Analysis of Enterprise Sustainable Crowdsourcing Incentive Mechanism Based on Principal-Agent Model
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
3. Model Formulation
3.1. Enterprise Crowdsourcing Single Motivation Incentive Model
3.2. Enterprise Crowdsourcing Multiple Motivations Incentive Model
4. Simulation and Discussion
4.1. Solver’s Work Quality Impact to Initiator Profit and Incentive Coefficient
4.2. How Does Uncertainty of Enterprise Operation Environment Affect the Incentive Coefficient?
4.3. The Monetary Incentive Plan When Considering Solver’s Effort Cost
5. Conclusions
- (1)
- The solver’s marginal output gain, which can be interpreted as the solver’s work quality, plays a key role in impacting enterprise profit and the incentive coefficient. On the one hand, the higher the work quality from the solver, the more benefits the initiator gets. This conclusion is common sense. On the other hand, the solver’s work quality will also influence the value of the incentive coefficient provided by the initiator. For rational participants, the solvers will determine the work effort and quality when they observe the initiator’s incentive plan, while the initiator will also estimate the expected profit from the crowdsourcing solver’s work effort, then decide the incentive for the solvers. The new findings in this paper provide managerial references for enterprise. From a sustainable crowdsourcing point of view, we recommend that the initiator can probably define a key performance index (KPI) to quantify and monitor the solver’s work quality, so that the QEP and QSP points are calculated, and enterprise can predict the expected profit and provide a proper incentive plan for the solver based on the results in this paper;
- (2)
- The incentive coefficient will be partially impacted by the external uncertainties that solvers are facing during enterprise sustainable crowdsourcing. The solvers will be expected to obtain less incentives when there are more uncertainties, such as uncertainties from enterprise research and development process. This conclusion is a good indication from an enterprise management point of view. In order to maintain a healthy sustainable crowdsourcing process, though the enterprise cannot control the external industry environment, we urge enterprise managers to try to take efforts to reduce the uncertainties of enterprise product research and development processes, such as identifying the purpose of the research, aligning internal sponsors and external material suppliers, stating product specifications, organizing regular meeting to review the schedule and discuss technical issues, etc. In fact, these actions not only benefit sustainable crowdsourcing, but also can strengthen the enterprise’s long term competitive edge;
- (3)
- When participating in different subtasks in sustainable crowdsourcing, no matter whether the solver is driven by single motivation or multiple motivations, the solver’s Effort Cost has a negative impact on the monetary incentive coefficient. The solver’s Effort Cost will influence the incentive plan, and the initiator tends to provide higher monetary incentive offerings to lower Effort Cost solvers. Furthermore, the solver is expected to obtain a higher incentive if the solver has a higher non-monetary incentive changing rate per the solver’s unit effort, which usually means the solver is a quicker learner, or an effective knowledge producer. This conclusion is especially useful for sustainable crowdsourcing in internal processes [31], in which the target crowd will be focused on junior and mid-level employees. Along this line of consideration, in order to reduce the solver’s Effort Cost, we recommend that the initiator to creates a good knowledge learning and sharing atmosphere when carrying out sustainable crowdsourcing processes in enterprise, which will inspire the solvers with multiple motivations to achieve great outputs. From the solver’s point of view, more attention should be paid to non-monetary output, such as gaining new knowledge, developing technical skills, etc. Therefore, the initiator should build a virtuous circle of solvers in enterprise sustainable crowdsourcing.
Author Contributions
Funding
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
PAM | Principal–Agent Model |
IRC | Individual Rationality Constraint |
ICC | Incentive Compatibility Constraint |
EC | Effort Cost |
OC | Opportunity Cost |
QEP | Quality Equilibrium Point |
QSP | Quality Saturation Point |
KPI | Key Performance Index |
Appendix A
Appendix B
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NPD Phases | Crowdsourcing Characteristics | Solvers | Typical Subtasks |
---|---|---|---|
FFE | Mainly from enterprise internal users The target is to identify opportunities and concepts | Employees | Strategy planning, research, idea generation, idea evaluation, business analysis |
Development | Inputs are mainly from partners or key clients The target is to develop a prototype | Partners, key clients | Prototype design, engineering, technical evaluation, prototype testing |
Commercialization | Feedback is collected from a wide range of clients The target is to promote the production line, improve product quality and reduce cost | Wide range of clients | Production, commercialization |
Motivation Type | Motivation Category | Typical Cases |
---|---|---|
Intrinsic | Obtaining social recognition and reputation | Thingivers, Wikipedia, SAP Community Network |
Learning new knowledge and skill | Wikipedia, Google Translate platform | |
Gaining joy, fun and attention | Dell IdeaStorm, Threadless, MI Community, LEGO Cuusoo platform | |
Extrinsic | Monetary and financial rewards | Innocentive, MTurk, Threadless, Youtube, Flickr, CrowdANALYTIX, Planbox, Taskcn |
Parameter | Description |
---|---|
β | Solver’s incentive coefficient |
λ | Solver’s total output gain |
µ | Solver’s marginal output gain, reflecting solver’s work quality |
e | Solver’s effort level |
δ | Exogenous random variables to solver, reflecting enterprise operation environment |
σ2 | Uncertainty of exogenous random variables to solver |
ε | Solver’s degree of risk aversion |
t | Solver’s Effort Cost coefficient |
M(λ) | Initiator’s payment to solver |
Ein | Initiator’s expected income |
Es | Solver’s certainty equivalence income |
CE | Solver’s Effort Cost |
CR | Solver’s risk cost |
Co | Solver’s Opportunity Cost |
Parameter | Description |
---|---|
β | Solver’s incentive coefficient vector provided by initiator, including extrinsic (β1) and intrinsic (β2). |
G(e1,e2) | Solver’s output by two efforts |
e(e1,e2) | Solver’s effort level |
δ | Exogenous random variables to solver, reflecting enterprise operation environment |
σ2 | Uncertainty of exogenous random variables in enterprise to solver |
ε | Solver’s degree of risk aversion |
Z | Observable information vector for solver’s effort |
M(e1,e2) | Initiator’s payment to solver |
Ein(e1,e2) | Initiator’s expected income |
Es(e1,e2) | Solver’s certainty equivalence income |
CE(e1,e2) | Solver’s Effort Cost |
Co | Solver’s Opportunity Cost |
Parameter | Description | Value |
---|---|---|
σ2 | Uncertainty of exogenous random variables to solver | 0.5 |
ε | Solver’s degree of risk aversion | 0.3 |
t | Solver’s Effort Cost coefficient | 0.8 |
Co | Solver’s Opportunity Cost | 10 |
Parameter | Description | Value |
---|---|---|
µ | Solver’s marginal output gain, reflecting solver’s work quality | 2 |
ε | Solver’s degree of risk aversion | 0.3 |
t | Solver’s Effort Cost coefficient | 0.8 |
G1 | Marginal output gain by monetary incentive | 0.8 |
G2 | Marginal output gain by non-monetary incentive | 0.4 |
CE12 | Monetary incentive change per solver’s non-monetary unit effort | 0.5 |
CE22 | Non-monetary incentive change per solver’s non-monetary unit effort | 0.5 |
Parameter | Description | Value |
---|---|---|
µ | Solver’s marginal output gain, reflecting solver’s work quality | 2 |
ε | Solver’s degree of risk aversion | 0.3 |
σ2 | Uncertainty of exogenous random variables in enterprise | 0.5 |
Co | Solver’s Opportunity Cost | 10 |
G1 | Marginal output gain by monetary incentive | 0.8 |
G2 | Marginal output gain by non-monetary incentive | 0.4 |
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Wang, G.; Yu, L. Analysis of Enterprise Sustainable Crowdsourcing Incentive Mechanism Based on Principal-Agent Model. Sustainability 2020, 12, 3238. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12083238
Wang G, Yu L. Analysis of Enterprise Sustainable Crowdsourcing Incentive Mechanism Based on Principal-Agent Model. Sustainability. 2020; 12(8):3238. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12083238
Chicago/Turabian StyleWang, Guohao, and Liying Yu. 2020. "Analysis of Enterprise Sustainable Crowdsourcing Incentive Mechanism Based on Principal-Agent Model" Sustainability 12, no. 8: 3238. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12083238