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Open AccessArticle

Opportunism Motivation of Environmental Protection Activism and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Study from China

by Shengnan Li 1, Jianbo Niu 2,3,4,* and Sang-Bing Tsai 5,6,*
1
College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
2
China Academy of Corporate Governance, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China
3
Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China
4
Collaborative Innovation Center for China Economy, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China
5
Zhongshan Institute, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Zhongshan 528400, China
6
Research Center for Environment and Sustainable Development of China Civil Aviation, Civil Aviation University of China, Tianjin 300300, China
*
Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2018, 10(6), 1725; https://doi.org/10.3390/su10061725
Received: 30 April 2018 / Revised: 22 May 2018 / Accepted: 22 May 2018 / Published: 25 May 2018
In the study of environmental protection issues for more than forty years, research on the impact of financial performance on environmental protection has been one of the important branches. In the framework of principal-agent theory, this paper explores the opportunism motives in a company’s environmental protection activism and the moderating role of corporate governance using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2005 to 2016. The study finds that: (1) the company’s environmental protection activism is driven by the opportunist motives of policymakers who want to mask their inability; and (2) environmental protection activism does not enhance the company’s future performance and value creation capability. Further studies find that corporate governance mechanisms play different moderating roles. Fund Shareholders play a positive governance role and reduce the correlation between financial performance and environmental protection activism. However, independence of the board of directors intensifies the opportunist motives. This paper provides new theoretical explanations for environmental protection decision-making, provides novel enlightenment for the protection of environmental protection policies in developing countries and regions. View Full-Text
Keywords: environmental protection activism; value creation; financial performance; inability disguise; corporate governance environmental protection activism; value creation; financial performance; inability disguise; corporate governance
MDPI and ACS Style

Li, S.; Niu, J.; Tsai, S.-B. Opportunism Motivation of Environmental Protection Activism and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Study from China. Sustainability 2018, 10, 1725.

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