | (0.49) | |
personnel change | −0.03 | −0.06 | −0.11 | −0.23 | −0.11 |
(−0.52) | (−0.69) | (−0.95) | (−1.19) | (−0.61) | |
Ceo duality | −0.73 * | −0.52 | −0.73 | −0.52 | −0.68 |
(−1.75) | (−0.88) | (−1.21) | (−0.90) | (−1.27) | |
Degree_BM/Close_BM | 0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 | −0.00 | |
(0.04) | (−0.21) | (0.63) | (0.21) | ||
Degree_BAM/Close_BAM | −0.00 | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | |
(−0.00) | (0.36) | (−0.76) | (−0.40) | ||
Chairmanseniority | −0.02 | −0.04 * | −0.01 | −0.04 | |
(−0.74) | (−1.68) | (−0.31) | (−1.30) | ||
Degree_BC/Close_BC | −0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 | −0.00 | |
(−0.18) | (−0.46) | (0.60) | (−0.08) | ||
Ceoseniority | −0.03 | −0.03 | −0.04 | −0.02 | |
(−0.77) | (−0.56) | (−0.79) | (−0.54) | ||
Degree_BG/Close_BG | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 | |
(−0.45) | (−0.14) | (−0.50) | (0.39) | ||
Cfoseniority | −0.00 | −0.02 | −0.02 | −0.01 | |
(−0.18) | (−0.79) | (−0.59) | (−0.31) | ||
Degree_BF/Close_BF | 0.00 * | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | |
(1.66) | (−0.55) | (−0.22) | (−0.52) | ||
N | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 |
pseudo R2 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.07 |
Harrell’s C | 0.53 | 0.64 | 0.64 | 0.60 | 0.62 |
Variable | Actual Results of Overcoming the Crisis | Actual Results of Shortening Crisis Duration | |
---|---|---|---|
Total interpersonal relationships of company members (Degree_M) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant | |
Average interpersonal relationships of company members (Degree_AM) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant | |
General network variables | Total interpersonal relationships of chairmen (Degree_C) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant |
Total interpersonal relationships of general managers (Degree_G) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant | |
Total interpersonal relationships of financial executives (Degree_F) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant | |
Sum of shortest distances for company members (Close_M) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant | |
Average shortest distance for company members (Close_AM) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant | |
Sum of shortest distances for chairmen (Close_C) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant | |
Sum of shortest distances for general managers (Close_G) | Negative | Nonsignificant | |
Sum of shortest distances for financial executives (Close_F) | Nonsignificant | Positive | |
Total bank relations of company members (Degree_BM) | Positive | Nonsignificant | |
Average bank relations of company members (Degree_BAM) | Negative | Nonsignificant | |
Bank network variables | Total bank relations of chairmen (Degree_BC) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant |
Total bank relations of general managers (Degree_BG) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant | |
Total bank relations of financial executives (Degree_BF) | Nonsignificant | Positive | |
Sum of shortest distances for company members (Close_BM) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant | |
Average shortest distance for company members (Close_BAM) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant | |
Sum of shortest distances for chairmen (Close_BC) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant | |
Sum of shortest distances for general managers (Close_BG) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant | |
Sum of shortest distances for financial executives (Close_BF) | Nonsignificant | Nonsignificant |
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Lin, S.-H.; Chang, T.-P.; Lai, H.-H.; Lu, Z.-Y. Do Social Networks of Listed Companies Help Companies Recover from Financial Crises? Sustainability 2022, 14, 5044. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14095044
Lin S-H, Chang T-P, Lai H-H, Lu Z-Y. Do Social Networks of Listed Companies Help Companies Recover from Financial Crises? Sustainability. 2022; 14(9):5044. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14095044
Chicago/Turabian StyleLin, Szu-Hsien, Tzu-Pu Chang, Huei-Hwa Lai, and Zi-Ying Lu. 2022. "Do Social Networks of Listed Companies Help Companies Recover from Financial Crises?" Sustainability 14, no. 9: 5044. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14095044