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Sustainability 2019, 11(2), 365; https://doi.org/10.3390/su11020365

Tacit Collusion of Pricing Strategy Game between Regional Ports: The Case of Yangtze River Economic Belt

School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China
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Received: 17 December 2018 / Revised: 5 January 2019 / Accepted: 7 January 2019 / Published: 12 January 2019
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Abstract

We develop a game model to analyze the tacit collusion between regional ports under three different scenarios. In the first scenario, there is simultaneous pricing game between regional ports; this intends to depict pricing strategy adopted independently. In the second, we consider two competing ports that make sequential pricing decisions. Thirdly, an infinitely repeated game model is then formulated for regional ports to test the stability of Nash equilibrium. Our main finding is that there is a certain degree of tacit collusion of pricing strategy between regional ports in the competitive environment; in particular, the tacit collusion of pricing strategy will gradually stabilize with the increasing number regional ports games. A case study of Yangtze River Economic Belt is provided to illustrate the results. View Full-Text
Keywords: regional ports; pricing strategy; game theory; tacit collusion; Yangtze-River Economic Belt regional ports; pricing strategy; game theory; tacit collusion; Yangtze-River Economic Belt
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Dong, G.; Zhong, D. Tacit Collusion of Pricing Strategy Game between Regional Ports: The Case of Yangtze River Economic Belt. Sustainability 2019, 11, 365.

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