Next Article in Journal
Riverside Greenway in Urban Environment: Residents’ Perception and Use of Greenways along the Huangpu River in Shanghai, China
Previous Article in Journal
Polydatin Beneficial Effects in Zebrafish Larvae Undergoing Multiple Stress Types
 
Search for Articles:
Title / Keyword
Author / Affiliation
Journal
Article Type
 
 
Advanced Search
 
Section
Special Issue
Volume
Issue
Number
Page
Journals
IJERPH
Volume 18
Issue 3
10.3390/ijerph18031119
ijerph-logo
Submit to this Journal Review for this Journal Edit a Special Issue
► Article Menu

Article Menu

share announcement question_answer thumb_up
...
textsms
...
Article

On Conflicts between Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and the Right to Life and Health Based on a Stackelberg Game

by
Chunming Xu
1 and
Debao Zhu
2,*
1
Shanghai International College of Intellectual Property, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
2
School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18(3), 1119; https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18031119
Received: 25 November 2020 / Revised: 15 January 2021 / Accepted: 20 January 2021 / Published: 27 January 2021
View Full-Text Download PDF
Browse Figures

Abstract

To solve the conflict between pharmaceutical patent protection and the right to life, health and increased patient satisfaction, drug prices can be regulated by levying an excess profit tax. An optimal tax strategy was formulated that not only could lower drug prices and improve public health and welfare, but also considers companies’ earnings. The strategy was based on the Stackelberg game theory as a bi-level mathematical model. In the model, the government is the leader, with patient satisfaction as the main goal, and pharmaceutical companies are the followers, with maximum drug revenue as the goal. The results show that under the premise of ensuring sufficient incentives for patent holders, the optimized tax on excess profit can effectively compensate for the shortcomings of pharmaceutical patent protection, alleviate the failure of market regulation of drug prices, improve patient satisfaction, and increase total social welfare. View Full-Text
Keywords: pharmaceutical patent; public health; excess profit tax; Stackelberg game pharmaceutical patent; public health; excess profit tax; Stackelberg game
►▼ Show Figures

Figure 1

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited
SciFeed

Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Xu, C.; Zhu, D. On Conflicts between Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and the Right to Life and Health Based on a Stackelberg Game. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 1119. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18031119

AMA Style

Xu C, Zhu D. On Conflicts between Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and the Right to Life and Health Based on a Stackelberg Game. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2021; 18(3):1119. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18031119

Chicago/Turabian Style

Xu, Chunming, and Debao Zhu. 2021. "On Conflicts between Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and the Right to Life and Health Based on a Stackelberg Game" International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 18, no. 3: 1119. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18031119

Find Other Styles
Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Metrics

Article Access Map by Country/Region

1
Back to TopTop