Looking Through the Corporate Glass Ceiling in China

Abstract

An important element in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China is the guarantee of gender equality in all fields. The principle is not reflected in terms of corporate governance and senior management, however. A study of the largest 400 companies listed on Chinese stock exchanges shows far fewer female board members and senior managers than male counterparts and only a small improvement over the course of a decade. A comparison of gender balances in terms of a range of variables, including stock exchange listing, industry type, and ownership type, reveals better balances in wholly privately owned firms than in those with controlling state interests. Subject to intervening government policies to promote state-owned enterprises over private sector counterparts, the pattern over the decade studied suggests there is a possibility privately owned enterprises may gradually displace state-owned companies in the largest 400 group and gender balances in senior roles in the largest 400 group will consequently improve.

1. Introduction and Literature Review: A New Look at Corporate Glass Ceilings

Following the long history in China of deliberate exclusion of women from senior roles in commerce and governance, the 1911 revolution overthrowing dynastic rule brought nominal liberation and equality to Chinese women. Less than four decades later, the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 brought a constitution that specifically promised equal rights for women in all spheres of political, economic, cultural, social, and family life (PRC Constitution, Article 48). While sympathetic accounts described changes in the midst of the most orthodox socialist years in terms of the emancipation of women in China as the “most spectacular” of all changes in the new China (Snow, 1967, p. 1), the reality of gender inequality persisted, arguably exacerbated by the shift to a quasi-market economy after 1979 (A. M. Han, 2001; Hershatter, 2007). The economic gender gap remains one of the most significant globally (World Economic Forum, 2021), with the causes and consequences the subject of many studies (Yang, 2020; Evans, 2021; Zhao, 2017; Jue, 2019).

An important manifestation of the economic gender gap is the glass ceiling faced by women in the corporate world, that is, the invisible barrier that limits the number of women in senior corporate leadership positions. Since the term was first coined almost half a century ago, researchers in Western economies have identified and studied the glass ceiling encountered by women in all economic spheres (Dang et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2011). The focus of most studies is tracking progress at shifting, if not eliminating, the barriers to advancement and equality faced by women in work (Kies, 2019). A commonly used benchmark used to identify the presence of glass ceilings is the number of women in the most senior governance and management levels of a country’s largest public companies (de Jonge, 2014), normally the most important contributors to a nation’s economic growth and well-being.

The subject has, somewhat surprisingly, received limited attention in China, the jurisdiction with the greatest economic transformation and growth since the glass ceiling concept emerged as an indicator of opportunities and constraints for women. In contrast to the upsurge in the study of the corporate glass ceiling phenomenon generally, the number of studies on the subject in the context of China, the world’s second-largest economy, is tiny (Martínez-Fierro & Lechuga Sancho, 2021). Research to date on gender equality in Chinese companies has tended to focus on employment generally, with little focus on gender issues at the top level of firms (Zhu et al., 2022).

A number of factors may explain the limited research on the subject, including language obstacles for researchers abroad, concerns over possible subject sensitivity by domestic researchers, and the difficulty of extracting the information from limited sources. The modest research on factors that correlate with gender balances in senior management and governance roles in China is not indicative of shortfalls in the literature of gender diversity and company leadership more generally, with a wide range of qualitative and quantitative studies completed in recent years. Most of the limited number of studies that look at gender imbalances at senior levels of Chinese companies tend to focus on social or cultural factors as probable explanations for gender imbalances in senior management and governance roles (Luan, 2018; H. Liu et al., 2022; Sung, 2023). While these limited qualitative studies may help explain some of the macro features of company leadership in China, they cannot explain apparent differences in gender balances in different parts of the economy and different types of public companies.

Other scholars have turned to more detailed quantitative studies in an effort to pinpoint the particular features of Chinese companies that distinguish them from counterparts abroad and may explain the different gender balances across the corporate sector. Two of the most important studies to date relied on indirect data by looking at Chinese companies listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange (de Jonge, 2014, 2015). A later study by the same author seeking to investigate gender proportions on the boards of Chinese companies using logistic regression analysis failed to find any statistically significant relationship between firm ownership and gender balance, the possible link of “most interest” to the author (de Jonge, 2022). The author noted, however, that there were several gaps in her data set. Another recent study found a negative correlation between state ownership and women chief executives but relied on a very limited dataset from a World Bank survey (Reilly & Wang, 2022).

These studies opened a new avenue for research on gender balances of company leadership in China that might investigate directly the features of Chinese corporations not replicated abroad—the level of state ownership and control of public companies listed on national stock exchanges and the special corporate governance rules unique to China. This topic posed a challenge, however, in terms of uncovering the theoretical foundation for an assumption that gender balances of senior leadership in companies may be related to their public or private ownership structure. While there is a vast literature on management gender balances in other jurisdictions that investigates possible links between a wide variety of independent variables and management gender balances, the impact of state and private ownership is not a variable considered elsewhere, as China is unique in terms of the significant portion of companies on the two major stock exchanges with majority state ownership. As a result, the investigation commenced with no presumptions or hypotheses to test and with no supporting theoretical literature that might point to a probable or possible finding.

The starting point for the present study was the identification of the largest public companies in China using Chinese data as opposed to the surrogate data or survey data used in previous studies. A distinctive ownership structure, with many of the largest companies majority-owned by the Chinese state or provincial governments, adds an important independent variable to test not found in Western economies. In addition, a unique corporate governance system provides a number of different possible corporate governance or management roles that can be tested. This article builds on prior international and Chinese research and the unique features of China’s available data to investigate more thoroughly the role of women in senior governance and management positions in the largest Chinese companies. An understanding of the varying levels of progress in different types of enterprises under different types of ownership may provide both companies and policymakers seeking to level the playing field more broadly in terms of corporate governance and senior management with some new insights.

This article is organized in four parts following this introduction. The next section explains the five factors that were evaluated in terms of their correlation with gender gaps in senior management and governance positions. The article then presents the findings, revealing the type of control of publicly listed companies—private or state—appears to have the strongest correlation with the gender gap. Further sections consider the implications of this finding and set out the caveats and limitations that should be recognized when evaluating the findings and conclusions.

2. The Study Variables

The study described in this article looked at the gender balances in corporate governance roles in the largest public companies in China. The primary object of the study was to observe both the extent to which women filled senior management roles in the largest Chinese companies and to identify the independent variables that correlated most closely with greater or lesser gender disparities in senior positions. The methodology proved to be quite straightforward, as correlations appeared directly from data once it was assembled into tables, so little could be added by conventional regression analysis.

The subjects for the study were the largest 400 companies in terms of market capitalization listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. All data was collected from reports to the stock exchanges. The gender makeup of corporate governance bodies and positions was compared across four variables—temporal changes in gender balances, the stock exchange on which the companies were listed, the ownership profile of the companies, and the industry grouping of the companies. The findings were then considered in light of previous qualitative findings on factors that might inhibit women’s promotion to senior governance and management positions in China.

2.1. Temporal Changes

The primary investigation looked at changes in governance and managerial roles in the largest 400 companies in China at two points in time 10 years apart (2010 and 2020) to track the extent (or lack) of change over that decade. The time period was used to avoid any data distortions that might result from the economic shocks that followed the COVID-19 lockdowns from 2021 to 2023. Also, the decade gap was sufficient to test the independent variables that might affect the gender balance of management personnel and the findings would not be enhanced with additional years.

Separately, we sought to track changes in individual companies that remained in the largest 400 group over the 10-year period to see whether the balance had changed in those companies (see

Table 1. Continuity of firms that appear in the largest 400 list in both 2010 and 2020.

		Ownership Type	Frequency	Percentage of Companies That Were in the Largest 400 Group in 2010 and That Remained in Largest 400 in 2020
Still in the largest 400 total		State-owned	116 (42% of the 279 state-owned companies in 2010)	74.84%
		Privately owned	39 (32% of the 121 privately owned companies in 2010)	25.16%
		Total	155	100% (155 of 155)
Still in the largest 400 by industry type	Manufact’g
		State-owned	48	36.64% (48 of 131)
		Privately owned	28	38.89% (28 of 72)
		Total	76	37.44% (76 of 203)
	Finance
		State-owned	26	89.66% (26 of 29)
		Privately owned	3	50.00% (3 of 6)
		Total	29	82.86% (29 of 35)

Source: compiled by authors using data provided by companies to the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.

). This would help indicate whether any shifts between the two most recent decades were attributable to different companies comprising the majority of firms in the largest 400 or to wider changes in corporate culture, which could perhaps be explained by further modernization in China (Chia et al., 1997) that resulted in shifts even within companies that were in the top-400 group in both periods.

There turned out to be a surprisingly small number of companies that retained a top 400 position over the decade, reflecting the dynamic nature of the Chinese economy of this decade. Well less than half the largest 400 companies in 2010 remained in the largest 400 group in 2020. The largest state-owned enterprises were much more likely to remain in the largest 400 group than the largest privately owned enterprises. Over half the largest state-owned enterprises in the largest 400 list in 2010 remained in this group in 2020, while only 20% of the privately owned firms remained in this group. Companies on the Shanghai exchange were twice as likely to remain as those on the Shenzhen exchange, reflecting the higher proportion of state-owned companies on the Shanghai exchange.

Economic disruption and market volatility were greater in the manufacturing sector than the finance sector, the two sectors that accounted for most of the companies on the exchanges in both years. Over 60% of the manufacturing companies in the top 400 in 2010 disappeared from this group by 2020, while more than 80% of finance companies in the group in 2010 had exited the largest-company list by 2020.

2.2. The Stock Exchanges

The two stock exchanges used for this study, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, opened in 1990, just over a decade after China’s economy opened to private ownership and investment. Both are managed by a government ministry, the China Securities Regulatory Commission. The Shanghai exchange is dominated by large-capitalization companies and is the home of most public companies controlled by state-owned enterprises, while the Shenzhen exchange has historically attracted fewer listings of companies controlled by state-owned enterprises and more medium and smaller companies, as well as new technology companies. In very recent times, both exchanges, as well as the new Beijing exchange, have moved to attract smaller high-technology firms with faster listing timetables for these companies.

2.3. Type of Ownership

The ownership structure profile of public companies in China is significantly different from the ownership profiles in developed Western economies. While listed companies other than family-controlled companies in jurisdictions such as the US are generally widely held entities, non-family-controlled companies in China are most often controlled by the central or provincial government through unlisted state-owned enterprises.

The role of the state in the Chinese “market” economy is significant, particularly in respect of the largest companies in the country, the group investigated in this study (see

Table 2. Largest 400 companies in China (measured in terms of market capitalization).

	Ownership Type	Frequency	Percentage of the Largest 400 on Each Exchange (or Both Exchanges for Combined)
	All Companies
2010
	State-owned	279	69.75%
	Privately owned	121	30.25%
	Total	400	100.00%
	Industry Type
	Manufacturing
	State-owned	131	32.75%
	Privately owned	72	18.00%
	Total	203	50.75%
	Finance
	State-owned	29	7.25%
	Privately owned	6	1.50%
	Total	35	8.75%
	Total Manufacturing	238	59.50%
	and Finance
2020
	All Companies
	State-owned	209	52.25%
	Privately owned	191	47.75%
	Total	400	100.00%
	Industry Type
	Manufacturing
	State-owned	89	22.25%
	Privately owned	139	34.75%
	Total	228	57.00%
	Finance
	State-owned	58	14.50%
	Privately owned	8	2.00%
	Total	66	16.50%

Source: compiled by authors using data provided by companies to the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.

). In 2010, the first year studied, state-owned enterprises controlled almost 70% of the largest companies listed on the exchanges. Ten years later, they accounted for only half the companies in the largest 400. The factors explaining the different fortunes of the two groups are a matter of debate. On the one hand, it has been argued that there is no discernible difference in the risk appetite (often an indicator of profit maximization objectives) of state-owned firms and privately owned companies (Haider & Fang, 2016). At the same time, however, the relative success of privately owned companies indicates that either they operate more profitably than state-owned firms, there have been significant changes in market preferences over the decade for goods and services provided by these companies, or a combination of these factors. Still, even if it is the case that political interference through party committees and secretaries embedded in state-owned enterprises (Opper et al., 2002) has an overall negative impact on their performance (Chang & Wong, 2004), with the government controlling over half the largest companies in China, they remain economic powerhouses.

2.4. Industry Type

Companies on the two large stock exchanges are classified into industry categories by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. The industry concentration on both exchanges over both periods was significant, with manufacturing companies dominating on both exchanges in both periods (see Table 2). The mining and finance industries were the next largest industries. The concentration of top 400 firms in only a few sectors was significant, particularly in 2020, when two sectors accounted for almost three-quarters of the top 400. The high concentration of firms in the manufacturing and finance sectors made comparisons of gender balances in different industries outside these two groups problematic, as numbers for almost all other industry groups were statistically insignificant.

2.5. Governance and Management Structures of Chinese Companies

Like their Western counterparts, Chinese-listed companies are run at the highest level by a board of directors elected by the shareholders, the members of which hold a fiduciary responsibility to act in the interests of shareholders. However, two further features of corporate governance in China have no counterparts in the conventional Western model of company leadership. The first is the existence of a second board, the “board of supervisors,” which is responsible for the supervision of management, including the board of directors. The second is the appointment of a “Party committee” headed by a Party secretary to represent the Communist Party and ensure that firms, including privately owned companies, act in conformity with Party objectives. As companies do not reveal details of Party committees or Party secretaries in their financial disclosures or annual reports, it is not possible to measure gender alignment for this position.

Generally, paralleling Western-listed companies, a chief executive officer (CEO) appointed by the board is the leader of the company’s management and is thus practically responsible for the day-to-day operational aspects of the company’s business. However, the position of CEO does not exist formally in Chinese company law, which only suggests but does not mandate the appointment by the board of directors of a “manager.” In practice, what constitutes senior management in a company will vary from company to company. Gender comparisons of “senior managers” thus draw on the company’s characterizations of management roles and collectively consider all persons classified as senior managers.

3. The Findings

Females account for just under 49% of the population in China (World Bank, 2021), and a true gender balance goal outcome would have seen a similar proportion of senior governance and management roles in the largest Chinese companies filled by women. If approximate parity is an indicator of gender balance in governance and senior management positions in China, the largest corporations in the country fall well short of the benchmark. On average, the largest 400 companies in China in 2010 had 21.4 senior staff (board members and senior managers), of whom a little more than 2.5 were women. In 2020, the largest 400 companies in China averaged 22.5 senior staff, of whom on average 3.6 were women.

There was, to be sure, an improvement over the decade from 2010 to 2020, but it was starting from a low base. As the number of women in senior positions grew, the total number of senior positions also grew so the proportional increase in women in senior roles was not great, rising from 12% of senior roles in 2010 to 17% of senior roles in 2020, a far cry from gender balance. Still, the number of women on the boards of directors increased by 40%, the number of women on supervisory boards increased by 13%, and the number of women senior managers increased by 24%, but once again all starting from a low base.

A closer examination of differences in the growth of women’s participation in terms of exchange listing, ownership, and industry types may provide insights into factors that promote or inhibit greater participation of women in governance and management roles.

3.1. Temporal Differences Between the Largest Companies in 2010 and 2020

As noted, there was a universal increase in women’s participation in the three governance and senior management roles investigated in the study.

The research findings showed that women filled a higher proportion of positions in each of the governance and senior management roles in the largest 400 companies in China in 2020 than in 2010 (see

Table 3. Women in governance and senior management roles in the largest 400 companies in 2010 and the largest 400 companies in 2020.

	Women Board Members	Women as a % of Board	Women Super’y Board Members	Women as a % of Super’y Board	Women Senior Managers	Women as a % of Senior Managers	Total Women Boards and Senior Managers	Women as a % of Total Boards and Senior Managers
2010	385	8.89%	370	19.18%	322	9.97%	1009	11.77%
2020	640	13.99%	424	21.24%	485	14.09%	1444	16.07%
All Companies
2010
State-owned	255	8.06%	245	16.84%	207	8.88%	674	10.62%
Privately owned	130	11.13%	125	26.37%	115	12.78%	335	15.03%
Total	385	8.89%	370	19.18%	322	9.97%	1009	11.77%
2020
State-owned	319	11.80%	201	16.05%	218	11.44%	708	13.18%
Privately owned	321	17.15%	223	29.97%	267	17.38%	736	20.37%
Total	640	13.99%	424	21.24%	485	14.09%	1444	16.07%
Industry Type
2010
Manufact’g
State-owned	115	8.21%	97	15.80%	97	8.99%	294	10.46%
Privately owned	76	11.03%	77	26.92%	59	11.57%	191	14.59%
Total	191	9.14%	174	19.95%	156	9.82%	485	11.77%
Finance
State-owned	56	12.56%	46	18.85%	32	11.76%	127	14.40%
Privately owned	4.	6.06%	7	22.58%	4	8.00%	16	12.31%
Total	60	11.72%	53	19.27%	36	11.18%	143	14.13%
2020
Manufact’g
State-owned	116	11.21%	74	16.86%	98	12.53%	272	13.41%
Privately owned	247	18.24%	152	28.73%	193	17.39%	536	20.71%
Total	363	15.19%	226	23.35%	291	15.38%	808	17.50%
Finance
State-owned	133	14.78%	70	14.86%	74	13.24%	269	14.87%
Privately owned	13	13.98%	9	20.00%	13	20.00%	31	16.94%
Total	146	14.70%	79	15.31%	87	13.94%	300	15.06%

Source: compiled by authors using data provided by companies to the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.

). The shift is evident in companies on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, in both state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in the largest 400 group, and in both the manufacturing and finance industries, the two industries that account for the bulk of companies in the largest 400 group. Increases in the private sector were greater than the increases in state-owned firms, however, and increases in manufacturing were greater than increases in finance companies, mirroring the higher percentage of non-state-owned firms in manufacturing. At the same time, the data also reveal there was an increase in the proportion of women filling senior management roles in the 155 companies that remained in the largest 400, suggesting a cultural shift more generally. However, within this group, privately owned firms recognized the benefits of more women in senior positions much more than state-owned enterprises, with greater increases in the companies not majority government owned.

3.2. Gender Differences Between Companies on Different Stock Exchanges

Overall, the proportion of women filling governance and senior management roles in China’s largest 400 companies increased in all roles from 2010 to 2020 in companies listed on both stock exchanges. The gap between gender balances in all three senior roles between exchanges was significant, and in every case, it grew from 2010 to 2020. There was, however, a notable difference in the changes in gender balance on the two exchanges, with the Shanghai exchange having a modest increase in gender balance and the Shenzhen exchange having a much more significant shift.

The explanation for shifting gender balances on the two exchanges is likely to reflect changes in the industry type and ownership type of the largest 400 companies on the exchanges. The industry composition of the largest 400 on each exchange shifted markedly over the decade. The number of manufacturing companies rose modestly from 43% to 48% of the largest 400 companies listed on the Shanghai exchange in the two census periods, while it climbed sharply from 43% to 70% of the largest 400 companies listed on the Shenzhen exchange in the two census periods. At the same time, finance companies, the next most important industry in the largest 400 group, increased their relative position on the Shanghai exchange from 11% to 22% of the largest 400 companies listed on that exchange, with a much smaller rise from 3% to 9% of the largest 400 companies listed on the Shenzhen exchange, increasing the dominance of manufacturing companies on that exchange.

State-owned companies accounted for a majority of the largest 400 companies on both exchanges in 2010, and a notably large majority in the case of the Shanghai exchange. In 2020, state-owned companies were a minority of companies on the Shenzhen exchange (only 33% of the largest 400 on that exchange), while they remained a higher proportion of the companies on the Shanghai exchange, although dropping from 80% to 55% of the largest 400 found on that exchange.

Although the changed gender balances on the two exchanges can be attributed to the changed relative levels of company ownership and industry type of companies on the exchanges, as seen below, the different gender balances in different industry groups correlate with different ownership patterns in those groups. The concentration of manufacturing companies in the largest 400 group listed on the Shenzhen exchange in 2020 and the fact that 74% of those companies are privately owned may go a long way to explaining the better gender balance of companies on that exchange.

3.3. Gender Differences in Companies That Were in the Largest 400 in Both 2010 and 2020

As suggested earlier, one way to test whether the increase in female participation in governance and management roles in the largest 400 in 2020, compared to their numbers in 2010, is related to changes in the industry types or ownership patterns in the group, or whether it reflects broader changes in Chinese society is to compare women’s participation in senior roles in the same companies in both periods, using the 155 companies that remained in the largest 400 group in both periods (see

Table 4. Women in governance and senior management roles in companies that were in the largest 400 list in both 2010 and 2020 organized by type of ownership.

Location	Ownership	Year	Number	% of 400	Women % Board	Women % Supervisory Board	Women % Senior Managers	Women % Boards and Senior Managers
Total Shanghai and Shenzhen	State-owned	2010	116	29.00%	8.15%	17.54%	9.02%	10.95%
		2020	116	29.00%	10.25%	15.58%	11.18%	12.30%
	Privately owned	2010	39	9.75%	10.06%	23.51%	12.43%	14.13%
		2020	39	9.75%	17.15%	29.50%	16.43%	20.04%
	Total	2010	155	38.75%	8.63%	19.05%	9.87%	11.75%
		2020	155	38.75%	11.99%	19.29%	12.50%	14.25%

Source: compiled by authors using data provided by companies to the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.

).

Female participation in governance and senior management roles in the 155 companies that remained in the largest 400 group in both census periods rose from 11.75% of the positions in 2010 to 14.25% in 2020. This compares with an 11.77% participation rate for women in 2010 and a 16.07% rate for women for all companies in the group in 2020. In other words, the companies that stayed in the largest 400 companies group over the period lagged behind those that grew in size to become part of this group. Even if societal changes could partially explain the increase in women, they do not account for the apparent lag in companies that were in the largest 400 group for more than a decade. A closer look at the composition of the 155 companies compared to the broader group may provide some insights.

It has been noted earlier that in 2020, privately owned companies in the largest 400 companies had 55% greater female participation than their state-owned counterparts. Privately owned firms accounted for 48% of the companies in the largest 400 group in that year. However, private companies accounted for only 25% of the firms that were in the largest 400 in both census periods. The significantly greater proportion of private companies in the group of companies that had grown substantially over the decade and joined the largest 400 group (almost twice the proportion of private companies as in the remaining company group) might explain why the broader largest 400 group has a better gender balance than the group of companies that remained in the list both times.

3.4. Gender Differences Between Companies with Different Types of Ownership

While women are now and a decade ago were seriously underrepresented on boards and in senior management roles in all types of large companies in China, the difference between state-owned and privately owned companies in both periods is notable (see Table 4). In 2010, female participation in all governance and senior management roles was 50% greater in privately owned firms than in publicly owned companies and 55% greater in 2020. In 2020, the privately owned companies had 45% greater female participation on the board of directors, 82% greater female participation on supervisory boards, and 52% greater female participation in terms of women as a proportion of senior managers. The gender balance gap between state-owned enterprises and privately owned companies was large to start with and has grown larger over time. The higher proportion of privately owned companies in the largest 400 companies listed on the Shenzhen exchange in 2010 and the dramatic increase in that proportion in 2020 may go a long way towards explaining the better gender balance of the Shenzhen exchange in 2010 and its much better balance in 2020.

3.5. Gender Differences Between Companies with Different Industry Types

While the relationships between independent variables examined in this study and the dependent variable of gender balance were, for the most part, consistent across the two census periods, for one variable, the industry type, it was not. Finance sector companies in the largest 400 companies in 2010 had 20% greater female participation in all governance and senior management positions than manufacturing companies in this group. Ten years later, the positions were reversed, and manufacturing companies in the largest 400 in 2020 had 16% greater female participation in these positions than finance companies in the group (see

Table 5. Women in governance and senior management roles in companies that were in the largest 400 list in both 2010 and 2020 organized by industry.

Industry	Year	Number	% of 400	Women % Board	Women % Senior Boards	Women % Senior Managers	Women % Boards and Senior Managers
Manuf’g	2010	203	50.75%	9.36%	20.38%	10.12%	12.44%
	2020	228	57.00%	15.59%	25.74%	16.03%	18.37%
	Total	431		12.66%	23.22%	13.25%	15.58%
Finance	2010	35	8.75%	11.30%	19.55%	11.53%	14.18%
	2020	66	16.50%	14.70%	16.81%	14.03%	15.15%
	Total	101		13.52%	17.76%	13.16%	14.81%

Source: compiled by authors using data provided by companies to the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.

).

Once again, the shift in gender balance correlates with the changes in ownership type of the largest companies. The proportion of privately owned companies in the finance industry that made it into the largest 400 group fell over the two census periods, while the proportion of privately owned companies in the manufacturing group had climbed significantly. In 2010, state-owned enterprises accounted for 64.53% of the manufacturing companies in the largest 400. In 2020, the ownership pattern was reversed, and privately owned manufacturing companies accounted for 61% of the manufacturing companies in the largest 400.

The findings are consistent with the conclusion that ownership rather than industry type seemed to be the best indicator of greater gender balance. As senior management is chosen by the owners of companies, owner choice rather than internal corporate features best explains the gender makeup of managers.

4. Conclusions: Ownership Matters—What the Future May Hold

While gender balance in governance and senior management in large Chinese companies remains a concept quite remote from reality at the coalface, it is slowly improving. There appears to be a correlation between gender balance and company ownership, with privately owned companies having more balance than their state-owned counterparts. The improvement in balance over a 10-year period in the country’s largest firms correlates with an increase in privately owned companies in the largest 400 firms, as privately owned companies outperformed state-owned enterprises at this end of the company size range. In the same period, manufacturing industry companies advanced ahead of finance industry companies in terms of gender balance. However, this coincided with a change in the ownership of finance companies and manufacturing companies in this period. In 2010, 17% of finance companies, which performed better in terms of gender balance than manufacturing companies, were privately owned. In 2020, when their gender balance figures fell below those of the manufacturing companies, only 12% of the sector comprised privately owned companies.

The figures suggest two things. First, privately owned companies are more likely than state-owned enterprises to grow into the largest 400 group. This conclusion is consistent with findings that greater proportions of women directors in companies correlate with improved firm performance (Y. Liu et al., 2014). Second, privately owned companies are more likely to have a better gender balance than state-owned enterprises, suggesting privately owned companies may value the inputs of women in senior governance and management roles more than state-controlled firms. Together, these two factors suggest that if everything else remains the same, it can be anticipated that privately owned companies outside the largest 400 sector will continue to grow and displace publicly owned companies currently in the largest 400 in the sector, and the gender balance in the largest companies will gradually improve.

How do the findings reconcile with previous qualitative research on the factors that might inhibit the promotion of women to senior governance and management positions in China? Three types of factors are commonly considered to affect gender balance: social factors, including gender stereotypes; organizational factors including a male-dominated organizational culture and human resource practices; and individual factors, primarily the career aspirations of women and their beliefs about glass ceilings (de Cieri, 2009). Evidence suggests all these impact promotion prospects, no doubt enhanced by a bias against women’s leadership in Asia generally (Jogulu & Wood, 2008) and quite likely compounded in China, where traditional culture is far from supportive of women’s leadership (S. Liu, 2013; Kies, 2019). Male bias against women managers in China may be particularly strong (Bowen et al., 2007), notwithstanding the empirical evidence that women are equally competent managers (Yan et al., 2018; G. Yu & Zhu, 2000).

Equity scholars have attributed a broad range of corporate behaviors to increased levels of female participation in company management, including desirable outcomes such as more efficient enterprises (Li et al., 2021), better environmental practices (Saeed et al., 2022; Jiang & Akbar, 2018; S. Han et al., 2019), and more accurate financial reports (Qi et al., 2018), as well as undesirable outcomes such as increased tax avoidance (X. Liu et al., 2022). Overall, however, if the empirical evidence is to be believed, Chinese companies with more female directors perform better (Chu & Oldford, 2023). Apart from the equity question, gender balance may make good business sense.

The empirical evidence suggests privately owned firms are further along the path of corporate gender balance than their state-owned counterparts. All things being equal, the gradual increase in the proportion of the largest companies that are privately owned could lead to some moderation of the glass ceiling phenomenon. The big “if” in this conclusion is everything else remaining the same. Developments in the Chinese economy that have seen the growth of industries with higher levels of private ownership and the opportunities for innovative and dynamic private companies to grow may change if the government concludes there are broader geopolitical reasons to favor the growth of state-owned enterprises over privately owned firms. Gender balance in large Chinese companies may very well depend on these broader political and economic considerations as China grapples with the optimal path to economic recovery in the post-COVID era.

An alternative possibility is that the state-private ownership division of publicly listed companies remains stable, but social changes, possibly related to demographic pressures or other social factors, lead to cultural changes within state enterprises that encourage a better gender balance. The prospects for this path may be limited; available evidence suggests cultural support for traditional gender roles, with women concentrating on home duties and men on business and financial matters, remains strong (Cho et al., 2015).

5. Caveats and Limitations

The obvious elephant in the room in this study and any study of an aspect of the economy in China is the unique company structure, ownership arrangements, and political environment in China. The impact of the Chinese Communist Party on all aspects of the economy and corporate operations is direct and pervasive (W. Yu, 2013). However sophisticated the analysis may be, it cannot reduce the complex effects of this intangible factor to a simple independent variable. The closest a study could come to considering the effects of political structures would be by analyzing the performance of majority state-owned enterprises relative to privately owned companies, but both ultimately operate within the same geopolitical environment. The effect of the political structure, if there is any, cannot be determined.

A second omission from the study is consideration of the remuneration aspect of gender balance. Genuine gender equality would require both equal access for women to senior positions and equal pay. Available evidence suggests women executives in China lag behind male counterparts in terms of remuneration (Jin et al., 2023). This study is limited to the first element of gender equity, namely the availability of senior roles for women.

A caveat to the findings arises because the study necessarily bypassed possible subtle and immeasurable gender influences such as female managers’ support for further female management participation (Xiong et al., 2022), a factor that, if it were to materialize, could lead to a compounding growth of female management in firms open to greater gender equality.

Finally, the period of the study omits any impact of market turmoil in some sectors in very recent times, such as post-COVID economic disruptions, the difficulties faced by some property developers and financial institutions (shadow banks) in China, and, more recently, tariff disputes with the United States. A changing political environment in China, including further support for state-controlled enterprises, may also affect membership of the largest 400 companies measured in terms of market capitalization subsequent to the study period. The longer-term trends in China will not be evident until further research updates the findings in 2030.