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Article

Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies

by 1, 2,* and 3,4
1
School of Finance and Economics, Yangtze Normal University, Chongqing 408100, China
2
Business School, Jiangsu Normal University, Xuzhou 221116, China
3
Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
4
Management Science Institute, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2020, 12(6), 2281; https://doi.org/10.3390/su12062281
Received: 20 February 2020 / Revised: 4 March 2020 / Accepted: 12 March 2020 / Published: 14 March 2020
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Optimal Decisions and Risk Assessment in Sustainable Supply Chains)
This study examined how to arrange the generation and pricing of supply chain members in the case of consumer green preference with different government subsidies. The green supply chain comprises a manufacturer and a retailer; the government subsidizes manufacturers who produce green products and consumers who buy green products. The study built a green supply chain pricing decision model with different forms of subsidy under various power structures. By backward induction and sensitivity analysis, this study analyzed optimal strategies of green supply chain under various modes, and we discuss how the government subsidy coefficient affects the optimal decision of a green supply chain. The results show that, firstly, whether the government subsidizes the manufacturers or the consumers, the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer is directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures. Secondly, when the government subsidizes the manufacturer, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are inversely proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the manufacturer leader; the carbon-emission level and the retail price are all directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the retailer leader. Finally, when the government subsidizes the consumers, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures. View Full-Text
Keywords: green supply chain; government subsidies; consumers’ low-carbon behavior; power structure; Stackelberg game green supply chain; government subsidies; consumers’ low-carbon behavior; power structure; Stackelberg game
MDPI and ACS Style

Su, C.; Liu, X.; Du, W. Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies. Sustainability 2020, 12, 2281. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12062281

AMA Style

Su C, Liu X, Du W. Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies. Sustainability. 2020; 12(6):2281. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12062281

Chicago/Turabian Style

Su, Chang, Xiaojing Liu, and Wenyi Du. 2020. "Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies" Sustainability 12, no. 6: 2281. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12062281

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