How Do Information Technology Resources Facilitate Relational and Contractual Governance in Green Supply Chain Management?
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
2.1. The Direct Effects of IT Infrastructure Resources
2.2. The Moderating Effects of IT Human Resources
2.3. The Relational and Contractual Governance and Partner’s Opportunism
3. Method
3.1. Data Collection
3.2. Measures
3.3. Measurement Validation
4. Analyses and Results
5. Discussion and Conclusions
5.1. Main Findings
5.2. Theoretical Contributions
5.3. Managerial Implications
5.4. Limitations and Future Directions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
IT Infrastructure Resources (ITIR) | |
---|---|
ITIR1 | Our company uses the most advanced IT devices. |
ITIR2 | Every year, our company invests heavily in new IT devices (e.g., desktops, laptops, servers, routers, internet connections, etc.). |
ITIR3 | We have latest released professional software and enterprise systems (ERP, SAP, Lotus Notes). |
ITIR4 | In our company, software systems are always upgrading timely. |
IT human resources (ITHR) | |
ITHR1 | Overall, our IT employees are knowledgeable when we are in IT-related troubles. |
ITHR2 | Our IT employees are very capable in training others. |
ITHR3 | Our IT employees are able to interpret business problems and develop appropriate technical solutions. |
ITHR4 | Our IT employees are good at maintaining computers and network |
Joint-actions (JA) | |
JA1 | Our company plans volume demands for the next seasons together with this distributor. |
JA2 | Our company jointly plans the new product demands for the next seasons with this distributor. |
JA3 | Our company plans the variety demands for the next seasons together with this distributor. |
JA4 | This distributor and our company jointly deal with problems that arise in the course of relationship together. |
JA5 | In most aspects of the relationship with this distributor, the responsibility for getting things done is shared. |
Explicit clauses designing (EC) | |
EC1 | In dealing with our major distributor, we have clauses that precisely define the role of each party. |
EC2 | In dealing with our major distributor, we have clauses that precisely define the responsibilities of each party. |
EC3 | In dealing with our major distributor, we have clauses that precisely state how each party is to perform. |
Contingent clauses designing (CC) | |
CC1 | In dealing with our major distributor, we have clauses that precisely state what will happen in the case of events occurring that were not planned. |
CC2 | In dealing with our major distributor, we have clauses that precisely state how disagreements will be resolved. |
CC3 | In dealing with our major distributor, we have clauses that precisely state how the unexpected problem should be dealt with. |
Partner’s opportunism (OP) | |
OP1 | The distributor exaggerated needs to get what they desired. |
OP2 | The distributor was not always sincere. |
OP3 | The distributor altered facts to get what they wanted. |
OP4 | Good faith bargaining was not a hallmark of the distributor’s negotiation style. |
OP5 | The distributor provided a completely truthful picture when negotiating. (reversed item) |
OP6 | The distributor breached formal or informal agreements to their benefit. |
OP7 | The distributor always makes us take extra duties. |
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Industries | Electronic and electric | 33.1% | Number of employees | Below 100 | 20.3% |
Small appliances | 31.4% | 100–499 | 34.6% | ||
Machinery manufacturing | 25.3% | 500–999 | 33.0% | ||
Food | 3.1% | Over 1000 | 12.1% | ||
Bath products | 6.8% | Cooperation duration | No more than 1 year | 11.6% | |
Garment | 0.3% | 1–3 years | 21.4% | ||
3–5 years | 37.6% | ||||
Ownership | State-owned | 20.1% | Over 5 years | 29.4% | |
Joint-venture | 22.7% | Position tenure of respondent | Below 1 year | 17.9% | |
Collective-owned | 16.9% | 1–3 years | 27.1% | ||
Private-owned | 30.8% | 3–5 years | 24.2% | ||
Wholly foreign-owned | 9.5% | Over 5 years | 30.8% |
Constructs | Estimates (SE) | AVE | CronbachAlpha | Constructs | Estimates (SE) | AVE | Cronbach Alpha |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
IT infrastructure resources (ITIR) | 0.69 | 0.85 | Explicit clauses designing (EC) | 0.59 | 0.81 | ||
ITSP1 | 0.86 (0.02) | EC1 | 0.78 (0.04) | ||||
ITSP2 | 0.84 (0.02) | EC2 | 0.74 (0.04) | ||||
ITSP3 | 0.83 (0.02) | EC3 | 0.79 (0.03) | ||||
ITSP4 | 0.79 (0.03) | Contingent clauses designing (CC) | 0.70 | 0.87 | |||
IT human resources (ITHR) | 0.74 | 0.92 | CC1 | 0.84 (0.02) | |||
ITPP1 | 0.83 (0.03) | CC2 | 0.87 (0.02) | ||||
ITPP2 | 0.85 (0.02) | CC3 | 0.80 (0.02) | ||||
ITPP3 | 0.88 (0.02) | Opportunism (OP) | 0.63 | 0.92 | |||
ITPP4 | 0.88 (0.02) | OP1 | 0.81 (0.03) | ||||
Joint-actions (JA) | 0.51 | 0.84 | OP2 | 0.84 (0.03) | |||
JA1 | 0.75 (0.03) | OP3 | 0.74 (0.04) | ||||
JA2 | 0.76 (0.04) | OP4 | 0.81 (0.03) | ||||
JA3 | 0.72 (0.04) | OP5 | 0.81 (0.03) | ||||
JA4 | 0.63 (0.06) | OP6 | 0.75 (0.05) | ||||
JA5 | 0.71 (0.04) | OP7 | 0.79 (0.03) |
Constructs | Means | SD | Construct Correlations | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ITIR | ITHR | JA | EC | CC | OP | |||
ITIR | 3.46 | 0.82 | 0.83 | |||||
ITHR | 3.42 | 0.92 | 0.68 | 0.87 | ||||
JA | 3.45 | 0.67 | 0.40 | 0.46 | 0.71 | |||
EC | 3.82 | 0.60 | 0.33 | 0.39 | 0.54 | 0.77 | ||
CC | 3.85 | 0.68 | 0.39 | 0.33 | 0.51 | 0.56 | 0.84 | |
OP | 2.80 | 0.77 | −0.01 | −0.12 | −0.10 | −0.26 | −0.10 | 0.79 |
Hypothesis (Path) | Hypothesized Model | ||
---|---|---|---|
Path Coefficient (SE) | t-Value | R2 | |
Hypotheses: | |||
ITIR→JA (H1a) | 0.23 (0.06) | 3.78 | 0.23 |
ITIR × ITHR→JA (H2a) | 0.19 (0.09) | 2.11 | |
ITIR→EC (H1b) | 0.34 (0.08) | 4.30 | 0.21 |
ITIR × ITHR→EC (H2b) | 0.19 (0.08) | 2.36 | |
ITIR→CC (H1c) | 0.23 (0.07) | 3.22 | 0.61 |
ITIR×ITHR→CC (H2c) | 0.23 (0.08) | 2.87 | |
JA→OP (H3a) | −0.27 (0.06) | 4.47 | 0.33 |
EC→OP (H3b) | 0.07 (0.11) | 0.65 | |
CC→OP (H3c) | −0.33 (0.05) | 6.55 | |
Control variables: | |||
Sales amount→OP | 0.08 (0.07) | 1.14 | |
Cooperation duration→OP | −0.50 (0.07) | 7.14 | |
Sales amount→JA | 0.02 (0.07) | 0.29 | |
Cooperation duration→JA | 0.25 (0.06) | 4.17 | |
Sales amount→EC | 0.01 (0.07) | 0.10 | |
Cooperation duration→EC | −0.34 (0.07) | 4.86 | |
Sales amount→CC | −0.02 (0.06) | 0.33 | |
Cooperation duration→CC | 0.40 (0.06) | 6.67 | |
EC→JA | 0.37 (0.05) | 7.40 | |
CC→JA | 0.15 (0.06) | 2.52 | |
EC→CC | 0.13 (0.07) | 1.82 |
Hypothesis | Results |
---|---|
H1a: The advancement of IT infrastructure resources would improve the joint-actions. | Passed |
H1b: The advancement of IT infrastructure resources would improve explicit clauses designing. | Passed |
H1c: The advancement of IT infrastructure resources would improve contingent clauses designing. | Passed |
H2a: The technical support of the IT personnel would strengthen the effects of IT infrastructure resources on joint-actions. | Passed |
H2b: The technical support of the IT personnel would strengthen the effects of IT infrastructure resources on explicit clauses designing. | Passed |
H2c: The technical support of the IT personnel would strengthen the effects of IT infrastructure resources on contingent clauses designing. | Passed |
H3a: The joint-actions would reduce partner’s opportunism. | Passed |
H3b: The design of explicit clauses would reduce partner’s opportunism. | Not Passed |
H3c: The design of contingent clauses would reduce partner’s opportunism. | Passed |
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Zhang, T. How Do Information Technology Resources Facilitate Relational and Contractual Governance in Green Supply Chain Management? Sustainability 2019, 11, 3663. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11133663
Zhang T. How Do Information Technology Resources Facilitate Relational and Contractual Governance in Green Supply Chain Management? Sustainability. 2019; 11(13):3663. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11133663
Chicago/Turabian StyleZhang, Tao. 2019. "How Do Information Technology Resources Facilitate Relational and Contractual Governance in Green Supply Chain Management?" Sustainability 11, no. 13: 3663. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11133663
APA StyleZhang, T. (2019). How Do Information Technology Resources Facilitate Relational and Contractual Governance in Green Supply Chain Management? Sustainability, 11(13), 3663. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11133663