# Decisions and Coordination of Green Supply Chain Considering Big Data Targeted Advertising

^{*}

*J. Theor. Appl. Electron. Commer. Res.*

**2022**,

*17*(3), 1035-1056; https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer17030053

## Abstract

**:**

## 1. Introduction

- (1)
- In the green supply chain where the online retailer conducts big data targeted advertising, what are the optimal decisions for the manufacturer and the online retailer?
- (2)
- What influence will the model parameters have on the equilibrium results of the green supply chain?
- (3)
- Can the zero wholesale price-side-payment contract and the greedy wholesale price-side-payment contract help to achieve the coordination of the green supply chain?

## 2. Literature Review

#### 2.1. Decisions of the Green Supply Chain

#### 2.2. Coordination of the Green Supply Chain

#### 2.3. Application of Big Data Targeted Advertising in the Supply Chain

## 3. Problem Description and Model Construction

## 4. Model Analysis

#### 4.1. Centralized Model

**Theorem**

**1.**

**Proposition**

**1.**

- (1)
- $\frac{\partial {g}^{c}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {v}^{c}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {p}^{c}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {Q}^{c}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{sc}{}^{c}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial E{B}^{c}}{\partial \lambda}>0$.
- (2)
- $\frac{\partial {g}^{c}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {v}^{c}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {p}^{c}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {Q}^{c}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{sc}{}^{c}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial E{B}^{c}}{\partial \beta}>0$.
- (3)
- $\frac{\partial {g}^{c}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {v}^{c}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {p}^{c}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {Q}^{c}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{sc}{}^{c}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial E{B}^{c}}{\partial e}>0$.

#### 4.2. Online-Retailer-Led Model

#### 4.2.1. Online-Retailer-Led Decentralized Model

**Theorem**

**2.**

**Proposition**

**2.**

- (1)
- $\frac{\partial {g}^{r}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\omega}^{r}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {v}^{r}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {p}^{r}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {Q}^{r}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{m}{}^{r}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{r}{}^{r}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{sc}{}^{r}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial E{B}^{r}}{\partial \lambda}>0$.
- (2)
- $\frac{\partial {g}^{r}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\omega}^{r}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {v}^{r}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {p}^{r}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {Q}^{r}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{m}{}^{r}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{r}{}^{r}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{sc}{}^{r}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial E{B}^{r}}{\partial \beta}>0$.
- (3)
- $\frac{\partial {g}^{r}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\omega}^{r}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {v}^{r}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {p}^{r}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {Q}^{r}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{m}{}^{r}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{r}{}^{r}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{sc}{}^{r}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial E{B}^{r}}{\partial e}>0$.

**Proposition**

**3.**

- (1)
- ${g}^{c}>{g}^{r}$,${v}^{c}>{v}^{r}$,${Q}^{c}>{Q}^{r}$,${\pi}_{sc}{}^{c}>{\pi}_{sc}{}^{r}$,$E{B}^{c}>E{B}^{r}$.
- (2)
- When${\beta}^{2}h{q}_{2}+{e}^{2}k{q}_{2}-kh<0$,${p}^{c}<{p}^{r}$; when${\beta}^{2}h{q}_{2}+{e}^{2}k{q}_{2}-kh>0$,${p}^{c}>{p}^{r}$.

#### 4.2.2. Coordination Model with the Zero Wholesale Price-Side-Payment Contract

**Proposition**

**4.**

#### 4.3. Manufacturer-Led Model

#### 4.3.1. Manufacturer-Led Decentralized Model

**Theorem**

**3.**

**Proposition**

**5.**

- (1)
- $\frac{\partial {g}^{m}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\omega}^{m}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {v}^{m}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {p}^{m}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {Q}^{m}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{m}{}^{m}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{r}{}^{m}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{sc}{}^{m}}{\partial \lambda}>0$,$\frac{\partial E{B}^{m}}{\partial \lambda}>$ 0.
- (2)
- $\frac{\partial {g}^{m}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\omega}^{m}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {v}^{m}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {p}^{m}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {Q}^{m}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{m}{}^{m}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{r}{}^{m}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{sc}{}^{m}}{\partial \beta}>0$,$\frac{\partial E{B}^{m}}{\partial \beta}>0$.
- (3)
- $\frac{\partial {g}^{m}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\omega}^{m}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {v}^{m}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {p}^{m}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {Q}^{m}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{m}{}^{m}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{r}{}^{m}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial {\pi}_{sc}{}^{m}}{\partial e}>0$,$\frac{\partial E{B}^{m}}{\partial e}>0$.

**Proposition**

**6.**

- (1)
- ${g}^{c}>{g}^{m}$,${v}^{c}>{v}^{m}$,${Q}^{c}>{Q}^{m}$,${\pi}_{sc}{}^{c}>{\pi}_{sc}{}^{m}$,$E{B}^{c}>E{B}^{m}$.
- (2)
- When${\beta}^{2}h{q}_{2}+{e}^{2}k{q}_{2}-kh<0$,${p}^{c}<{p}^{m}$; when${\beta}^{2}h{q}_{2}+{e}^{2}k{q}_{2}-kh>0$,${p}^{c}>{p}^{m}$.

#### 4.3.2. Coordination Model with the Greedy Wholesale Price-Side-Payment Contract

**Proposition**

**7.**

## 5. Numerical Analysis

#### 5.1. Impact of Model Parameters

#### 5.2. Coordination Contract

## 6. Conclusions

- (1)
- Manufacturers must correctly understand the real product needs of consumers and actively carry out product improvements and green investment. Online retailers must meet consumer service needs and improve consumer satisfaction. As a result, the increase in the attenuation coefficient of known information consumers is promoted, and the withdrawal of consumers is inhibited.
- (2)
- In order to increase the green sensitivity of consumers, both manufacturers and online retailers must actively promote green products to create a new fashion for green consumption. In reality, the environmental awareness of consumers is constantly increasing, which is very important for the development of the green supply chain.
- (3)
- When big data targeted advertisements are delivered, online retailers should optimize the content of the targeted advertisements and adopt quick response strategies, such as issuing coupons to potential consumers waiting for conversion. As a result, the increase in the sensitivity coefficient of big data targeted advertising and the conversion rate of potential consumers is improved.
- (4)
- Whether it is an online-retailer-led green supply chain or a manufacturer-led green supply chain, manufacturers and online retailers should trust each other, agree on a fixed payment fee acceptable to both parties, and coordinate the green supply chain by adopting a zero wholesale price-side-payment contract or a greedy wholesale price-side-payment contract. The application of the contract ensures that both parties can obtain more profits and the green supply chain can obtain higher environmental benefits.

## Author Contributions

## Funding

## Institutional Review Board Statement

## Informed Consent Statement

## Data Availability Statement

## Acknowledgments

## Conflicts of Interest

## Appendix A

#### Appendix A.1. The Proof of Theorem 1

#### Appendix A.2. The Proof of Proposition 1

#### Appendix A.3. The Proof of Theorem 2

#### Appendix A.4. The Proof of Proposition 2

#### Appendix A.5. The Proof of Proposition 3

#### Appendix A.6. The Proof of Theorem 3

#### Appendix A.7. The Proof of Proposition 5

#### Appendix A.8. The Proof of Proposition 6

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**Figure 2.**Decisions, demand, profits, and environmental benefit change with $\lambda $. (

**a**) Greenness and targeted advertising intensity change with λ. (

**b**) Prices change with $\lambda $. (

**c**) Demand and environmental benefit change with $\lambda $. (

**d**) Profits change with $\lambda $.

**Figure 3.**Decisions, demand, profits, and environmental benefit change with $\beta $. (

**a**) Greenness and targeted advertising intensity change with $\beta $. (

**b**) Prices change with $\beta $. (

**c**) Demand and environmental benefit change with $\beta $. (

**d**) Profits change with $\beta $.

**Figure 4.**Decisions, demand, profits, and environmental benefit change with $e$. (

**a**) Greenness and targeted advertising intensity change with $e$. (

**b**) Prices change with $e$. (

**c**) Demand and environmental benefit change with $e$. (

**d**) Profits change with $e$.

Notations | Descriptions |
---|---|

$\omega $ | Wholesale price |

$p$ | Retail price |

$g$ | Greenness |

$v$ | Big data targeted advertising intensity |

${q}_{1}$ | Demand of known information consumers |

$\lambda $ | Demand attenuation coefficient of known information consumers |

${q}_{2}$ | Demand of potential consumers |

$r$ | $\mathrm{Conversion}\mathrm{rate}\mathrm{of}\mathrm{potential}\mathrm{consumers}(0r1)$ |

$\beta $ | Green sensitivity coefficient of potential consumers |

$e$ | Big data targeted advertising sensitivity coefficient of potential consumers |

$B$ | Big data targeted advertising investment |

$h$ | The investment cost coefficient of big data targeted advertising |

$T$ | Green investment |

$k$ | Green investment cost coefficient |

$Q$ | Total consumer demand |

${\pi}_{m}$ | Manufacturer’s profit |

${\pi}_{r}$ | Online retailer’s profit |

${\pi}_{sc}$ | Supply chain’s profit |

$EB$ | Environmental benefit |

$\mathit{X}$ | ${\mathit{\pi}}_{\mathit{m}}{}^{\mathit{r}}$ | ${\mathit{\pi}}_{\mathit{m}}{}^{\mathit{z}\mathit{s}}$ | ${\mathit{\pi}}_{\mathit{r}}{}^{\mathit{r}}$ | ${\mathit{\pi}}_{\mathit{r}}{}^{\mathit{z}\mathit{s}}$ | ${\mathit{\pi}}_{\mathit{s}\mathit{c}}{}^{\mathit{c}}$ | ${\mathit{\pi}}_{\mathit{s}\mathit{c}}{}^{\mathit{z}\mathit{s}}$ |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

147,838.52 | 3838.52 | 3838.52 | 5019.61 | 17,494.81 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

149,917.72 | 3838.52 | 5917.72 | 5019.61 | 15,415.61 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

151,996.92 | 3838.52 | 7996.92 | 5019.61 | 13,336.41 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

154,076.12 | 3838.52 | 10,076.12 | 5019.61 | 11,257.21 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

156,155.32 | 3838.52 | 12,155.32 | 5019.61 | 9178.01 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

158,234.52 | 3838.52 | 14,234.52 | 5019.61 | 7098.81 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

160,313.72 | 3838.52 | 16,313.72 | 5019.61 | 5019.61 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

$\mathit{Y}$ | ${\mathit{\pi}}_{\mathit{m}}{}^{\mathit{m}}$ | ${\mathit{\pi}}_{\mathit{m}}{}^{\mathit{g}\mathit{s}}$ | ${\mathit{\pi}}_{\mathit{r}}{}^{\mathit{m}}$ | ${\mathit{\pi}}_{\mathit{r}}{}^{\mathit{g}\mathit{s}}$ | ${\mathit{\pi}}_{\mathit{s}\mathit{c}}{}^{\mathit{c}}$ | ${\mathit{\pi}}_{\mathit{s}\mathit{c}}{}^{\mathit{g}\mathit{s}}$ |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

50,159.46 | 2438.10 | 19,173.87 | 2159.46 | 2159.46 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

52,948.76 | 2438.10 | 16,384.57 | 2159.46 | 4948.76 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

55,738.06 | 2438.10 | 13,595.27 | 2159.46 | 7738.06 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

58,527.36 | 2438.10 | 10,805.97 | 2159.46 | 10,527.36 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

61,316.66 | 2438.10 | 8016.67 | 2159.46 | 13,316.66 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

64,105.96 | 2438.10 | 5227.37 | 2159.46 | 16,105.96 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

66,895.23 | 2438.10 | 2438.10 | 2159.46 | 18,895.23 | 21,333.33 | 21,333.33 |

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## Share and Cite

**MDPI and ACS Style**

Hu, H.; Li, Y.; Li, M.
Decisions and Coordination of Green Supply Chain Considering Big Data Targeted Advertising. *J. Theor. Appl. Electron. Commer. Res.* **2022**, *17*, 1035-1056.
https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer17030053

**AMA Style**

Hu H, Li Y, Li M.
Decisions and Coordination of Green Supply Chain Considering Big Data Targeted Advertising. *Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research*. 2022; 17(3):1035-1056.
https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer17030053

**Chicago/Turabian Style**

Hu, Haiju, Yakun Li, and Mengdi Li.
2022. "Decisions and Coordination of Green Supply Chain Considering Big Data Targeted Advertising" *Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research* 17, no. 3: 1035-1056.
https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer17030053