Search Results (7)

This study analyses the emotional communication strategies employed by far-right party leaders on TikTok during the 2024 European elections, focusing on their appeal to voters. Combining quantitative and qualitative content analysis of 472 videos from 27 leaders in 24 countries, the research examines the dominant emotions, themes, stylistic resources, and their impact on engagement. The results reveal a dual strategy that combines positive emotions such as hope and ambition, which generate the highest levels of engagement, with negative emotions such as fear and uncertainty, which emphasise crisis narratives. Leaders who balance optimism with polarising narratives show greater resonance, particularly with audiences. The findings underscore the growing role of TikTok in far-right political communication and demonstrate its effectiveness in mobilising emotional engagement among young people. Despite limitations, the study highlights the sophistication of emotional strategies in digital political communication and provides insights into how far-right leaders use TikTok to influence voter behaviour. Full article

The present study concentrates predominantly on the statement that the voter is influenced by and consumes the political communication marketing formed through political structures, content which is partially created based on the political matters of a country. Consequently, this study is founded upon the point that voting actions reflect what kind of content voters consume; therefore, the elector is the potential customer of the “electoral marketplace”. Accordingly, the primary goal of this study is to explain the effect that the political marketing of various parties might have on voters’ behaviour. Correspondingly, we introduce the framework of the planned research; identify the vital research principles; and clarify the intentions of the study and the required theoretical background, together with the data gathering and analysis methods used at this stage for the implementation of the envisaged project. In this context, primary research has been conducted quantitatively, the conclusions of which confirm the presence of the relationship outlined above. In conclusion, this research demonstrates that there is a certain correlation between broader political marketing and electoral perceptions. According to the survey results, we conclude that there is a positive linear correlation between the values of all four elements of the marketing mix, which is statistically significant. We found that there are three different levels of correlation between the pairs of the political marketing mix. Accordingly, it appears that there is a stronger correlation between Price and Product and between Place and Promotion, respectively, while there is a slightly weaker correlation between Place and Product and Promotion and Product. At the same time, there is an even weaker but still positive and statistically significant correlation between Promotion and Price and Price and Place, respectively. In addition, “Promotion” falls behind the rest of the elements of political marketing, a fact that partially confirms the given picture with regard to political marketing and considers “Promotion”, and thus the actual political/pre-election campaign, to be less influential compared to other components of the political marketing mix (Product, Place, and Price), which, according to the specific results, appear to influence, indirectly but more strongly, the voting choices of Cypriots. Full article

Modelling the epidemic’s spread on multiplex networks, considering complex human behaviours, has recently gained the attention of many scientists. In this work, we study the interplay between epidemic spreading and opinion dynamics on multiplex networks. An agent in the epidemic layer could remain in one of five distinct states, resulting in the SIRQD model. The agent’s attitude towards respecting the restrictions of the pandemic plays a crucial role in its prevalence. In our model, the agent’s point of view could be altered by either conformism mechanism, social pressure, or independent actions. As the underlying opinion model, we leverage the q-voter model. The entire system constitutes a coupled opinion–dynamic model where two distinct processes occur. The question arises of how to properly align these dynamics, i.e., whether they should possess equal or disparate timescales. This paper highlights the impact of different timescales of opinion dynamics on epidemic spreading, focusing on the time and the infection’s peak. Full article

The world is changing under the pressure of environmental and health crises, and in this context, location choice and political choice become of even more poignant importance. Following a Culture-Based Development (CBD) stand, our paper highlights the link between political voting and the cultural and ecological valuation of a place. We start from the premise that the individual utility functions of the urban inhabitant and the urban voter coincide, since they both express the citizen’s satisfaction with the life in a place. We suggest that the unified citizen’s utility function is driven by a trade-off between the availability of virtual and physical spaces for interaction. We expect that this trade-off can lead to dissatisfaction with the place and consequent political discontent if the incumbents’ access to green areas and artistic environment in a place is simultaneously hampered for a long time. Our operational hypothesis is that the political sensitivity of citizens is related to the local availability of green areas (geographies of flowers) and cultural capital endowments (geographies of flower power). Using individual-level data from the WVS from the period close before the pandemic—2017–2020, we test empirically this hypothesis. We use as an outcome of interest the individual propensity to active political behaviour. We explain this propensity through the geographies of flowers (i.e., green areas) and geographies of flower power (i.e., cultural and creative industries). We compare the effects for urban and for rural areas. We find strong dependence of politically proactive behaviour on the geographies of flowers and geographies of flower power, with explicit prominence in urban areas. We find a more pronounced effect of these two geographies on the utility function of incumbent than migrant residents. We also crosscheck empirically the relationship of this CBD mechanism on an aggregate level, using data from the Cultural and Creative Cities Monitor. The findings confirm the Schelling magnifying effect of micro preferences on a macro level. Full article

The high effectiveness of a vaccination-promotion campaign, which may be measured by the number of those successfully convinced to get vaccinated, is a key factor in combating the COVID-19 pandemic. This, however, appears to be linked to the precise identification of the underlying causes for vaccine hesitancy behaviours. Based on a regression model (adjusted R² of 0.78) analysing 378 sub-regions of Poland, we showed that such behaviours, even when going against the party agenda, can be indirectly yet precisely gauged predominantly through voting patterns. Additionally, education and population density were found to be positively related to low vaccine hesitancy, while markers of social exclusion, both external (employment rate) and psychological (voter turnout) ones, affected it negatively. In the second, follow-up part of our study, which analyses the changes that took place in two months (adjusted R² of 0.53), we found a further increase in vaccination rate to be positively related to the number of those already vaccinated and to the political views of the population, and negatively related to its level of education. In both cases, there was a surprisingly weak relationship between the potential markers of accessibility and vaccination rate. In spite of the known overall differences in vaccination rates for different age and sex groups, these variables did not have any additional informative value in explaining the observed regional differences. Full article

We analyse the role of personality traits along with individuals’ cooperative behaviour, level of trust in the UK government and the European Council (EC, the body that defines the European Union’s overall political direction and priorities) and socio-demographics on UK citizens’ voting choices on the 2016 Brexit referendum. We use data from a survey conducted in April 2019 on 530 UK citizens who voted in the 2016 Brexit referendum. We use a Probit model to investigate what role voters’ personality traits, their trust in government institutions, their level of cooperative behaviour and socio-demographics played in the way they voted. We find voters’ choice was associated voters’ personality traits. In particular, voters associated with being extraverted, acting with self-confidence and outspokenness (i.e., agency), and voters’ closeness to experience, to forming part of a diverse community and the exchange of ideas and experiences were found to be associated with voting for Brexit in the 2016 referendum. We found that voters’ willingness to cooperate with others was associated with being less likely to vote for Brexit. In addition, voters who trusted the UK government were more likely to vote for Brexit, whereas voters trusting the EC were more likely to vote for the UK to stay in the EU. We also found that voters with relatively high level of education were less likely to vote for Brexit and voters not seeking jobs were more likely to vote for Brexit than students, unemployed and retired. We conclude that incorporating personality profiles of voters, their pro-social behaviour as well as their views on trust in politicians/government institutions, along with socio-demographic variables, into individuals’ vote choice analysis can account for voter heterogeneity and provide a more complete picture of an individual’s vote choice decisions, helping to gain a better understanding of individual vote choices (e.g., better predictions of future individual vote intentions). Full article

Since the 2008 global financial crisis, Britain’s young people have been disproportionately affected by policies of welfare retrenchment. Youth disillusionment with austerity has been cited as a reason for the youthquake witnessed in the 2017 General Election, where the Labour Party’s better-than-expected performance resulted in the loss of the ruling Conservative Party government’s parliamentary majority. The degree of one-party dominance among younger voters was unprecedented, with Labour’s aggressively pro-youth agenda paying dividends. However, this paper takes the attention away from voting behaviour and towards non-electoral forms of youth political participation in the UK. What are the strongest predictors of non-electoral political participation among young British people? Three possible predictors are explored: educational attainment, level of trust in politicians, and party identification. Three forms of non-electoral participation are considered: signing a petition, taking part in a boycott and sharing political messages on social media. Using a bespoke representative survey commissioned by Hope Not Hate, this paper finds that educational attainment does not have a particularly strong effect on non-electoral participation, with Labour Party identification being significantly associated with all three forms. A strong relationship is also discovered between identifying with a ‘minor party’ and non-electoral political participation among Britain’s young people. Full article