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Article

An Attack on Zawadzki’s Quantum Authentication Scheme

1
Departamento de Matemática Aplicada a la Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, 28040 Madrid, Spain
2
MACIMTE, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 28933 Madrid, Spain
3
Department of Mathmatical Sciences, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL 33431, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Authors names listed alphabetically.
Academic Editor: Ivan B. Djordjevic
Entropy 2021, 23(4), 389; https://doi.org/10.3390/e23040389
Received: 29 January 2021 / Revised: 22 March 2021 / Accepted: 23 March 2021 / Published: 25 March 2021
Identification schemes are interactive cryptographic protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of their identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decides whether or not it comes from the intended prover. Given the growing interest in quantum computation, it is indeed desirable to have explicit designs for achieving user identification through quantum resources. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki. We discuss the applicability of the theoretical impossibility results from Lo, Colbeck and Buhrman et al. and formally prove that the protocol must necessarily be insecure. Moreover, to better illustrate our insecurity claim, we present an attack on Zawadzki’s protocol and show that by using a simple strategy an adversary may indeed obtain relevant information on the shared identification secret. Specifically, through the use of the principal of conclusive exclusion on quantum measurements, our attack geometrically reduces the key space resulting in the claimed logarithmic security being reduced effectively by a factor of two after only three verification attempts. View Full-Text
Keywords: quantum identity authentication; private equality tests; conclusive exclusion quantum identity authentication; private equality tests; conclusive exclusion
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MDPI and ACS Style

González-Guillén, C.E.; González Vasco, M.I.; Johnson, F.; Pérez del Pozo, Á.L. An Attack on Zawadzki’s Quantum Authentication Scheme. Entropy 2021, 23, 389. https://doi.org/10.3390/e23040389

AMA Style

González-Guillén CE, González Vasco MI, Johnson F, Pérez del Pozo ÁL. An Attack on Zawadzki’s Quantum Authentication Scheme. Entropy. 2021; 23(4):389. https://doi.org/10.3390/e23040389

Chicago/Turabian Style

González-Guillén, Carlos E., María Isabel González Vasco, Floyd Johnson, and Ángel L. Pérez del Pozo. 2021. "An Attack on Zawadzki’s Quantum Authentication Scheme" Entropy 23, no. 4: 389. https://doi.org/10.3390/e23040389

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