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Collection and Remanufacturing of Waste Products under Patent Protection and Government Regulation

1
Zhejiang Business Technology Institute, Ningbo 315012, China
2
Department of Management Science & Engineering, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China
3
Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2018, 10(5), 1402; https://doi.org/10.3390/su10051402
Received: 20 March 2018 / Revised: 19 April 2018 / Accepted: 27 April 2018 / Published: 2 May 2018
(This article belongs to the Section Economic, Business and Management Aspects of Sustainability)
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Abstract

There is increasing academic and pragmatic interest in leveraging patent rights to invigorate remanufacturing for waste products under governmental interventions via regulations and reward–penalty instruments. In practice, many original manufacturers that are possessed with intellectual property rights allow third-party remanufacturers to implement reproducing operations through authorization and charging licensing fees. The general purpose of this paper is to explore favorable strategies for a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system of waste product collection and remanufacturing, in the context of either manufacturer-remanufacturing or remanufacturer-remanufacturing. To achieve such an objective, game theory is adopted to establish models of three collection and remanufacturing modes among channel members involving a manufacturer, a seller, and a remanufacturer. In so doing, the results show that a government’s allocations of elementary remanufacturing ratio and the unit amount of reward–penalty count significantly in CLSC operations, especially for the manufacturer, who acts as the leader in the system and makes mode selections. View Full-Text
Keywords: patent protection; reward-penalty policy; remanufacturing; closed-loop supply chain (CLSC); waste collection patent protection; reward-penalty policy; remanufacturing; closed-loop supply chain (CLSC); waste collection
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Zhang, D.; Zhang, X.; Shi, B.; Cao, J.; Zhou, G. Collection and Remanufacturing of Waste Products under Patent Protection and Government Regulation. Sustainability 2018, 10, 1402.

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