A DNN Architecture Generation Method for DDoS Detection via Genetic Alogrithm
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- With the access of various devices to the network and the emergence of more network services [10,11,12], DDoS attacks are becoming more secretive and changeable and can cause more significant losses [13,14,15,16,17]. For some networks, it is necessary to select a particular model to prevent DDoS attacks [18,19] and constantly adjust the model to identify new DDoS attack types or even reconstruct the model to detect rapidly changing DDoS attack patterns [20]. In these scenarios, the model’s construction needs experienced researchers. Frequent model construcution will consume many resources [21].
- This paper uses the GA to generate a model architecture while minimizing human intervention. In some scenarios, the proposed method can find a model with good performance in a limited time to deal with the problem of DDoS detection.
- This paper uses the model generated, some existing advanced DNN models and some advanced machine learning models to experiment on the same dataset. This paper evaluates theses models in terms of precision, recall, F1-score and accuracy. The analysis results show that the models generated by the proposed method have better performance than the existing methods studied in this paper.
- In addition to the CICDDoS2019 dataset, this article also conducted experiments on two other datasets, and the models generated by the proposed method still perform well.
- Six datasets are used to evaluate the best model generated by the method proposed in this paper and the best model generated by existing methods. The results show that the model generated in this paper has stronger generalization.
- After generating about 200,000 models, this paper analyzed the architecture of models with good performance and found that some combinations of architecture patterns frequently appeared in models with good performance. This paper conducted a t-SNE dimension reduction analysis on the model architecture sequences and found that the architecture sequences of models with good performance would also produce aggregation in the low-dimensional space; this shows that the models with good performance have some commonalities, and these results can provide a certain reference for future researchers in model design.
2. Previous Works
3. Methodology
3.1. Definition of Proposed Method
3.2. Dataset Preparation
3.3. Model Generation
3.3.1. Introduction of the GA
- Selection: individuals in the population compete for survival resources, and the better individuals survive.
- Crossover: some characteristics of the previous generation can be passed on to the progeny so that the progeny and parents have a certain degree of similarity.
- Mutation: the newly generated individuals in the population will mutate, which leads to the introduction of some new characteristics in the population.
3.3.2. Coding Model Architecture
3.3.3. Fitness Function
3.3.4. Solution Selection
3.3.5. Crossover
3.3.6. Mutation
3.4. Model Evaluation
4. Experiment and Evaluation
4.1. Dataset Selection
4.2. Data Preprocessing
- Remove invalid information from the input data: Some of the 87 features extracted by the CIC flowmeter tool should not be used as input features in the DNN. These are flow ID, time stamp, source IP, source port, target IP and target port. These features would all have different distributions in different application contexts and should not be taken as features to discern the abnormal flow of DDoS, which could otherwise cause overfitting problems in the DNN. Therefore, this paper removed these features in the data processing stage and chose other flow features as inputs to the DNN [43].
- Cleaning of datasets: This paper complemented the large number of NAN and INF in the raw data with the mean values of the other data.
- Transform labels in the manner of one-hot code: What was addressed in the experiment was a 2-Classification problem, so 1 × 2 one-hot coding was used to indicate the category of a piece of data [44].
- Data normalization processing: The normalization of the data can avoid numerically undesirable effects on the results because of the large difference in the orders of magnitude of the input data and is also convenient for the initialization of the DNN weights. Additionally, the data can be normalized to improve the speed of the gradient descent method for solving the optimal solution. This paper used the maximum–minimum Fmethod in the experiments to normalize the input data. The maximum–minimum method’s formula is as follows:
- Data expansion to solve the problem of uneven sample distribution: In the CICDDoS2019 dataset, there is a problem of an uneven distribution of sample data, in which the proportion of TFTP, SNMP and DNS traffic is significantly higher than other traffic. In the case of uneven data distribution in the dataset, the training and testing of the model are not objective [36,37,45]. In this paper, the dataset is expanded by the smote method. The smote method generates data through one piece of data and N pieces of data with the same category and the most similar features to avoid the over-fitting problem [46]. The formula generated by the smote method is as follows:
4.3. Evaluation
4.4. Hyperparameter Tuning
4.5. Model Generation
4.6. Evaluation of Models Generated
4.7. Comparative Experiment
5. Discussion
6. Conclusions and Future Work
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Symbol | Description |
---|---|
P | Set of solutions |
A solution in the population, the subscript id represents the id number of the solution | |
The probability that a solution is selected to participate in generating a new solution | |
The length of a sequence corresponding to a solution | |
F | Set of fitness of solutions |
Weight of accuracy in fitness function | |
Weight of single data processing time in fitness function | |
Represents the average time of processing a single piece of data in the test phase of the model | |
The fitness value of a solution | |
[,] | The corresponding cumulative probability interval of the solution |
The probability that a solution is selected to provide a gene fragment to a new solution | |
A random number | |
A value used to determine whether to use GEN LRU |
Description | Code | Parameter |
---|---|---|
Full Connected Layer | 0 | Neurons {2,4,6,8,16,32,64} |
Conv2d | 1 | Kernel size {2,4,6,8} Stride {1,2,3,4} |
Maxpool2d | 2 | Pooling {2,3,4,5} |
Droupout | 3 | Dropout rate {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5} |
Residual layer | 4 | Kernel size {2,4,6,8} Padding {1,2,3,4} |
Activation Functions | Code | Optimizer | Code | Loss Function | Code |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Relu | 5 | Adam | 0 | Logarithmic Cross Entropy Loss | 0 |
Sigmoid | 6 | Sgd | 1 | Mse Loss | 1 |
Tanh | 7 | Rmdgrop | 2 | Smooth Mse Loss | 2 |
Softplus | 8 | L1 Loss | 3 |
Description | Code | Parameter |
---|---|---|
Full Connection Layer with 32 neurons | 0 | 32 |
Full Connection Layer with 64 neurons | 0 | 64 |
Conv2d with 4∗4 Convolutional filter and stride is 2 | 1 | 4,2 |
Relu activation | 5 | |
Full Connected Layer with 2 neurons | 0 | 2 |
Logarithmic cross entropy loss | 0 | |
Adam optimizer | 0 | |
Learn Rate | 0.01 |
Tag | Percentage before Smote Method | Percentage after Smote Method |
---|---|---|
BENIGN | 0.00114 | 0.05011 |
DrDoS_DNS | 0.10129 | 0.08262 |
DrDoS_NetBIOS | 0.08176 | 0.08309 |
DrDoS_NTP | 0.02402 | 0.07811 |
UDP-lag | 0.00732 | 0.08163 |
WebDDoS | 0.00001 | 0.04184 |
DrDoS_UDP | 0.06261 | 0.08296 |
DrDoS_MSSQL | 0.09034 | 0.08306 |
Syn | 0.03161 | 0.08333 |
DrDoS_LDAP | 0.04354 | 0.08332 |
DrDoS_SSDP | 0.05215 | 0.08329 |
TFTP | 0.40115 | 0.08333 |
DrDoS_SNMP | 0.10307 | 0.08332 |
Method | ACC | PRE | REC | F1_SCORE |
---|---|---|---|---|
(50,400) | 0.9913 | 0.9978 | 0.9848 | 0.9913 |
(100,200) | 0.9913 | 0.9975 | 0.9850 | 0.9912 |
(200,100) | 0.9937 | 0.9996 | 0.9878 | 0.9937 |
(400,50) | 0.9909 | 0.9974 | 0.9844 | 0.9909 |
Complexity Cost | Range |
---|---|
Flops (M) | [0.01,6.1] |
Pamras (M) | [0.0,0.01] |
Complexity Cost | Average Value |
---|---|
Flops (M) | 0.1105 |
Pamras (M) | 0.0020 |
Normal | Attack | |
---|---|---|
Normal | 0.9994 | 0.0006 |
Attack | 0.0119 | 0.9881 |
Techniques | ACC | PRE | REC | F1_SCORE |
---|---|---|---|---|
Best model generated | 0.9937 | 0.9993 | 0.9881 | 0.9937 |
Mahmoud Said Elsayed et al. [47] | 0.9913 | 0.9990 | 0.9837 | 0.9913 |
Andrés Chartuni et al. [48] | 0.9927 | 0.9999 | 0.9855 | 0.9927 |
Abdullah Emir Cil et al. [49] | 0.9914 | 0.9985 | 0.9846 | 0.9915 |
Shalaka S. Mahadik et al. [50] | 0.9866 | 0.9964 | 0.9771 | 0.9867 |
Aman Rangapur et al. [51] | 0.9921 | 0.9987 | 0.9857 | 0.9921 |
SVM | 0.8024 | 0.9646 | 0.6243 | 0.7580 |
C4.5 | 0.9817 | 0.9795 | 0.9840 | 0.9817 |
RF | 0.7862 | 0.9931 | 0.5800 | 0.7323 |
LR | 0.5071 | 0.5071 | 1.0000 | 0.6729 |
Dataset | ACC | PRE | REC | F1_SCORE |
---|---|---|---|---|
CICIDS2017 | 0.9906 | 0.9896 | 0.9915 | 0.9906 |
CICIDS2018 | 0.9993 | 0.9986 | 1.0000 | 0.9993 |
Method | Flops (M) | Params (M) |
---|---|---|
Model generation using six datasets | 0.2173 | 0.0038 |
Model generation using one dataset | 0.1105 | 0.0020 |
Chiba Z et al. [27] | 0.9507 | 0.0305 |
Techniques | ACC | PRE | REC | F1_SCORE | T (ms) | KS |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Best model generated with six datasets | 0.9902 | 0.9903 | 0.9903 | 0.9902 | 0.001477 | 0.607 |
Best model generated with one dataset | 0.9937 | 0.9993 | 0.9881 | 0.9937 | 0.001340 | 0.624 |
Best model generated by Chiba Z et al. [27] | 0.9777 | 0.9785 | 0.9778 | 0.9777 | 0.001371 | 0.605 |
Techniques | Dataset | ACC | PRE | REC | F1_SCORE |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Best model generated with six datasets | CICDDoS2019 | 0.9902 | 0.9903 | 0.9903 | 0.9902 |
CICIDS2017 | 0.9660 | 0.9664 | 0.9660 | 0.9660 | |
CICIDS2018 | 0.9984 | 0.9984 | 0.9984 | 0.9984 | |
KDD_CUP99 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.00000 | |
NSL-KDD | 0.9352 | 0.9354 | 0.9352 | 0.9352 | |
UNSW | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | |
Best model generated with one dataset | CICDDoS2019 | 0.9937 | 0.9993 | 0.9881 | 0.9937 |
CICIDS2017 | 0.7460 | 0.7500 | 0.7458 | 0.7449 | |
CICIDS2018 | 0.5029 | 0.7514 | 0.5000 | 0.3346 | |
KDD_CUP99 | 0.9079 | 0.9225 | 0.9076 | 0.9071 | |
NSL-KDD | 0.7675 | 0.7795 | 0.7663 | 0.7644 | |
UNSW | 0.4817 | 0.4649 | 0.4835 | 0.4039 | |
Best model generated by Chiba Z et al. [27] | CICDDoS2019 | 0.9777 | 0.9785 | 0.9778 | 0.9777 |
CICIDS2017 | 0.8121 | 0.8202 | 0.8117 | 0.8108 | |
CICIDS2018 | 0.6591 | 0.6879 | 0.6583 | 0.6448 | |
KDD_CUP99 | 0.9995 | 0.9995 | 0.9995 | 0.9995 | |
NSL-KDD | 0.7010 | 0.7018 | 0.7012 | 0.7010 | |
UNSW | 0.4937 | 0.4968 | 0.4999 | 0.3308 |
Topology Layer | Percentage of Occurrence |
---|---|
Full Connected Layer | 0.2597 |
Conv2d | 0.0175 |
Maxpool2d | 0.0957 |
Droupout | 0.0087 |
Residual layer | 0.1693 |
Relu | 0.0896 |
Sigmoid | 0.0412 |
Tanh | 0.0773 |
Softplus | 0.2402 |
Number of Occurrences | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
---|---|---|---|---|
Full Connected Layer | 0.5050 | 0.3110 | 0.1220 | 0.0470 |
Conv2d | 0.8100 | 0.1800 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
Maxpool2d | 0.2380 | 0.6875 | 0.0588 | 0.0147 |
Droupout | 0.9705 | 0.0294 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
Residual layer | 0.3375 | 0.4936 | 0.1278 | 0.0358 |
Relu | 0.6000 | 0.2923 | 0.0769 | 0.0307 |
Sigmoid | 0.6825 | 0.0950 | 0.0222 | 0.0000 |
Tanh | 0.2463 | 0.6811 | 0.0724 | 0.0000 |
Softplus | 0.3913 | 0.4434 | 0.1217 | 0.0347 |
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Zhao, J.; Xu, M.; Chen, Y.; Xu, G. A DNN Architecture Generation Method for DDoS Detection via Genetic Alogrithm. Future Internet 2023, 15, 122. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi15040122
Zhao J, Xu M, Chen Y, Xu G. A DNN Architecture Generation Method for DDoS Detection via Genetic Alogrithm. Future Internet. 2023; 15(4):122. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi15040122
Chicago/Turabian StyleZhao, Jiaqi, Ming Xu, Yunzhi Chen, and Guoliang Xu. 2023. "A DNN Architecture Generation Method for DDoS Detection via Genetic Alogrithm" Future Internet 15, no. 4: 122. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi15040122
APA StyleZhao, J., Xu, M., Chen, Y., & Xu, G. (2023). A DNN Architecture Generation Method for DDoS Detection via Genetic Alogrithm. Future Internet, 15(4), 122. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi15040122