Application of Dynamic Fault Tree Analysis to Prioritize Electric Power Systems in Nuclear Power Plants
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Methodology Development
2.1. EPS Structure
2.2. Static Fault Tree Analysis
- It is assumed that 4.16 kV is the offsite power.
- Failure to run to the supply power, and failure of the bus are considered for each 4.16 kV A/B bus.
- Batteries and lower voltage buses are not considered.
- A LOOP accident is taken as the initiating event with the probability one.
- Standby failure, failure to start, and failure to run are considered for EDG A/B and the AAC DG.
- Only part of the EPS in Unit 2 is considered.
- Unavailable to use AAC DG in Unit 1 is considered to accommodate a failure of EDG A/B in Unit 2 (only for SFT).
2.3. Dynamic Fault Tree Analysis
2.3.1. Characteristics of a Dynamic Fault Tree
2.3.2. Dynamic Gates
2.3.3. Development of Dynamic Gate for a Specific Shared Facility
2.3.4. Construction of the Dynamic Fault Tree
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Static Fault Tree Evaluation
3.2. Dynamic Fault Tree Evaluation
4. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
AAC DG | Alternate AC Diesel Generator |
DFT | Dynamic Fault Tree |
EPS | Electric Power System |
EDG | Emergency Diesel Generator |
FDEP gate | Functional dependency gate |
LOOP | Loss Of Offsite Power |
NPP | Nuclear Power Plant |
PSA | Probabilistic Safety Assessment |
PAND gate | Priority AND gate |
SFT | Static Fault Tree |
SBO | Station Blackout |
SLD | Single Line Diagram |
SPARE gate | Standby or Spare gate |
SEQ gate | Sequence Enforcing gate |
WSP gate | Warm Standby or Spare gate |
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Event Name | Description | Failure Mode | Failure Rate (h−1) | Mission Time (h) |
---|---|---|---|---|
%IE-LOOP | Loss of Offsite Power | Demand | 1 | |
EPBSY-K4160B | Fault on Class 1E 4.16 kV Bus in Unit 1 | Running | 72 | |
EPBSY-K4160A | Fault on Class 1E 4.16 kV Bus in Unit 1 | Running | 72 | |
EP-K1460A-PS | 4.16 kV A Power Supply Failure in Unit 1 | Running | 72 | |
EP-K1460B-PS | 4.16 kV B Power Supply Failure in Unit 1 | Running | 72 | |
EPDGS-01A | EDG A Fails To Start in Unit 1 | Demand | ||
EPDGS-01B | EDG B Fails To Start in Unit 1 | Demand | ||
EPDGS-01E | AAC DG Fails To Start | Demand | ||
EPDGR-01A | EDG A Fails To Run in Unit 1 | Running | 72 | |
EPDGR-01B | EDG B Fails To Run in Unit 1 | Running | 72 | |
EPDGR-01E | AAC DG Fails To Run | Running | 72 | |
U2-EPBSY-K4160A | Fault on Class 1E 4.16 kV Bus in Unit 2 | Running | 72 | |
U2-EPBSY-K4160B | Fault on Class 1E 4.16 kV Bus in Unit 2 | Running | 72 | |
U2-EP-K1460A-PS | 4.16 kV A Power Supply Failure in Unit 2 | Running | 72 | |
U2-EP-K1460B-PS | 4.16 kV B Power Supply Failure in Unit 2 | Running | 72 | |
U2-EPDGS-01A | EDG A Fails To Start in Unit 2 | Demand | ||
U2-EPDGS-01B | EDG B Fails To Start in Unit 2 | Demand | ||
U2-EPDGR-01A | EDG A Fails To Run in Unit 2 | Running | 72 | |
U2-EPDGR-01B | EDG B Fails To Run in Unit 2 | Running | 72 |
Gate | ||
---|---|---|
PAND | , |
Component | ||
---|---|---|
SP1-SB (Stand By) | ||
SP1-AC (Active) | )* | |
Gate | Time of Failure () | State () |
SPARE |
Gate | ||
---|---|---|
SEQ |
Component | ||
---|---|---|
A | ||
B |
Component | Additional Condition 1 (AC1) | Additional Condition 2 (AC2) |
SP1-SB for SPARE Gate 1 (Standby) | ||
SP1-SB for SPARE Gate 2 (Standby) | ||
Gate | Time of Failure (Ti) | State (Si) |
SPARE 1 (Spare-Active) | ||
SPARE 2 (Spare-Active) |
Component | Time to Failure (Ti) | State (Si) |
EDG A-SB (Standby) | ||
EDG A-AC (Active) | )* | |
Component | Additional Condition for EDG | |
EDG A for Train A | = | |
Gate | Time to Failure (Ti) | State (Si) |
SPARE Train A with EDG (AC) | ||
Component | Time to Failure (Ti) | State (Si) |
AAC DG-SB (Standby) | ||
AAC DG-AC (Active) | )* | |
Component | Additional Conditions for AAC DG | |
AAC DG for Train A (AC1) | ||
AAC DG for Train A (AC2) | ||
AAC DG for Train A (AC3) | = | |
AAC DG for Train A (AC4) | ||
Gate | Time to Failure (Ti) | State (Si) |
SPARE Train A with EDG and AAC DG | ( |
Group | No. | Basic Event 1 | Basic Event 2 | Basic Event 3 | Basic Event 4 | Basic Event 5 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Ⅰ | 1 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01A | EPDGR-01B | EPDGR-01E | |
2 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01A | EPDGR-01B | EPDGS-01E | ||
3 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01A | EPDGR-01E | EPDGS-01B | ||
4 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01B | EPDGR-01E | EPDGS-01A | ||
5 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01E | EPDGS-01A | EPDGS-01B | ||
6 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01A | EPDGS-01B | EPDGS-01E | ||
7 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01B | EPDGS-01A | EPDGS-01E | ||
8 | %IE-LOOP | EPBSY-K4160B | EPDGR-01A | EPDGR-01E | ||
9 | %IE-LOOP | EPBSY-K4160A | EPDGR-01B | EPDGR-01E | ||
10 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGS-01A | EPDGS-01B | EPDGS-01E | ||
11 | %IE-LOOP | EPBSY-K4160B | EPDGR-01A | EPDGS-01E | ||
12 | %IE-LOOP | EPBSY-K4160A | EPDGR-01B | EPDGS-01E | ||
13 | %IE-LOOP | EPBSY-K4160A | EPDGR-01E | EPDGS-01B | ||
14 | %IE-LOOP | EPBSY-K4160B | EPDGR-01E | EPDGS-01A | ||
Ⅱ | 15 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01A | EPDGR-01B | U2-EPDGR-01A | U2-EPDGR-01B |
16 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01B | EPDGS-01A | U2-EPDGR-01A | U2-EPDGR-01B | |
17 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01A | EPDGS-01B | U2-EPDGR-01A | U2-EPDGR-01B | |
18 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01A | EPDGR-01B | U2-EPDGR-01B | U2-EPDGS-01A | |
19 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01A | EPDGR-01B | U2-EPDGR-01A | U2-EPDGS-01B | |
20 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGS-01A | EPDGS-01B | U2-EPDGR-01A | U2-EPDGR-01B | |
21 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01A | EPDGS-01B | U2-EPDGR-01A | U2-EPDGS-01B | |
22 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01B | EPDGS-01A | U2-EPDGR-01B | U2-EPDGS-01A | |
23 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01B | EPDGS-01A | U2-EPDGR-01A | U2-EPDGS-01B | |
24 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01A | EPDGS-01B | U2-EPDGR-01B | U2-EPDGS-01A | |
25 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01A | EPDGR-01B | U2-EPDGS-01A | U2-EPDGS-01B | |
26 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01A | EPDGR-01B | U2-EPBSY-K4160A | U2-EPDGR-01B | |
27 | %IE-LOOP | EPBSY-K4160B | EPDGR-01A | U2-EPDGR-01A | U2-EPDGR-01B | |
28 | %IE-LOOP | EPBSY-K4160A | EPDGR-01B | U2-EPDGR-01A | U2-EPDGR-01B | |
29 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGR-01A | EPDGR-01B | U2-EPBSY-K4160B | U2-EPDGR-01A | |
30 | %IE-LOOP | EPDGS-01A | EPDGS-01B | U2-EPDGR-01B | U2-EPDGS-01A |
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Baek, S.; Heo, G. Application of Dynamic Fault Tree Analysis to Prioritize Electric Power Systems in Nuclear Power Plants. Energies 2021, 14, 4119. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14144119
Baek S, Heo G. Application of Dynamic Fault Tree Analysis to Prioritize Electric Power Systems in Nuclear Power Plants. Energies. 2021; 14(14):4119. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14144119
Chicago/Turabian StyleBaek, Sejin, and Gyunyoung Heo. 2021. "Application of Dynamic Fault Tree Analysis to Prioritize Electric Power Systems in Nuclear Power Plants" Energies 14, no. 14: 4119. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14144119