Securing Operational Capability for Exceptional Circumstances: How Do Professional First Responders Respond to the Unexpected?
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. On the Requirements in Challenging Situations
3. Materials and Methods
4. Results
4.1. A Threat of Serious Violence Faced by a Police Officer
4.1.1. On Noticing the Unusual Circumstances
“They didn’t have proper observing directions. It was rather disorderly. One of them should have been observing one direction while the other was observing another direction. Then they would have had the situation under control. Their actions would have signaled to us that the door is located right there—open it.”
“They were certainly very busy, but, in my view, they achieved nothing. I assumed that when we got the door open, they would take control of the situation, prepare to use a firearm, and start shouting commands to the suspects. If that had been the case, I would have had an opportunity to drop the handspike, seek protection from the walls, and arrest anyone who walked out of the room.”
“At the point when the door was opened, I realized that nobody was doing anything [relevant]. Because nobody was prepared to use a firearm, I took one myself. However, I couldn’t drop the handspike. It was a small wooden apartment building, so I couldn’t throw it anywhere, because someone would have trodden on it, as we have so often seen. I remember that I went inside the apartment with the firearm in one hand and the handspike in the other. It all happened in a second.”
4.1.2. On the Beginning of Improvisation and Overcoming Obstacles
“I knew that I was by far the best in these situations due to my experience and background. When you feel confident that you can handle these things, taking on a role is not that difficult. […] But I didn’t do it deliberately. The main rule is to have your eye on the target and prepare to use a firearm as quickly as possible. And because no one else did, I did. I felt that if I wasn’t going to do it, then nobody would. Then I made the decision. It was just a second after the door opened. I didn’t think about it at all.”
“In the special task force, we practiced taking charge of situations in extreme scenarios a lot. For example, a scenario in which the leader became ambushed and took a hit. The educational idea was to keep the team running smoothly—someone had to take the lead on the fly. And generally, it was down to me, probably because I can’t stand that kind of disorder. Then, I rather aggressively took the lead to end the disorder and got things working again.”“Although the special forces are more creative in their actions, they also have much stricter rules. And if the situation demands it, then you must be very creative in how you deviate from the rules.”
4.1.3. On Starting an Immediate Action
“Through experience, education, and training, you learn to understand that the timeframes are so limited. If you must change roles, for example, you understand that it has to be done because there is no way not to do it. If you don’t, the game is up.”
“Maybe the question is more about daring. Let’s take this same incident four to five years ago. Even if my knowledge had been no different, I would have been excessively polite to make such an intervention. At that time, I would not necessarily have taken the role I wanted to take. I would have seen that our safety was threatened, but still, I wouldn’t have done it. When talking about operational performance, I now think that if I hurt someone’s feelings in a situation it would be the least of our problems.”
4.2. Explosion in a Shopping Mall
4.2.1. On Identifying the Bigger Picture
“In such situations, where there are many people, you simply cannot focus on one person and start treating them. Instead, you must get an understanding of the whole situation and what is going on. But if you think about individual things, it’s all over. The uppermost thing in my mind was that I had to understand the overall situation to consider what steps to take, for example not focusing on the most seriously injured but gaining an overall view to deal with the situation. This was my primary goal and I was then able to implement the appropriate processes.”
“When I saw the severed foot at the entrance, I realized that something really serious had happened. Now I had to carefully consider what actually had to be done. A great number of people were running away and many of them grabbed me shouting, ‘Help, help!’ I just kept moving forwards and said ‘out of my way!’”“I knew that if I didn’t ignore them, I would be doing a poor job and we would fail. Many more people may have died, then. But if I did this properly, we had a much better chance of success.”
4.2.2. On Making Decisions
“Then I saw a pile of people, it could be called a pile—they were partially overlapping, and I immediately noted that some of them were dead. Then I declared a major incident. After that, the situation became quite clear.”
“When the rescue teams were performing their tasks, I was able to figure out the bigger picture, to think ahead about what we would need to do if this or that happened. I sort of created scenarios for where we might be in half an hour, for example. You don’t just start thinking about this after half an hour. You must anticipate the situation, read it and think about how it may have developed in half an hour or two hours.”
“In these kinds of situations, you have to think about the bigger picture, not just the visible effects. In this case, you mustn’t think about the explosion itself, but what would be the most effective or primary help. I prefer to think of it in terms of having an overview before making any decisions about the necessary actions.”
“[Afterwards] the emergency paramedics criticized my decisions as I had decided to divide their units into two individual operatives. They were used to working as two-person teams. They took it badly. I divided the units because there were so few paramedics and so many people needed immediate help. They would have wanted to work as pairs, to support each other in such an extreme situation. […] In my opinion, every professional must be able to administer lifesaving help within a couple of minutes. It would be unacceptable for one person to receive help while another person close by died, i.e., if we could have helped both persons—opened their airways or stopped them bleeding, for example. In this kind of situation, I cannot think about a paramedic’s feelings. I just think about their performance.”
4.3. Why Were the Experts Able to Deviate from the Scripts?
5. Discussion
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Action/Mission of the Expert | Script | Cues | Why Difficult to Deviate from the Script? | Why Could Deviate from the Script? |
---|---|---|---|---|
Breaking the door down (team mission: entering the apartment, stopping the violence, and securing the scene). | One police patrol breaks the door down; the other controls the situation and prepares to use firearms. | Disorganized action and mixed focus by the second patrol. Differing perceptions about the situation between the interviewee and the incident commander. | The incident commander leads the team’s actions. Deviating from the script would mean exceeding his authority. It would be a sign of mistrust of colleagues. | Assurance that following the script may result in a serious threat. Training in special task forces has clarified models of actions and enhanced the ability to make a distinction between the relevant and irrelevant; it has also prepared for creativity to act according to the demands of a situation. |
Switching roles; taking the lead on the fly, preparing to use a firearm, entering the apartment, communicating by action. | The incident commander leads the situation. The other patrol focuses on the target, is ready to use a firearm, and start shouting commands if necessary. | The other patrol was neither mentally nor practically ready to use a firearm. Their actions were not streamlined, stable, or focused. | Lack of confidence. Lack of strength to not having to be polite. Willingness to ponder, discuss, or instruct other team members about the next steps. | The initial presumption is the suspect(s) will attack and is/are motivated to use violence. Understanding of possible consequences if the situation continues with the given script. Awareness of how time constraints affect decision-making. No necessity to be polite; the inconvenience for colleagues should not affect decision-making. Perception about keeping the action running smoothly despite surprises. |
Missing obvious and visible problems. Addressing and orientating action towards the unknown. | Firefighters exist to help people in need. Much activity is on major incidents in time-pressured, decision-making situations. Resources should be quickly targeted to where needed. | The initial information did not make sense. Communication problems at the emergency center suggested that the situation was serious. Severed foot indicated a powerful explosion. | A chaotic situation puts focus on numerous sub-problems. Helping people is at the core of firefighters’ identity; feels wrong and unnatural not to help people in need. Difficult to exclude irrelevant things from decision-making. | Clear perception about the importance of gaining a bigger picture overview before acting. Understanding the importance of resource distribution in major incidents. Understanding how empathy may lead to addressing non-urgent problems. |
Dividing the emergency paramedic units into two individual operatives to gain maximum effect from available resources. | Emergency paramedics work as two-person teams, in which both have certain roles. It is important to support and be supported by a partner in demanding situations. | The number of people with life-threatening injuries seemed to be considerably high available resources could respond to. | Working in two-person teams is an established practice for mutual support. Wishing to provide the best possible medical treatment to each injured person; unwilling to compromise quality with quantity. Reluctance to shout orders in a situation that is already shocking. | Understanding that in an urgent, time-constrained situation, optimizing the quantity of help is more important than the quality. The starting point in mind is that every professional should be able to administer lifesaving help. Ability to see the systemic structure beyond the visible action. |
Synthesis: Why could deviate from the script? | Experience and training have helped to perceive: the underlying systemic structures and their leverage points, along with actions to be taken; the essential patterns from the less essential background, to direct attention to most important things; the crucial role of time as a contingent element of a situation; the relationship of tasks and sub-tasks. Orientation to expertise has enhanced: moral responsibility to do good; the idea that there is no reason to assume that nothing can go wrong; the idea that doing good may require impolite behavior and ignoring empathy or other emotions. |
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Heino, O.; Kalalahti, J. Securing Operational Capability for Exceptional Circumstances: How Do Professional First Responders Respond to the Unexpected? Sustainability 2021, 13, 6418. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13116418
Heino O, Kalalahti J. Securing Operational Capability for Exceptional Circumstances: How Do Professional First Responders Respond to the Unexpected? Sustainability. 2021; 13(11):6418. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13116418
Chicago/Turabian StyleHeino, Ossi, and Joanna Kalalahti. 2021. "Securing Operational Capability for Exceptional Circumstances: How Do Professional First Responders Respond to the Unexpected?" Sustainability 13, no. 11: 6418. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13116418
APA StyleHeino, O., & Kalalahti, J. (2021). Securing Operational Capability for Exceptional Circumstances: How Do Professional First Responders Respond to the Unexpected? Sustainability, 13(11), 6418. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13116418