Study on the Evolutionary Game of Cooperation and Innovation in Science and Technology Town Enterprises
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Background
2.1. Enterprise Technology Innovation Challenges
2.2. Corporate Collaborative Innovation Factors
2.2.1. The Company’s Own Factor
2.2.2. Relationships between Companies
2.2.3. The External Environment
3. Basic Assumptions and Model Building
3.1. Corporate Cooperation and Innovation Game Relationship
3.2. Model Construction
3.2.1. Gaming Sides
3.2.2. Game Strategy
3.2.3. Model Assumptions
4. An Evolutionary Game Model of Cooperative Innovation under the Market Mechanism
4.1. The Equilibrium Point of the Strategy
4.2. Stability Analysis of Equilibrium Point
4.3. Parametric Analysis
5. Considering Enterprise Cooperative Innovation under Government Regulation
5.1. Equilibrium Point of the Strategy
5.2. Stability Analysis of Equilibrium Point
5.3. Parametric Analysis
- (1)
- When and , that is, , , the area of will become smaller at this time, indicating that when government regulation is introduced again, the probability of the system evolving to increases, and the greater the , the greater the possibility. It shows that the larger the fine imposed by the government on the enterprise, the more inclined the enterprise is to choose cooperative innovation.
- (2)
- When and , that is, the additional benefits obtained by the government’s subsidies to enterprises that do not participate in cooperative innovation are greater than the cost of cooperation, due to the government’s intervention, both companies will choose a cooperative innovation strategy. Co-innovation will gain economic benefits, which in turn will encourage enterprises to actively participate in co-innovation. □
6. Numerical Simulation
- (1)
- The total cost of cooperative innovation between Enterprise A and Enterprise B is = CNY 200,000, the cost sharing rate of enterprise A is = 0.5, and the cost sharing rate of enterprise B is $ = 0.5.
- (2)
- If both parties choose co-innovation, the total revenue of co-innovation is = 1.05 million.
- (3)
- The cooperative innovation coefficients of Enterprises A and B are and , respectively, and the cooperative innovation effort coefficients of Enterprises A and B are and , respectively.
- (4)
- When there is a “free-rider” behavior, the increase or decrease in the collaborative innovation benefit of both companies is = CNY 50,000.
- (5)
- In order to encourage the cooperation and innovation of enterprises in the characteristic scientific and technological innovation town, the government provides a subsidy of = 0.05, an incentive bonus = CNY 10,000, and a fine of = CNY 10,000 for cooperation and breach of contract.
6.1. Simulation Research on Evolutionary Game between Enterprises under the Market Mechanism
6.1.1. Influence of Cooperative Innovation Costs and Benefits on the Evolutionary Results of Both Game Parties
- (1)
- From the parameter analysis above, it can be known that the smaller the total cost of enterprise cooperative innovation, the more likely it is to promote the probability that both parties choose cooperative innovation. Therefore, this paper considers that, under the market mechanism, assuming other parameters remain unchanged, with the total cost of enterprise cooperative innovation (), the impact of the total cost of enterprise cooperative innovation on the system’s evolutionary results is shown in Figure 2.
- (2)
- From the above parameter analysis, it can be known that the greater the total revenue of enterprise cooperative innovation, the more likely it is to promote the probability that both parties choose cooperative innovation. Therefore, this paper considers that, under the market mechanism, assuming that other parameters remain unchanged, as the enterprise cooperative innovation benefits increase (), the influence of the total cost of enterprise cooperative innovation on the system’s evolutionary results is shown in Figure 3.
6.1.2. The Influence of Cooperative Willingness Coefficient and Cooperative Effort Coefficient on the Evolution Results of Both Game Parties
6.1.3. The Influence of “Free-Rider” Behavior on the Evolution Results of Both Sides of the Game
6.2. Simulation Research on Evolutionary Game of Both Sides of Enterprises under Government Regulation
6.2.1. The Influence of Government Cost Subsidy Intensity on the Evolution Results of Both Sides of the Game
6.2.2. The Influence of Incentive Bonus on the Evolution Results of Both Game Parties
6.2.3. The Influence of Liquidated Penalty on the Evolution Results of Both Game Parties
7. Results and Discussion
7.1. Conclusions
- (1)
- Whether under the market mechanism or government regulation, the cost and benefit of cooperative innovation directly affect the willingness of cooperative innovation of enterprises in a science- and innovation-oriented characteristic town. Moreover, the coefficient of cooperative willingness and the coefficient of cooperative effort of enterprises have positive effects on the evolution of the system tending to the direction of cooperative innovation because they directly affect the benefits obtained by the enterprises’ cooperation.
- (2)
- The government can adopt both an incentive bonus and cost subsidy to promote the cooperative innovation of science- and innovation-oriented characteristic town enterprises, which is conducive to improving the stabilization of the system’s evolution [56]. At the early stage of cooperative innovation, an incentive bonus is a stronger driver for cooperative innovation, but the incentive effect of a cost subsidy is more durable and efficient at the later stage; the combination of the two incentive methods is more effective than a single incentive method.
- (3)
- The “free-rider” speculative behavior of enterprises can greatly damage the cooperative innovation of enterprises, and the system tends to evolve in the direction of uncooperative innovation as the increase or decrease in synergistic innovation benefits of both enterprises due to “free-rider” behavior becomes larger. At this point, the introduction of the government’s penalty regulation mechanism, which imposes fines on enterprises that have reached cooperation intentions and defaulted, can lessen the damage of “free-riding” to the enthusiasm of cooperative innovation among enterprises and promote the system to evolve in the direction of cooperative innovation.
7.2. Theoretical Implications
7.3. Suggestions for Countermeasures
- (1)
- SMEs are an integral part of the science and innovation town and are an important force in promoting innovation in the town. Promoting and encouraging the participation of SMEs in collaborative innovation will lay the foundation for the development of science and innovation towns. Enterprises should take advantage of their own advantages and environmental opportunities; enhance their own technological innovation and technological maturity; improve their willingness and efforts to cooperate and innovate; and work on enhancing their creditworthiness, reviewing their long-term growth strategies in due course, cultivating a sense of worry, developing a win-win cooperation vision from a strategic perspective, and working with other SMEs in order to collaborate, share results, and share risks. It is also imperative that SMEs are able to absorb the lessons learned from the success and failure of core enterprises, to learn from the advanced management and technology of core enterprises, to increase their investment in innovation factors, to strengthen the pool of highly skilled and educated workers, and to promote the common progress of all members of the community.
- (2)
- Build an innovative knowledge platform and consolidate the development platform of science and innovation towns. It is important that businesses actively participate in the construction of a science- and innovation-based town in order to build it into an open, cooperative, and shared knowledge platform with a clustering effect [57] and to promote technology clustering. As a result of the development of a knowledge sharing platform, clustering and sharing of information, knowledge, and technology will be accelerated. In order to promote the development of a high-quality science and innovation town, the core companies should actively organize and promote its development. Meanwhile, core enterprises must actively organize and drive SMEs and other nodes of the industry chain to cooperate and innovate in order to encourage product development, technology renewal, channel building, and brand building in science and innovation cities.
- (3)
- Establish a credit collection system and enterprise credibility mechanism to optimize the development ecology of science and innovation towns. By developing a credit collection system and a credibility mechanism, science and innovation towns will be able to assess the credit status of enterprises that have failed to cooperate and innovate by imitating innovation, malicious competition, and free-riding, among other things. Science and innovation towns and related institutions will boycott companies that do not comply with this requirement in order to encourage them to focus on long-term gains rather than short-term speculative interests in repeated games. Higher credit ratings and policy preferences for reputable firms will enhance win-win cooperation in the repeated game [58], which will further optimize the innovation development ecology of science and innovation towns.
- (4)
- Enhance the government’s role as a scientific guidance organization, and clarify the direction in which science and innovation towns are being developed. It is imperative that the role of government in the development of a collaborative innovation system is highly emphasized in the process of planning and developing science- and innovation-oriented characteristic towns, as well as the provision of policy support and guidance. Set up government-funded projects and increase investments in science and technology innovation in order to promote the establishment of a systematic science and technology innovation system. Improve the construction of intermediary services in science- and innovation-oriented characteristic towns to reduce the risk of cooperative innovation among enterprises, while strengthening the protection of intellectual property rights [59] and establishing reasonable financial and incentive mechanisms, as well as moderate punishment mechanisms. By taking advantage of the different sensitivity to incentives and penalties of enterprises participating in cooperative innovation, we should use both financial investment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the cost of innovation subjects participating in cooperative innovation and to effectively enhance the enthusiasm of these enterprises. In addition, it is necessary to establish a moderate punishment mechanism and to formulate a variety of punishment measures in order to motivate more businesses to participate in cooperative innovation in science and innovation towns.
7.4. Shortcomings and Prospects
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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Enterprise B | ||
---|---|---|
Cooperative innovation | ||
Enterprise A | ||
non-cooperative innovation |
Balance Point | Stability | ||
---|---|---|---|
+ | - | ESS | |
+ | + | Unstable | |
+ | + | ESS | |
+ | - | Unstable | |
- | 0 | Saddle Point |
Enterprise B | ||
---|---|---|
Cooperative innovation | ||
Enterprise A | ||
non-cooperative innovation |
Balance Point | Stability | ||
---|---|---|---|
+ | - | ESS | |
+ | + | Unstable | |
+ | + | ESS | |
+ | - | Unstable | |
- | 0 | Saddle Point |
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Li, F.; Wang, Y. Study on the Evolutionary Game of Cooperation and Innovation in Science and Technology Town Enterprises. Sustainability 2022, 14, 9210. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14159210
Li F, Wang Y. Study on the Evolutionary Game of Cooperation and Innovation in Science and Technology Town Enterprises. Sustainability. 2022; 14(15):9210. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14159210
Chicago/Turabian StyleLi, Feng, and Yalong Wang. 2022. "Study on the Evolutionary Game of Cooperation and Innovation in Science and Technology Town Enterprises" Sustainability 14, no. 15: 9210. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14159210