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Article

Board Structure and Executive Compensation for R&D Spending in Innovative Companies Amid COVID-19

by
Muhammad Abrar-ul-haq
Department of Economics and Finance, College of Business Administration, University of Bahrain, Zallaq P.O. Box 32038, Bahrain
J. Risk Financ. Manag. 2025, 18(2), 69; https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020069
Submission received: 5 January 2025 / Revised: 24 January 2025 / Accepted: 27 January 2025 / Published: 1 February 2025
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bridging Financial Integrity and Sustainability)

Abstract

Innovation has played a vital role in continuing business operations worldwide amid the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. Innovation is critical for the success and survival of global organizations. Due to the risky long-term nature of innovation, executives with decision-making power may act cynically. Such pessimistic actions become normal when executive compensation is based on the firm’s short-term outcomes. Therefore, the current research examines the effect of executive compensation on research and development (R&D) investment using data from the world’s top 48 innovative companies in Australia. The proposed model was tested using Smart-PLS (v.3.2.8). The findings indicate that board composition significantly and positively affects R&D investment. Likewise, the long-term composition of executives has a positive effect, whereas short-term executive compensation has a negative effect on R&D. Hence, this research suggests that to increase innovation, firms should control the myopic actions of top management by orientating their compensation toward long-term innovation.
Keywords: R&D spending; board composition; long-term incentives; cash compensation; Smart-PLS R&D spending; board composition; long-term incentives; cash compensation; Smart-PLS

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MDPI and ACS Style

Abrar-ul-haq, M. Board Structure and Executive Compensation for R&D Spending in Innovative Companies Amid COVID-19. J. Risk Financ. Manag. 2025, 18, 69. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020069

AMA Style

Abrar-ul-haq M. Board Structure and Executive Compensation for R&D Spending in Innovative Companies Amid COVID-19. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2025; 18(2):69. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020069

Chicago/Turabian Style

Abrar-ul-haq, Muhammad. 2025. "Board Structure and Executive Compensation for R&D Spending in Innovative Companies Amid COVID-19" Journal of Risk and Financial Management 18, no. 2: 69. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020069

APA Style

Abrar-ul-haq, M. (2025). Board Structure and Executive Compensation for R&D Spending in Innovative Companies Amid COVID-19. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 18(2), 69. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020069

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