Evolutionary Game Analysis of Pricing Dynamics for Automotive Over-the-Air Services: A Duopoly Model with Endogenous Payoffs

Over-the-Air updates have emerged as a critical competitive frontier in the Software-Defined Vehicle era. While offering value creation opportunities, automakers face strategic uncertainty regarding pricing models (e.g., subscription vs. one-time purchase). To clarify these dynamics, this study develops an evolutionary game model of duopolistic pricing competition. Unlike traditional studies with exogenous payoff assumptions, we innovatively employ the Hotelling model to endogenously derive firm profit functions based on consumer utility maximization. The highlights of this study include: (1) We establish an integrated “static–dynamic” framework connecting micro-level consumer choice with macro-level strategy evolution; (2) We identify that product differentiation is the decisive variable governing market stability; (3) We demonstrate that under moderate differentiation, the market exhibits a robust self-correcting tendency towards “Tacit Collusion” (mutual high pricing). However, simulation results also warn that an asymmetric disruptive strategy by a market leader can override this robustness, forcing the market into a low-profit equilibrium. These findings provide theoretical guidance for automakers to optimize pricing strategies and avoid value-destroying price wars.