Next Article in Journal
Verify the Validity of Guidance Sign in Buildings: A New Method Based on Mixed Reality with Eye Tracking Device
Next Article in Special Issue
Burger.i.doo”—An Innovative Education Game for the Assessment of Sustainability from Meat and Substitute Products in Science Education
Previous Article in Journal
Development of the SUNRA Tool to Improve Regional and Local Sustainability of the Transportation Sector
Previous Article in Special Issue
Developing Capacities to Lead Change for Sustainability: A Quasi-Experimental Study of Simulation-Based Learning
 
 
Font Type:
Arial Georgia Verdana
Font Size:
Aa Aa Aa
Line Spacing:
Column Width:
Background:
Review

Revisiting the Concept of Values Taught in Education through Carroll’s Corporate Social Responsibility

by
Eddie W. L. Cheng
Department of Social Sciences, The Education University of Hong Kong, Tai Po, Hong Kong, China
Sustainability 2022, 14(18), 11280; https://doi.org/10.3390/su141811280
Submission received: 4 July 2022 / Revised: 8 August 2022 / Accepted: 6 September 2022 / Published: 8 September 2022
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Innovative Teaching and Learning in Education for Sustainability)

Abstract

:
Schools and universities are not only places to learn subject knowledge, but also places to help students develop their values. Despite this explicit need for cultivating students’ values, what values should be taught is always a common question among educators. While seminal theories have proposed different typologies of values, few of them have been connected to the social environment that currently governs people’s behaviors. From a theoretical standpoint, this study reviews the concept of values and draws attention to Carroll’s corporate social responsibility (CSR), which fosters a mindset of altruism rather than self-interest. By recalling how Carroll’s CSR relates to human values, students will be taught to behave correctly in society. As a result, a two-layer paradigm, which highlights the importance of a value system that is understated in social practices, is introduced. This paper promises to redirect social dialogues about core values and help generate future research directions in the field.

1. Introduction

Schools and universities are not only places to learn subject knowledge, but also places to help students develop their values. This learning experience extends from the moral values developed in schools [1] to the career-oriented values acquired in higher education, such as those essential to good medical practices [2]. Despite this explicit need for cultivating students’ values, what values should be taught is always a common question among educators. Value is broadly defined as “the importance or worth of something for someone” [3]. Rokeach [4] (p. 6) further refers to it as “an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence.” Therefore, values are relatively stable and play a crucial role in driving preferences, attitudes, and behaviors [5]. They are “the states of the human spirit” [6] (p. 145). According to Ziliotti [7] (p. 409), values can be intrinsic or extrinsic, where intrinsic values are “valuable for (their) own sake”, such as friendship, and extrinsic values exist “for the sake of something else”, such as a fence that protects a family’s safety.
Among other values, core values are the most important values or those that are at the heart of a value system, as noted by Harrison and McKinnon [8] when describing cultural values. A commonly used definition was developed by Smolicz [9] (p. 75), who suggested that core values form “one of the most fundamental components of a group’s culture.” Numerous studies have found that values are quite stable over time [10]. Sharabi and Haarpaz [11], when grouping values into core and peripheral, found that core values were more stable than peripheral values. This can be explained by the concept of value hierarchies where one’s core values entail shaping the very core of one’s identity [5]. Such an enduring identity extends to its continuity and stability [12]. Moreover, when core values are characterized in Smolicz’s definition as the norm of a culture, such values may not necessarily be positive in the eyes of the world. In terms of morality, ideal core values must be positive and ethical. For example, social morality is defined as “the whole set of moral values and principles for guiding actions impinging on the welfare and interests of others that is accepted as authoritative by a particular community” [13] (p. 226), while political morality refers to “the moral convictions and commitments that govern decisions about what laws to enact, what policies to pursue …” [14] (p. 1).
In line with morality, this study aims to revisit the concept of values taught in education through Carroll’s corporate social responsibility (CSR), which is perceived to be grounded in principles similar to the concept of sustainability. Although CSR and sustainability are regarded as “umbrella constructs”, meaning that they are broad concepts spanning across multiple meanings [15], they both draw attention to the importance of morals and ethics [16]. Carroll’s CSR mainly highlights four levels of responsibilities (i.e., philanthropic, ethical, legal, and economic), while sustainability, in the popular form of the “triple bottom line” introduced by Elkington [17], focuses on three major pillars (i.e., social, environmental, and economic). Compared to sustainability, a seemingly more neutral “slogan”, Carroll’s CSR tends to concentrate more on the legacy of responsibility [18]. Referring to a corporation’s sense of duty to society [19], CSR is expected to make significant contributions to the sustainable development of society [20]. Therefore, by developing values through CSR, students will become more willing to safeguard our social, economic, and natural environment proactively. The integration of CSR into the area of educational sustainability for cultivating secondary students’ personal values has been raised recently [21]. Since Carroll’s CSR promotes values aligned with different levels of responsibilities, this study argues that a student’s value system should reflect his or her social responsibility, which is the basis for shaping the relationships among values. The concept of social responsibility has recently gained momentum in education, demanding a rethinking of relevant teaching practices and anticipated interactions with the community [22]. This study employs a narrative review approach to draw on the existing literature deemed critical to the review. This approach not only helps create scholarly summaries of research on values through sensible interpretation and critique [23], but also provides insights into positive values education. According to Greenhalgh, Thorne, and Malterud [24] (p. 3), the narrative review, in contrast to the systematic review, aims at “an authoritative argument, based on informed wisdom that is convincing to an audience of fellow experts.” The evidences collected must be authentic, relevant, and sufficient to inform the review’s conclusions. In the following sections, the conceptions aiding in the positioning of the essential values in a two-layer paradigm are discussed. Examples of values will be used to illustrate the underlying logic that directs the discussion in this paper.

2. Values Education

A teacher’s professionalism includes not only skills for didactic methods and the subject area being taught, but also being a values educator for helping students develop their whole personality [25]. This aligns with the United Nation’s sustainable development goals, which call for greater efforts to engage students in creating a better world [26]. Sutrop [25] cited British philosopher Harry Brighouse’s four perspectives on the goal of education. These perspectives stem from four different theories, where the goal of education is articulated to help people (1) focus on their own freedom, choice, and right to self-determination (i.e., the theory of human autonomy), (2) build a more productive workforce that supports economic growth (i.e., the theory of human capital), (3) develop the conditions for “a good life and the development of personality” (i.e., the theory of human development), and (4) prepare for “living together with others in society” (i.e., the theory of civic education) [27] (as cited in [25], pp. 189–190). Since these educational perspectives are imbued with tightly intertwined personal, cultural, and social values, Sutrop [25] concluded that “the nature of education is deeply ethical” (p. 190), while “values permeate every aspect of education” and thus there is no such a thing as a “value-free education” (p. 189).
While education is claimed to be value-laden, we should ask the question: What values have to be taught in education? Sutrop [25] (p. 192) agreed with Russell [28] that “the kind of education we strive to give mirrors our understanding of desirable virtues”, which, according to Russell [28], should indicate what type of people we wish to “produce”. As Sutrop [25] (p. 192) further mentioned, for raising obedient, loyal, and hardworking people who strictly follow orders and commands, the authoritarian style of teaching with rote methods should be employed; conversely, for establishing a state with “the rule of law, a participatory style of dialogue and interchange, and a rapidly growing, innovative economy,” our young people should develop “enterprising, creative, and critical thinking” mindsets. However, this bipolar, mutually exclusive view may not accurately reflect the values our society needs. The reason is twofold. First, people grow up with different personalities. According to the American Psychological Association [29], personality is defined as “the enduring configuration of characteristics and behavior that comprises an individual’s unique adjustment to life, including major traits, interests, drives, values, self-concept, abilities, and emotional patterns” and “all (theories of personality) agree that personality helps determine behavior.” For example, students differ in their preferred learning styles, which are known to be intricately related to their individual differences [30]. Second, the existing literature has already commented that personality predicts business success (e.g., [31]). Take Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) as an example. MBTI, which outlines sixteen personality types that influence individuals in making decisions [32], has been widely used to identify the types of personality dominated in different contexts, such as the recruitment of cabin crews [33] and language learning in a cross-cultural environment [34]. Although researchers have criticized the validity of the Jungian-based theory behind MBTI (e.g., [35]), there is no debate about the existence of individual differences arising from various personality types, which match the work values of different kinds of jobs. In fact, values that are required in the workplace are diverse because many of them are job-dependent. For example, creative jobs, such as sales and marketing, might look for people with innovative ideas and self-directed characters, while jobs involving routine tasks, such as administration or factory assembly lines, might fit those who are obedient and loyal. On the other hand, some values are mandatory in the workplace, such as those of being adaptable, self-motivated, and hardworking.
Behind what is mentioned above lies the sense that there are different concepts in explaining the nature of values. Sutrop [25] mentioned three concepts: absolutism (also known as idealism), relativism, and pluralism. Absolutists believe that values are important in all cases (e.g., teaching justice as an absolute value in moral education), while values are context-oriented in the eyes of relativists and pluralists. Unlike relativism being defined as the belief that values are relative to each particular culture or society [36] (e.g., teaching the Bible in a Catholic school that does not teach other religious values), pluralism refers to the belief that people with different values can live in mutual respect in society [37] (e.g., teaching different traditions in the local community). Rather than arguing over which concept is more applicable than the other in terms of their relevance in society, Forsyth [38] suggested that both idealism and relativism are conceptualized as independent concepts, helping to explain the importance of values that influence the formation of ethical norms and social codes of behavior. In short, “idealism focuses on ‘unselfish’ concern for others, whereas relativism focuses on the best of alternatives” [36] (p. 84). Although they, including pluralism, are considered non-opposing concepts, there are situations leading to value ambivalence. For example, Park [36] found that highly relativistic individuals were reluctant to comply with idealistic signals of organizational environment (e.g., organizational control systems). This form of distinguishing between individual and cultural values, initially proposed by Schwartz [39], will be discussed in the following sections.

3. The Concept of Values

The identification of a set of values appropriate for teaching in all possible settings is a daunting task. However, Chernilo [40], when providing some essential hints on conceptualizing political forms of modernity, draws attention to his conviction that there would not be a social model representing all modern societies. He agreed with Habermas’ [41] social theory of contemporary politics that the values of the Western nation-state (in particular, liberal democracy) may not be the same to those values that predominate in many other countries, such as those countries with Islamic or Confucian cultures. Due to multiculturalism (i.e., differentiation) and globalism (i.e., commonality), countries, as various forms of socio-cultural arrangements, should work together in order to transform to the wider context of modernity’s structural evolution, given that this is not what Luhmann [42] suggested with the formation of world society. With this in mind, it is possible to teach a set of positive values that can explain modern social life across nations and cultures (i.e., common or shared values), whereas these values may vary among different nations and cultures within an acceptable range (i.e., tolerable differentiation). It is clear that if people have very different sets of values, conflicts will inevitably arise.
Regarding shared values, Rokeach’s typology is perhaps the most popular one. Rokeach [4], based on the analysis of examples across nations, classified values into two types: (1) instrumental values, which pertain to desirable modes of conduct, and (2) terminal values, which pertain to desirable end-states of existence. For the most part, instrumental values, such as ambitions, imagination, cheerfulness, cleanliness, forgiveness, love, politeness, honesty, responsibility, obedience, and self-control, are personal in nature and largely exist in what philosophers describe the private domain; conversely, terminal values, such as a comfortable life, an exciting life, equality, freedom, national security, pleasure, self-respect, wisdom, happiness, true friendship, and social recognition, are mostly social or collective in nature, but their relevance is frequently queried in public discourse [43] (for details, refer to p. 355). This classification of values is similar to the view that values can be grouped into assigned or held, representing two realms of values [44]. Assigned values refer to “the expressed relative importance or worth of an object to an individual or group in a given context” [45] (p. 236), while held values are defined as “ideals of what is desirable, how things ought to be, and how one should interact with the world” and should take the form of “desirable modes of behavior” [44] (p. 2). Assigned values, compared to held values, can shape real behaviors better, but are influenced by held values and other external forces, such as socialization processes, knowledge and perception, and contextual factors [46].
The above classifications echo Ziliotti’s [7] extrinsic (either instrumental or non-instrumental) and intrinsic values. However, the notion that a terminal value is superior to an instrumental value because the former is a desired end-state is inaccurate [7,47]. Other than being an end (terminal) or a means to some end (instrumental), a value can be both. For example, it can be a terminal value for one person and instrumental for another [48] (p. 94). For Dorsey [49] (p. 138), “instrumental value is often characterized in vague terms” and “can no longer be classified as a form of extrinsic value.” For Baard [47] p. 198), “not all means have instrumental value” and “some are simply instrumental while others reflect intrinsic or final values, to the extent that they are necessary causes.” As Schwartz [50] noted, all types of motivational concerns should be referred to as the term “goals”, rather than being labeled as instrumental (preferred mode of behavior) or terminal (end-state of existence).
If values are conceptualized as goals to achieve, this utilitarian approach to defining values permits the pursuit of non-positive values because it does not consider the real nature of the values. When considering morality, all human values cultivated at schools and universities must be positive. For example, the term “ambition”, which is broadly defined as “having a strong wish to be successful, powerful, or rich” [3], may not be accepted as a moral value because it may violate human principles when it is related to the eagerness of power and richness. As Sutrop [25] (p. 195) mentioned, “the main role of teachers is to create an environment (‘a caring school community’) that allows the students to develop certain behavioral inclinations or qualities of character (virtues) and perform morally required acts.” In terms of moral intelligence, it is crucial to apply universal human principles to people’s personal values, goals, and actions [51]. Clarken [52] (p. 3) summarized the ten principles developed based on the four dimensions of moral intelligence by Lennick and Kiel: (1) integrity means “acting consistently with principles, values and beliefs,” “telling the truth,” “standing up for what is right,” and “keeping promises;” (2) responsibility means “taking personal responsibility,” “admitting mistakes and failures,” and “embracing responsibility for serving others;” (3) forgiveness means “letting go of one’s own mistakes” and “letting go of others’ mistakes;” (4) compassion means “actively caring about others.” He also introduced a similar list of characteristics of a moral person who “respects human dignity, cares about the welfare of others, integrates individual interests and social responsibilities, demonstrates integrity, reflects on moral choices, and seeks peaceful resolution of conflict” [52] (p. 3), as defined by the Association of Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD) Panel on Moral Education in the United States.

4. The Two-Layer Paradigm

4.1. Underlying Assumptions of the Paradigm

Following Schwartz’s [53,54] line of value pluralism, researchers have found it difficult to think of a social arrangement, in which people are able to absorb and tolerate different sources of value conflicts “without perpetually devolving into stalemate situations” [43] (p. 351). Inasmuch as a social group specifies its goals and how they should be accomplished, such goals stem from specific values. Likewise, people’s preferences, choices, and behaviors are rooted in the realization of their personal values [55,56]. This study, therefore, reaffirms the premise that positive values form the driving force for sustaining a good behavior, should values be the underlying assumptions of a behavior. In considering this, a person’s behavior is not a core value. Core values lie deep in people’s hearts and are not easily changed with varying circumstances. In other words, students are not just taught to replicate a particular behavior, but, more importantly, to establish the values that help induce changes in behavior. For example, students learn not to litter because they are told that littering damages the environment and causes public health problems; however, if students do not develop such values as empathy, caring, and a sense of civic-mindedness, their non-littering behavior would not be sustainable.
Instead of identifying an exhaustive list of positive values, this study focuses on structuring a paradigm for specifying the relationships (both lateral and vertical) among values that are essential to form a person’s preferences, choices, attitudes, and behaviors. The core and peripheral values previously mentioned are expected to be classified at two layers in the paradigm. The classification used in this study is made according to human morality that drives a person to become a good person. Although James Madison, the former president of the United States, once said that “if men were angels, no government would be necessary” (as quoted in [57], p. 318), this would not prevent students from learning to be a good person. As the second premise articulated by Socrates, “what is chiefly to be valued is not life itself, but a good life, that is, a just and honorable life” (as quoted in [58], p. 27). Schools and universities are places for cultivating students’ positive values. Moreover, the expected causality between layers will be considered. As a result, the former will help screen out irrelevant values, while the latter will help specify the role of each layer.
According to Jones et al. [44] (p. 1), “the study of values can tap into the moral and less tangible aspects of people’s cognition.” Human morality appears in nature in two analogous forms [59] (p. 1): (1) self-immolating motives that may drive a person to be compassionate, concerned, and benevolent; (2) impartial motives that may drive a person to focus on fairness, equity, and justice. In such a typology, some moral means may conflict with each other, such as a motive for beneficence versus one for justice, a motive for sympathy versus one for fairness. As stated earlier, in contrast to the view that values are universal across cultures, this study argues that the values should be universally endorsed but may have different degrees of importance across cultures. Based on the premise that a culture consists of a shared set of values and beliefs [60], different cultures may have individual hierarchies of values and beliefs. For example, Vignoles, Smith, Becker, and Easterbrook [61] found that Europe, in spite of its implicitly multicultural nature, had a value profile, which was somewhat different from those of North America and Asia. Magun, Rudnev, and Schmidt [62] found that European countries were diverse in their value class composition. Witte, Stanciu, and Boehnke [39], when studying personal and cultural values of European countries, further found that the structure of individual values at the cultural level was subject to societal challenges. Therefore, selecting values that can be applied universally, with an acceptable degree of variation across nations or cultures, is essential in this new paradigm.

4.2. The Circular Paradigm

As shown in Figure 1, the circular paradigm, as a general principle, has two layers, namely “core layer” and “peripheral layer”, each of which represents a particular role. In regard to the connection of the two layers, this study follows Sharabi and Harpaz’s [11] view that core values are part of a human being’s basic values system developed during early socialization as opposed to peripheral values that are mainly shaped by surrounding pressure or societal trends. In addition, borrowing Carroll’s CSR [18,63,64], this study argues that core values reflect one’s philanthropic (i.e., an altruistic desire as one’s quality of life) and ethical (i.e., moral philosophy that governs a person’s behavior) principles, while peripheral values reflect one’s legal principles (i.e., obeying or complying with the laws). According to Arjoon [65] (p. 347), “law is jurisdictionally limited since what is legitimately required in one state or country may differ from another, whereas ethical values are inclined to be more universal.” This echoes the premise that personal values are people’s “broad desirable goals that motivate (their) action and serve as guiding principles in their lives,” while social (cultural) values represent “the goals that members of the social collective (e.g., nations, religious groups, business organizations) are encouraged to pursue” [5] (p. 630).
Carroll’s CSR aims to regulate business organizations’ behavior through influencing their policies and practices in order to protect and improve the welfare of society [66]. Related counterparts include business ethics, ESG (stands for Environmental, Social, and Governance), stakeholder management, sustainability, and corporate citizenship. This study adopts Carroll’s CSR because it sets itself apart from its “peers”, not only for its role in promoting an altruistic and moral life of business organizations [67], but also for highlighting individual competencies to take on different levels of responsibility implementation in today’s social context [68]. The building of such individual competencies reminds us of the importance of values education. Given the popularity of the concept due to its generic nature, this study focuses on Carroll’s original CSR meaning, which reflects what Carroll [69] (p. 37) insisted was “the current trend toward strategic philanthropy to remain the guiding philosophy.”
In summary, the values at the core layer (i.e., the core values) are those human values or principles that should permanently exist in the heart of human beings. They are positive human qualities with philanthropic and ethical standards. For Carroll [64] (p. 42), an ethical company should “do what is right, just, and fair”, while an altruistic company should “be a good corporate citizen”. By the same token, an ethical person should “do what is right, just, and fair”, while an altruistic person should “be a good citizen”. Both philanthropic and ethical principles are thus crucial in developing core values. By contrast, the peripheral layer contains human values that conform to only legal principles. Carroll [64] (p. 41) argued that the legal level mirrors the view of “codified ethics” in the sense that many of the laws operate with some ethical norms about fairness and justice. Therefore, obeying the law is the bottom line of socially acceptable behaviors, while disobeying the law is not only illegal but potentially unethical. These various kinds of principles are adapted from the concept of CSR, pertaining to three of the four levels of responsibilities. The remaining economic component is excluded because this level aims at maximizing gains without compliance with, at least, the basic legal requirements. Although new ethical principles continue to emerge in the dynamic global environment and ethics form the driving force of new laws [64], both core and peripheral values persistently contribute to the formation of good characters and behaviors.
From the perspective of theory building, the antecedents of a variable explain the variation of that variable and should be emphasized [70,71,72]. For example, when an accident is investigated, the cause of that accident should be focused. In a similar vein, if people look for a good behavior, they should pay attention to what causes a good behavior. In the two-layer paradigm, the values at the core and peripheral layers are predictors of a preferred behavior. Merely maintaining values at the peripheral layer does not guarantee a sustainable behavior. Both intra-layer and inter-layer relationships among these values are possible, given the proposition that values at both layers determine the choice of preferred behaviors. Future research is encouraged to be planned in this direction to explore more potentiality of the paradigm.
Some may ask whether it is possible to build positive values on a good behavior. In the social cognitive school, behavior modeling may help facilitate the performance of an expected behavior of a role model by an observer [73]. The underlying questions here are (1) whether the behavior is good, and (2) how the behavior is judged to be good. Unless the assumption that the behavior is good is true, the theorizing process for identifying the values may become self-fulfilling. One possible way to evaluate the goodness of the behavior is to compare it with other behaviors through a set of criteria, which should be the values that are expected to be derived from these behaviors. Yet, these values should be able to impartially assess the behaviors. Therefore, a set of values should not be used to judge whether a behavior is better or more successful than other behaviors if such values are derived from that behavior but not from other behaviors. For example, in the selection process of applicants for a job vacancy, if the criteria are in favor of a particular applicant due to the fact that they are derived from that applicant, the judgment falls into the trap of the self-fulfilling prophecy. In other words, that applicant is portrayed as being superior to other applicants. Similarly, a behavior is portrayed as being superior to other behaviors when the values are derived from that behavior and are, therefore, in favor of it.
Despite the possibility that positive values can be built on a good behavior, business scandals and fraudulent cases are commonly found in society, including in those sectors with strong ethical standards, such as accounting and financial practices. With a sample of 164 accounting students from two universities in the northeastern United States, Abdolmohammadi and Baker [74] investigated the relationship between Rokeach values and principled moral reasoning and found that those who demonstrated a stronger tendency to follow rules and regulations (i.e., conformity values) had a lower ability of ethical reasoning; hence, they concluded that these people were not desirable candidates for entry to the profession. Arjoon [65] (p. 345) cited Termes [75], further stating that “ethical functioning of financial institutions cannot be trusted to the imposition of codes of ethical conduct, but the only way in which companies can be ethical is for people to be ethical,” and “ethics therefore is concerned with what we are and not just what we do” [65] (p. 347). Thus, an employee’s ethical practices do not depend solely on the company’s ethical conduct, but more on the employee’s moral values, which reflect a person’s true self-worth, rather than prescribed behaviors. Teachers, working as values educators, should urge students to be aware of their own values, empower them with the skills to reflect on values, and support their moral development in order to form “their own personal code of values” [25] (p. 193).

4.3. The Nature of Human Values

As noted, human qualities are crucial to the implementation of good behaviors. Art [76] (as cited in [77], p. 441), when discussing the reasons for supporting democracy abroad (i.e., the best form of governance, the best guarantee for the protection of human rights, the prevention of mass murder and genocide, facilitating economic growth, and assisting the cause of peace), did not promote positive qualities of citizens. Without the promotion of human qualities, all the stipulated policies and rules will not be successfully implemented. Human qualities form the assumption of these policies and rules. Human qualities are synonymous with human values, which are regarded as the most stable form of human cognition [44,78]. The term “value” has been defined earlier. Its meaning in terms of human values can be further explored.
A popular source of values perceived to be taught in education comes from Schwartz [79], who developed [53] and later refined [54] the theory of basic human values, which attempted to identify universal values that are recognized throughout major countries. He commented that the ten motivationally distinct dimensions of values (i.e., benevolence, self-direction, hedonism, security, achievement, power, conformity, tradition, stimulation, and universalism) he identified form a circular structure that portrays their dynamic relationships. He further claimed that the values in the ten dimensions, while representing what the majority of a culture emphasizes, are not necessarily positive; furthermore, actions taken for a value may conflict with some values but be congruent with some others. For example, those who look for achievement values (e.g., personal success) probably target power values (e.g., dominance) but reject benevolence values (e.g., emphasizing the wellbeing of others) [80]. This phenomenon of value ambivalence reminds us of the conflict between idealistic and relativistic/pluralistic camps on whether values should be universal or social/cultural in nature. Instead of defending for the inclusivity of all camps, this study argues that only moral values (excluding immoral values), which are accepted by all cultures/societies, can be universally applicable. For such moral values, individual cultures/societies should determine their acceptable levels of application, rather than being forced to believe in an absolute degree of relevance. Nevertheless, the universally accepted range is not easy to achieve and may require a lengthy process of mutual understanding and respect, but only by then can value conflicts between and within cultures/societies be minimized.
When taking human morality into consideration, core values must be positive and ethical. This helps distinguish them from peripheral values that are not necessarily ethical despite being required to be adhered to. In addition to the early mentioned Clarken’s [52] moral principles and characteristics that are critical to establishing core values, Spencer, Tyahur, and Jackson [81], when discussing the concept of civility, argued that the inherent worth of a person should include qualities for interacting with others. The core values should reflect a person’s moral intelligence, which is defined as “the mental capacity to determine how universal human principles—like those embodied by the ‘Golden Rule’—should be applied to our personal values, goals, and actions” [82] (p. 7), stipulated in two of the seven original intelligences introduced by Gardner [83] due to the fact that they are value-centered, compared to other intelligences, such as emotional and social intelligences, which are value-free [52].
Considering the discussion held so far, a set of core values can be classified, according to the two kinds of intelligence. One is intrapersonal intelligence, which consists of one’s “ability to understand oneself and use that information to regulate one’s own life”; the other is interpersonal intelligence, which is a person’s “ability to recognize the intentions, feelings, and motivations of others” [52] (p. 2). Although they function separately, both help build one’s internal state of mind. Under the influence of world issues, such as cultural and economic globalization, public health threats, global climate change, and emergent technologies and science, our understanding of human values is continually challenged by new questions [84]. While applying moral principles to core values has clear ontological supports, maintaining a convincing set of values should be an ongoing research direction.

4.4. An Example Showing the Difficulties in Teaching Values

Despite the importance of values education in fostering the development of positive and ethical competencies in youth [85], there are many difficulties in teaching values, especially conflicting values due to personal, social, political, and religious reasons (e.g., [79,86,87]). Some examples of value conflicts have been given in previous sections. Here, the difficulties of teaching students the concepts of freedom and responsibility are discussed. Besides Morlino’s [88] views on the connection of equality and freedom to political reasoning and functioning, Rokeach, observed by Jost et al. [41], emphasized these two core values and argued that the presence of ideological differences results from the priority of them. This statement ignores the significance of other core values, such as civic responsibility, which is core to civic education in schools and universities [22,89]. Payne, Adair, Colegrove, Falkner, McManus, and Sachdeva [90], drawing on the theoretical lens of the communitarian approach to citizenship, stressed the importance of fulfilling responsibilities to the community through mutual care and concern. Therefore, schools should focus on teaching the broader concept of citizenship to inspire students’ sense of civic responsibility, while universities should promote closer links between theory and practice and facilitate students’ learning to address real world civic responsibility issues.
Civic responsibility generally refers to citizens’ engagement in identifying and addressing issues of public concern. It has been widely discussed in education for the purpose of developing students with civic responsibility through civic engagement, such as service learning (e.g., [91,92,93]). As noted by Thornton and Jaeger [94] (p. 994), there are five dimensions of civic responsibility: (1) knowledge and support of democratic values, systems, and processes, (2) desire to act beneficially in a community and for its members, (3) use of knowledge and skills for societal benefit, (4) appreciation for and interest in those unlike self, and (5) personal accountability. This conception is claimed to underscore the importance of a citizen’s responsibility in support of good citizenship. Yet, it does not clearly link civic responsibility to obedience to the law, which is seen as a mandatory responsibility [95]. Whereas the rule of law sets the principle of governance [96] and is seen as the baseline principle in Carroll’s CSR [64], civic responsibility includes citizens’ compliance with the rule of law [97], the act of which must be governed by justice, truth, and rationality. This view is inspired by the discussion of the case of Socrates (e.g., [58,98]), who suggested that people should not obey only those laws that they like or that may result in a good verdict for them [98]. In fact, civic responsibility implies moral responsibility [99].
Moreover, teachers may find it difficult to explain the balance among rights, freedom, and civic responsibility. Here, we skip the discussion of the tradeoff between rights and freedom; for example, one cannot freely start a particular business, such as energy or gas, due to the fact that such rights are only granted by the government to very few business entities, which are referred to as monopolies or oligopolies. Instead, we discuss how civic responsibility restrains human rights and freedom, and vice versa. In essence, citizenship involves both rights and responsibilities [100]. For example, citizens have the freedom and right to consume any commodities, but they also have a social responsibility to consume rationally. The right-and-duty pair has been discussed by philosophers since the age of Aristotle and Plato [95]. Rostbøll [101], citing Immanuel Kant’s view on the co-constitutive nature of freedom and the public legal order in democracy, argued that one’s freedom and rights are shaped by the constitutional system, which establishes an impersonal public legal framework, emphasizing mutual respect and minority rights. Human rights, as an ideology, should not deepen racial and class inequalities or exclude victims’ rights from violence [102]. For example, citizens have the right to strike, while the law should assure that others’ right to work would not be sacrificed, and vice versa. If people see rights and freedom on one side of a balance and civic responsibility on the other side of it, the more a person vies for rights and freedom, the less that person obeys the laws that restrict rights and freedom. Regardless of the outcome one expects from this balancing act, there would neither be the best equilibrium point nor the best social form.

5. Conclusions

This study has revisited the concept of values taught in education by reviewing existing value theories, such as the models of Schwartz, Rokeach, and Clarken, and discussing potential conflicts and difficulties, such as the teaching of civics. While the two-layer paradigm proposed in this study has been made from the perspective of Carroll’s CSR, what core values should be included is not fully understood. For scientific clustering among values, it is crucial to ask what measurable items are suitable for the test. External factors may also be considered in order to establish a more comprehensive model for empirical testing. By knowing which values can and how they relate to good behaviors and being a good citizen, it is possible to offer new intervention points in education for sustaining the social system. Moreover, the one who administers the test and evaluation of values to be taught in education should be objective and avoid biases. As Krauss and Sales [103] noted, biases, as a major problem of comprehension, affect the research conducted by social scientists. Calvillo, Swan, and Rutchick [104] further mentioned that people with different ideologies may support different conclusions that are inferred by the same evidence. Similarly, it is interesting to know how human values may alter in response to external forces, such as political ideology, although values are argued to be stable over time. Research may then be conducted to identify and examine factors that contribute to either positive or negative human qualities.
Rather than ending, the discussion of what values should be inherited has only just begun. Although critical comments on certain articles have been provided, this study is not intended to dismiss the merits of the existing literature. It is hoped that this work can cast some light on the adoption of an alternative approach to deal with this topic. In the present study, the basic concept of theory building has been used to draw attention to the risk of adopting flawed assumptions that would contaminate the propositional process. Without proper conceptualization within a theory, misunderstanding and misleading would occur. It is clear that misconducts are attributed to the violation of core and peripheral values as shown in the two-layer paradigm proposed in this study, not to mention other external forces, including the actions taken by other stakeholders of education [105]. As Sassower [106] (p. 50) put it, “if we hope to see a transformation of the human condition in our lifetime, we should encourage a democratic discourse, however populist, that engages more people. The engagement should be local and communal, appealing to altruism as an inherent human propensity to collaborate and be empathetic rather than to competition and individualized success.” Echoing an earlier premise that positive human values are the assumption of good behaviors, the essence of Sassower’s statement is the role of altruism, without which the transformation will not succeed no matter how many people are involved in the dialogue process. Values are to be inherited. Schools and universities should be careful not to put the cart before the horse and should always be mindful of the moral intent of teaching positive values.

Funding

This research was funded by The Education University of Hong Kong, grant number R6403.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

References

  1. Feng, W.D. Infusing moral education into English language teaching: An ontogenetic analysis of social values in EFL textbooks in Hong Kong. Discourse Stud. Cult. Politics Educ. 2019, 40, 458–473. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  2. Blakey, A.G.; Pickering, N. Putting it on the table: Toward better cultivating medical student values. Med. Sci. Educ. 2018, 28, 533–542. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  3. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge Dictionary; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2022; Available online: https://dictionary.cambridge.org (accessed on 21 June 2022).
  4. Rokeach, M. The Nature of Human Values; Free Press: New York, NY, USA, 1973. [Google Scholar]
  5. Sagiv, L.; Roccas, S.; Cieciuch, J.; Schwartz, S.H. Personal values in human life. Nat. Hum. Behav. 2017, 1, 630–639. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  6. Sagatovsky, V.N. Human qualities and the system of basic values. J. Value Inq. 1996, 30, 145–156. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  7. Ziliotti, E. Democracy’s value: A conceptual map. J. Value Inq. 2020, 54, 407–427. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  8. Harrison, G.L.; McKinnon, J.L. Cross-cultural research in management control systems design: A review of the current state. Account. Organ. Soc. 1999, 24, 483–506. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  9. Smolicz, J. Core values and cultural identity. Ethn. Racial Stud. 1981, 4, 75–90. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  10. Bardi, A.; Goodwin, R. The dual route to value change: Individual processes and cultural moderators. J. Cross-Cult. Psychol. 2011, 42, 271–287. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  11. Sharabi, M.; Harpaz, I. Core and peripheral values: An over time analysis of work values in Israel. J. Hum. Values 2009, 15, 153–166. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  12. Ashforth, B.E.; Mael, F.A. Organizational identity and strategy as a context for the individual. Adv. Strateg. Manag. 1996, 13, 19–64. [Google Scholar]
  13. Musschenga, A.W. Education for moral integrity. J. Philos. Educ. 2001, 35, 219–235. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
  14. Perry, M.J. The Political Morality of Liberal Democracy; Cambridge University Press: New York, NY, USA, 2010. [Google Scholar]
  15. Strand, R.; Freeman, R.E.; Hockerts, K. Corporate social responsibility and sustainability in Scandinavia: An overview. J. Bus. Ethics 2015, 127, 1–15. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  16. Meseguer-Sánchez, V.; Gálvez-Sánchez, F.J.; López-Martínez, G.; Molina-Moreno, V. Corporate social responsibility and sustainability. A bibliometric analysis of their interrelations. Sustainability 2021, 13, 1636. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  17. Elkington, J. The Triple Bottom Line: Does It All Add Up? Routledge: London, UK, 2004. [Google Scholar]
  18. Carroll, A.B.; Brown, J.A. Corporate Social Responsibility: A review of current concepts, research and issues. In Corporate Social Responsibility; Weber, J., Wasieleski, D., Eds.; Emerald Publishing Limited: Bingley, UK, 2018; pp. 39–69. [Google Scholar]
  19. Brondani, M.A. Teaching social responsibility through community service-learning in predoctoral dental education. J. Dent. Educ. 2012, 76, 609–619. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  20. Zhang, D.; Morse, S.; Ma, Q. Corporate social responsibility and sustainable development in China: Current status and future perspectives. Sustainability 2019, 11, 4392. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  21. Burgos, J.; Carnero, M.C. Assessment of social responsibility in education in secondary schools. Sustainability 2020, 12, 4849. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  22. Coelho, M.; Menezes, I. University social responsibility, service learning, and students’ personal, professional, and civic education. Front. Psychol. 2021, 12, 617300. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  23. MacLure, M. “Clarity bordering on stupidity”: Where’s the quality in systematic review? J. Educ. Policy 2005, 20, 393–416. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  24. Greenhalgh, T.; Thorne, S.; Malterud, K. Time to challenge the spurious hierarchy of systematic over narrative reviews? Eur. J. Clin. Investig. 2018, 48, e12931. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  25. Sutrop, M. Can values be taught? The myth of value-free education. Trames 2015, 19, 189–202. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  26. Algraini, S. Education for human development: A capability perspective in Saudi public education. Compare 2019, 51, 416–432. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  27. Brighouse, H. On Education; Routledge: London, UK, 2006. [Google Scholar]
  28. Russell, B. The Aims of Education. In On Education: Especially in Early Childhood; Russell, B., Ed.; Unwin Books: London, UK, 1973; pp. 28–46. [Google Scholar]
  29. American Psychological Association. Dictionary; American Psychological Association: Washington, DC, USA, 2022; Available online: https://dictionary.apa.org/personality (accessed on 15 March 2022).
  30. Komarraju, M.; Karau, S.J.; Schmeck, R.R.; Avdic, A. The big five personality traits, learning styles, and academic achievement. Personal. Individ. Differ. 2011, 51, 472–477. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  31. Brandstätter, H. Personality aspects of entrepreneurship: A look at five meta-analyses. Personal. Individ. Differ. 2011, 51, 222–230. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  32. Amirhosseini, M.H.; Kazemian, H. Machine learning approach to personality type prediction based on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Multimodal Technol. Interact. 2020, 4, 9. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  33. Song, M.; Choi, H.-J.; Hyun, S.S. MBTI personality types of Korean cabin crew in Middle Eastern airlines, and their associations with cross-cultural adjustment competency, occupational competency, coping competency, mental health, and turnover intention. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 3419. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
  34. Azadipour, S. Personality types and intercultural competence of foreign language learners in education context. J. Educ. Health Promot. 2019, 8, 236. [Google Scholar]
  35. Stein, R.; Swan, A.B. Evaluating the validity of Myers-Briggs Type Indicator theory: A teaching tool and window into intuitive psychology. Soc. Pers. Psychol. Compass. 2019, 13, e12434. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  36. Park, H. The role of idealism and relativism as dispositional characteristics in the socially responsible decision-making process. J. Bus. Ethics 2005, 56, 81–98. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  37. Blazak, R. Ethnic envy: How teens construct whiteness in globalized America. In Globalizing the Streets: Cross-Cultural Perspectivs on Youth, Social Control, and Empowerment; Salek, F., Brotherton, D.C., Eds.; Columbia University Press: New York, NY, USA, 2008; pp. 169–184. [Google Scholar]
  38. Forsyth, D.R. Judging the morality of business practices: The influence of personal moral philosophies. J. Bus. Ethics 1992, 11, 461–470. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  39. Witte, E.H.; Stanciu, A.; Boehnke, K. A new empirical approach to intercultural comparisons of value preferences based on Schwartz’s theory. Front. Psychol. 2020, 11, 1723. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  40. Chernilo, D.A. Social Theory of the Nation-State: The Political Forms of Modernity beyond Methodological Nationalism; Routledge: Abingdon, UK, 2007. [Google Scholar]
  41. Habermas, J. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy; The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 1996. [Google Scholar]
  42. Luhmann, N. Essays on Self-Reference; Columbia University Press: New York, NY, USA, 1990. [Google Scholar]
  43. Jost, J.T.; Basevich, E.; Dickson, E.S.; Noorbaloochi, S. The place of values in a world of politics: Personality, motivation, and ideology. In Handbook of Value: Perspectives from Economics, Neuroscience, Philosophy, Psychology, and Sociology; Brosch, T., Sander, D., Eds.; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2016; pp. 351–374. [Google Scholar]
  44. Jones, N.A.; Shaw, S.; Ross, H.; Witt, K.; Pinner, B. The study of human values in understanding and managing social-ecological systems. Ecol. Soc. 2016, 21, 15. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  45. Brown, T.C. The concept of value in resource allocation. Land Econ. 1984, 60, 231–246. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  46. Seymour, E.; Curtis, A.; Pannell, D.; Allan, C.; Roberts, A. Understanding the role of assigned values in natural resource management. Australas. J. Environ. Manag. 2012, 17, 142–153. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  47. Baard, P. The goodness of means: Instrumental and relational values, causation, and environmental policies. J. Agric. Environ. Ethics 2019, 32, 183–199. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  48. Langford, G. Values in education (1). In New Essays in the Philosophy of Education; Langford, G., O’Connor, D.J., Eds.; Routledge: Oxon, UK, 2010; pp. 87–101. [Google Scholar]
  49. Dorsey, D. Can instrumental value be intrinsic? Pac. Philos. Q. 2012, 93, 137–157. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  50. Schwartz, S.H. Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values? J. Soc. Issues 1994, 50, 19–45. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  51. Lennick, D.; Kiel, F. Moral Intelligence: Enhancing Business Performance and Leadership Success; Pearson Education, Inc.: Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA, 2008. [Google Scholar]
  52. Clarken, R.H. Moral Intelligence in the Schools. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Michigan Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, USA, 20 March 2009; Available online: https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED508485.pdf (accessed on 12 June 2021).
  53. Schwartz, S.H. An overview of the Schwartz theory of basic values. Online Read. Psychol. Cult. 2012, 2, 11. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  54. Schwartz, S.H. The refined theory of basic values. In Values and Behavior; Roccas, S.S., Sagiv, L., Eds.; Springer: Cham, Switzerland, 2017; pp. 51–72. [Google Scholar]
  55. Roccas, S.; Sagiv, L. Personal values and behavior: Taking the cultural context into account. Soc. Personal. Psychol. Compass 2010, 4, 30–41. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  56. Haberman, M.; Post, L. Teachers for multicultural schools: The power of selection. Theory Pract. 1998, 37, 96–104. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  57. Levy, J.T. There is no such thing as ideal theory. Soc. Philos. Policy 2016, 33, 312–333. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  58. Domanski, A. Why obey the law? Plato’s answer. Akroterion 1999, 44, 24–37. [Google Scholar]
  59. Tomasello, M. A Natural History of Human Morality; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2016. [Google Scholar]
  60. Little, J.M.; Gaier, S.; Spoutz, D. The role of values, beliefs, and culture in student retention and success. In Critical Assessment and Strategies for Increased Student Retention; Black, R.C., Ed.; IGI Global: Hershey, PA, USA, 2018; pp. 54–72. [Google Scholar]
  61. Vignoles, V.L.; Smith, P.B.; Becker, M.; Easterbrook, M.J. In search of a pan-European culture: European values, beliefs, and models of selfhood in global perspective. J. Cross-Cult. Psychol. 2018, 49, 868–887. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  62. Magun, V.; Rudnev, M.; Schmidt, P. Within- and between-country value diversity in Europe: A typological approach. Eur. Soc. Rev. 2016, 32, 189–202. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
  63. Carroll, A.B. A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate performance. Acad. Manag. Rev. 1979, 4, 497–505. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  64. Carroll, A.B. The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: Toward the moral management of organizational stakeholders. Bus. Horiz. 1991, 34, 39–48. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  65. Arjoon, S. Corporate governance: An ethical perspective. J. Bus. Ethics 2005, 61, 343–352. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  66. Carroll, A.B. Carroll’s pyramid of CSR: Taking another look. Int. J. Corp. Soc. Responsib. 2016, 1, 3. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  67. Petersen, H.L.; Vredenburg, H. Morals or economics? Institutional investor preferences for corporate social responsibility. J. Bus. Ethics 2009, 90, 1–14. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  68. Osagie, E.R.; Wesselink, R.; Runbaar, P.; Mulder, M. Unraveling the competence development of corporate social responsibility leaders: The importance of peer learning, learning goal orientation, and learning climate. J. Bus. Ethics 2018, 151, 891–906. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  69. Carroll, A.B. Ethical challenges for business in the new millennium: Corporate social responsibility and models of management morality. Bus. Ethics Q. 2000, 10, 33–42. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  70. Corley, K.G.; Gioia, D.A. Building theory about theory building: What constitutes a theoretical contribution? Acad. Manag. Rev. 2011, 36, 12–32. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  71. Fried, E.I. Lack of theory building and testing impedes progress in the factor and network literature. Psychol. Inq. 2020, 31, 271–288. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  72. Rivard, S. Theory building is neither an art nor a science: It is a craft. J. Inf. Technol. 2021, 36, 316–328. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  73. Oyibo, K.; Vassileva, J. Gender difference and difference in behavior modeling in fitness applications: A mixed-method approach. Multimodal Technol. Interact. 2020, 4, 21. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  74. Abdolmohammadi, M.J.; Baker, C.R. Accountants’ value preferences and moral reasoning. J. Bus. Ethics 2006, 69, 11–25. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  75. Termes, R. Ethics in financial institutions. In The Ethical Dimension of Financial Institutions and Markets; Argandoña, A., Ed.; Springer-Verlag: Berlin, Germany, 1995. [Google Scholar]
  76. Art, R.J. A Grand Strategy for America; Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY, USA, 2003. [Google Scholar]
  77. Scott, J.M.; Steele, C.A. Assisting democrats or resisting dictators? The nature and impact of democracy support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990–1999. Democratization 2005, 12, 439–460. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  78. Ives, C.D.; Kendal, D. The role of social values in the management of ecological systems. J. Environ. Manag. 2014, 144, 67–72. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  79. dos Santos Freire, E.; Marques, B.G.; de Jesus Miranda, M.L. Teaching values in physical education classes: The perception of Brazilian teachers. Sport Educ. Soc. 2018, 23, 449–461. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  80. De Holanda, C.; Lins, G.; Hanel, P.H.P.; Johansen, M.K.; Maio, G.R. Mapping the structure of human values through conceptual representations. Eur. J. Personal. 2019, 33, 34–51. [Google Scholar]
  81. Spencer, L.G.; Tyahur, P.M.; Jackson, J.A. Civility and academic freedom: Extending the conversation. J. Contemp. Rhetor. 2016, 6, 50–61. [Google Scholar]
  82. Lennick, D.; Kiel, F. Moral leadership: Caring for and believing in people. Manag. Today 2005, 21, 18–22. [Google Scholar]
  83. Gardner, H. Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences; Basic Books: New York, NY, USA, 1983. [Google Scholar]
  84. Dancák, P. The human person dignity and compassion. Philos. Canon Law 2017, 3, 19–31. [Google Scholar]
  85. Berkowitz, M.W. What works in values education. Int. J. Educ. Res. 2011, 50, 153–158. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  86. Halstead, J.M. Values and values education in schools. In Values in Education and Education in Values; Halstead, J.M., Taylor, M.J., Eds.; The Falmer Press: London, UK, 1996; pp. 3–14. [Google Scholar]
  87. Quinlan, K.M. Teaching values: Ethical and emotional attunement through an educational humanities approach. Educ. Dev. 2020, 21, 8–11. [Google Scholar]
  88. Morlino, L. “Good” and “bad” democracies: How to conduct research into the quality of democracy. J. Communist Stud. Transit. Politics 2004, 20, 5–27. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  89. Knowles, R.T. Ideology in the schools: Developing the teacher’s civic education ideology scale within the United States. Educ. Citizsh. Soc. Justice 2019, 14, 260–278. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  90. Payne, K.A.; Adair, J.K.; Colegrove, K.S.S.; Lee, S.; Falkner, A.; McManus, M.; Sachdeva, S. Reconceptualizing civic education for young children: Recognizing embodied civic action. Educ. Citizsh. Soc. Justice 2020, 15, 35–46. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  91. Malinenko, S.; Tutuska, J.; Matthews, L. Bridging civic engagement to civic responsibility through short-term, international service-learning experiences: A qualitative analysis of student reflections. eJournal Public Aff. 2018, 7, 108–131. [Google Scholar]
  92. Muddiman, E. Degree subject and orientations to civic responsibility: A comparative study of business and sociology students. Crit. Stud. Educ. 2020, 61, 577–593. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
  93. Zhao, X.; Haste, H.; Selman, R.L.; Luan, Z. Compliant, cynical, or critical: Chinese youth’s explanations of social problems and individual civic responsibility. Youth Soc. 2017, 49, 1123–1148. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  94. Thornton, C.H.; Jaeger, A.J. A new context for understanding civic responsibility: Relating culture to action at a research university. Res. High. Educ. 2007, 48, 993–1020. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  95. Ronconi, L. From Citizen’s Rights to Civic Responsibilities; IZA Discussion Papers, No. 12457; Institute of Labor Economics (IZA): Bonn, Germany, 2019; Available online: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3427594 (accessed on 3 February 2020).
  96. United Nations. What Is the Rule of Law; United Nations Publications Customer Service: Herndon, VA, USA, 2020; Available online: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law (accessed on 27 January 2020).
  97. Guagnano, G.; Santini, I. Active citizenship in Europe: The role of social capital. Int. J. Sociol. Soc. Policy 2020, 40, 79–98. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  98. D’Amato, A. Obligation to obey the law: A study of the death of Socrates. South. Calif. Law Rev. 1976, 49, 1079–1108. [Google Scholar]
  99. Colby, A.; Ehrlich, T. Educating Citizens: Preparing America’s Undergraduates for Lives of Moral and Civic Responsibility; Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, CA, USA, 2003. [Google Scholar]
  100. Janoski, T. Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional, and Social Democratic Regimes; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1998. [Google Scholar]
  101. Rostbøll, C.F. Kant, freedom as independence, and democracy. J. Politics 2016, 78, 792–805. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  102. David, L. Human rights as an ideology? Obstacles and benefits. Crit. Sociol. 2020, 46, 37–50. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  103. Krauss, D.A.; Sales, B.D. Legal standards, expertise, and experts in the resolution of contested child custody cases. Psychol. Public Policy Law 2000, 6, 843–879. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  104. Calvillo, D.P.; Swan, A.B.; Rutchick, A.M. Ideological belief bias with political syllogisms. Think. Reason. 2019, 26, 291–310. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  105. Tauginienė, L.; Urbanovič, J. Social responsibility in transition of stakeholders: From the school to the university. Stakehold. Gov. Responsib. 2018, 14, 143–163. [Google Scholar]
  106. Sassower, R. Postmodern relativism as enlightened pluralism. In Relativism and Post-Truth in Contemporary Society; Stenmark, M., Fuller, S., Zackariasson, U., Eds.; Palgrave Macmillan: London, UK, 2018; pp. 35–52. [Google Scholar]
Figure 1. The two-layer paradigm.
Figure 1. The two-layer paradigm.
Sustainability 14 11280 g001
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Cheng, E.W.L. Revisiting the Concept of Values Taught in Education through Carroll’s Corporate Social Responsibility. Sustainability 2022, 14, 11280. https://doi.org/10.3390/su141811280

AMA Style

Cheng EWL. Revisiting the Concept of Values Taught in Education through Carroll’s Corporate Social Responsibility. Sustainability. 2022; 14(18):11280. https://doi.org/10.3390/su141811280

Chicago/Turabian Style

Cheng, Eddie W. L. 2022. "Revisiting the Concept of Values Taught in Education through Carroll’s Corporate Social Responsibility" Sustainability 14, no. 18: 11280. https://doi.org/10.3390/su141811280

Note that from the first issue of 2016, this journal uses article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Metrics

Back to TopTop