A Comparative Analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative with Other Global and Regional Infrastructure Initiatives: Prospects and Challenges

Abstract

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the first and currently the most expansive global infrastructure initiative, notably for its scale and emphasis on connectivity. In response, alternative initiatives such as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) and Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP), including their components the Blue Dot Network (BDN) and Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI), as well as Global Gateway (GG) and the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), have emerged to counterbalance the BRI’s influence and promote more transparent, sustainable, and rules-based infrastructure frameworks. This review investigates how global and regional infrastructure initiatives—namely PGII/BDN, GG, FOIP/PQI, and 3SI—compare with the BRI in terms of development objectives, implementation models, institutional structures, and implications for developing economies. Adopting an inductive approach, this review identifies key themes from the literature to evaluate these initiatives across seven dimensions: (1) infrastructure objectives, (2) the quality and transparency of investments, (3) investment policy orientation, (4) trade policy orientation, (5) inclusivity and regional integration, (6) coordination mechanisms, and (7) environmental sustainability. While PGII/BDN, GG, FOIP/PQI, and 3SI appear well-positioned to address some of BRI’s shortcomings, the evidence does not clearly favour one model over another in terms of achieving welfare-enhancing outcomes and bridging development gaps. Nonetheless, strategic competition and complementarities among the connectivity policies of multiple initiatives can ultimately contribute to more accountable, multidimensionally sustainable, and socially inclusive infrastructure development. We also illustrate how stated preference methods, i.e., willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA), can be used to quantify the value of soft infrastructure, particularly public preferences for sustainable investment and norm diffusion, which are central to evaluating the social welfare gains from participating in these initiatives.

1. Introduction

While there are economic benefits to developing countries from infrastructure projects implemented under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there are perennial concerns such as the expansion of China’s economic and geopolitical influence, economic security vulnerabilities, debt-trap diplomacy, socially inefficient compensation rates to landowners, the insufficient engagement of local stakeholders, the halting and cancellation of infrastructure projects, and questionable labour and environmental standards.

Additional concerns that are rarely discussed in the literature but are of immense importance are the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) issues and the challenge of using cost–benefit analysis (CBA) in developing countries (Quah & Iuldashov, 2020). The conflict between demands for consumption and growth and demands for a higher quality of life is central to every case of NIMBY. NIMBYs are becoming more and more widespread in recent times due to rising affluence, greater educational opportunities and higher literacy rates, wider information dissemination, globalisation, the distrust of governments and private corporations, the increasing demand for energy, and the expansion of facilities to meet economic growth objectives. Even before any of the available conflict resolution instruments are used for NIMBYs, projects need to be assessed through properly tuned and adapted valuation techniques of CBA. CBA is meant to provide a systematic evaluation based on economic principles, along with transparency and accountability. Taking into account both tangible and intangible benefits and costs, it includes environmental impacts, ecosystem goods and services, normative preferences and so forth. Expressing gains and losses using the measuring rod of money allows for comparisons with economic impacts. The fundamentals of CBA for both developed and developing countries are the same. However, in applying the principles, specific valuation techniques commonly used in developed countries are not as appropriate for developing countries. Labour, goods and financial markets differ between developing and developed economies, and these differences may result in erroneous CBA if certain valuation techniques are used. As such, these intricacies between countries are rooted in varying and unique preferences and needs for infrastructure among the developing countries. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the market for global and regional infrastructure initiatives is vast and it is quickly being filled with competitors.

To counter or complement BRI cooperation, several alternatives to BRI have emerged including the Build Back Better World (B3W) in June 2021 (rebranded as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) in June 2022), led by the U.S. and G7 partner countries; Global Gateway (GG), which was launched in 2021 by EU member states; Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI), which was launched in 2015 as a key component of the broader Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP) and was formalised in 2016; the Blue Dot Network (BDN), which was founded in 2019 by the U.S. in collaboration with Australia and Japan, providing a certification mechanism for PGII and FOIP; and the Three Seas (Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Sea) Initiative (3SI) which was founded by 12 EU countries in 2015.

While the empirical literature on infrastructure development has focused heavily on China’s BRI, there remains limited systematic comparative analysis studies across the BRI and other emerging global and regional infrastructure initiatives. Mutlu (2023) applies a geoeconomic framework based on Blackwill and Harris (2016) to compare the BRI, PGII, and GG across dimensions such as trade policy, investment tools, sanctions, energy, foreign aid, and cyber elements. Siddiqa and Abbas (2022) offer a more narrative-driven account of the competition and complementarity between the BRI and PGII in the Middle East, with a focus on financing models, institutional mechanisms, and development standards. Based on a media content analysis of focus group discussions with key stakeholders involved in the BRI’s policy framework, Shah et al. (2022) derived comparison indicators pertaining to inclusivity, capacity, labour protection, anti-corruption, the incorporation of local needs, head start, cohesiveness, commitment, debt trap, mistake allowance, focus, sustainability, and regional peace. Matsumura (2019) employs a geoeconomic lens to compare the BRI and FOIP, distinguishing between genuine strategic articulation and propaganda use in official documents. On the contrary, Nagy (2021) uses a regionalism matrix analysis framework to compare the BRI and FOIP. Simonov (2025) compares the BRI and PGII across governance, sustainability, financing, and geopolitical dimensions from the perspectives of Sinocentric globalisation and U.S.–China competition. Dziewiałtowski-Gintowt (2019) compares the BRI and 3SI from a synergistic perspective in terms of their investment priorities, objectives, principles and infrastructure projects given their mutual interest to develop economic corridors passing through Central and Eastern Europe. Other studies offer a less direct analytical comparison between the BRI and its counterparts, e.g., Grieger (2021), Gaens and Sinkkonen (2023), Heldt (2023), Karjalainen (2023), and Zbińkowski (2019), primarily examining the narrative and features behind one of the alternative initiatives—such as FOIP/PQI, GG, or 3SI. While the BRI is often referenced in these types of studies, the comparisons tend to be more implicit or discursive, reflecting the reality that many of these initiatives have emerged, at least in part, as responses to the BRI.

Building on this emerging body of work, this review identifies two key gaps. First, most comparative studies focus narrowly on the BRI and one or two other initiatives, limiting the breadth of comparative insight. Second, while some studies examine selected benefits and trade-offs, few offer a systematic, multi-dimensional evaluation of both perceived advantages and drawbacks across all major Western and allied infrastructure initiatives. Although recent contributions such as Mutlu (2023) and Nagy (2021) provide valuable insights using established frameworks, a more flexible and comprehensive approach that is grounded in themes identified across the literature can better inform CBA practitioners seeking to assess the optimal social welfare outcomes associated with participation in each initiative.

Thus, this study seeks to address the following research question: how do the other major infrastructure initiatives compare with the BRI in terms of development objectives, governance models, financing mechanisms, and implications for developing economies? Rather than applying a formalised framework, we adopt a bottom-up, inductive comparative approach, identifying key themes from the academic literature, policy documents, media articles, and official communications. We evaluate the following initiatives—the BRI, PGII/BDN, GG, FOIP/PQI, and 3SI—across seven dimensions: (1) infrastructure objectives, (2) the quality and transparency of investments, (3) investment policy orientation, (4) trade policy orientation, (5) inclusivity and regional integration, (6) coordination mechanisms, and (7) environmental sustainability. This approach offers flexibility and breadth, capturing the evolving landscape of global and regional infrastructure initiatives that remain underexplored in their totality. Our aim is to provide a comprehensive foundation for future research to build upon using more formalised comparative frameworks. These initiatives were chosen based on three practical criteria: (1) the scale and scope of their financial commitments, (2) their explicit or implied policy positioning as alternatives or complements to the BRI, and (3) their backing by major geopolitical actors, including G7 countries, the EU, Japan, and Central and Eastern European states. CBA, when appropriately contextualised, can help policymakers evaluate the trade-offs among the available infrastructure alternatives in their respective regions.

Finally, we draw on an existing methodology from the literature to illustrate how soft infrastructure elements—such as transparency, sustainability certification, and norm diffusion—can be valued using stated preference techniques like willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). These preferences influence infrastructure funding decisions and outcomes but are not fully captured by conventional metrics. This is especially pertinent given the scale of these initiatives: PGII committed USD 600 billion towards global infrastructure investment from 2022–2027, FOIP pledged USD 75 billion by 2030 for the Indo-Pacific region, GG promised to mobilise USD 318 billion for global infrastructure between 2021 and 2027, and 3SI estimated a funding need of USD 690 billion to address infrastructure gaps across 13 Central and Eastern European countries1 by 2030 (see

Table 1. General comparison between global and regional infrastructure initiatives.

	Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)	Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)	Global Gateway (GG)	Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP) and Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI)	Three Seas Initiative (3SI)
Inception	2013	2022	2021	2016	2015
Funding	USD 1.175 trillion (invested and contracted) (Nedopil, 2025)	USD 600 billion by 2027 (pledged) (Minister of International Development Canada, 2023)	USD 318 billion between 2021 and 2027 (pledged) (The Eurasian Times, 2023)	FOIP: USD 75 billion by 2030 (pledged) (Murakami & Kaushik, 2023) PQI: USD110 billion from 2015 to 2020 (budgeted), increased to USD 200 billion in 2016 (Gaens & Sinkkonen, 2023)	USD 690 billion by 2030 (required) and EUR 928 million (committed), with target budget of EUR 3–5 billion (Seno, 2023; Wilczek & Rudowski, 2024)
Regional Focus	Global (Global South-focused, with strongest operational presence in Asia)	Global (Global South-focused)	Global (Africa-focused, Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe)	Indo-Pacific, Asia	Central and Eastern Europe (Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Sea countries)
Objectives	Infrastructure; energy, trade, connectivity	Quality infrastructure; connectivity, supply chain resilience, domestic job creation and social expenditure, climate and health security, gender equality and equity	Quality infrastructure; connectivity, supply chain resilience, climate, health, and food security, transport, education and research	Quality infrastructure; transport, sustainability, maritime security	Infrastructure; energy, transport, digital connectivity
Financing Model	Primarily state-funded	Private sector mobilisation + G7 public funding	EU grants/loans + private capital mobilisation	ODA loans + private partnerships	Private + EU public funds
Governance	Bilateral (state-led)	Multilateral, rule-based (G7-led coalition)	Multilateral, rules-based (EU institutions)	Multilateral, rules-based (Japan-led, U.S.-supported)	Multilateral (EU-led, regionally coordinated)

).

2. Comparison of BRI with Other Global and Regional Infrastructure Initiatives

China’s first-mover advantage, being the major global infrastructure initiative of its kind in the 21st century, has set the bar for other alternative initiatives. PGII/BDN, GG, FOIP/PQI, and 3SI, while not just economic ventures, are widely seen as geopolitical responses to China’s growing influence through the BRI. Since the inception of the BRI in 2013, China has also recognised the importance of sustainability development goals pertaining to green growth, health and digital infrastructure and critical resource extraction from less habitable regions. The BRI has evolved into an umbrella initiative comprising the Silk Road Economic Belt, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, and several thematic extensions such as the Green Silk Road, Health Silk Road, Digital Silk Road, Polar Silk Road, and Space Silk Road. However, while China’s domestic capabilities are impressive, the international impacts of these initiatives remain mixed. As a result, these alternative initiatives are expected to not only rival the BRI in terms of its existing substantial impact on investment and connectivity but also improve upon its weaknesses, particularly in areas such as transparency, governance, and sustainability. This expectation places more pressure on these initiatives to avoid mistakes, as they must demonstrate their ability to offer a superior alternative to the BRI.

Besides competition, by focusing on different aspects of infrastructural development, and tapping on different markets and financial instruments, these alternative initiatives are said to be complementary to the BRI in some ways as well. The crucial question then is as follows: how successful would these initiatives be in putting pressure on China’s evolving BRI framework and in covering the bases of fair, inclusive and sustainable trade interconnectedness?

2.1. Infrastructure Objectives

Differences in infrastructure focus reflect deeper divergences in development philosophies and priorities, strategic interests and comparative advantages. These initiatives often balance trade-offs and complementarities between competing goals: maximising economic efficiency versus promoting social welfare, expanding geopolitical influence versus minimising security risks, and pursuing rapid development versus ensuring environmental sustainability and fair labour conditions.

The emphasis on quality infrastructure and private funding models are areas where PGII, GG, FOIP/PQI and 3SI share similarities with each other and where they differ from the BRI’s approach, which focuses on “standard” infrastructure and state-funded financing models (Grieger, 2021). Both PGII and GG are framed as normative contrasts to the BRI’s state-led model, particularly in terms of democratic values, transparency, high standards, and equal partnerships. The language of EU fact sheets and speeches places stronger emphasis on strengthening supply chain resilience, particularly by reducing strategic dependencies on China. GG is framed as an EU-external cooperation strategy aimed at securing sustainable and reliable infrastructure connections. In contrast, PGII—while also globally oriented—places relatively more focus on the Global South and includes strong domestic policy framing within the U.S., emphasising job creation and middle-class economic security (Mutlu, 2023). As highlighted in a textual analysis of official declarations, 3SI shares similarities with the BRI in its focus on overarching goals such as connectivity, commerciality, and complementarity. However, while these themes appear with comparable proportional frequency across both initiatives, the term ‘cooperation’ appears significantly less frequently in 3SI documents relative to the BRI, suggesting a particularly strong emphasis on cooperative rhetoric within BRI communications.

Although the BRI includes a maritime component through the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, its primary emphasis remains on trade facilitation and economic infrastructure, particularly port construction and supply chain connectivity. In contrast, FOIP’s maritime pillar centres on security cooperation, freedom of navigation, and maritime law enforcement (Gaens & Sinkkonen, 2023). In addition, 3SI also holds significant geopolitical and energy security implications. A key initiative is the North–South Gas Corridor, which will facilitate the supply of American liquified natural gas (LNG) to Central Europe. This project is poised to reduce the region’s dependence on Russian gas imports, particularly in Central and Eastern European countries, and challenges Germany’s plans to establish a gas trading hub with Russia (Dziewiałtowski-Gintowt, 2019). Plans to transition away from fossil fuels toward renewable energy are also underway, driven in part by the Three Seas region’s significant potential for solar photovoltaic deployment (Wilczek & Rudowski, 2024). While the alternative initiatives share broad normative alignment around rule-based order, connectivity, quality investments and support for developing countries, FOIP places greater emphasis on maritime security, and 3SI focuses more heavily on energy security—distinguishing them in strategic orientation from PGII and GG. In contrast to globally scoped initiatives such as PGII and GG (albeit with certain regional priorities), FOIP/PQI and 3SI are primarily regionally anchored strategies aimed at enhancing connectivity and autonomy in geoeconomic-sensitive zones—the Indo-Pacific/Asia and Central and Eastern Europe, respectively.

Infrastructure can be broadly categorised into (i) hard physical infrastructure (e.g., roads, railways, ports), (ii) ICT infrastructure (e.g., broadband, mobile networks), and (iii) soft infrastructure (e.g., border efficiency, legal frameworks, institutional quality). While both physical and ICT infrastructure fall under the “hard” category, their impacts differ sharply. Zaninovic et al. (2024) found that hard physical infrastructure has minimal influence on trade, whereas ICT and institutional efficiency have significant positive effects, particularly on supply chain trade. Fung et al. (2005) found that soft infrastructure, i.e., the quality of market institutions, plays a more significant role in attracting FDI inflows relative to hard infrastructure. In this regard, PGII, GG, and FOIP may hold an advantage. The investments under PGII are oriented towards soft aspects of development, namely climate security, health security, digital technology and connectivity, and gender equity and equality (Siddiqa & Abbas, 2022). The investments under GG also emphasise these soft aspects (but less explicitly gender equality) with the addition of food security, transport, education, and research (Mutlu, 2023).

Comparatively speaking, the BRI primarily promotes the hard aspects of development, i.e., the building of infrastructure overseas by leveraging China’s comparative advantage in manufacturing value chains. Likewise, even though FOIP promotes a rule-based regional order that comes with soft infrastructure components, its infrastructure implementation pillar PQI primarily focuses on quality physical infrastructure in the areas of transportation, water management and energy in Asia (Katada, 2020; Gaens & Sinkkonen, 2023). Similarly, 3SI primarily focuses on both physical and digital infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe. The quality of infrastructure—including electricity supply, air transport, roads, ports, and railways—in 3SI countries (which are primarily new EU member states) trails behind that of their non-3SI counterparts (older, more developed EU member states), underscoring the need to invest in critical infrastructure development (Zbińkowski, 2019). Ultimately, the dichotomy between hard and soft infrastructure may be misleading. They are not substitutes but complements. Without roads and electricity, digital services cannot operate; without institutional quality and digital literacy, physical infrastructure underperforms.

2.2. Quality and Transparency of Investments

Upholding the quality of infrastructure investments is important to ensure that projects are executed transparently, safely and reliably under good governance and that fiscal2, social and environmental sustainability standards are met. BDN complements PGII and FOIP projects by assessing and endorsing infrastructure that meets high standards of transparency, sustainability, and developmental impact, providing them with an external certification of quality. The OECD took over the technical and operational responsibilities for the global certification process of BDN in June 2021. The OECD’s credibility as an authority stems from its perceived neutrality—neither closely aligned with neoliberal orthodoxy nor fully committed to Keynesian interventionism, allowing it to be broadly accepted across diverse political and economic contexts (Ashbee, 2021). In contrast, the EU embeds its standards directly into the funding and approval processes of GG and 3SI projects, without relying on a separate certification mechanism.

The BRI has been criticised to be relatively less transparent in terms of the magnitude, scale and clauses of its projects and their financing. China’s official GDP growth data was also suspected to be significantly overstated at times as lower-level officials have an incentive to over-report to show that they have attained high economic growth rates in their respective provinces. Therefore, China’s GDP indicator alone may provide a misleading signal of its economic health in financing its BRI in the meantime (Matsumura, 2019). Moreover, it was reported that creditors command large control over foreign borrowers, giving the latter less flexibility to restructure their debts, default on their loans without risking the collateralisation of strategic assets, or introduce more stringent environmental and labour standards in contractual terms (Gelpern et al., 2022). The “hidden debt” incurred by developing BRI countries was estimated to be USD 385 billion by 2017 (Grieger, 2021). Another example concerns the USD 1.5 billion Chinese loan taken to finance the construction of the BRI’s Belgrade–Budapest rail line, which aims to improve connectivity between China and Europe. This project was awarded without a competitive bidding process, i.e., a public tender, which potentially constituted illegal state aid by bypassing EU legal frameworks that emphasise transparency and competition in public procurement (Dziewiałtowski-Gintowt, 2019).

A lack of transparency not only increases the likelihood of infrastructure projects being opposed as NIMBY facilities due to diminished public trust but also imposes additional costs on firms bidding for such projects, stemming from information asymmetry, corruption, and ill-defined property rights. Generally, the degree of transparency in economic policymaking has been shown to be highly and positively correlated with a country’s attractiveness to foreign direct investment (FDI). Based on a transparency index ranking of various countries that assesses “the level of corruption, law and order, bureaucratic quality, contract viability and the risk of government expropriation of private assets”, it was found that a one-point increase in transparency ranking is associated with a 40% increase in FDI (Drabek & Payne, 2002). Increased FDI not only injects capital but also promotes knowledge transfer, job creation, and productivity gains. These dynamic spillover effects can significantly amplify the economic benefits of infrastructure projects beyond their initial investment costs, especially in developing economies where such benefits are most critical. Consequently, initiatives like PGII/BDN and GG, through their emphasis on transparent project standards and contractual terms, may offer greater long-term economic gains by strengthening investor confidence. However, potential shortcomings in assurance and implementation remain and will be addressed in subsequent sections.

2.3. Investment Policy Orientation

Unlike the BRI, which primarily relies on public bilateral loans from Chinese state-owned banks such as the China Development Bank and engages with multilateral institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the China Development Bank (CDB), and the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM China) for infrastructure development in low- to middle-income countries, PGII focuses on attracting private sector investment through blended finance approaches, leveraging various development finance tools. These include the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM U.S.), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). Similarly, GG aims to crowd in private sector investments by leveraging EU financial frameworks such as the Instrument for Development and International Cooperation (NDICI) and the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD+). This strategy is complemented by investment programmes like the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) III, Interreg, InvestEU, and Horizon Europe, employing a mix of grants, soft loans, and guarantees. The European Commission uses the public–private partnership (PPP) model to merge public funds designated for development aid with private investments to finance infrastructure projects under the GG strategy, aiming to create a synergy where public investment attracts private capital, thereby expanding the financial base for large-scale infrastructure projects that might otherwise be too costly or risky for private entities to undertake alone (Mutlu, 2023; Heldt, 2023; Tagliapietra, 2023; Simonov, 2025).

Although estimates of BRI spending vary widely, conservative figures provided by institutions such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), William & Mary TradeAid, and UNCTAD estimate BRI funding at approximately USD 272 billion between 2014 and 2017, USD 354.4 billion between 2000 and 2014, and USD 448 billion between 2014 and 2018. When compared to GG’s funding of around USD 413 billion (EUR 350 billion) between 2014 and 2018, the BRI and GG may seem comparable in terms of funding size. However, since grants tend to provide more long-term social benefits than loans because they do not require repayment, which lessens the financial burden on recipient countries, GG may have a more positive impact on infrastructural development compared to the BRI (USITC, 2021; Tagliapietra, 2023).

In 2015, PQI allocated USD 110 billion worth of “quality infrastructure investment” in Asia over the next 5 years, which was increased to USD 200 billion in 2016 (Gaens & Sinkkonen, 2023). PQI is similar to the BRI in two ways. First, both initiatives primarily rely on official development assistance (ODA) loans for infrastructure financing in contrast to the blended finance models of PGII and GG and the investment fund-driven approach of 3SI. Second, a significant portion of the ODA loans under both the BRI and PQI has historically been tied to the procurement of domestic inputs, thereby supporting the exporting of a country’s own industries—China’s and Japan’s, respectively. PQI leverages public funding from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment (JOIN). However, unlike the BRI, PQI also explicitly promotes PPPs, aiming to mobilise private capital alongside public funds by utilising the Japan International Cooperation Agency’s (JICA)’s Private Sector Investment Finance (PSIF) tool to enhance project quality and sustainability (Grieger, 2021; Gaens & Sinkkonen, 2023).

Similarly, the Three Seas Investment Fund (3SIIF), under the 3SI initiative, seeks to foster a diverse, fiscally responsible, and environmentally sustainable investment portfolio. This portfolio aims to attract private investors and international financial institutions to bridge the infrastructure gap between the Three Seas region and Western Europe. The focus areas include energy, transportation, and digital infrastructure, specifically enhancing North–South connectivity. Each eligible infrastructure project, whether a new development (greenfield) or expansion of existing facilities (brownfield), is expected to be construction-ready and deliver substantial benefits to at least two regional states. Managed on a fully commercial basis, the fund operates with a transparent investment process independent of its shareholders and anticipates a high internal rate of return between 12 and 15%, reflecting the Three Seas region’s unique position at the intersection of emerging market dynamism and developed market stability. The U.S. has shown interest in supporting the fund through the DFC, pledging to contribute no less than 30% of the total commitments from the 3SI states. The initial investment has a potential multiplier effect by being positioned to complement EU or national funds, draw additional equity investments, and stimulate lending by financial institutions. Ultimately, the goal is for direct public funding to constitute only 30–40% of infrastructural investment, with the majority sourced from private investors and commercially operated state-owned enterprises (Wilczek & Rudowski, 2024).

Therefore, private sector equity is instrumental to the funding of public infrastructure projects under PGII, GG, FOIP/PQI and 3SI. Public financing infused with private financing through shared partnership may be considered advantageous over purely public financing because private providers have stronger incentives to ensure quality by taking responsibility for both the construction and maintenance of infrastructure projects, sharing risks, and improving efficiency and innovation (Engel et al., 2020). This model contrasts with the BRI, which is more reliant on public financing and may not have the same level of quality incentives. Empirical evidence indicates that in Asia, highly indebted countries exhibit a positive and significant medium-term private investment multiplier. This outcome is supported by several region-specific factors that bolster investor confidence: the adoption of counter-cyclical fiscal policies to sustain macroeconomic stability, the continued prioritisation of infrastructure investments, export-oriented development strategies with integration into global value chains, and access to regional financial safety nets. Additionally, structural reforms and liberalisation efforts, economic diversification across emerging sectors, and growing emphasis on high-tech industries create a conducive environment for enhancing returns on private capital, even under conditions of elevated public debt (Jalles et al., 2024).

Ideally, the relationships between participating countries and the leading states of global or regional infrastructure initiatives should not be zero-sum. Engagement with one initiative should not preclude mutually beneficial cooperation with others, nor should it result in disproportionate dependency or trade asymmetries (Zhao, 2021). However, under the BRI’s ‘17 + 1’ mechanism in Central and Eastern Europe, concerns have emerged over worsening trade imbalances and declining foreign currency reserves. For instance, the EU’s trade deficit with China peaked at EUR 397 billion in 2022 before decreasing to EUR 291 billion in 20233 marking the first significant reduction in a decade. This reflects China’s shift towards domestic consumption and reduced foreign imports under its “dual circulation” model. In response to these structural asymmetries, initiatives like 3SI aim to diversify investment sources and reduce dependence on Chinese financing (Wroblewski & Spinck, 2023). A notable example of dissatisfaction with BRI outcomes is Italy’s withdrawal from the BRI in 2023, driven by persistent trade imbalances—Italy’s exports to China lagged significantly behind its imports, especially relative to non-BRI European economies (Simonov, 2025).

Despite its high foreign liabilities, China’s foreign currency reserves amounted to USD 3.32 trillion4 in 2024 Q3, exceeding the combined reserves of all G7 countries. In comparison, during the same period, the U.S. held about USD 0.04 trillion5, Japan USD 1.25 trillion6, Germany USD 0.38 trillion7, France and Italy USD 0.29 trillion each8, the U.K. USD 0.19 trillion9 and Canada USD 0.13 trillion10. There is, however, a risk that China’s high trade surplus and foreign exchange reserves could diminish if trade tensions with the U.S. intensify. These reserves are essential for stabilising the yuan, not only by enabling the central bank to buy back the currency when it depreciates but also financing international initiatives like the BRI, which often require foreign currency outflows. A decline in reserves would constrain China’s capacity to support BRI projects directly through reduced capital availability and indirectly by weakening national income from net exports. This, in turn, could trigger higher imported inflation, deepen yuan depreciation, and potentially fuel capital flight, further eroding investor confidence (Matsumura, 2019).

The effectiveness of private investment depends not only on market incentives but also on institutional quality and public oversight. In weak institutional settings, highly motivated private firms working alongside poorly monitored public officials can lead to inefficiencies or the misuse of funds, as seen in some PPPs in developing countries. While cost-cutting can improve efficiency, it may also reduce service quality if not properly regulated. To ensure positive welfare outcomes, infrastructure quality should be observable and tied to contractor performance. Where public engineering capacity is strong, greater public sector management may be more appropriate (Glaeser & Poterba, 2020).

Therefore, although the alternative initiatives aim to address the capital flight, market instability, and debt risks associated with the BRI, there is still a risk that they may not attract sufficient private sector investment to fund large-scale infrastructure projects. The private sector consists of profit-maximising business entities that prioritise asset security over the fulfilment of development objectives. In this regard, private investors may tend to be highly selective, favouring lower-risk infrastructure projects that promise good returns on investment but having short investment cycles (Rana, 2021). Consequently, economic infrastructure such as roads, railways, satellite communications, and clean/renewable energy technologies could be more likely to be prioritised over social infrastructure projects like hospitals and universities, which have a lower likelihood of recovering capital costs but provide significant positive externalities to society. In contrast, Chinese companies are observed to be less risk adverse in committing capital to infrastructure projects in countries with volatile economic, regulatory and political environments such as in the Middle East due to China’s strategic interests and generous state backing for state-owned investment and construction companies (Siddiqa & Abbas, 2022; Schacht, 2024).

Under the modern PPP model in emerging Asian economies, private firms are responsible for the entire lifecycle of infrastructure projects, including maintaining existing assets and financing subsequent phases of investment, with the government playing a more limited role in providing loans and guarantees. While PQI emphasises sustainability and quality infrastructure, this model still entails significant financial and operational risks for private firms (Katada, 2020). The requirement for private investors to finance and manage investments exposes them to adverse global macroeconomic conditions, such as unanticipated currency depreciation and GDP growth volatility, resulting in a risk of market failure and declining investor demand for infrastructure projects. To date, the limited success of 3SIIF in attracting investment from private investors, international financial institutions, and the U.S. may reflect either a flawed perception of the region’s investment potential, overly strict funding criteria, or both. In four years, the fund has made only five investments (Wilczek & Rudowski, 2024).

The Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) is a key element of FOIP, considering the development prospects of Africa and in counterbalancing the BRI’s significant influence in the region. Similarly, Africa is the key regional priority of GG, with a target investment deployment of EUR 150 billion (Tagliapietra, 2023). Since some African nations are already encumbered by debt due to BRI11, adding to their debt via ODA loans for infrastructure development would conflict with FOIP’s principle of debt sustainability. Exacerbated by Japanese companies’ risk aversion of investing in unstable territories, Japan pledged USD 20 billion of ODA loans and investments in 2019 to Africa, which was only a third of China’s in the previous year (Grissler & Vargö, 2021).

The persistent failure of G7 countries to meet the 0.7% ODA benchmark (except for Germany) underscores the fiscal and political challenges of traditional development financing. Although PGII’s model of mobilising private investment through blended finance and public guarantees offers a promising alternative, its success will still depend on whether G7 governments are prepared to make credible long-term commitments to backstop private risk—a requirement that is functionally similar to meeting ODA obligations in spirit, if not in structure. Moreover, given that G7 countries’ infrastructure is barely sufficient to support their economic needs or public services, it may be difficult to justify to their taxpayers as to why billions of dollars should be spent on infrastructure projects in developing countries, rather than addressing their own domestic infrastructure needs. In contrast, China had invested USD 755 billion in the BRI, which has more than 140 participating countries to date, in about eight years since its inception (Shah et al., 2022).

In sum, the landscape of infrastructure financing reflects a fundamental divergence between the BRI’s predominantly state-led, loan-based model and the blended finance strategies of its Western and allied counterparts—PGII, GG, FOIP/PQI, and 3SI—which prioritise mobilising private sector capital through public guarantees, grants, and institutional frameworks. While private investment can lead to more socially optimal outcomes by driving efficiency, innovation, and long-term fiscal sustainability, it is also highly sensitive to political, financial, and market risks, limiting its scope in less stable developing contexts. Conversely, China’s strategic use of sovereign-backed loans allows BRI projects to advance in riskier environments but raises concerns over debt sustainability, transparency, and asymmetric trade relations. Despite China’s superior foreign currency reserves, which could enable sustained BRI financing, intensifying trade tensions with the U.S. and an increasingly adverse geopolitical climate could weaken the yuan and erode these reserves. This, in turn, would constrain China’s ability to finance overseas infrastructure projects, particularly those requiring foreign currency outflows. A prudent balance between public and private financing models may offer a more resilient and adaptable approach to global and regional infrastructure development—one that alternative initiatives might be better positioned to deliver in theory (due to their design and intentions) than the predominantly state-driven BRI.

2.4. Trade Policy Orientation

PGII, GG, FOIP/PQI and 3SI operate primarily at the multilateral level, engaging with multiple countries or regions through frameworks based on cooperation, shared standards, and institutional coordination. In contrast, the BRI is largely bilateral in implementation, despite being multilateral in scope.

In bilateral trade agreements, non-member countries are often placed at a disadvantage due to the exclusive nature of tariff preferences granted only to the two signatory countries. For instance, if Country A and Country B sign a bilateral agreement reducing tariffs for each other’s goods, a third country (Country C) exporting similar products to either A or B continues to face the higher non-discriminatory tariff. This discriminatory treatment distorts trade by diverting imports away from more efficient producers like Country C, solely because they are not party to the agreement. Such trade diversion effects are common in bilateral settings, where access to preferential markets is restricted. In contrast, multilateral agreements, such as those governed by the World Trade Organization (WTO), are in principle non-discriminatory under Article I of the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT): tariff concessions granted to one WTO member must be extended to all other WTO members. As a result, trade among WTO members is conducted on a more neutral, efficiency-enhancing basis.

This distinction has important implications for infrastructure and connectivity initiatives. Multilateral approaches—such as those supported by PGII, GG, FOIP/PQI, and 3SI—may foster long-term liberalisation benefits, even for non-member countries. By contrast, infrastructure development agreements rooted in bilateralism—such as many under the BRI—may lead to fragmented outcomes and unequal access to trade and investment flows. Ultimately, national incentives to support multilateral versus bilateral frameworks depend on each country’s factor endowments and political economy trade-offs, including the distribution of producer surplus, consumer surplus, and tariff revenues (Saggi & Yildiz, 2010).

While both bilateral and multilateral initiatives are susceptible to governance failures, the risks of socially inefficient or politically motivated infrastructure projects are often more pronounced under bilateral arrangements. This is due to weaker accountability mechanisms, limited competitive pressure, and asymmetric donor–recipient dynamics that can skew project selection away from local or regional priorities. For instance, the long-term fiscal sustainability of Chinese investments in Croatian shipyards has been questioned and the BRI’s Belgrade–Budapest railway project, while enhancing trade between China and central–northern Europe and southern European ports, does not necessarily contribute to the region’s internal connectivity or north–south routes (Dziewiałtowski-Gintowt, 2019).

2.5. Inclusivity and Regional Integration

It has been argued that the BRI tends to exclude domestic contractors from participating in infrastructure projects, with 89% being Chinese companies, while the U.S., European and Japanese counter-initiatives are allowed for more consideration towards the needs of and benefits to the local economy (Grissler & Vargö, 2021). One example concerns the Gwadar port of Pakistan, which is the key structural link of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor under the BRI. The construction of the Gwadar Eastbay Expressway had a negative impact on the economic well-being of fishermen by restricting their access to the sea, and such developmental decisions were made without adequate local consultation and impact assessments (Shah et al., 2022). Another example concerns the Muse–Mandalay Railroad project in Myanmar, whereby the “consultation process” was generally one-sided (just the presentation of the economic benefits) and only with community representatives rather with than the local communities directly affected by the construction of the railroad (Mark et al., 2020). Such dynamics are not unique to Pakistan and Myanmar and might be observed in other developing countries participating in the BRI due to the favouring of larger economic players who possess strong informal networks with political elites or Chinese investment partners. This poses barriers to local firms without such connections and have no ethically Chinese representatives, exacerbated by limited capital and technical expertise. Thus, the opaque decision-making and limited community engagement of BRI projects may foster NIMBY syndrome rooted in the perceived erosion of local ownership and economic benefit.

Initiatives such as PGII/BDN, GG, FOIP/PQI, and 3SI emphasise integration through a rational-legal perspective, establishing a rule-based order to promote organisational and institutional efficiency. These frameworks encourage participating countries to align with established norms and engage in broad cooperation (Nagy, 2021). This emphasis is grounded in the understanding that promoting quality infrastructure depends heavily on regulatory harmonisation and standardisation. Coordinating across sectors, borders, and jurisdictions requires predictable institutional frameworks that support long-term governance and sustainability goals. Such alignment enables the integration of diverse regional policies into cohesive infrastructure systems, particularly in sectors like energy, water, and transport, and provides the stability needed for innovations such as green technologies to thrive (Blind, 2024). In contrast, the BRI often relies on non-binding memorandums of understanding (MoUs) focused on maintaining sovereignty and process-oriented cooperation toward specific goals, which, in theory at least, allows for some flexibility in adapting to the domestic priorities of host countries (Nagy, 2021). This draws parallels with the BRI’s strong emphasis on cooperation as mentioned in Section 2.1, suggesting a discrepancy between actual implementation and participatory ideals regarding BRI projects.

It can be argued that some of these alternative initiatives may provoke a different kind of NIMBY syndrome, i.e., resistance towards normative expectations such as environmental conditionality, anti-corruption benchmarks, or human rights clauses, which may be perceived by recipients as externally imposed and misaligned with local developmental priorities or institutional capacities. For example, unlike the BRI, which does not impose the requirement of participating countries to adopt liberal democratic norms, the cooperation mechanism for the diffusion of EU’s connectivity policies’ norms under GG appears to be “coercive” and “non-reflexive” in nature, based on an analysis of EU communications and official documents on this issue. Communications of GG’s principles and values to beneficiaries are structured unilaterally, emphasising adherence and conformity. There is a noticeable lack of discussion on the degree to which participating countries are expected to absorb these norms, a shared understanding on what construes fair and sustainable among domestic stakeholders, and how a misalignment of preferences on project terms will be addressed. This suggests that participating countries are limited to a binary choice: to either accept or decline cooperation in EU connectivity projects in the interest of high-quality assurance of the infrastructure to be delivered (Karjalainen, 2023). This highlights an important irony in that both the BRI and GG could face similar criticisms about inclusivity, albeit for different reasons: the BRI for not fulfilling promises of local engagement and GG for enforcing strict compliance to regional standards without enough flexibility to adapt to local contexts.

While China was the ASEAN’s largest external trading partner in 2015, lower tariffs under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), alongside concerns over China’s lending practices and South China Sea disputes, have allowed the valuation of Japan’s infrastructure projects in ASEAN’s six largest economies to surpass China’s by USD 112 billion in 2019. This shift aligns with the FOIP strategy, leveraging the ASEAN’s strategic role in connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Grissler & Vargö, 2021). However, although ASEAN countries are generally supportive of FOIP’s proposed connectivity and economic development policies, the compromise of ASEAN centrality and unity is a concern, i.e., the ASEAN is not playing a central role in the FOIP strategy unlike in the Asia–Pacific, and the necessity of adopting shared values may put some ASEAN countries off from participating. In addition, given that most ASEAN countries are already actively participating in BRI projects, the decoupling of U.S.–China security confrontation from sustainable economic development is preferred (Tomotaka, 2021). Not all EU’s values are also welcomed by ASEAN countries, meaning that GG faces the same type of resistance as FOIP (Garcia & Masselot, 2015). Transitionary allowances are also essential to ensure that the trade-off between economic/energy security and the adoption of green energy or other sustainable development goals is not compromised. Some developing countries may be unable to adhere to the strict principles and standards set out by the other infrastructure initiatives with regard to human rights, environmental sustainability, legislation and anti-corruption frameworks, thus being excluded from participating in them. For example, with regard to environmental protection, the funding of coal-fired power plants is phased out under PGII. However, the BRI provides transitory funding allowances for abated and more efficient coal-fired power plants, which would be more practical for developing countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam where there are significant concerns about the increase in electricity prices and potential power shortages with regard to the phasing out of coal power (Siddiqa & Abbas, 2022; Do & Burke, 2024).

Another challenge of high-quality infrastructure investments is that they demand robust and transparent governance, which often entails lengthy administrative processes and potential reductions in state sovereignty for participating countries. Developing nations may struggle with these complex bureaucratic requirements, hindering their ability to mobilise investments swiftly. In Africa, infrastructure projects are frequently tied to election campaigns, suggesting a mismatch between local time preferences and the extended screening processes necessary for mobilising investments, unlike the faster-paced BRI. Moreover, while the transition to green energy is perceived to be a necessity according to EU norms in the GG strategy, it may be perceived as secondary to the pressing need for basic infrastructure by developing countries, leading to resistance against mandates for minimum green investments. Afrobarometer’s national surveys, conducted across 34 African countries between 2019 and 2021, indicate that slightly more than half of the respondents favour greater local control over the use of external development funds and the management of human rights and socio-political issues within their countries (Heldt, 2023). Moreover, the BRI’s Digital Silk Road has given China a first-mover advantage in setting standards within the digital economy, such as in 5G, the IoT, and smart city development (He, 2022). This established influence could make it challenging for new initiatives to persuade countries to adopt alternative standards before proving their resilience and value.

In sum, inclusivity remains a contested notion across both the BRI and its Western and allied counterparts. In the case of the BRI, while it is rhetorically framed as an open and cooperative initiative, limited local consultation in practice, the dominance of Chinese firms in infrastructure projects and insufficient environmental or social impact assessments have led to tensions over project legitimacy. However, the BRI’s appeal also stems from its relatively flexible terms—fewer policy conditions, faster disbursement, and limited requirements to conform to international standards. This low-conditionality approach can be seen as a form of inclusiveness, particularly for countries that struggle to meet the strict environmental, governance, and human rights criteria imposed by other initiatives. Conversely, initiatives such as PGII/BDN, GG, FOIP/PQI, and 3SI promote inclusiveness through transparent procurement, sustainability standards, and fair access under multilateral or regional frameworks. These features aim to reduce corruption, encourage stakeholder participation, promote green energy and ensure benefits are more evenly distributed. Yet, from the perspective of developing countries, the need to conform to predefined norms and standards may be perceived as intrusive or sovereignty-limiting. Thus, despite their intentions, these initiatives may inadvertently exclude some countries that lack the institutional capacity to comply with such frameworks and hinder the mobilisation of critical infrastructure investments.

2.6. Coordination Mechanisms

While all four initiatives share a commitment to rule-based governance, their degree of institutionalisation varies, with GG and 3SI embedded in EU structures, FOIP/PQI largely Japan-led, and PGII coordinated among G7 states. Unlike the BRI, which is centrally coordinated by China, involving multiple actors can lead to challenges in aligning policy objectives. This may result in more diversified but less targeted infrastructure investments in developing countries. Although the broad objectives of PGII, FOIP/PQI and GG are well-established, specific details on funding sources, coordinating mechanisms, capital allocation, cross-border contractual obligations, and project timelines remain relatively less concrete and cohesive compared to the BRI, even though the latter has also been criticised for the opacity and viability of its operational strategy and implementation guidelines (Shah et al., 2022; Siddiqa & Abbas, 2022; Matsumura, 2019; Tagliapietra, 2023). Diplomatic principles at the strategic level do not always align with the actual implementation of infrastructure projects on the ground. Essentially, the misalignment between the soft power approach (e.g., promoting transformative ambitions through BDN certification) and hard power capacity (e.g., the BDN’s actual ability to influence or change investment decisions) suggests that the market risks may remain unmitigated, and firms may not see guaranteed profits despite the emphasis on transparency and sustainability (Ashbee, 2021). These uncertainties might lead developing countries, which prioritise meeting their infrastructure needs over potential debt repayment challenges, to favour the BRI’s financing approach. The BRI’s straightforward loan structure from Chinese banks, which could be less expensive than market financing with fewer strings attached, offers a clearer and more immediate understanding of the financial terms involved (Heldt, 2023; Gelpern et al., 2022; Shah et al., 2022).

Regarding PGII, trade relations between G7 countries and China are not uniform. For instance, the U.S. is engaged in a trade war with China, while Japan maintains a relatively less confrontational bilateral relationship. While PGII and FOIP emphasise democratic values and high-quality, sustainable projects at their core, they are more reactionary to China’s growing influence through the BRI compared to GG. Given the U.S.’s critical stance toward China, this introduces challenges in reaching consensus among member states on PGII’s and FOIP’s investment-led infrastructure policies, which may serve as competitors or complements to the BRI (Shah et al., 2022). While the U.S. plays a central role in FOIP, especially in safeguarding geoeconomic security in the Indo-Pacific region, the Trump administration appeared to distance itself from leading the economic and infrastructure components of FOIP by failing to implement adequate institutional and funding commitments, leaving Japan to shoulder much of the financial responsibility for implementing digital technology, infrastructure, and energy projects to counter the BRI. Moreover, U.S.–Japan relations were strained by the U.S.’s withdrawal from the TPP in 2017 and demands from the U.S. to reduce Japan’s trade surplus (Matsumura, 2019). Moreover, there is disagreement among G7 and EU member states about which regions—Sub-Saharan Africa, South/Latin America and the Caribbean, or the Western Balkans—should be prioritised for infrastructure investment (Siddiqa & Abbas, 2022; Heldt, 2023).

Bottlenecks may also occur in policy implementation, since multilateral cooperation may imply lower efficiency and more bureaucracy despite enhancing legitimacy and inclusiveness. For example, after its initial launch in 2019, the BDN did not see significant progress or activity for a period of time until the OECD took a more active role in 2021, which revitalised the initiative (Grieger, 2021). Moreover, it has been reported that the BDN was officially “launched” again and its global certification process formally initiated during the OECD Infrastructure Forum in 202412. Despite ambitious targets, 3SIIF’s current total commitments equate to only EUR 928 million, which is below the initial EUR 3–5 billion goal as of mid-2024. The call to increase the current level of commitments to the fund has been met with a lukewarm response from 3SI member states, with Czechia and Slovakia not establishing any formal commitment. Moreover, Poland has an unduly influence on the fund, which undermines the concept of regional cooperation (Wilczek & Rudowski, 2024).

Heterogeneity among 3SI members has historically complicated the goal of economic integration due to diverse monetary systems and economic conditions. As of 2019, only six 3SI members—Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—had adopted the Euro, while others, such as Poland and Croatia, still used domestic currencies. At that time, three members—Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania—remained outside the Schengen area, meaning internal border controls continued to restrict seamless trade and movement13 (Dziewiałtowski-Gintowt, 2019). In comparison, however, BRI countries are even more diverse and lack a unified, rule-based framework, making 3SI participation more institutionally coherent and potentially more advantageous for Central and Eastern Europe.

2.7. Environmental Sustainability

Infrastructure projects that fail to align with the environmental expectations of local communities may also be classified as NIMBY facilities, particularly when adverse pollution is concentrated in specific areas that the physical infrastructure is being constructed in. NIMBY facilities may not only be limited in scope in terms of zoning and siting decisions since, regionally, economic corridors can lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions not only from infrastructure development but also from transportation and industrial production processes. Although direct evidence on local environmental preferences is limited, differences in environmental outcomes between BRI and non-BRI member countries offer an indirect lens to assess such concerns. Empirical studies examining changes in pollution levels, carbon intensity, and the deployment of green technologies provide insight into the extent to which BRI projects have been perceived as environmentally unsustainable or otherwise.

Several studies have shown that BRI member countries fare worse in environmental sustainability compared to non-member countries, and this negative effect is more pronounced for developing countries than developed countries. For example, Elish and Aboelsoud (2024) found a significant increase in ecological footprint consumption (EFP) (as measured by the Global Footprint Network) among BRI member countries, especially African countries, after the implementation of the BRI in 2014, and this is linked to an increase in financial development, implying the lack of sustainable and green finance to ensure that industries adopt cleaner technologies as they grow (Ahmad et al., 2020; Baloch et al., 2019). Although the BRI was found to have improved its member countries’ environmental quality in terms of exporting new green technology and augmenting environmental regulation (indirectly proxied by external health expenditures), the industrial structure effect remained unchanged, i.e., industries were still predominantly using fossil fuels. Moreover, the resource utilisation stage was still the main driver for expanding the scale of economy rather than the production efficiency stage, meaning that scale effects would continue to result in more environmental pollution (Cao et al., 2021). Countries along the Maritime Silk Road were assessed to fare poorly in wastewater treatment and water use efficiency, the development and deployment of renewable energy sources, the coverage of marine protected areas, support for marine science research, and the preservation of ecosystem services and genetic resources (Chen et al., 2023).

The pollution haven theory is validated by Ali and Wang (2023), who found that upstream countries in global value chains (GVCs) are likely to relocate their polluting industries to the lower stream of GVCs, where most BRI economies are located. Moreover, improvement in environmental quality is only evident for developed economies as they are able to leverage their more energy-efficient and less carbon-intensive production technology in assemblages during the final stage of production, producing cleaner intermediate inputs relative to their imported counterparts, i.e., a pollution halo effect. In contrast, environmental quality deteriorates for emerging and developing BRI economies.

However, other studies suggest that the BRI has contributed to improving environmental quality in participating countries, particularly in developing regions. In Africa, the BRI participation of developing countries has been linked to substantial reductions in the carbon intensity of energy-intensive sectors compared to both developed and non-participating countries (Dusengemungu et al., 2023). The disparity in impact between developed and developing countries may arise from the fact that developed nations are less likely to participate in the BRI, potentially missing out on the additional green benefits it offers through increased technical efficiency in industrial structures and technological innovation in the harnessing of renewable energy. Moreover, developing nations often start with lower baselines in terms of green energy infrastructure and tend to have higher levels of energy consumption and pollution. As a result, the potential for significant environmental improvements in developing countries may be greater, leading to more pronounced returns to scale in terms of environmental quality improvements compared to developed nations. An analysis of 65 BRI countries revealed a 34.5% reduction in energy consumption and a 36.4% decrease in carbon emissions, attributed to technology transfer regarding the reduction in fossil fuel usage and the optimisation of energy structures (Jiang et al., 2021).

Moreover, the BRI has significantly promoted the intra-industry trade of Environmental Goods (EGs), especially in renewable energy technologies and pollution-monitoring apparatus. The environmental benefits of the BRI were particularly pronounced for developing participants—greater for vertical intra-industry trade (products with similar attributes but different qualities) than horizontal intra-industry trade (products with different attributes but similar qualities) (Zhou et al., 2024). Based on two counterfactual scenarios, Yan et al. (2024) found that shifting production from local producers to Chinese multinational enterprises could abate 29.06 million tonnes of carbon emissions, and by relocating production to countries with cleaner energy structures rather than importing from China, global emissions could be reduced by 165 million tonnes.

Although the construction of six major economic corridors improves trade facilitation by shortening trade time and reducing trade costs, which in turn promotes economic growth in BRI member countries, a higher level of emissions may ensue. However, Xiang et al. (2024) found that the magnitude and direction of the environmental effect vary substantially across economic corridors. For example, although five of the economic corridors are associated with an increase in total greenhouse emissions, with the China–Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC) having the largest increase and the New Eurasian Land Bridge (ELB) having the smallest increase, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is associated with a decrease in total greenhouse emissions. Emission elasticity, i.e., the percentage change in emissions resulting from a 1% increase in GDP, is greater than 1 for CO₂ and N₂O within the China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC), CICPEC, and the China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC), indicating that emissions in these regions are rising faster than economic output. However, in most BRI member countries, the rate of economic growth exceeds the rate of emissions growth, i.e., emission elasticity is less than 1. Moreover, four countries that are located in the ELB—primarily developed economies—have managed to achieve both an increase in GDP and a reduction in emissions under trade facilitation. Although the decoupling of absolute emissions from economic growth remains limited to developed countries, BRI trade facilitation generally leads to improved emission intensity (emissions produced per unit of GDP) across most member countries, which constitutes a notable environmental achievement.

In sum, while some BRI projects have triggered NIMBY-type resistance due to environmental degradation or insufficient consultation, evidence also shows that BRI participation has, in certain contexts, contributed to measurable environmental improvements—particularly in developing countries through the deployment of green infrastructure under the Green Silk Road. This suggests that environmental NIMBYism related to the BRI may be context-dependent and potentially mitigated by green investment offsets. By contrast, alternative initiatives from the West, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific, despite their stronger environmental governance standards, have yet to demonstrate equivalent environmental gains at scale. As Hussain et al. (2021) note, institutional factors such as political stability, the rule of law, and corruption control are critical for enhancing renewable energy investment. Trade openness can also mitigate the adverse effects of weak governance. A potential comparative advantage for these emerging initiatives, therefore, lies not only in enforcing high environmental standards, but in helping partner countries move from reducing emission intensity to achieving absolute emission reductions. This would require targeted reforms to improve environmental governance and reshape consumption and production structures in developing economies.

3. Measuring the Value of Quality Soft Infrastructure Elements

The demand for hard infrastructure—such as expressways, ports, and power grids—is relatively straightforward to estimate since it directly supports societal and economic functions. In contrast, the benefits of soft infrastructure are less tangible but likewise essential in driving economic activity, fostering innovation, and enhancing well-being, as outlined in Section 2.1. See

Table 2. Detailed comparison between global and regional infrastructure initiatives.

Infrastructure Initiative	BRI	PGII	GG	FOIP and PQI	3SI
Regional focus	Global (with strongest operational concentration in Asia, Africa, and increasingly Latin America)	Global (with explicit strategic orientation toward the Global South, i.e., Africa, Latin America, Asia, Oceania)	Africa (greatest priority), Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Balkans, Asia, Oceania	Indo-Pacific: spanning the eastern coast of Africa, Indian Ocean, and Pacific Ocean rim, connecting Asia (greatest priority) and Africa	Central–Eastern Europe: Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas
Key objectives	- Infrastructure construction and connectivity - Trade facilitation and regional economic integration - Energy security and resource access - Digital connectivity (Digital Silk Road) - Health cooperation (Health Silk Road) - Environmental cooperation (Green Silk Road) - Scientific collaboration (Space/Polar Silk Roads)	- Infrastructure construction and sustainable connectivity - Climate resilience and green energy transition - Health security - Gender equality and equity - Digitalisation - Domestic job creation and social expenditure - Supply chain resilience	- Infrastructure and sustainable connectivity - Climate resilience and green energy transition - Health and food security - Transport - Education and research - Digitalisation - Supply chain resilience	FOIP: - Rule of law and freedom of navigation - Maritime security and regional peace - Economic prosperity via regional connectivity - Promotion of free trade and open supply chains PQI: infrastructure construction and connectivity (transportation, water management, energy)	- Improving infrastructure competitiveness from cross-border and macro-regional connectivity, commerciality, and complementarity across energy, transport, and digital sectors in Central and Eastern Europe - Enhancing energy security and diversification (e.g., LNG corridors)
Key features	“Standard” and hard infrastructure; emphasises openness, inclusiveness, and fair trade in official rhetoric; however, project-level implementation has raised concerns about transparency, competitive procurement, and debt sustainability in practice	“Quality” and soft infrastructure alongside hard infrastructure; prioritise fairness, good governance, transparency and accountability; promote open competition; life-cycle cost considerations and debt sustainability, including strong emphasis on environmental and social safeguards and normative conditionality; facilitate free trade and regional integration by building regulatory environments and institutional capacity			Hard infrastructure; aims to garner political support and strengthen transatlantic ties for regionally strategic infrastructure projects
Investment policy	Primarily funded by Chinese state-owned banks; includes multilateral institutions like the AIIB, CDB, and EXIM China; a notable portion of loans are tied to the procurement of domestic inputs	Uses blended finance to mobilise private sector investments through various development finance tools, e.g., DFC, USAID, EXIM U.S., MCC, and USTDA	Combines EU public grants, soft ODA loans, and guarantees with private investments; mobilised through instruments, e.g., NDICI, EFSD+, IPA III, Interreg, InvestEU, and Horizon Europe	Relies mainly on soft ODA loans via institutions like JBIC and JOIN; a notable portion of loans is tied to the procurement of domestic inputs; promotes PPPs via tools like JICA’s PSIF	Supported by member state contributions to the 3SIIF, as well as EU public funds and private sector investments
Trade policy	Mainly bilateral engagements; process-oriented, non-binding MoUs and sovereignty-centric perspective that includes cooperation on specific goals	Primarily multilateral engagements; rule-based order, rational-legal perspective to promote organisational and institutional efficiency that includes broad cooperation
Inclusivity	Debatable as developing countries such as Pakistan and Myanmar have complained about the lack of local engagement in infrastructure projects, contrary to BRI rhetorics; however, having fewer conditions attached to loans and investments, and not having to adhere to regional standards and principles, could be perceived as inclusive	Debatable as although a fair, transparent and standardised system of international trade and investment rules can foster inclusiveness of economies, participating countries may feel that their sovereignty is compromised by having to accept the diffusion of these norms, regulations and standards			Inclusive but largely internal to the EU as the central goal is to eliminate development differences between 3SI-12 (new EU states) and non-3SI-12 countries (older, more developed EU states)
Coordination	Multilevel principal coordination mechanism with more than 140 participating countries to date, but might be offset by institutional heterogeneity across these countries	Despite the presence of institutional frameworks, actual coordination remains fragmented due to the lack of a principal coordination mechanism, different geopolitical interests, trade relationships with China, and internal disagreements over geographic and policy priorities
Economic and geopolitical stance	To foster economic interdependence and expand China’s geopolitical influence through infrastructure financing, connectivity, and soft power diplomacy	Framed as a direct strategic countermeasure to BRI to promote a transparent, high-quality alternative to Chinese infrastructure financing	Primarily an EU-driven strategy for projecting normative influence; framed as an indirect countermeasure to BRI	Partially direct counter to BRI—less explicitly confrontational than PGII, but shares strategic goals	Primarily a regional infrastructure initiative but has increasingly been framed as a soft counterbalance to China’s growing influence in Central and Eastern Europe

for detailed highlights of the comparison between the infrastructure initiatives.

Since private investment plays a central role in financing non-BRI infrastructure initiatives (Section 2.3), their success depends heavily on the ability to attract capital aligned with sustainable development goals, including improvements in transparency (Section 2.2) and environmental sustainability (Section 2.7). Moreover, the diffusion of international norms and standards may require host countries to accept certain limitations on policy autonomy or regulatory sovereignty (Section 2.5). While such trade-offs are rarely quantified in traditional cost–benefit analysis (CBA), they can meaningfully affect public acceptance and long-term outcomes. Therefore, capturing these intangible preferences, particularly when evaluating initiatives like GG that explicitly promote norm-diffusing connectivity, can help estimate the full social value of infrastructure investments. We briefly illustrate the economic theory of willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) behind the use of stated choice experiments to estimate demand for specific aspects of soft infrastructure such as certified and transparent sustainable investment products (Section 3.1), as well as adopting international norms and standards (Section 3.2).

While WTP is the highest amount that the individual is willing to give to obtain a chosen good, WTA is a mirror opposite of the least amount of compensation that individual requires to give a chosen good or accept harm (Boardman et al., 2018). For example, in the case of air pollution, WTP is the maximum amount an individual would be willing to pay to obtain clean air while WTA would be the minimum compensation an individual would require to forego clean air and accept polluted air. When properly estimated, WTP and WTA aid CBA in valuing non-market goods such as clean air, safety, biodiversity or even preferences for sustainability itself in monetary terms. Although proven to be useful in the applied policy setting, there are certain academic debates around the concept and, therefore, implications of the use of WTP and WTA in CBA. For example, as presented by Kahneman et al. (1991), cognitive biases such as endowment effect and loss aversion might explain the observable disparity rather than equivalence between WTP and WTA. As such, cognitive biases might distort the values being measured, and hence, it should be viewed as approximate values to aid policymaking in tandem with other considerations instead of being a single definitive tool. Other academic debates surrounding WTP and WTA are essentially rooted in the general critique of the stated preference methods of valuation.

There are varied preferences for sustainability on firm or even country levels given the unique circumstances in which all agents are aspiring for higher standards of living. If developing countries are ever to converge with developed countries, then increased pollution is unavoidable at some point in time of the development. As such, an important thing to determine is the optimal level of pollution that a country/firm is willing to endure while simultaneously meeting its economic objectives. Similarly, given the trade-offs involved in different infrastructure financing models and regional approaches, it is equally important to assess the optimal scale and type of high-quality infrastructure investments that balance development goals with sustainability and institutional resilience.

3.1. WTP for Certified Sustainable Investment Products

The empirical findings by Gutsche and Ziegler (2019) show that private investors exhibit measurable WTP for sustainable investment attributes, trading off lower financial returns for higher ESG performance. This logic parallels the positioning of infrastructure initiatives such as PGII/BDN, GG, FOIP/PQI and 3SI, where higher-quality infrastructure investments may come with greater scrutiny, slower mobilisation, and stricter governance standards but are supported by value-aligned public and private stakeholders.

In stated choice experiments, participants are presented with a series of choice sets, each containing multiple alternatives that share the same attributes but differ in their attribute levels. For example, in Gutsche and Ziegler (2019), participants selected from several fixed-interest sustainable investment products (with an investment horizon of three years) that all had the same core attributes—such as the type of financial provider, annual nominal interest rate, consideration of sustainability criteria, and presence of transparency logos—but varied in the specific levels of these attributes (e.g., 1.3% vs. 1.7% interest rate, certified vs. not certified sustainability criteria, a transparency logo issued by an NGO vs. issued by the state).

The utility that respondent i derives from investment alternative j can be expressed as

$$U_{ijm}={\beta }_i^{\prime }{x}_{ijm}+{\epsilon }_{ijm}$$

(1)

Here, $x_{ijm}$ is the attribute vector of alternative j, ${\beta }_i^{\prime }$ is the vector of individual-specific taste coefficients, and ${\epsilon }_{ijm}$ is the unobserved error term. Non-financial attributes (e.g., sustainability criteria) are modelled as random, while financial attributes (e.g., interest rates) are fixed. To model unobserved heterogeneity, the coefficient for non-financial attribute k is expressed as

$${\beta }_{ik}={\beta }_k+{\sigma }_k{u}_{ik}$$

(2)

where ${\beta }_k$ is the mean population preference for attribute k, and ${\sigma }_k{u}_{ik}$ represents the individual-specific deviation from the mean.

Each respondent completes M = 6 discrete choice sets, selecting one fixed-interest investment product out of J = 4 alternatives per set. These observed choices are used to estimate a mixed logit model using Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) estimation:

• Make initial guesses of ${\beta }_k$ and ${\sigma }_k$ for each attribute k.
• For each individual i, simulate 1000 random draws of their possible taste coefficients using Equation (2), where $v_{ik}$~N(0, 1) (only for the random non-financial attributes).
• For each draw, compute utility $U_{ijm}$ by multiplying the drawn ${\beta }_{ik}$ values (for random attributes) and fixed ${\beta }_k$ values (for financial attributes) with the observed attribute levels in $x_{ijm}$.
• Incorporate observed heterogeneity via interaction terms between non-financial attributes and individual characteristics (e.g., strong “warm glow” feelings from making sustainable investments, high environmental awareness, or low perceived risk of sustainable investments).
• Compute the probability of choosing the observed alternative in each set using the logit formula $P_{ijm}={\displaystyle \frac{\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p} (U_{ijm})}{{\sum }_{k=1}^J \mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p} (U_{ikm})}}$.
• Compute the joint probability over all M choice sets, and average over 1000 draws to obtain the simulated likelihood for individual i.
• Iteratively update ${\beta }_k$, ${\sigma }_k$, and the fixed interaction coefficients to maximise the likelihood of the observed choices across all individuals.

The mean WTP represents the financial attribute adjustment (e.g., interest rate reduction) required to maintain constant utility when a non-financial attribute (e.g., sustainability criteria) marginally improves. It is derived as the ratio of the partial derivative of utility with respect to the non-financial attribute to that of the financial attribute. Unlike traditional stated choice experiments where cost negatively enters utility, financial return positively affects utility. Therefore, a more negative WTP implies a higher willingness to sacrifice financial return for more sustainable or transparent investment attributes.

3.2. WTA on International Values, Norms, and Standards of Connectivity

The same stated choice experiment framework and mixed logit model may also be adapted to measure people’s preferences for adopting international norms and standards at the expense of some degree of state sovereignty or local control, which could be relevant for the alternative initiatives like PGII, GG, FOIP, and 3SI. The utility function of individual i choosing alternative initiative j in choice set m can be written as

$$U_{ijm}={\alpha }_1{G}_j-{\alpha }_2{S}_j+\beta F_j+{\mu }_i+{\epsilon }_{ijm}$$

(3)

where ${\alpha }_1{G}_j$ is the utility gained from adopting a given level of international norms and standards $G_j$, ${\alpha }_2{S}_j$ is the disutility from losing a given level of state sovereignty $S_j$, $\beta F_j$ is the utility gained from a given level of infrastructure funding $F_j$, ${\mu }_i$ captures individual-specific unobserved preference heterogeneity (e.g., political beliefs, national pride) and ${\epsilon }_{ijs}$ is the idiosyncratic error term.

To measure the compensating variation required to hold utility constant, i.e., the infrastructure funding required to make an individual indifferent between preserving sovereignty and accepting international norms and standards, the WTA expression can be written as

$$WT{A}_{G_j-S_j}=-{\displaystyle \frac{{\alpha }_{1G_j}-{\alpha }_{2S_j}}{\beta }}$$

(4)

If the benefit from adopting international norms and standards outweighs sovereignty loss (i.e., ${\alpha }_1{G}_j$ > ${\alpha }_2{S}_j$), then WTA is negative, meaning that less infrastructure funding is required to incentivise the adoption. In contrast, if ${\alpha }_1{G}_j$ < ${\alpha }_2{S}_j$, then WTA is positive, meaning more infrastructure funding is required to compensate for the perceived loss of sovereignty. These preferences, when aggregated, can be used to infer broader country-level attitudes toward sovereignty trade-offs.

4. Discussion and Conclusions

In an era marked by increasing geopolitical fragmentation, digitalisation, and a heightened awareness of human equality, the 21st century demands more than just physical development. It also calls for the enhancement of societal well-being, particularly in developing economies. Alternative infrastructure initiatives like PGII, GG, FOIP/PQI, and 3SI—driven by Western, European, and East Asian powers—aim to promote multilateralism and competition in delivering quality cross-border critical infrastructure. These efforts emphasise high standards of transparency, governance, sustainability and the diversification of risks in areas where China’s BRI has traditionally fallen short. Yet, these initiatives involve trade-offs related to efficiency, coordination, inclusivity, and incentives. Given these trade-offs, we cannot claim that any single model is superior to another in terms of achieving welfare-enhancing outcomes and bridging development gaps.

As the BRI maintains its first-mover advantage with well-established physical and digital links, and shows improvements in addressing its deficiencies, it exerts pressure on newer initiatives to truly offer competitive advantages to developing economies and to demonstrate a robust financing framework. Moreover, the BRI already boasts approximately USD 1.175 trillion (Nedopil, 2025) in its extensive construction and investment portfolio while other initiatives are slow to pick up the pace (see Table 1). Given the pressing needs for economic growth and energy security in developing countries, it is important to ask the following: to what extent do the risks of substandard construction/project abandonment, non-performing loans, and disruption to local communities’ lives constitute an acceptable trade-off for BRI-funded infrastructure projects? This is a classic NIMBY dilemma, which is not exclusive to the BRI. All major infrastructure initiatives must navigate complex trade-offs, requiring consensus-building and the alignment of incentives across multiple stakeholders: national governments, local communities, public funders, and private investors. While initiatives like the BRI and its alternatives can promote connectivity and improve living standards through geopolitical and economic soft power, they also entail risks related to financing, regulatory alignment, and the potential erosion of local sovereignty. These dynamics inevitably produce winners and losers. It is therefore essential to evaluate such projects through a Kaldor–Hicks lens, ensuring that the benefits to winners are, in principle, sufficient to compensate for the losses of those adversely affected.

It can be argued that the conflict between the adverse impacts of NIMBY facilities on local communities hosting them and societies at large demanding economic growth comes from China’s inexperience in dealing with legal frameworks that are different from its own (Quah & Iuldashov, 2022). While the US and EU led initiatives have yet to prove their competitiveness in the global market of infrastructure initiatives, they benefit from longer histories of domestic infrastructure development and facility siting with a variety of legal frameworks (Fair, 2025; European Commission, 2014). However, these come at the cost of slower project rollout due to multilateral cooperation and coordination, stricter standards, transparency requirements, and bureaucratic procedures, which diminishes the original purpose of these initiatives—to bring about economic prosperity swiftly by connecting developed and developing economies. For many developing countries, the ideal approach likely lies somewhere between these extremes—ensuring both timely financing and implementation (which can only happen with robust coordinating mechanisms, project timelines, and reliable capital sources) while safeguarding quality, sustainability, and fairness. Fairness in this context can be meaningfully assessed through CBA using WTP or WTA methods. These tools help quantify both social welfare outcomes and the net present value of projects, enabling more inclusive and evidence-based infrastructure decisions. The BRI and other initiatives will need to co-evolve to better meet the needs in the developing world and this could be a unique opportunity for innovation in conflict resolution schemes that mitigate the NIMBY syndrome. Ultimately, whichever initiative is more capable of addressing NIMBY issues together with local authorities and communities, along with a practical roadmap of how the infrastructure projects will be financed and implemented, will be able to secure a larger share in the global market of infrastructure projects. As such, the competition between infrastructure initiatives is a positive development for the countries in need of such investments.

When the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimated that a USD 26 trillion bill of infrastructure is needed in Asia from 2016 to 2030, this sum was adjusted to factor climate change impact (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2017). In fact, the total amount pledged by all major Western and allied infrastructure initiatives combined remains substantially below the estimated infrastructure investment needs for Asia alone—let alone the global requirements. There is a wide array of investments needed such as the building of land and maritime networks, but the most important one by far is the energy sector. Most of the developing countries still primarily rely on fossil fuels to generate energy to sustain their economic growth momentum. This will continue to be the case in the foreseeable future despite the enormous social cost of carbon when both climate change impact and public health costs are taken into account. The transitioning of the global economy to meet sustainable development goals is not achievable with a one-size-fits-all solution. The developing world needs a wide range of policies, technologies, and funds to fulfil both environmental commitments and economic growth objectives. China, the US, EU, Japan or other countries are unable to meet these needs single-handedly. Developing countries will need all of these initiatives as potential infrastructure financing options to assess and pick what works best for them and their populace. The presence of competition is ultimately beneficial for all sides.

Competition also creates opportunities to cooperate in areas where cooperation brings about mutual benefits. One of such areas is addressing climate change and achieving sustainable development goals. Even with heterogeneous preferences at the national level, infrastructure projects under the BRI and alternative initiatives can be complementary rather than purely competitive at the regional level. As shown in the literature and grounded case studies (beyond official rhetoric), the BRI and initiatives such as PGII, GG, and FOIP often embody contrasting models—state-led versus market-driven, speed versus quality, hard versus soft infrastructure, etc. Each approach has its respective strengths and trade-offs. State-led financing under the BRI can provide rapid capital deployment, which may complement the quality assurance and private sector participation emphasised in Western and allied infrastructure initiatives. The implementation of the PPP model, which is still maturing in many developing economies, could benefit from such synergies. In the case of 3SI, opportunities for coordination are evident—for instance, the proposed Three Seas Digital Highway aligns with China’s Digital Silk Road; academic collaboration has emerged among universities along the New Silk Road; and the Belgrade–Budapest high-speed rail, a BRI project, could be linked to strategic 3SI projects such as Rail Baltica, enhancing regional connectivity and co-financing potential. Moreover, while clear differences exist today, these may narrow over time. As mentioned, the BRI has already expanded beyond hard infrastructure through its Digital Silk Road, Green Silk Road, and Health Silk Road, signalling an effort to catch up to the governance, sustainability, and inclusiveness standards promoted by other initiatives. As such, the potential for convergence and mutual learning among initiatives suggests that future complementarities could become even more pronounced, especially in addressing the evolving needs of developing economies. Ultimately, the role of global and regional infrastructure initiatives is to coordinate and trigger sustainable development within their respective spheres while collectively contributing to efforts in narrowing the global infrastructure gap. The whole world stands to benefit if such initiatives prove to be successful in addressing the global infrastructure gap.

Future studies could offer empirical answers to the following questions, which are complex and not easily resolved: Could the strict conditions for sustainable development imposed by alternative initiatives and the reliance on attracting sufficient private sector investment impede the development process? How would these alternative initiatives balance the need to simultaneously ensure mutual cooperation by engaging local stakeholders in the decision-making process and for the host countries to absorb a certain extent of values, norms and standards of the political and economic unions involved to ensure quality infrastructure? Would economic asymmetries between China and BRI-participating countries prove to be harmful in the long run? Is a non-zero-sum game possible to ensure that developed countries in these initiatives do not benefit purely at the expense of developing countries, considering the relatively less cohesive presence of a central coordinating body or unified leadership to ensure funding commitment compared to the BRI? With the backdrop of the U.S.–China trade war, what is the outlook for the financial sustainability of the BRI? Given the overlap in regional coverage, is there room for these initiatives to coexist and perhaps complement the BRI, despite geopolitical tensions?

Overall, competition between the BRI, PGII, GG and others is a good thing, as it can encourage all initiatives to strive for excellence, promote innovation and ultimately lead to better infrastructure projects and more economic development for the countries involved. At the same time, competition inadvertently creates conflicts of interest, undermines cooperation and collaboration in critical areas, and hinders the possibility to effectively achieve shared goals and objectives of both initiatives such as sustainable development and decarbonisation. It is important for both initiatives to strike a balance between healthy competition and cooperation and learn from each other in order to maximise their positive impact on economic development and infrastructure in developing countries.

However, initiatives such as the BRI, PGII, GG, FOIP, and 3SI are not make or break for developing countries. Ultimately, the economic future of the developing world is in its own hands, and much will depend on its own capability to manage the competing needs of its societies amidst a rapidly changing global landscape. Participating countries need to be pragmatic and act in their own interest to benefit the most from the competition. History has proven that even smaller countries could negotiate bilaterally with China and successfully achieve better offers. This means that each country needs to be conducting better cost–benefit analyses to estimate the demand for both tangible and intangible infrastructure elements and understanding their trade-offs to guide government spending. Such research would help ensure that investments are neither under- nor overspent, allowing these initiatives to stand as worthy competitors (or even partners) to the BRI in bridging the infrastructure gap between developed and developing economies.