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Article

Adapting to Multipolarity: Insights from Iterated Game Theory Simulations—A Preliminary Study on Hypothetical Optimal Global Cooperation

by
Panagiotis E. Petrakis
*,
Anna-Maria Kanzola
and
Ioannis Lomis
Department of Economics, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 157 72 Athens, Greece
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
J. Risk Financ. Manag. 2024, 17(8), 370; https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17080370
Submission received: 6 July 2024 / Revised: 14 August 2024 / Accepted: 17 August 2024 / Published: 19 August 2024
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Globalization and Economic Integration)

Abstract

The global geopolitical landscape is characterized by the rise of new powers and a shift toward multipolarity. This study examines the impact of multipolarity on international cooperation using an iterated game theory approach, particularly the classic prisoner’s dilemma, extended to a multiplayer setting. This effort can be regarded as a preliminary study of hypothetical optimal global cooperation. The main hypothesis is that an increase in the number of large countries in the international system will lead to higher levels of cooperation. Our simulation approach confirmed this. Our findings extend to the conclusion that multipolarity, under appropriate cultural and value systems, can foster new economic development and fair competition. Furthermore, we emphasize the importance of evolving strategies and cooperative dynamics in a multipolar world, contributing to discussions on foreign economic policy integration, sustainability, and managing vulnerabilities among great powers. The study underscores the necessity of strategic frameworks and international institutions in promoting global stability and cooperation amidst the complexities of multipolarity.
Keywords: multipolarity; game theory; prisoner’s dilemma; international relationships; trade; institutions; strategic thinking multipolarity; game theory; prisoner’s dilemma; international relationships; trade; institutions; strategic thinking

Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Petrakis, P.E.; Kanzola, A.-M.; Lomis, I. Adapting to Multipolarity: Insights from Iterated Game Theory Simulations—A Preliminary Study on Hypothetical Optimal Global Cooperation. J. Risk Financ. Manag. 2024, 17, 370. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17080370

AMA Style

Petrakis PE, Kanzola A-M, Lomis I. Adapting to Multipolarity: Insights from Iterated Game Theory Simulations—A Preliminary Study on Hypothetical Optimal Global Cooperation. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2024; 17(8):370. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17080370

Chicago/Turabian Style

Petrakis, Panagiotis E., Anna-Maria Kanzola, and Ioannis Lomis. 2024. "Adapting to Multipolarity: Insights from Iterated Game Theory Simulations—A Preliminary Study on Hypothetical Optimal Global Cooperation" Journal of Risk and Financial Management 17, no. 8: 370. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17080370

APA Style

Petrakis, P. E., Kanzola, A.-M., & Lomis, I. (2024). Adapting to Multipolarity: Insights from Iterated Game Theory Simulations—A Preliminary Study on Hypothetical Optimal Global Cooperation. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 17(8), 370. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17080370

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